חולין עח

חולין עח

דְּנִיכְחוֹשׁ חֵילֵיהּ, אֶלָּא סוֹקְרוֹ בְּסִיקְרָא אַמַּאי? כִּי הֵיכִי דְּלִיחְזְיוּהּ אִינָשֵׁי וְלִיבְעֻי רַחֲמֵי עִילָּוֵיהּ.

that the tree’s strength will lessen. It is possible that the tree shed its fruits prematurely due to excessive blossoming. It taxes the tree to sustain these blossoms, and this may render the tree incapable of sustaining the fruits that subsequently grow from the blossoms. Stones were used to weaken the tree during blossoming, thereby reducing the number of blossoms that it needed to nourish. But with regard to painting it with red paint, for what benefit is it performed that makes it permitted despite the fact that this was the practice of the Amorites? The Gemara explains: One does so in order that people will see the tree and pray for it.

כִּדְתַנְיָא: ״וְטָמֵא טָמֵא יִקְרָא״ – צָרִיךְ לְהוֹדִיעַ לָרַבִּים, וְרַבִּים מְבַקְּשִׁים עָלָיו רַחֲמִים. וְכֵן מִי שֶׁאֵירַע בּוֹ דָּבָר – צָרִיךְ לְהוֹדִיעַ לָרַבִּים, וְרַבִּים מְבַקְּשִׁים עָלָיו רַחֲמִים.

As it is taught in a baraita: It is derived from the verse: “And he will cry: Impure, impure” (Leviticus 13:45), that a leper must publicize the fact that he is ritually impure. He must announce his pain to the masses, and the masses will pray for mercy on his behalf. And likewise, one to whom any unfortunate matter happens must announce it to the masses, and then the masses will pray for mercy on his behalf.

אָמַר רָבִינָא: כְּמַאן תָּלֵינַן כּוּבְסָא בְּדִיקְלָא, כְּמַאן? כִּי הַאי תַּנָּא.

Ravina said: In accordance with whose opinion do we hang bunches of unripe dates on a palm tree that casts off its dates, despite the fact that this is the practice of the Amorites? It is in accordance with the opinion of this tanna of the baraita just cited, who states that one must announce such occurrences to the masses so that they will pray for mercy.

הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ בְּהֵמָה הַמְקַשָּׁה.

מַתְנִי׳ אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ נוֹהֵג בֵּין בָּאָרֶץ בֵּין בְּחוּצָה לָאָרֶץ, בִּפְנֵי הַבַּיִת וְשֶׁלֹּא בִּפְנֵי הַבַּיִת, בְּחוּלִּין וּבְמוּקְדָּשִׁין.

MISHNA: The prohibition against slaughtering an animal itself and its offspring applies both in Eretz Yisrael and outside of Eretz Yisrael, both in the presence, i.e., the time, of the Temple and not in the presence of the Temple, and it applies with regard to non-sacred animals and with regard to sacrificial animals.

כֵּיצַד? הַשּׁוֹחֵט אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ, חוּלִּין בַּחוּץ – שְׁנֵיהֶם כְּשֵׁרִים, וְהַשֵּׁנִי סוֹפֵג אֶת הָאַרְבָּעִים.

How so? In the case of one who slaughters an animal itself and its offspring, both of which are non-sacred, and slaughters them outside the Temple courtyard, both of the animals are fit for consumption, but for slaughtering the second animal, one incurs [sofeg] the forty lashes for violating the prohibition: “You shall not slaughter it and its offspring both in one day” (Leviticus 22:28).

קָדָשִׁים בַּחוּץ – הָרִאשׁוֹן חַיָּיב כָּרֵת, וּשְׁנֵיהֶם פְּסוּלִים, וּשְׁנֵיהֶם סוֹפְגִים אֶת הָאַרְבָּעִים.

If both animals were sacrificial animals slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, then for slaughtering the first animal, one is liable to receive excision from the World-to-Come [karet]. For slaughtering the second animal one is not liable to receive karet. The second animal was not fit for sacrifice, since one may not slaughter an animal and its offspring on the same day. And both animals are disqualified for use as offerings, and for the slaughter of both of them, one incurs forty lashes apiece: The first being a sacrificial animal slaughtered outside the courtyard and the second being the offspring of an animal slaughtered that day.

