בבא מציעא סא

בבא מציעא סא

אִם אֵינוֹ עִנְיָן לְנֶשֶׁךְ כֶּסֶף, שֶׁהֲרֵי כְּבָר נֶאֱמַר ״לֹא תַשִּׁיךְ לְאָחִיךָ״, תְּנֵהוּ עִנְיָן לְרִבִּית כֶּסֶף.

If the verse is not referring to the matter of neshekh with money, as it is already stated in that same verse: “You shall not lend with interest [tashikh] to your brother,” indicating that taking money as interest is prohibited, apply the expression “neshekh of money” to the matter of ribit, i.e., tarbit with money.

אֵין לִי אֶלָּא בְּלֹוֶה, בְּמַלְוֶה מִנַּיִן?

The baraita continues: I have derived a source for this prohibition only with regard to a borrower, for whom it is prohibited to pay interest on a loan. From where is it derived that there is also a prohibition stated with regard to a lender?

נֶאֱמַר נֶשֶׁךְ בַּלֹּוֶה וְנֶאֱמַר נֶשֶׁךְ בַּמַּלְוֶה. מָה נֶשֶׁךְ הָאָמוּר בַּלֹּוֶה – לֹא חִלַּקְתָּ בּוֹ בֵּין בְּכֶסֶף בֵּין בְּאוֹכֶל בֵּין בְּנֶשֶׁךְ בֵּין בְּרִבִּית, אַף נֶשֶׁךְ הָאָמוּר בַּמַּלְוֶה – לֹא תַּחְלוֹק בּוֹ בֵּין בְּכֶסֶף בֵּין בְּאוֹכֶל בֵּין בְּנֶשֶׁךְ בֵּין בְּרִבִּית. מִנַּיִן לְרַבּוֹת כׇּל דָּבָר? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״נֶשֶׁךְ כׇּל דָּבָר אֲשֶׁר יִשָּׁךְ״.

The baraita answers: Neshekh is stated with regard to a borrower, and neshekh is stated with regard to a lender. Just as concerning neshekh that is stated with regard to a borrower, you did not distinguish with regard to it between a loan of money and a loan of food, or between whether the interest is forbidden as neshekh or as ribit, so too, concerning neshekh stated with regard to a lender, do not distinguish with regard to it between a loan of money and a loan of food, or between whether the interest is forbidden as neshekh or as ribit. The baraita concludes: From where is it derived to include in the prohibition interest of any sort? The verse states: “Neshekh of anything that is lent with interest.”

רָבִינָא אָמַר: לָא נֶשֶׁךְ בְּאוֹכֶל וְלָא רִבִּית בְּכֶסֶף צְרִיכִי קְרָא, דְּאִי כְּתִיב ״אֶת כַּסְפְּךָ לֹא תִתֵּן לוֹ בְּנֶשֶׁךְ וְאׇכְלְךָ בְּמַרְבִּית״ – כִּדְקָאָמְרַתְּ. הַשְׁתָּא דִּכְתִיב ״אֶת כַּסְפְּךָ לֹא תִתֵּן לוֹ בְּנֶשֶׁךְ וּבְמַרְבִּית לֹא תִתֵּן אׇכְלֶךָ״, קְרִי בֵּיהּ הָכִי: ״אֶת כַּסְפְּךָ לֹא תִתֵּן לוֹ בְּנֶשֶׁךְ וּבְמַרְבִּית״, ״וּבְנֶשֶׁךְ וּבְמַרְבִּית לֹא תִתֵּן אׇכְלֶךָ״.

Ravina said: An explicit verse is not required, neither to derive neshekh of food nor to derive ribit of money. As, if it were written: You shall not give him your money with neshekh and your food with marbit, juxtaposing neshekh with money alone and marbit with food alone, it would be as you say, that there is a need for the derivation of the baraita. But now that it is written: “You shall not give him your money with neshekh and with marbit you shall not give him your food,” interposing both neshekh and marbit between money and food, read into the verse this interpretation: Your money you shall not give him for neshekh and for marbit; and for neshekh and for marbit you shall not give your food.

וְהָא תַּנָּא ״נֶאֱמַר״ ״נֶאֱמַר״ קָאָמַר!

