ביצה לט-מ

ביצה לט-מ

וְרַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: מִשּׁוּם דְּהָוֵי לֵיהּ דָּבָר שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ מַתִּירִין, וְכׇל דָּבָר שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ מַתִּירִין — אֲפִילּוּ בְּאֶלֶף לֹא בָּטֵיל.

And Rav Ashi said a different explanation as to why the spices, water, and salt are not subject to nullification: It is because any one of these ingredients is an object whose prohibition is temporary, as the prohibition against their being taken out of the Shabbat limits lapses once the Festival has passed, and the general principle is that anything whose prohibition is temporary cannot become nullified, even by one part in one thousand.

רַבִּי יְהוּדָה פּוֹטֵר בַּמַּיִם. מַיִם אִין, מֶלַח לָא? וְהָא תַּנְיָא, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: מַיִם וָמֶלַח בְּטֵלִין בֵּין בָּעִיסָּה בֵּין בַּקְּדֵרָה! לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא — בְּמֶלַח סְדוֹמִית, הָא — בְּמֶלַח אִסְתְּרוֹקָנִית.

§ It is taught in a mishna: Rabbi Yehuda exempts one from travel limitations in the case of water. The Gemara asks: Does this mean to imply that water, yes, it is exempted by Rabbi Yehuda, but salt, no, it is not? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda says: Water and salt are both nullified, whether in a dough or in a pot of cooked food. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. In this case of the mishna, the reference is to salt of Sodom, which is quite coarse and does not blend in easily with the dough, and, being noticeable in the final product, is not nullified. In that case of the baraita, the reference is to a type of fine salt known as isterokanit salt. Consequently, it is not noticeable in the final product and can be nullified.

וְהָתַנְיָא, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: מַיִם וָמֶלַח בְּטֵלִין בָּעִיסָּה, וְאֵין בְּטֵלִין בַּקְּדֵרָה מִפְּנֵי רוֹטְבָּהּ! לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא — בְּעָבָה, הָא — בְּרַכָּה.

The mishna states that according to Rabbi Yehuda water mixed into dough, and presumably into a cooked dish as well, is considered nullified. The Gemara challenges this: But isn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda says: Water and salt are nullified in dough but not in a pot, due to its sauce. The pot, unlike bread, ends up with liquid in it, so the borrowed water is still recognizable. The Gemara replies: This is not difficult. This case of the mishna, where Rabbi Yehuda says that the water is nullified in the cooked food, is referring to a thick dish that has no liquid sauce. That case of the baraita, in which Rabbi Yehuda said the water is not nullified, is referring to a thin dish with liquid sauce.

מַתְנִי׳ הַגַּחֶלֶת כְּרַגְלֵי הַבְּעָלִים, וְשַׁלְהֶבֶת בְּכׇל מָקוֹם. גַּחֶלֶת שֶׁל הֶקְדֵּשׁ — מוֹעֲלִין בָּהּ, וְשַׁלְהֶבֶת — לֹא נֶהֱנִין, וְלֹא מוֹעֲלִין. הַמּוֹצִיא גַּחֶלֶת לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים — חַיָּיב, וְשַׁלְהֶבֶת — פָּטוּר.

MISHNA: A coal that one borrowed from another on the Festival is as the feet of the owner, and it may be carried on the Festival to any place where its owner may walk. Since it has substance, it is associated with its owner. But a flame that one lit from another’s flame may be taken anywhere, as it has no substance. This essential difference between a coal and a flame has additional halakhic ramifications: If one uses a coal of consecrated property for a non-consecrated purpose, he is liable for misuse of consecrated property, since it has substance. But if one uses a consecrated flame, although according to rabbinic law one may not derive benefit from it ab initio, if one did benefit from it, he is not liable for misuse, since it does not have substance. Similarly, one who takes out a coal from a private domain to the public domain on Shabbat is liable for the prohibited labor of carrying, but one who takes out a flame is exempt.

גְּמָ׳ תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: חֲמִשָּׁה דְּבָרִים נֶאֶמְרוּ בַּגַּחֶלֶת: הַגַּחֶלֶת כְּרַגְלֵי הַבְּעָלִים, וְשַׁלְהֶבֶת בְּכׇל מָקוֹם. גַּחֶלֶת שֶׁל הֶקְדֵּשׁ — מוֹעֲלִין בָּהּ, וְשַׁלְהֶבֶת — לֹא נֶהֱנִין וְלֹא מוֹעֲלִין. גַּחֶלֶת שֶׁל עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה — אֲסוּרָה, וְשַׁלְהֶבֶת — מוּתֶּרֶת. הַמּוֹצִיא גַּחֶלֶת לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים — חַיָּיב, וְשַׁלְהֶבֶת — פָּטוּר. הַמּוּדָּר הֲנָאָה מֵחֲבֵירוֹ — אָסוּר בְּגַחַלְתּוֹ, וּמוּתָּר בְּשַׁלְהַבְתּוֹ.

GEMARA: The Sages taught in a Tosefta (Beitza 4:7): Five things were stated with regard to a coal, in relation to the practical halakhic differences between a coal and a flame: (1) Coal is as the feet of the owner with regard to its Festival resting place, whereas a flame may be carried anywhere. (2) One is liable for misusing property consecrated to the Temple with a consecrated coal, whereas with regard to a flame, according to rabbinic law one may not benefit from it, but he is not liable for misusing property consecrated to the Temple. (3) Coal used for idol worship is prohibited for one to benefit from it, whereas from a flame of this sort it is permitted to benefit. (4) One who carries out a coal to the public domain is liable, whereas one who carries out a flame is exempt. (5) One who is prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from another is prohibited from using his coal, but he is permitted to derive benefit from his flame.