חוּלִּין בִּפְנִים – שְׁנֵיהֶם פְּסוּלִין, וְהַשֵּׁנִי סוֹפֵג אֶת הָאַרְבָּעִים; קָדָשִׁים בִּפְנִים – הָרִאשׁוֹן כָּשֵׁר וּפָטוּר, וְהַשֵּׁנִי סוֹפֵג אֶת הָאַרְבָּעִים וּפָסוּל.

If both animals were non-sacred and slaughtered inside the Temple courtyard, both of them are unfit to be sacrificed, being non-sacred animals slaughtered in the courtyard. And for slaughter of the second animal, one incurs the forty lashes for slaughtering an animal and its offspring on a single day. If both animals were sacrificial animals slaughtered inside the Temple courtyard, the first is fit for sacrifice, and one who slaughters it is exempt from any punishment. But for slaughter of the second animal, one incurs the forty lashes for slaughtering an animal and its offspring on a single day, and it is unfit for sacrifice, because one was not allowed to slaughter it on that day.

חוּלִּין וְקָדָשִׁים בַּחוּץ – הָרִאשׁוֹן כָּשֵׁר, וּפָטוּר, וְהַשֵּׁנִי סוֹפֵג אֶת הָאַרְבָּעִים, וּפָסוּל.

If the first animal was non-sacred and the second a sacrificial animal, and both were slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, the first is fit for consumption and one who slaughters it is exempt from any punishment. But for slaughtering the second animal, one incurs the forty lashes for slaughtering an animal and its offspring on a single day, and the animal is unfit for sacrifice.

קָדָשִׁים וְחוּלִּין בַּחוּץ – הָרִאשׁוֹן חַיָּיב כָּרֵת וּפָסוּל, וְהַשֵּׁנִי כָּשֵׁר, וּשְׁנֵיהֶם סוֹפְגִים אֶת הָאַרְבָּעִים.

If the first animal was a sacrificial animal and the second was non-sacred and both were slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, for the first animal, one is liable to receive karet for slaughtering a sacrificial animal outside the courtyard, and the animal is unfit for sacrifice. And the second is fit for consumption; and for the slaughter of both of them one incurs forty lashes apiece: The first being a sacrificial animal slaughtered outside the courtyard and the second being the offspring of an animal slaughtered that day.

חוּלִּין וְקָדָשִׁים בִּפְנִים – שְׁנֵיהֶם פְּסוּלִין, וְהַשֵּׁנִי סוֹפֵג אֶת הָאַרְבָּעִים. קָדָשִׁים וְחוּלִּין בִּפְנִים – הָרִאשׁוֹן כָּשֵׁר וּפָטוּר, וְהַשֵּׁנִי סוֹפֵג אֶת הָאַרְבָּעִים וּפָסוּל.

If the first animal was non-sacred and the second was a sacrificial animal and both were slaughtered inside the Temple courtyard, both of them are unfit for sacrifice. And for slaughtering the second animal, one incurs the forty lashes. If the first animal was a sacrificial animal and the second was non-sacred and both were slaughtered inside the Temple courtyard, the first is fit for sacrifice and one who slaughters it is exempt from any punishment. And for slaughtering the second animal, one incurs the forty lashes, and the animal is unfit for sacrifice, as it is non-sacred.

חוּלִּין בַּחוּץ וּבִפְנִים – הָרִאשׁוֹן כָּשֵׁר, וּפָטוּר, וְהַשֵּׁנִי סוֹפֵג אֶת הָאַרְבָּעִים, וּפָסוּל.

If both animals were non-sacred, and one slaughters them, the first outside the Temple courtyard and the second inside the Temple courtyard, the first is fit for consumption and one who slaughters it is exempt from any punishment. And for slaughtering the second animal, one incurs the forty lashes for slaughtering an animal and its offspring on a single day, and the animal is unfit for sacrifice as it is non-sacred.

קָדָשִׁים בַּחוּץ וּבִפְנִים – הָרִאשׁוֹן חַיָּיב כָּרֵת, וּשְׁנֵיהֶם סוֹפְגִים אֶת הָאַרְבָּעִים, וּשְׁנֵיהֶם פְּסוּלִים.