The Gemara asks: But isn’t the tanna of the baraita saying that neshekh of food and tarbit of money are derived by means of a verbal analogy: Neshekh is stated with regard to a borrower, and neshekh is also stated with regard to a lender? How can Ravina, an amora, state that the verbal analogy is not needed?

הָכִי קָאָמַר: אִילּוּ לֹא נֶאֱמַר קְרָא, הָיִיתִי אוֹמֵר גְּזֵירָה שָׁוָה. עַכְשָׁיו שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר קְרָא, גְּזֵירָה שָׁוָה לָא צְרִיךְ. אֶלָּא גְּזֵירָה שָׁוָה לְמָה לִי? לְ״נֶשֶׁךְ כׇּל דָּבָר אֲשֶׁר יִשָּׁךְ״, דְּלָא כְּתִב בְּמַלְוֶה.

The Gemara answers: This is what Ravina is saying: Had the verse not stated the terms neshekh and tarbit interposed between money and food, I would have said that the halakha that both terms apply to both money and food would be derived by means of a verbal analogy. Now, as the verse is stated in that manner, a verbal analogy is not necessary. The Gemara asks: Rather, why do I need this verbal analogy? The Gemara explains: I need the verbal analogy to teach that “neshekh of anything that is lent for interest” (Deuteronomy 23:20), which is written with regard to a borrower but not written with regard to a lender, applies to a lender as well.

אָמַר רָבָא: לְמָה לִי דִּכְתַב רַחֲמָנָא לָאו בְּרִבִּית, לָאו בְּגָזֵל, לָאו בְּאוֹנָאָה?

§ Rava said: Why do I need it to be that the Merciful One writes a prohibition with regard to interest, a prohibition with regard to robbery (see Leviticus 19:13), and a prohibition with regard to exploitation (see Leviticus 25:14), a transaction where one of the parties overcharged or underpaid? There appears to be one principle underlying all three prohibitions: One must not take possession of another’s money in illegitimate ways.

צְרִיכִי, דְּאִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא לָאו בְּרִבִּית – מִשּׁוּם דְּחִידּוּשׁ הוּא, דַּאֲפִילּוּ בְּלֹוֶה אָסְרָה רַחֲמָנָא.

The Gemara explains: They are necessary. As, had the Merciful One written the prohibition only with regard to interest, one could not have derived the other prohibitions from it because it is a prohibition with a novel element that does not appear in other halakhot. This novel element is that the Merciful One prohibited a loan with interest even for the borrower. With regard to the two other prohibitions, there is a prohibition against taking another’s money, but there is no prohibition for the victim, who has his money taken.

וְאִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא לָאו בְּגָזֵל – מִשּׁוּם דִּבְעַל כֻּרְחֵיהּ, אֲבָל אוֹנָאָה – אֵימָא לָא.

And had the Merciful One written the prohibition only with regard to robbery, one could not have derived the other prohibitions from it, as perhaps robbery is prohibited only due to the fact that it is an action taken against the will of the victim. But in the cases of exploitation and interest, where there is an element of consent, one would say they are not prohibited.

וְאִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא לָאו בְּאוֹנָאָה, מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא יָדַע דְּמָחֵיל.

And had the Merciful One written the prohibition only with regard to exploitation, one could not have derived the other prohibitions from it, as perhaps exploitation is prohibited only due to the fact that the victim does not know that he was the victim of exploitation and therefore cannot waive repayment. In the cases of interest and robbery, the borrower and the victim, respectively, are aware that their money was taken and waiving repayment is possible, so perhaps those actions are not prohibited.

חֲדָא מֵחֲדָא לָא אָתְיָא. תֵּיתֵי חֲדָא מִתַּרְתֵּי. הֵי תֵּיתֵי? לָא לִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא לָאו בְּרִבִּית, וְתֵיתֵי מֵהָנָךְ. מָה לְהָנָךְ שֶׁכֵּן שֶׁלֹּא מִדַּעַת, תֹּאמַר בְּרִבִּית דְּמִדַּעְתֵּיהּ.

The Gemara suggests: Although no one of these prohibitions can be derived from one of the other prohibitions, perhaps one of them can be derived from the other two. The Gemara clarifies: Which prohibition will you derive from the other two? Let the Merciful One not write the prohibition with regard to interest, and instead derive that prohibition from these two, robbery and exploitation. The Gemara rejects that suggestion: What is notable about these prohibitions? They are notable in that they are transgressed without the consent of the victim. Will you say the same with regard to interest, which the borrower gives with his consent, as he agrees to accept the loan under those conditions?