מַאי שְׁנָא שַׁלְהֶבֶת עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה דְּשַׁרְיָא, וּמַאי שְׁנָא דְּהֶקְדֵּשׁ דַּאֲסִירָא? עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, דִּמְאִיסָה וּבְדִילִי אִינָשֵׁי מִינַּהּ — לָא גְּזַרוּ בַּהּ רַבָּנַן. הֶקְדֵּשׁ, דְּלָא מְאִיס וְלָא בְּדִילִי אִינָשֵׁי מִינֵּיהּ — גְּזַרוּ בֵּיהּ רַבָּנַן.

With regard to the halakhot cited in the baraita above, the Gemara asks: What is different in the case of a flame of idol worship, that one is permitted to use it even ab initio, as the baraita uses the term permitted in that case; and what is different in the case of a consecrated flame, in that it is prohibited to be used ab initio, as the baraita states: One may not benefit from it, but he is not liable for misuse? The Gemara explains: In the case of idol worship, which is repulsive to Jews and from which Jewish people inherently maintain separation, the Sages did not decree additional restrictions with regard to it. However, concerning consecrated property, which is not repulsive and from which people do not inherently maintain separation, in order to prevent its misuse, the Sages did decree with regard to it that it is prohibited to use the flame.

הַמּוֹצִיא גַּחֶלֶת לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים — חַיָּיב, וְשַׁלְהֶבֶת — פָּטוּר. וְהָא תַּנְיָא: הַמּוֹצִיא שַׁלְהֶבֶת כׇּל שֶׁהוּא — חַיָּיב! אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: כְּגוֹן שֶׁהוֹצִיאוֹ בְּקֵיסָם.

§ It is taught in the baraita that one who carries out a coal to the public domain is liable, whereas one who carries out a flame is exempt. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in another baraita: One who carries out a flame of any size on Shabbat is liable? Rav Sheshet said: The second baraita is referring to a case where one carried out the flame along with a wooden chip. Since the flame is attached to a physical object, it is considered significant.

וְתִיפּוֹק לֵיהּ מִשּׁוּם קֵיסָם! בִּדְלֵית לֵיהּ שִׁעוּרָא. דִּתְנַן: הַמּוֹצִיא עֵצִים — כְּדֵי לְבַשֵּׁל בֵּיצָה קַלָּה.

The Gemara raises an objection: But if so, let it derive that one is liable for carrying out in this case due to the wooden chip, and the presence of the flame is irrelevant. The Gemara responds: That baraita speaks of a chip that does not have the minimum measure that determines liability for carrying out, as we learned in a mishna (Shabbat 89b): In the case of one who carries out wood on Shabbat, the measure that determines liability is enough wood to cook an egg of the kind that is the easiest to cook, which is the egg of a chicken. Because the chip is too small to cook an egg, one is not liable for carrying it out, but one is liable for carrying out the flame attached to it.

אַבָּיֵי אָמַר: כְּגוֹן דְּשַׁיְיפֵיהּ [לְ]מָנָא מִשְׁחָא וְאַתְלִי בֵּיהּ נוּרָא. וְתִיפּוֹק לֵיהּ מִשּׁוּם מָנָא? בְּחַסְפָּא.

Abaye said a different scenario: The mishna is referring to a case where one smeared a vessel with oil, and lit a fire on it, and carried out that flame. The Gemara asks: If so, let it derive that one is liable for carrying out in this case due to the vessel itself, and the flame is irrelevant. The Gemara replies: The mishna is referring to a fire lit in an earthenware shard, not in a whole vessel.

וְתִיפּוֹק לֵיהּ מִשּׁוּם חַסְפָּא! בִּדְלֵית לֵיהּ שִׁעוּרָא. דִּתְנַן: חֶרֶס — כְּדֵי לִיתֵּן בֵּין פַּצִּים לַחֲבֵירוֹ, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה.

The Gemara challenges: And nevertheless, let it derive that one is liable for carrying due to the earthenware shard itself. The Gemara answers: It deals with a shard that is not of the minimum measure that determines liability for carrying out, as we learned in a mishna (Shabbat 82a): The measure that determines liability for carrying out earthenware is enough to place between one window frame and another, as small shards of earthenware were sometimes placed between window frames during construction. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.

אֶלָּא הָא דִּתְנַן: הַמּוֹצִיא שַׁלְהֶבֶת פָּטוּר, הֵיכִי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ? כְּגוֹן דְּאַדְּיֵיהּ אַדּוֹיֵי לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים.

The Gemara asks: But if so, if one is liable for carrying it out whenever the flame is attached to an object of substance, that which we learned in the mishna here: One who carries out a flame is exempt, under what circumstances can this case be found? The Gemara answers: The mishna is speaking of a case where one fanned the fire with his hand so that it spread into the public domain without its being attached to any vessel.

מַתְנִי׳ בּוֹר שֶׁל יָחִיד — כְּרַגְלֵי הַיָּחִיד, וְשֶׁל אַנְשֵׁי אוֹתָהּ הָעִיר — כְּרַגְלֵי אַנְשֵׁי אוֹתָהּ הָעִיר, וְשֶׁל עוֹלֵי בָבֶל — כְּרַגְלֵי הַמְמַלֵּא.