If both animals were sacrificial animals, and one slaughters them, the first outside the Temple courtyard and the second inside the Temple courtyard, for slaughtering the first animal one is liable to receive karet, and for slaughtering both of them one incurs forty lashes apiece. One set of lashes is given because the first was a sacrificial animal slaughtered outside the courtyard, and the second set of lashes is given because the second animal is the offspring of an animal slaughtered that day. And both of them are unfit for sacrifice.

חוּלִּין בִּפְנִים וּבַחוּץ – הָרִאשׁוֹן פָּסוּל, וּפָטוּר, וְהַשֵּׁנִי סוֹפֵג אֶת הָאַרְבָּעִים, וְכָשֵׁר. קָדָשִׁים בִּפְנִים וּבַחוּץ – הָרִאשׁוֹן כָּשֵׁר, וּפָטוּר, וְהַשֵּׁנִי סוֹפֵג אֶת הָאַרְבָּעִים, וּפָסוּל.

If both animals were non-sacred, and one slaughters them, the first inside the Temple courtyard and the second outside the Temple courtyard, the first is unfit for sacrifice, as it is non-sacred, and the one who slaughters it is exempt. And for the second, one incurs the forty lashes and the animal is fit for consumption. If both animals were sacrificial animals, and one slaughters them, the first inside the Temple courtyard and the second outside the Temple courtyard, the first is fit for sacrifice and one who slaughters it is exempt. And for the second animal, one incurs the forty lashes, and the animal is unfit for sacrifice because its requisite time has not yet arrived.

גְּמָ׳ תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: מִנַּיִן לְאוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ שֶׁנּוֹהֵג בְּמוּקְדָּשִׁין? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״שׁוֹר אוֹ כֶשֶׂב אוֹ עֵז כִּי יִוָּלֵד״, וּכְתִיב בָּתְרֵיהּ: ״וְשׁוֹר אוֹ שֶׂה אֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ לֹא תִשְׁחֲטוּ בְּיוֹם אֶחָד״ – לִימֵּד עַל אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ שֶׁנּוֹהֵג בְּמוּקְדָּשִׁין.

GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita: From where is it derived that the prohibition against slaughtering an animal itself and its offspring in a single day applies to sacrificial animals? It is derived from a verse, as the verse states: “When a bull, or a sheep, or a goat, is born…but from the eighth day and forward it may be accepted for an offering…to the Lord” (Leviticus 22:27), and it is written in the following verse: “And whether it be a bull or a sheep, you shall not slaughter it and its offspring both in one day.” The juxtaposition of the verses teaches with regard to the prohibition against slaughtering an animal itself and its offspring that it applies to sacrificial animals as well.

וְאֵימָא: בְּמוּקְדָּשִׁין – אִין, בְּחוּלִּין – לָא! ״שׁוֹר״ הִפְסִיק הָעִנְיָן.

The Gemara challenges: But since this prohibition is taught in the context of other halakhot of consecrated animals, perhaps I will say: Yes, it applies to sacrificial animals, but it does not apply to non-sacred animals. The Gemara explains: The repetitive phrase “and whether it be a bull or a sheep” in the second verse, when those types of animals, i.e., bulls and sheep, were already mentioned in the first verse, interrupted the topic, clarifying that the second verse is not referring to sacrificial animals.

וְאֵימָא: בְּחוּלִּין – אִין, בְּמוּקְדָּשִׁין – לָא! כְּתִיב: ״וְשׁוֹר״ – וָי״ו מוֹסִיף עַל עִנְיָן רִאשׁוֹן.

The Gemara challenges: But if so, I will say: Yes, the prohibition applies to non-sacred animals, but it does not apply to sacrificial animals. The Gemara explains: Since in that verse it is written: “And whether it be a bull…you shall not slaughter it and its offspring,” the conjunction “and” adds the prohibition stated in the second verse to the first matter, including sacrificial animals as well.

אִי מָה קָדָשִׁים כִּלְאַיִם לָא, אַף אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ כִּלְאַיִם לָא? אַלְּמָה תַּנְיָא: אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ נוֹהֵג בְּכִלְאַיִם וּבְכוֹי?