לָא לִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא לָאו בְּאוֹנָאָה, וְתֵיתֵי מֵהָנָךְ. מָה לְהָנָךְ, שֶׁכֵּן אֵין דֶּרֶךְ מִקָּח וּמִמְכָּר בְּכָךְ.

The Gemara suggests: Let the Merciful One not write the prohibition with regard to exploitation, and instead derive that prohibition from these two, robbery and interest. The Gemara rejects that suggestion: What is notable about these prohibitions? They are notable in that they are not transgressed in the typical manner of buying and selling. Will you say the same with regard to exploitation, which is transgressed in the context of typical buying and selling?

אֶלָּא לָא לִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא לָאו בְּגָזֵל, וְתֵיתֵי מֵהָנָךְ. דְּמַאי פָּרְכַתְּ: מָה לְרִבִּית שֶׁכֵּן חִידּוּשׁ? אוֹנָאָה תּוֹכִיחַ!

Rather, let the Merciful One not write the prohibition with regard to robbery, and instead derive that prohibition from these two, interest and exploitation. As what refutation will you offer? If you say: What is notable about interest? It is notable in that the prohibition of interest contains a novel element; the case of exploitation will prove that a novel element is not a factor, as the prohibition against exploitation contains no novel element.

מָה לְאוֹנָאָה שֶׁכֵּן לָא יָדַע וּמָחֵיל? רִבִּית תּוֹכִיחַ!

If you say, what is notable about exploitation? It is notable in that in this case, the victim does not know that he was the victim of exploitation and therefore he cannot waive repayment; the case of interest will prove that the inability to waive repayment is not a factor, as the borrower is aware of the interest and able to waive repayment.

וְחָזַר הַדִּין: לֹא רְאִי זֶה כִּרְאִי זֶה, וְלֹא רְאִי זֶה כִּרְאִי זֶה. הַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן, שֶׁכֵּן גּוֹזְלוֹ. אַף אֲנִי אָבִיא גָּזֵל!

The Gemara comments: And the inference has reverted to its starting point. The aspect of this case, interest, is not like the aspect of that case, exploitation, and the aspect of that case, exploitation, is not like the aspect of this case, interest. Their common denominator is that one robs another of money, i.e., takes money from another that is not due to him. I will also bring the prohibition against robbery, which shares that common denominator, and derive it from the other two prohibitions.

אָמְרִי: הָכִי נָמֵי. אֶלָּא, לָאו בְּגָזֵל לְמָה לִי? לְכוֹבֵשׁ שְׂכַר שָׂכִיר.

The Sages said: Indeed, the prohibition against robbery is superfluous. But if the prohibition against robbery can be derived from the prohibitions against interest and exploitation, why do I need the prohibition written in the Torah with regard to robbery? The Gemara answers: That verse is not written to prohibit a standard case of robbery; rather, it serves to prohibit the action of one who withholds the wages of a hired laborer. In that case, unlike robbery, the employer does not take money from the laborer; he merely fails to pay him his wages.

כּוֹבֵשׁ שְׂכַר שָׂכִיר, בְּהֶדְיָא כְּתִיב בֵּיהּ ״לֹא תַעֲשֹׁק שָׂכִיר עָנִי וְאֶבְיוֹן״! לַעֲבוֹר עָלָיו בִּשְׁנֵי לָאוִין.

The Gemara challenges: With regard to one who withholds the wages of a hired laborer, it is explicitly written: “You shall not oppress a hired laborer who is poor and destitute” (Deuteronomy 24:14). There is no need to derive this prohibition from the verse concerning robbery. The Gemara answers: It is written so that withholding the wages of a hired laborer always involves violating two prohibitions.

וְלוֹקְמַהּ בְּרִבִּית וְאוֹנָאָה, וְלַעֲבוֹר עָלָיו בִּשְׁנֵי לָאוִין? דָּבָר הַלָּמֵד מֵעִנְיָינוֹ,

The Gemara asks: But let us interpret the verse concerning robbery as prohibiting interest or exploitation, and say that it is written so that these prohibitions always involve violating two prohibitions. The Gemara answers: The prohibition against robbery is applied to the case of withholding the wages of a hired laborer because it is a matter derived from its context,

וּבְעִנְיָינָא דְּשָׂכִיר כְּתִיב.

and this prohibition is written in the context of the matter of a hired laborer: “You shall not oppress your neighbor, nor rob him, and the wages of a hired servant shall not abide with you all night until the morning” (Leviticus 19:13).