MISHNA: With regard to a cistern of an individual, water drawn from it is as the feet of the individual who owns the cistern, and the water may be carried only to those places where its owner is permitted to walk. And water drawn from a cistern belonging jointly to all the people dwelling in a particular town is as the feet of the people of that town. And water drawn from a cistern of those who come up to Eretz Yisrael from Babylonia, i.e., a public cistern, is as the feet of whoever fills his vessel with its water; the water has no defined boundary of its own since it is made available to all.

גְּמָ׳ רָמֵי לֵיהּ רָבָא לְרַב נַחְמָן, תְּנַן: בּוֹר שֶׁל יָחִיד — כְּרַגְלֵי הַיָּחִיד, וּרְמִינְהוּ: נְהָרוֹת הַמּוֹשְׁכִין וּמַעֲיָנוֹת הַנּוֹבְעִין — הֲרֵי הֵן כְּרַגְלֵי כׇּל אָדָם! אָמַר (רָבָא): הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן — בִּמְכוּנָּסִין. וְאִתְּמַר נָמֵי, אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אָבִין אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: בִּמְכוּנָּסִין.

GEMARA: Rava raised a contradiction to Rav Naḥman: We learned in the mishna that the water of a cistern of an individual is as the feet of the individual; and Rava raised a contradiction from the Tosefta (Beitza 4:8): Water drawn from flowing rivers and flowing springs are as the feet of all people. Rava said: With what are we dealing here in the mishna? With cisterns that contain collected water, not flowing water. And it was also said that Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin said that Shmuel said: The mishna applies only to collected water.

וְשֶׁל עוֹלֵי בָבֶל — כְּרַגְלֵי הַמְמַלֵּא. אִתְּמַר: מִילֵּא וְנָתַן לַחֲבֵירוֹ, רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר: כְּרַגְלֵי מִי שֶׁנִּתְמַלְּאוּ לוֹ, רַב שֵׁשֶׁת אָמַר: כְּרַגְלֵי הַמְמַלֵּא.

§ The mishna states: And water drawn from a cistern of those who come up to Eretz Yisrael from Babylonia, i.e., a public cistern, is as the feet of whoever fills his vessel with its water. It was stated that amora’im disagreed with regard to this issue: In the case of one who filled a vessel with water from a public cistern on behalf of another and gave the water to him, Rav Naḥman said: The water is as the feet of the one for whom they were filled; Rav Sheshet said: It is as the feet of the one who filled it.

בְּמַאי קָא מִיפַּלְגִי? מָר סָבַר: בֵּירָא דְהֶפְקֵרָא הוּא, וּמָר סָבַר: בֵּירָא דְשׁוּתָּפֵי הוּא.

The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do they disagree? The Gemara explains: One Sage, Rav Sheshet, holds that a public cistern is ownerless, and the halakha is that one cannot take possession of ownerless property on behalf of someone else. Therefore, the water belongs to the one who drew it; it is as his feet, and this status does not change even if he subsequently gave it to anyone else. And one Sage, Rav Naḥman, holds that a public cistern is considered jointly owned by all its partners, namely, all of the Jewish people. Therefore, it is possible for one partner to draw water on behalf of another partner, and the drawn water immediately belongs to the person for whom it was drawn.

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רָבָא לְרַב נַחְמָן: הֲרֵינִי עָלֶיךָ חֵרֶם — הַמּוּדָּר אָסוּר.

Rava raised a challenge to Rav Naḥman from a mishna (Nedarim 47b): One who says to another: I am hereby prohibited to you by force of ḥerem, a kind of vow of prohibition, as objects declared as ḥerem are generally consecrated to the Temple, the one prohibited by the vow, the addressee, is prohibited to derive benefit from the person who made the vow or from his property, as the point of the vow was to prohibit the addressee from deriving any benefit from the one who made the vow.

הֲרֵי אַתָּה עָלַי חֵרֶם — הַנּוֹדֵר אָסוּר. הֲרֵינִי עָלֶיךָ וְאַתָּה עָלַי — שְׁנֵיהֶם אֲסוּרִים זֶה בָּזֶה, וּמוּתָּרִין בְּשֶׁל עוֹלֵי בָבֶל, וַאֲסוּרִין בְּשֶׁל אוֹתָהּ הָעִיר.

If he said to him: You are hereby prohibited to me by force of ḥerem, the one making the vow is himself prohibited to derive benefit from the addressee or from his property. If he said to him: I am hereby prohibited to you and you to me by force of ḥerem, they are both prohibited to benefit from one another. And they are permitted to benefit from anything belonging to those who come up from Babylonia, i.e., public property that is not owned by any person or group, but they are prohibited to benefit from property that is jointly owned by the inhabitants of that city, as both parties have a share in such items.

וְאֵלּוּ הֵן דְּבָרִים שֶׁל עוֹלֵי בָבֶל: הַר הַבַּיִת, הַלְּשָׁכוֹת וְהָעֲזָרוֹת, וּבוֹר שֶׁל אֶמְצַע הַדֶּרֶךְ. וְאֵלּוּ הֵן שֶׁל אוֹתָהּ הָעִיר: הָרְחוֹב, וּבֵית הַכְּנֶסֶת, וּבֵית הַמֶּרְחָץ.