The Gemara challenges: If this prohibition also applies to sacrificial animals, perhaps just as with regard to sacrificial animals, the offspring of diverse kinds is not included, e.g., the offspring of a ewe and a goat is unfit to be an offering, so too with regard to the prohibition of: A mother and its offspring, the offspring of diverse kinds should not be included, so that in the case of the offspring of a ewe and a goat, it would be permitted to slaughter the mother and offspring on the same day. Why, then, is it taught in a baraita (see Tosefta 5:1): The prohibition of: A mother and its offspring, applies to the offspring of diverse kinds and to a koy, a kosher animal with characteristics of both domesticated and undomesticated animals?

וְעוֹד, ״שֶׂה״ כְּתִיב, וְאָמַר רָבָא:

And additionally, why should the prohibition of: A mother and its offspring, apply to the offspring of diverse kinds? “A sheep,” is written in the verse with regard to that prohibition, and Rava said

זֶה בָּנָה אָב – כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״שֶׂה״ אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא לְהוֹצִיא אֶת הַכִּלְאַיִם. אָמַר קְרָא ״אוֹ״ לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַכִּלְאַיִם.

concerning the verse: “These are the animals that you may eat: An ox, a seh of sheep, and a seh of goats” (Deuteronomy 14:4), that this verse establishes a paradigm for other cases: Wherever the word seh is stated in the Torah, it serves only to exclude an animal of diverse kinds. The Hebrew word seh denotes either a sheep or a goat. The offspring of diverse kinds, which is neither a sheep nor a goat, does not qualify as a seh. The Gemara answers that with regard to a mother and its offspring, the verse states: “Whether it be a bull or a sheep” (Leviticus 22:28), and the “or” is superfluous there and serves to include the offspring of diverse kinds.

הַאי ״אוֹ״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְחַלֵּק, דְּסָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: עַד דְּשָׁחֵיט שׁוֹר וּבְנוֹ שֶׂה וּבְנוֹ לָא מִיחַיַּיב, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן. לְחַלֵּק – מִ״בְּנוֹ״ נָפְקָא.

The Gemara challenges: This word “or” is necessary to separate the prohibitions, as it might enter your mind to say: One is not liable unless he slaughters both a bull and its offspring and a sheep and its offspring in a single day. Therefore, the word “or” teaches us that one is liable for slaughtering either type of animal with its offspring. The Gemara responds: Separating the prohibitions is derived from the use of the words “its offspring” instead of their offspring.

וְאַכַּתִּי מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְתַנְיָא: אִילּוּ נֶאֱמַר ״שׁוֹר וָשֶׂה וּבְנוֹ״, הָיִיתִי אוֹמֵר: עַד שֶׁיִּשְׁחוֹט שׁוֹר וָשֶׂה וּבְנוֹ, תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״שׁוֹר אוֹ שֶׂה אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ״. מַאי לָאו מֵ״אוֹ״ נָפְקָא לֵיהּ? לָא, מֵ״אוֹתוֹ״.

The Gemara challenges: But the word “or” is still necessary for that which is taught in a baraita: If it were stated: A bull, and a sheep, and its offspring you shall not slaughter in one day, I would say: One is not liable unless he slaughters a bull, and a sheep, and the offspring of one of them in a single day. Therefore, the verse states: “A bull or a sheep…it and its offspring” (Leviticus 22:28), to teach that one is liable even for slaughtering either of them and its offspring. What, is it not from the word “or” that the baraita derives this halakha? The Gemara responds: No, it is derived from the word “it,” and the offspring of diverse kinds are included in the prohibition due to the word “or.”

הָנִיחָא לְרַבָּנַן, דִּמְיַיתַּר לְהוּ ״אוֹתוֹ״, אֶלָּא לַחֲנַנְיָה, דְּלָא מְיַיתַּר לֵיהּ ״אוֹתוֹ״, לְחַלֵּק מְנָא לֵיהּ? לְחַלֵּק לָא צְרִיךְ קְרָא, דְּסָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי יוֹנָתָן.