״לֹא תִּגְנֹבוּ״ דִּכְתַב רַחֲמָנָא לְמָה לִי? לְכִדְתַנְיָא: לֹא תִּגְנֹב – עַל מְנָת לְמֵיקַט, לֹא תִּגְנֹב – עַל מְנָת לְשַׁלֵּם תַּשְׁלוּמֵי כֶפֶל.

The Gemara asks: Why do I need the prohibition: “You shall not steal” (Leviticus 19:11), that the Merciful One wrote? This is yet another prohibition against taking money by illegitimate means, and it could be derived from the other prohibitions mentioned previously. The Gemara answers that it is necessary for the Merciful One to write that prohibition for that which is taught in a baraita: “You shall not steal” applies in all circumstances, even if you do so only in order to aggravate the victim; “you shall not steal” applies in all circumstances, even if you do so in order to pay the double payment as a gift to the person from whom you stole.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב יֵימַר לְרַב אָשֵׁי: לָאו דִּכְתַב רַחֲמָנָא בְּמִשְׁקָלוֹת, לְמָה לִי? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לְטוֹמֵן מִשְׁקְלוֹתָיו בְּמֶלַח. הַיְינוּ גָּזֵל מְעַלְּיָא הוּא! לַעֲבוֹר עָלָיו מִשְּׁעַת עֲשִׂיָּיה.

Rav Yeimar said to Rav Ashi: Why do I need the prohibition that the Merciful One wrote with regard to weights: “You shall do no unrighteousness in judgment, in measure, in weight, or in volume” (Leviticus 19:35)? It is merely another form of robbery. Rav Ashi said to him: It is referring to a seller who buries his weights in salt, in order to lighten them. Rav Yeimar said: That is the same as full-fledged robbery; therefore, it should not require a separate derivation. Rav Ashi answered: It is written to establish that he violates the prohibition from the moment of the act of burying them. He violates the prohibition even before he actually deceives a buyer with the buried weights.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״לֹא תַעֲשׂוּ עָוֶל בַּמִּשְׁפָּט בַּמִּדָּה בַּמִּשְׁקָל וּבַמְּשׂוּרָה״. ״בַּמִּדָּה״ – זוֹ מְדִידַת קַרְקַע, שֶׁלֹּא יִמְדּוֹד לְאֶחָד בִּימוֹת הַחַמָּה וּלְאֶחָד בִּימוֹת הַגְּשָׁמִים. ״בַּמִּשְׁקָל״ – שֶׁלֹּא יַטְמִין מִשְׁקְלוֹתָיו בְּמֶלַח. ״וּבַמְּשׂוּרָה״ – שֶׁלֹּא יַרְתִּיחַ.

The Sages taught: The verse states: “You shall do no unrighteousness in judgment, in measure, in weight, or in volume [uvamesura]” (Leviticus 19:35). “In measure”; this is referring to the measurement of land, e.g., this means that in a case where two people are dividing their jointly owned field, one may not measure the land to be given to one during the summer and measure the land to be given to the other during the rainy season, because the length of the measuring cord is affected by the weather conditions. “In weight”; this is referring to the fact that he may not bury his measuring weights in salt. And “in volume”; this teaches that one may not froth the liquid one is selling, creating the impression that there is more liquid in the vessel than there actually is.

וַהֲלֹא דְּבָרִים קַל וְחוֹמֶר: וּמָה מְשׂוּרָה שֶׁהִיא אֶחָד מִשְּׁלֹשִׁים וּשְׁלֹשָׁה בַּלּוֹג הִקְפִּידָה עָלָיו תּוֹרָה – קַל וְחוֹמֶר לְהִין, וַחֲצִי הִין, וּשְׁלִישִׁית הִין, וּרְבִיעִית הַהִין, וְלוֹג, וַחֲצִי לוֹג, וּרְבִיעִית הַלּוֹג.