That mishna provides examples: And the following are items of those coming up from Babylonia, i.e., publicly owned items: The Temple Mount, the chambers, and the courtyards on the Temple Mount, and a cistern situated in the middle of the road. And these are items jointly owned by the inhabitants of that city: The street, and the synagogue, and the bathhouse.

וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ בֵּירָא דְשׁוּתָּפֵי הוּא, אַמַּאי מוּתָּר? וְהָתְנַן: הַשּׁוּתָּפִין שֶׁנָּדְרוּ הֲנָאָה זֶה מִזֶּה — אֲסוּרִים לִיכָּנֵס לֶחָצֵר לִרְחוֹץ בַּבּוֹר!

Rava, having cited the mishna in full, concludes his challenge to the opinion of Rav Naḥman: And if you say that a cistern of those who come up from Babylonia, a public cistern, is owned jointly by partners, i.e., by all Jews, why should it be permitted for the one who made the vow and the addressee to use it? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Nedarim 45b): Two partners who took a vow not to derive benefit from one another are prohibited to enter a joint courtyard in which they both have a share to wash themselves in a cistern. According to you, the same should apply to a cistern in which the two of them have a share, such as the cisterns of those who come up from Babylonia.

לִרְחוֹץ הָכִי נָמֵי, וְהָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן — לְמַלּאוֹת, מָר מִדִּידֵיהּ קָא מְמַלֵּא וּמַר מִדִּידֵיהּ קָא מְמַלֵּא.

Rav Naḥman answered: Indeed that is the case. So too, they are prohibited to wash themselves in a cistern because when bathing one uses of all the water of the cistern, part of which belongs to the forbidden partner. But when the baraita says that a cistern of those who come up from Babylonia is permitted to both parties, with what are we dealing here? The baraita is referring only to filling water from the cistern. This is permitted because it is considered that this one fills from his portion, and that one fills from his portion. The water that each of them draws is considered retroactively designated exclusively for him, so that the partner has no share in it at all.

וְסָבַר רַב נַחְמָן יֵשׁ בְּרֵירָה? וְהָתְנַן: הָאַחִין הַשּׁוּתָּפִין, כְּשֶׁחַיָּיבִין בַּקָּלְבּוֹן — פְּטוּרִין מִמַּעְשַׂר בְּהֵמָה.

The Gemara asks: And does Rav Naḥman hold that there is retroactive designation? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Shekalim 1:7): If brothers divided up inherited property among themselves and subsequently joined their property again and became partners, they are obligated to add a kalbon, a small coin, to the obligatory half-shekel yearly Temple donation. The kalbon covered both the cost to the Temple of exchanging half-shekels into larger coins and the depreciation of the donated coin. Although a whole shekel given by two partners does not need to be changed into a larger coin, the Sages imposed the same kalbon fee on the partners as on everyone else. However, these partners are exempt from the animal tithe, in accordance with the standard halakha that people who own animals in partnership are exempt from the animal tithe.

וּכְשֶׁחַיָּיבִין בְּמַעְשַׂר בְּהֵמָה — פְּטוּרִין מִן הַקָּלְבּוֹן.

The quote from the mishna continues: And in a situation in which the brothers are liable for the animal tithe, as when they have not yet divided up their inheritance, and all the deceased’s estate is therefore still considered a single unit and not a partnership, they are exempt from the kalbon, in accordance with the halakha that a father who contributes a single shekel for his two dependent sons does not need to add the kalbon.

וְאָמַר רַב עָנָן: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא שֶׁחָלְקוּ גְּדָיִם כְּנֶגֶד טְלָאִים וּטְלָאִים כְּנֶגֶד גְּדָיִם.

And Rav Anan said: The Sages taught that the inherited property is no longer considered a single unit after the brothers divided it and then rejoined in a partnership only when they divided kids against lambs or lambs against kids, i.e., if one brother took kids and the other took a corresponding value of lambs. This kind of division is considered a commercial transaction, with one brother purchasing goats and paying for them with lambs and vice versa. Therefore, when they join their animals again as partners, it is considered an entirely new partnership.

אֲבָל חָלְקוּ גְּדָיִם כְּנֶגֶד גְּדָיִם וּטְלָאִים כְּנֶגֶד טְלָאִים, אוֹמֵר: זֶהוּ חֶלְקוֹ הַמַּגִּיעוֹ מִשָּׁעָה רִאשׁוֹנָה לְכָךְ.

However, if they divided kids against kids and lambs against lambs, meaning that each brother took an equal portion of each of the items they inherited, one can say of each brother’s portion: This is his portion destined to reach him from the first moment, from the time of the death of the deceased. If the brothers form their partnership again, the inheritance becomes a single unit again, and they are therefore obligated in the animal tithe and exempt from the kalbon.

וְרַב נַחְמָן אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ חָלְקוּ גְּדָיִם כְּנֶגֶד גְּדָיִם וּטְלָאִים כְּנֶגֶד טְלָאִים — אֵין אוֹמֵר: זֶה חֶלְקוֹ הַמַּגִּיעוֹ מִשָּׁעָה רִאשׁוֹנָה לְכָךְ.

But Rav Naḥman said: Even if they divided kids against kids and lambs against lambs, one does not say that this is his portion destined to reach him from the first moment. This is because Rav Naḥman does not accept the principle of retroactive designation. Consequently, the resolution proposed previously for the issue of filling water from the cistern of those who come up from Babylonia is invalid.