The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the opinion of the Rabbis, cited further in the discussion, for whom the word “it” is superfluous and can be used for this derivation, leaving the word “or” available to include the offspring of diverse kinds; but according to the opinion of Ḥananya, for whom the word “it” is not superfluous, from where does he derive that one is to separate into two prohibitions slaughtering either a bull with its offspring or a sheep with its offspring? The Gemara answers that there is no need for a verse to separate them into two prohibitions, as Ḥananya holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yonatan.

דְּתַנְיָא: ״אִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יְקַלֵּל אֶת אָבִיו וְאֶת אִמּוֹ״, אֵין לִי אֶלָּא אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ, אָבִיו שֶׁלֹּא אִמּוֹ וְאִמּוֹ שֶׁלֹּא אָבִיו מִנַּיִן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ קִלֵּל״ – אָבִיו קִלֵּל, אִמּוֹ קִלֵּל, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יֹאשִׁיָּה.

As it is taught in a baraita: From the verse: “A man who curses his father and his mother shall die” (Leviticus 20:9), I have derived only that one is liable if he curses both his father and his mother. From where do I derive that if one curses his father but not his mother, or his mother but not his father, he is liable? The continuation of the verse states: “His father and his mother he has cursed, his blood is upon him.” In the first part of the verse, the word “curses” is in proximity to “his father,” and in the last part of the verse, “cursed” is in proximity to “his mother.” This teaches that the verse is referring to both a case where he cursed only his father and a case where he cursed only his mother; this is the statement of Rabbi Yoshiya. Rabbi Yoshiya maintains that conjunctions are interpreted strictly unless the verse indicates otherwise.

רַבִּי יוֹנָתָן אוֹמֵר: מַשְׁמָע שְׁנֵיהֶם כְּאֶחָד, וּמַשְׁמָע אֶחָד בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ, עַד שֶׁיִּפְרוֹט לְךָ הַכָּתוּב ״יַחְדָּו״.

Rabbi Yonatan says: There is no need for this derivation, because the phrase “his father and his mother” indicates that one is liable if he curses both of them together, and it also indicates that he is liable if he curses either one of them on their own, unless the verse specifies that one is liable only if he curses both together. An example of a verse where the Torah specifies that the halakha applies only to the two elements in conjunction is: “You shall not plow with an ox and a donkey together” (Deuteronomy 22:10). According to Rabbi Yonatan, had the verse stated with regard to a mother and its offspring: A bull and a sheep, and not: A bull or a sheep, one would still be liable for slaughtering each with its own offspring independently. Therefore, the word “or” is superfluous, and is utilized by Ḥananya, who agrees with the opinion of Rabbi Yonatan, to include the offspring of diverse kinds in this prohibition.

מַאי חֲנַנְיָה, וּמַאי רַבָּנַן? דְּתַנְיָא: אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ נוֹהֵג בִּנְקֵבוֹת, וְאֵינוֹ נוֹהֵג בִּזְכָרִים. חֲנַנְיָה אוֹמֵר: נוֹהֵג בֵּין בִּזְכָרִים וּבֵין בִּנְקֵבוֹת.

The Gemara asks: What is the opinion of Ḥananya, and what is the opinion of the Rabbis that were mentioned earlier? Their opinions are elucidated as it is taught in a baraita: Despite the fact that the verse is written in the masculine form, the prohibition against slaughtering itself and its offspring in a single day applies to females, i.e., to a mother and its offspring, but it does not apply to males, i.e., a male animal and its offspring. Ḥananya says: It applies both to males and to females.

מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבָּנַן? דְּתַנְיָא: יָכוֹל יְהֵא אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ נוֹהֵג בֵּין בִּזְכָרִים וּבֵין בִּנְקֵבוֹת? וְדִין הוּא: חִיֵּיב כָּאן, וְחַיָּיב בְּאֵם עַל הַבָּנִים; מָה כְּשֶׁחִיֵּיב בְּאֵם עַל הַבָּנִים – בִּנְקֵבוֹת וְלֹא בִּזְכָרִים, אַף כְּשֶׁחִיֵּיב כָּאן – בִּנְקֵבוֹת וְלֹא בִּזְכָרִים.