The Gemara adds: And are the following matters not inferred a fortiori: And if with regard to the mesura volume, which equals one thirty–third of a log, the Torah was fastidious concerning it that one may not deceive another, it can be inferred a fortiori that with regard to a hin, which equals twelve log, and a half-hin, and a third-hin, and a quarter-hin, and a log, and a half-log, and a quarter-log, which are all much larger volumes, that one may not deceive another.

אָמַר רָבָא: לְמָה לִי דִּכְתַב רַחֲמָנָא יְצִיאַת מִצְרַיִם בְּרִבִּית, יְצִיאַת מִצְרַיִם גַּבֵּי צִיצִית, יְצִיאַת מִצְרַיִם בְּמִשְׁקָלוֹת?

§ Rava says: Why do I need the mention of the exodus from Egypt that the Merciful One wrote in the context of the halakhot of the prohibition against interest (see Leviticus 25:37–38), and the mention of the exodus from Egypt with regard to the mitzva to wear ritual fringes (see Numbers 15:39–41), and the mention of the exodus from Egypt in the context of the prohibition concerning weights (see Leviticus 19:35–36)?

אָמַר הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא: אֲנִי הוּא שֶׁהִבְחַנְתִּי בְּמִצְרַיִם בֵּין טִפָּה שֶׁל בְּכוֹר לְטִפָּה שֶׁאֵינָהּ שֶׁל בְּכוֹר, אֲנִי הוּא שֶׁעָתִיד לִיפָּרַע מִמִּי שֶׁתּוֹלֶה מְעוֹתָיו בְּגוֹי וּמַלְוָה אוֹתָם לְיִשְׂרָאֵל בְּרִבִּית, וּמִמִּי שֶׁטּוֹמֵן מִשְׁקְלוֹתָיו בְּמֶלַח, וּמִמִּי שֶׁתּוֹלֶה קָלָא אִילָן בְּבִגְדוֹ וְאוֹמֵר: ״תְּכֵלֶת הוּא״.

Rava explains: The Holy One, Blessed be He, said: I am He Who distinguished in Egypt between the drop of seed that became a firstborn and the drop of seed that did not become a firstborn, and I killed only the firstborn. I am also He Who is destined to exact punishment from one who attributes ownership of his money to a gentile and thereby lends it to a Jew with interest. Even if he is successful in deceiving the court, God knows the truth. And I am also He Who is destined to exact punishment from one who buries his weights in salt, as this changes their weight in a manner not visible to the eye. And I am also He Who is destined to exact punishment from one who hangs ritual fringes dyed with indigo [kala ilan] dye on his garment and says it is dyed with the sky-blue dye required in ritual fringes. The allusion to God’s ability to distinguish between two apparently like entities is why the exodus is mentioned in all of these contexts.

רָבִינָא אִיקְּלַע לְסוּרָא דִפְרָת. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב חֲנִינָא מִסּוּרָא דִּפְרָת לְרָבִינָא: יְצִיאַת מִצְרַיִם דִּכְתַב רַחֲמָנָא גַּבֵּי שְׁרָצִים, לְמָה לִי? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אָמַר הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא, אֲנִי הוּא שֶׁהִבְחַנְתִּי בֵּין טִפָּה שֶׁל בְּכוֹר לְטִפָּה שֶׁאֵינָהּ שֶׁל בְּכוֹר, אֲנִי עָתִיד לִיפָּרַע מִמִּי שֶׁמְּעָרֵב קִרְבֵי דָגִים טְמֵאִין בְּקִרְבֵי דָגִים טְהוֹרִין וּמוֹכְרָן לְיִשְׂרָאֵל.

The Gemara relates: Ravina happened to come to Sura on the Euphrates. Rav Ḥanina of Sura on the Euphrates said to Ravina: Why do I need the mention of the exodus from Egypt that the Merciful One wrote in the context of creeping animals: “Do not make yourselves detestable with all the creeping animals that swarm…for I am the Lord Who brings you up from the land of Egypt” (Leviticus 11:43–45)? Ravina said to him: The Holy One, Blessed be He, said: I am He Who distinguished in Egypt between the drop of seed that became a firstborn and the drop of seed that did not become a firstborn, and I killed only the firstborn. I am also He Who is destined to exact punishment from one who intermingles the innards of non-kosher fish with the innards of kosher fish and sells them to a Jew, who is unable to distinguish between them.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֲנָא ״הַמַּעֲלֶה״ קָא קַשְׁיָא לִי, מַאי שְׁנָא הָכָא ״הַמַּעֲלֶה״ דִּכְתַב רַחֲמָנָא?