אֶלָּא דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא בֵּירָא דְהֶפְקֵרָא הִיא, אֶלָּא הָכָא בְּמַגְבִּיהַּ מְצִיאָה לַחֲבֵירוֹ קָא מִיפַּלְגִי. מָר סָבַר: קָנָה, וּמָר סָבַר: לָא קָנָה.

The Gemara retracts its previous explanation of the disagreement between Rava and Rav Naḥman: Rather, everyone agrees that a cistern of those who come up from Babylonia, i.e., a public cistern, is an ownerless cistern, but here they disagree over a different issue: One who picks up a found article intending to acquire it on behalf of his friend. One Sage, Rav Naḥman, holds that if one picks up a found object on behalf of his friend, his friend acquires it through this act as though he had picked it up himself. The water of the ownerless cistern is like a found object. Therefore, if one draws water on behalf of another, the latter acquires it, and consequently the water is as his feet. And one Sage, Rav Sheshet, holds that when one picks up a found object for another, the latter does not acquire it. Rather, it belongs to the one who actually picked it up, and consequently the water is as the feet of the one who draws it.

מַתְנִי׳ מִי שֶׁהָיוּ פֵּירוֹתָיו בְּעִיר אַחֶרֶת וְעֵרְבוּ בְּנֵי אוֹתָהּ הָעִיר לְהָבִיא אֶצְלוֹ מִפֵּירוֹתָיו — לֹא יָבִיאוּ לוֹ. וְאִם עֵרַב הוּא — פֵּירוֹתָיו כָּמוֹהוּ.

MISHNA: With regard to one who had produce in a different city beyond the Shabbat limit, and the residents of that city where the produce was located joined the Shabbat boundaries, enabling them to reach the owner’s home on the Festival, and they wish to bring him some of his produce, they may not bring it to him. His produce is as his feet; since it is outside of his Shabbat limit, it may not be taken from its place. However, if the owner placed an eiruv to enable travel to that city, the legal status of his produce is like his status with regard to the Shabbat limit. People from that city who also placed an eiruv may bring the produce to him, since he himself may walk to the produce and take it.

מִי שֶׁזִּמֵּן אֶצְלוֹ אוֹרְחִים — לֹא יוֹלִיכוּ בְּיָדָם מָנוֹת, אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן זִכָּה לָהֶם מָנוֹתֵיהֶם מֵעֶרֶב יוֹם טוֹב.

With regard to one who invited guests to visit him from a town beyond his Shabbat limit, and they joined the Shabbat boundaries to enable them to reach his house, they may not carry in their hands back to their town any portions they received from him as gifts. These portions are as the feet of the host, since they belonged to him on the eve of the Festival. This is true unless he transferred ownership of their portions to them on the eve of the Festival, in which case the gifts may be carried wherever the recipients may walk.

גְּמָ׳ אִתְּמַר: הַמַּפְקִיד פֵּירוֹת אֵצֶל חֲבֵירוֹ — רַב אָמַר: כְּרַגְלֵי מִי שֶׁהִפְקִידוּ לוֹ, וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: כְּרַגְלֵי הַמַּפְקִיד. לֵימָא רַב וּשְׁמוּאֵל דְּאָזְדוּ לְטַעְמַיְיהוּ, דִּתְנַן: אִם הִכְנִיס בִּרְשׁוּת — בַּעַל הֶחָצֵר חַיָּיב. רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: לְעוֹלָם אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב עַד שֶׁיְּקַבֵּל עָלָיו בַּעַל הַבַּיִת לִשְׁמוֹר.

GEMARA: It is stated that amora’im disagreed with regard to one who deposits produce with another for safekeeping: In whose possession is the produce with regard to determining its place of rest over the Festival? Rav said: They are as the feet of the one with whom they were deposited. And Shmuel said: They are as the feet of the object’s owner. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that Rav and Shmuel follow their usual line of reasoning, as we learned in a mishna: If one brought in his produce or his ox to another’s courtyard with his permission, the owner of the courtyard is liable for any damage caused to them. And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: The homeowner is never liable for damages, unless the homeowner explicitly accepts upon himself the responsibility to watch them.

וְאָמַר רַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַב: הֲלָכָה כְּדִבְרֵי חֲכָמִים, וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי. לֵימָא רַב דְּאָמַר כְּרַבָּנַן וּשְׁמוּאֵל דְּאָמַר כְּרַבִּי?

And Rav Huna said that Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis, who disagreed with Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. If so, let us say that Rav spoke here in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, with the following reasoning: Just as when one gives permission to store something in his yard, that object is under his jurisdiction concerning monetary responsibility, so too, it is in his jurisdiction concerning the establishment of the Shabbat limit. And Shmuel spoke here in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: When a homeowner gives permission to store something in his yard, the object is not in his jurisdiction, whether with regard to monetary responsibility or with regard to the Shabbat limit.

אָמַר לְךָ רַב: אֲנָא דַּאֲמַרִי אֲפִילּוּ לְרַבִּי — עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי הָתָם, אֶלָּא דְּבִסְתָמָא לָא קַבֵּיל עֲלֵיהּ נְטִירוּתָא, אֲבָל הָכָא — הָא קַבֵּיל עֲלֵיהּ נְטִירוּתָא.