The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning of the Rabbis, i.e., the first tanna? Their reasoning is as it is taught in a baraita: One might have thought that the prohibition against slaughtering a mother and its offspring would apply both to males and to females. But could one not derive this by logical inference, reaching the opposite conclusion: The Torah rendered one obligated here not to slaughter an animal and its offspring in a single day, and the Torah rendered one obligated with regard to a mother bird with its chicks not to seize them together, but to dispatch the mother. Just as when it rendered one obligated with regard to a mother bird with its chicks, the obligation applies to female birds but not to males, as the verse states: “And the mother sitting on the chicks” (Deuteronomy 22:6), so too, when it rendered one obligated here, with regard to an animal and its offspring, the obligation should apply to female animals, but not to males.

לֹא, אִם אָמַרְתָּ בְּאֵם עַל הַבָּנִים, שֶׁכֵּן לֹא עָשָׂה בָּהּ מְזוּמָּן כְּשֶׁאֵינוֹ מְזוּמָּן, תֹּאמַר בְּאוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ, שֶׁעָשָׂה בּוֹ מְזוּמָּן כְּשֶׁאֵינוֹ מְזוּמָּן?

One may respond: No, if you say that this is so with regard to a mother bird with its chicks, for which the Torah did not render prepared ones equivalent to unprepared ones, as the obligation to dispatch the mother bird applies only where one happens to encounter a mother bird with its chicks spontaneously, but not to ones that he keeps in his property, shall you also say that this is so with regard to the prohibition of an animal itself and its offspring, for which the Torah rendered prepared ones equivalent to unprepared ones, prohibiting an animal and its offspring even if they are prepared? If so, the prohibition against slaughtering an animal and its offspring should apply to both males and females.

תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״אוֹתוֹ״ – אֶחָד וְלֹא שְׁנַיִם. אַחַר שֶׁחִלֵּק הַכָּתוּב, זָכִיתִי לְדִין: חִיֵּיב כָּאן וְחִיֵּיב בְּאֵם עַל הַבָּנִים – מָה כְּשֶׁחִיֵּיב בְּאֵם עַל הַבָּנִים – בִּנְקֵבוֹת וְלֹא בִּזְכָרִים, אַף כְּשֶׁחִיֵּיב כָּאן – בִּנְקֵבוֹת וְלֹא בִּזְכָרִים.

Therefore, the verse states: “A bull or a sheep, it and its offspring” (Leviticus 22:28). The superfluous word “it” indicates that this applies to only one parent, but not to two. The baraita continues: After the verse separated the parents, rendering the prohibition applicable to only one of them, I merited returning to the logical inference mentioned earlier: The Torah rendered one obligated here not to slaughter an animal and its offspring in a single day, and the Torah rendered one obligated to dispatch the mother with regard to a mother bird with its chicks. Just as when it rendered one obligated with regard to a mother bird with its chicks, the obligation applies to females but not to males, so too, when it rendered one obligated here, the obligation applies to females but not to males.

וְאִם נַפְשְׁךָ לוֹמַר, ״בְּנוֹ״ – מִי שֶׁבְּנוֹ כָּרוּךְ אַחֲרָיו, יָצָא זָכָר שֶׁאֵין בְּנוֹ כָּרוּךְ אַחֲרָיו.

And if it is your wish to say that one can refute this, that refutation can be countered by the following derivation: The verse states: “It and its offspring” (Leviticus 22:28), indicating that this applies to that parent whose offspring clings to it. This serves to exclude the male parent, whose offspring does not cling to it.

מָה אִם נַפְשְׁךָ לוֹמַר? וְכִי תֵּימָא ״אוֹתוֹ״ זָכָר מַשְׁמַע, הֲרֵי הוּא אוֹמֵר ״בְּנוֹ״ – מִי שֶׁבְּנוֹ כָּרוּךְ אַחֲרָיו, יָצָא זָכָר שֶׁאֵין בְּנוֹ כָּרוּךְ אַחֲרָיו.

The Gemara asks: To what possible refutation is the expression: If it is your wish to say, referring? The Gemara explains that the possible refutation is: And if you would say that the word “it,” in the verse denotes a male, as it is expressed in the masculine gender in the Hebrew, the response is that the verse also states “its offspring” in that verse, indicating that this applies to that parent whose offspring clings to it. This serves to exclude the male parent, whose offspring does not cling to it.