Rav Ḥanina said to him: I was not asking about the very mention of the exodus. Rather, I was asking about the term “Who brings you up” mentioned in that verse; that is what is difficult for me. What is different here, that the Merciful One wrote: “Who brings you up from the land of Egypt,” as opposed to the other three instances cited by Rava where the exodus is mentioned in the context of mitzvot and prohibitions, where it is written: “Who brought you out”?

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לְכִדְתָנָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל. דְּתָנָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל, אָמַר הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא: אִילְמָלֵא (לֹא) הֶעֱלֵיתִי אֶת יִשְׂרָאֵל מִמִּצְרָיִם אֶלָּא בִּשְׁבִיל דָּבָר זֶה, שֶׁאֵין מְטַמְּאִין בִּשְׁרָצִים – דַּיִּי.

Ravina said to him: It is to teach as it was taught in the school of Rabbi Yishmael. As it was taught in the school of Rabbi Yishmael: The Holy One, Blessed be He, said: Had I brought the Jewish people up from Egypt only for this matter, so that they would not become impure by consuming creeping animals, it would be sufficient for Me, as observance of this mitzva elevates their spiritual stature.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: וּמִי נְפִישׁ אַגְרַיְיהוּ טְפֵי מֵרִבִּית וּמִצִּיצִית וּמִמִּשְׁקָלוֹת? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא נְפִישׁ אַגְרַיְיהוּ טְפֵי, מְאִיסִי לְמֵכְלִינְהוּ.

Rav Ḥanina said to him: And is the reward for abstaining from consuming creeping animals greater than the reward for observing the halakhot with regard to interest and ritual fringes and weights? Let the Merciful One write: Who brings you up, in the context of those mitzvot as well. Ravina said to him: Even though their reward is not greater, it is more repulsive for Jews to eat creeping animals. Avoiding those animals brings them up, in the sense that it is praiseworthy and enhances the transcendent nature of the Jews.

וְאֵיזֶהוּ תַּרְבִּית, הַמַּרְבֶּה בְּפֵירוֹת. כֵּיצַד? לָקַח הֵימֶנּוּ חִטִּים בְּדִינַר זָהָב וְכוּ׳. אַטּוּ כֹּל הָנֵי דְּאָמְרִינַן עַד הַשְׁתָּא, לָאו רִבִּית הוּא?

§ The mishna teaches: And which is tarbit? It is the case of one who enters into a transaction that yields an increase in the produce beyond his investment. How so? For example, a case where one acquired wheat from another at the price of one kor of wheat for one gold dinar, with the wheat to be supplied at a later date, and such was the market price of wheat at the time he acquired it. The price of one kor of wheat then increased and stood at thirty dinars. At that point, the buyer said to the seller: Give me all of my wheat now, as I wish to sell it and purchase wine with it. The seller said to him: Since it is ultimately wine that you want, not wheat, each kor of your wheat is considered by me to be worth thirty dinars, and you have the right to collect its value in wine from me. And in this case, the seller did not have wine in his possession. The Gemara asks: Is that to say that all these cases that we said in the mishna until now are not cases of interest?

אָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ: עַד כָּאן שֶׁל תּוֹרָה, מִכָּאן וְאֵילָךְ שֶׁל דִּבְרֵיהֶם. וְכֵן אָמַר רָבָא: עַד כָּאן שֶׁל תּוֹרָה, מִכָּאן וְאֵילָךְ שֶׁל דִּבְרֵיהֶם.

Rabbi Abbahu says: Until here, i.e., in the first two cases it presents, the mishna is referring to cases of interest by Torah law, and from this point forward the mishna is referring to cases of interest by rabbinic law. If the lender does not explicitly stipulate that the debtor must pay a sum greater than the value of the loan they do not violate the Torah prohibition of interest, but the Sages prohibited doing so. And so says Rava: Until here the mishna is referring to cases of interest by Torah law, and from this point forward the mishna is referring to cases of interest by rabbinic law.

עַד כָּאן – ״יָכִין רָשָׁע וְיִלְבַּשׁ צַדִּיק״. עַד כָּאן, וְתוּ לָא? אֶלָּא, אֲפִילּוּ עַד כָּאן – ״יָכִין רָשָׁע וְיִלְבַּשׁ צַדִּיק״!