The Gemara rejects the comparison: Rav could have said to you: I said my statement in this case even in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. For Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi stated his halakha only there, that an object brought into a courtyard is not considered in the possession of the homeowner with regard to monetary responsibility, because in the ordinary situation one who allows someone to bring items into his courtyard does not accept upon himself the responsibility of watching them. But here, the homeowner has accepted upon himself the responsibility of watching the produce, and consequently it is as his feet.

וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: אֲנָא דַּאֲמַרִי אֲפִילּוּ לְרַבָּנַן — עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמְרִי רַבָּנַן הָתָם, אֶלָּא דְּנִיחָא לֵיהּ לְאִינִישׁ דְּנֵיקוּם תּוֹרֵיהּ בִּרְשׁוּתֵיהּ דְּבַעַל חָצֵר, דְּאִי מַזֵּיק לֵיהּ — לָא מִיחַיַּיב. אֲבָל הָכָא — מִי נִיחָא לֵיהּ לְאִינִישׁ דְּלֵיקוּם פֵּירֵיהּ בִּרְשׁוּתֵיהּ דְּחַבְרֵיהּ?!

And similarly, Shmuel could have said: I said my statement here even in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, as the Rabbis stated their opinion only there, maintaining that the objects are considered in the jurisdiction of the homeowner, because it is a person’s, i.e., the owner’s, preference that his ox or other object be established in the jurisdiction of the owner of the courtyard, so that if his ox does damage to the homeowner’s property the owner will not be liable. But here, is it a person’s preference for his produce to be in another’s jurisdiction with regard to the establishment of its Shabbat limit? It is certainly inconvenient for him to have his produce out of his Shabbat limit. Consequently, the two disputes between Rav and Shmuel are not necessarily connected.

תְּנַן: וְאִם עֵרַב הוּא — פֵּירוֹתָיו כָּמוֹהוּ. וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ כְּרַגְלֵי מִי שֶׁהִפְקִידוּ אֶצְלוֹ, כִּי עֵרַב הוּא מַאי הָוֵי? אָמַר רַב הוּנָא, אָמְרִי בֵּי רַב: כְּגוֹן שֶׁיִּחֵד לוֹ קֶרֶן זָוִית.

The Gemara asks concerning Rav’s opinion: We learned in the mishna: However, if the owner placed an eiruv, the legal status of his produce is like his status. And if you say that deposited produce is as the feet of the one with whom they were deposited, even if the owner of the produce placed an eiruv, what of it? The produce is under the jurisdiction of the people in the other town with whom it was deposited. It should be as their feet, not as the feet of the owner. Rav Huna said that the Sages of the school of Rav said in reply to this question: The mishna is dealing with a case where the keeper designated a corner of his house for the owner, thereby revealing his intention that the produce not be considered in his own jurisdiction but rather in that of the owner. Consequently, it remains as the feet of the owner.

תָּא שְׁמַע: מִי שֶׁזִּמֵּן אֶצְלוֹ אוֹרְחִים — לֹא יוֹלִיכוּ בְּיָדָם מָנוֹת, אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן זִכָּה לָהֶם מָנוֹתֵיהֶם מֵעֶרֶב יוֹם טוֹב. וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ כְּרַגְלֵי מִי שֶׁהִפְקִידוֹ אֶצְלוֹ, כִּי זִכָּה לָהֶם עַל יְדֵי אַחֵר מַאי הָוֵי? הָכִי נָמֵי, כֵּיוָן שֶׁזִּכָּה לָהֶם עַל יְדֵי אַחֵר — כְּמִי שֶׁיִּחֵד לוֹ קֶרֶן זָוִית דָּמֵי.

The Gemara raises another challenge to Rav’s opinion: Come and hear a different proof from the mishna: With regard to one who invited guests to visit him, they may not carry in their hands any portions they may have received back to their town, unless he transferred ownership of their portions to them on the eve of the Festival. And if you say that the halakha is that deposited items are as the feet of the one with whom they were deposited, even if he transferred ownership to them by means of another person taking possession on their behalf, what of it? The portions are in any event deposited in the house of the host, and they should be as his feet. The Gemara answers: Here too, since he transferred ownership to them by means of another person, it is considered as a case of one who designated a corner for him, so that the gifts are considered in the jurisdiction of the guests and may be carried wherever they may walk.

וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: זִכָּה שָׁאנֵי.

And if you wish, say instead that the entire case of transferring ownership is different because the host’s specific intention is to transfer possession of the portions entirely to his guests. This means that the guests have certainly established the place of rest of these portions in their own jurisdiction and that the portions are as their feet.

רַב חָנָא בַּר חֲנִילַאי תְּלָא בִּשְׂרָא בְּעִבְרָא דְּדַשָּׁא. אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב הוּנָא, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִי אַתְּ תְּלֵית — זִיל שְׁקֵיל, וְאִי אִינְהוּ תְּלוֹ לָךְ — לָא תִּשְׁקוֹל.

The Gemara relates: Rav Ḥana bar Ḥanilai once hung meat on the bar of the door of his host’s house, located outside his own town. He subsequently wondered if he was permitted to take the meat home with him, since he had made an eiruv enabling him to walk from his home to his host’s home. He came before Rav Huna to ask his opinion. Rav Huna said to him: If you yourself hung the meat, go take it, but if your hosts hung it for you, you may not take it.

וְאִי אִיהוּ תְּלָא מִי שָׁקֵיל? וְהָא רַב הוּנָא תַּלְמִיד דְּרַב הֲוָה, וְאָמַר רַב: כְּרַגְלֵי מִי שֶׁהִפְקִידוּ אֶצְלוֹ! שָׁאנֵי עִבְרָא דְּדָשָׁא, דִּכְמִי שֶׁיִּחֵד לוֹ קֶרֶן זָוִית דָּמֵי.

The Gemara questions this: And if he himself hung the meat, may he indeed take it? But wasn’t Rav Huna a student of Rav, and Rav said that when an object is deposited in one’s house it is as the feet of the one with whom it was deposited, which in this case is the host. The Gemara responds: Here it is different, as Rav Ḥana bar Ḥanilai hung the meat on the bar of the host’s door, and this case is considered similar to a case of one who designated a corner for him. Since he was given a particular spot for the meat, it is considered his in all respects.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב הִלֵּל לְרַב אָשֵׁי: וְאִי אִינְהוּ תָּלוּ לֵיהּ לָא שָׁקֵיל? וְהָאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: שׁוֹר שֶׁל פַּטָּם — הֲרֵי הוּא כְּרַגְלֵי כׇּל אָדָם.

The Gemara raises a further objection with regard to this incident: Rav Hillel said to Rav Ashi: And if they hung the meat for him, may he indeed not take it? But didn’t Shmuel say: An ox of a fattener, who fattens oxen in order to sell them for meat, is as the feet of all people, i.e., it is as the feet of whoever buys it on the Festival. This shows that meat that is likely to be sold is not as the feet of its owner, but rather it follows the buyer, as the intention before the Festival is that it be for whoever happens to purchase it. Here too, the intention from the outset was that Rav Ḥana would take it over the course of the Festival.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: וְאִי אִינְהוּ תָּלוּ לֵיהּ לָא שָׁקֵיל? וְהָאָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי דּוֹסָא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אָשֵׁי לְרַב כָּהֲנָא: וְאִי אִינְהוּ תָּלוּ לֵיהּ לָא שָׁקֵיל? וְהָתְנַן: הַבְּהֵמָה וְהַכֵּלִים כְּרַגְלֵי הַבְּעָלִים!

Furthermore, Ravina said to Rav Ashi: And if the hosts hung the meat for him, may he indeed not take it? But didn’t Rabba bar bar Ḥana say that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Dosa, that in a town that has only one shepherd, an animal that will be given to that shepherd over the course of the Festival is as the feet of the shepherd, since it is certain that the animal will be transferred to him. Here too, since the meat was put aside for Rav Ḥana, he should be permitted to take it with him. There is a further difficulty: Rav Ashi said to Rav Kahana: And if they hung the meat for him, may he indeed not take it? But didn’t we learn in a mishna: The status of animals and vessels is as the feet of their owner? The same should apply to meat that was hung for him; it should be as his feet.

אֶלָּא, שָׁאנֵי רַב חָנָא בַּר חֲנִילַאי — דְּגַבְרָא רַבָּה הוּא וּטְרִיד בִּשְׁמַעְתֵּיהּ, וְהָכִי קָאָמַר לֵיהּ: אִי אַתְּ תְּלֵית, אִית לָךְ סִימָנָא בְּגַוֵּויהּ וְלָא מַסְּחַתְּ דַּעְתָּךְ מִנֵּיהּ, זִיל שְׁקוֹל. וְאִי אִינְהוּ תָּלוּ לָךְ, מַסְּחַתְּ דַּעְתָּךְ, וְלָא תִּשְׁקוֹל.

Because of all these questions, the Gemara reinterprets the case of Rav Ḥana. Rather, the problem with the meat concerns a completely different matter, as the issue under consideration is not the establishment of its place of rest but the prohibition against eating meat that has been left unobserved, due to the concern that it might have been exchanged for prohibited meat. Rav Ḥana bar Ḥanilai is different from the average person, as he is a great man and occupied with his studies, and this is what Rav Huna said to him: If you yourself hung it, in which case you noticed some recognizable mark on the meat and your attention was not diverted from it, the meat is not forbidden for having been left unobserved, and therefore you may go and take it. However, if the hosts hung it for you, you thereby diverted your attention from it, and they too did not pay careful attention to it after hanging it on your behalf. In that case, it is considered meat that has been left unobserved, and you may therefore not take it.

מַתְנִי׳ אֵין מַשְׁקִין וְשׁוֹחֲטִין אֶת הַמִּדְבָּרִיּוֹת, אֲבָל מַשְׁקִין וְשׁוֹחֲטִין אֶת הַבַּיָּיתוֹת. אֵלּוּ הֵן בַּיָּיתוֹת — הַלָּנוֹת בָּעִיר. מִדְבָּרִיּוֹת — הַלָּנוֹת בָּאֲפָר.

MISHNA: On a Festival one may not water and slaughter desert animals, which graze mainly outside the town, as they are considered muktze. However, one may water and slaughter domestic animals. The mishna elaborates: These are considered domestic animals: Those that sleep in the city at night. Desert animals are those that sleep in the pasture and come into town only rarely.

גְּמָ׳ לְמָה לִי לְמֵימַר מַשְׁקִין וְשׁוֹחֲטִין? מִילְּתָא אַגַּב אוֹרְחֵיהּ קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן, דְּלַשְׁקֵי אִינָשׁ בְּהֶמְתּוֹ וַהֲדַר לִשְׁחוֹט, מִשּׁוּם סִרְכָא דְמַשְׁכָּא.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: The mishna is coming to teach which animals are muktze and consequently may not be slaughtered and eaten on the Festival. Why, then, do I need the mishna to say: One may water and slaughter? What does watering have to do with the topic at hand? The Gemara explains: The tanna of the mishna teaches us a practical matter incidentally: That a person should first water his animal and only afterward slaughter it, due to the adhesion of the skin to the meat when this is not done. If one first waters the animal, it is easier to skin it after slaughtering it.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: אֵלּוּ הֵן מִדְבָּרִיּוֹת וְאֵלּוּ הֵן בַּיָּיתוֹת. מִדְבָּרִיּוֹת — כֹּל שֶׁיּוֹצְאוֹת בַּפֶּסַח וְרוֹעוֹת בָּאֲפָר, וְנִכְנָסוֹת בִּרְבִיעָה רִאשׁוֹנָה. וְאֵלּוּ הֵן בַּיָּיתוֹת — כֹּל שֶׁיּוֹצְאוֹת וְרוֹעוֹת חוּץ לַתְּחוּם, וּבָאוֹת וְלָנוֹת בְּתוֹךְ הַתְּחוּם. רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: אֵלּוּ וְאֵלּוּ בַּיָּיתוֹת הֵן. אֶלָּא אֵלּוּ הֵן מִדְבָּרִיּוֹת — כֹּל שֶׁיּוֹצְאוֹת וְרוֹעוֹת בָּאֲפָר, וְאֵין נִכְנָסוֹת לַיִּשּׁוּב, לֹא בִּימוֹת הַחַמָּה וְלֹא בִּימוֹת הַגְּשָׁמִים.

The Sages taught in a baraita: Which are desert animals, and which are domestic ones? Desert animals include all those that go out to pasture at Passover time and graze in the pasture day and night and enter the town again only at the first rainfall, at the start of the rainy season. And these are domestic animals: All that go out in the morning and graze outside the town’s boundary but come and sleep within the boundary at night. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Both these and those are considered domestic animals and may be slaughtered on the Festival. Rather, these are desert animals that may not be slaughtered on the Festival: All those that go out and graze in the pasture and do not enter the settled area, neither in the summer nor in the rainy season.

וּמִי אִית לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי מוּקְצֶה? וְהָא בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בַּר רַבִּי מֵרַבִּי: פַּצְעִילֵי תְמָרָה — לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן מַהוּ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֵין מוּקְצֶה לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן

The Gemara asks concerning Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s opinion: And does Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi in general accept the concept of muktze? But didn’t Rabbi Shimon, son of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, inquire of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: Unripe dates that are placed in a basket to ripen until they are edible, what is the halakha according to Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai? Are they considered muktze or not? He said to him in response: There is no recognition of the halakha of muktze according to Rabbi Shimon,

אֶלָּא גְּרוֹגְרוֹת וְצִמּוּקִין בִּלְבַד!

except for the case of dried figs and raisins in the midst of the drying process alone. These are fruits that are fit to be eaten fresh and were deliberately removed from use to allow them to undergo a drying process, during which time they are inedible; they have therefore been actively removed from one’s mind for the interim. Unripe dates, however, are unfit to be eaten fresh and become fit for eating only when they are ripe. Therefore, if one places unripe dates in a basket to ripen, they are never completely removed from his mind, not having been changed from an edible state to an inedible state, and are permitted. If so, desert animals, which are similarly never completely removed from one’s mind, should also not be considered muktze. Why, then, does Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi indicate that they have the status of muktze?

אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: הָנֵי נָמֵי כִּגְרוֹגְרוֹת וְצִמּוּקִין דָּמֵי, וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: לִדְבָרָיו דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן קָאָמַר, וְלֵיהּ לָא סְבִירָא לֵיהּ.

The Gemara suggests several resolutions: If you wish, say that these desert animals are also considered similar to dried figs and raisins, as by sending them outside the town the owner has actively removed them from use. And if you wish, say instead that the fact that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi told his son that Rabbi Shimon does not accept the halakha of muktze except for the case of dried figs and raisins does not prove anything about his own opinion; he stated this only in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Shimon, but he himself does not hold accordingly.

וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: לְדִבְרֵיהֶם דְּרַבָּנַן קָאָמַר לְהוּ. לְדִידִי אֵין מוּקְצֶה, אֶלָּא לְדִידְכוּ: אוֹדוֹ לִי מִיהַת הֵיכָא דְּיוֹצְאוֹת וְרוֹעוֹת בַּפֶּסַח וְנִכְנָסוֹת בִּרְבִיעָה רִאשׁוֹנָה דְּבַיָּיתוֹת הֵן. וַאֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ רַבָּנַן: לָא, מִדְבָּרִיּוֹת הֵן.

And if you wish, say a different answer: He himself, like Rabbi Shimon, did not accept the concept of muktze, and when he spoke in the baraita he was speaking, for the sake of argument, in accordance with the words of the Rabbis who had spoken before him, saying to them, in effect: According to my opinion, there is no halakha of muktze at all, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, and all animals may be slaughtered on the Festival. But even according to your approach, that there is a halakha of muktze, agree with me, in any event, that with regard to a case where they go out and graze on Passover and enter again at the first rainfall, they are considered domestic animals and should be permitted. But the Rabbis said to him: No, even those are desert animals.

הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ מַשִּׁילִין פֵּירוֹת וּסְלִיקָא מַסֶּכֶת בֵּיצָה