The Gemara comments: In the cases in the mishna cited until here there is a fulfillment of the verse: The wicked may prepare and the righteous shall don (see Job 27:17), which is interpreted as referring to the case of a wicked father who collects interest from borrowers. Upon inheriting the father’s estate, his righteous son is not obligated to return the interest to the borrower. The Gemara asks: Is this verse applicable only in the cases discussed until here, and no further? It is logical that if the heir does not need to return the interest that was prohibited by Torah law, all the more so the heir should not need to return the interest that was prohibited by rabbinic law. Rather, Rava said: Even in the cases discussed until here one can apply the verse: The wicked may prepare and the righteous shall don.

עַד כָּאן – רִבִּית קְצוּצָה. מִכָּאן וְאֵילָךְ – אֲבַק רִבִּית.

The Gemara comments: Until here the tanna cites cases of fixed interest, i.e., where the amount to be paid as interest was fixed at the time of the loan, which is prohibited by Torah law. From this point forward the tanna cites cases with only a hint of interest, prohibited by rabbinic law, as there is no fixed sum paid as interest.

אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: רִבִּית קְצוּצָה יוֹצְאָה בְּדַיָּינִין, אֲבַק רִבִּית אֵינָהּ יוֹצְאָה בְּדַיָּינִין. רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ רִבִּית קְצוּצָה נָמֵי אֵינָהּ יוֹצְאָה בְּדַיָּינִין.

Rabbi Elazar says: Fixed interest can be removed from the lender’s possession by means of legal proceedings adjudicated by judges. By contrast, in cases of a hint of interest, prohibited by rabbinic law, the money paid cannot be removed by means of legal proceedings adjudicated by judges. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Even fixed interest cannot be removed by means of legal proceedings adjudicated by judges.

אָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן? דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״בַּנֶּשֶׁךְ נָתַן וְתַרְבִּית לָקַח וָחָי לֹא יִחְיֶה אֵת כׇּל הַתֹּעֵבוֹת הָאֵלֶּה עָשָׂה״ – לְמִיתָה נִיתַּן וְלֹא לְהִישָּׁבוֹן. רַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה אָמַר, אָמַר קְרָא: ״אֶל תִּקַּח מֵאִתּוֹ נֶשֶׁךְ וְתַרְבִּית וְיָרֵאתָ מֵאֱלֹהֶיךָ״ – לְמוֹרָא נִיתַּן וְלֹא לְהִשָּׁבוֹן.

Rabbi Yitzḥak says: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan? It is as the verse states: “He has given forth with neshekh and he took tarbit, shall he live? He shall not live. He performed all these abominations, he shall be executed; his blood shall be upon him” (Ezekiel 18:13). It can be inferred that one who takes interest is subject to death at the hand of Heaven but not to repayment, as the court cannot compel him to repay the interest. Citing a different proof, Rav Adda bar Ahava said that the verse states: “You shall not take from him neshekh or tarbit; you shall fear your God and your brother shall live with you.” (Leviticus 25:36). It can be inferred that one who does so is subject to shirking the fear of Heaven, but not to repayment.

רָבָא אָמַר: מִגּוּפֵיהּ דִּקְרָא שְׁמִיעַ לֵיהּ, ״מוֹת יוּמָת דָּמָיו בּוֹ יִהְיֶה״. הוּקְשׁוּ מַלְוֵי רִבִּית לְשׁוֹפְכֵי דָּמִים: מָה שׁוֹפְכֵי דָּמִים לֹא נִיתְּנוּ לְהִשָּׁבוֹן – אַף מַלְוֵי רִבִּית לֹא נָתְנוּ לְהִשָּׁבוֹן.

Rava said: It can be derived from the verse in Ezekiel itself, not by inference, as it is written: “He shall be executed; his blood shall be upon him” (Ezekiel 18:13). In the verse, lenders who charged interest were juxtaposed with shedders of blood. This teaches: Just as shedders of blood are not subject to repayment, so too, lenders who charge interest are not subject to repayment.

אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר? דְּאָמַר קְרָא:

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Elazar that interest prohibited by Torah law can be reclaimed by means of legal proceedings adjudicated by judges? It is as the verse concerning the prohibition against taking interest states: