עירובין סח

עירובין סח

מָה הַזָּאָה שְׁבוּת, וְאֵינָהּ דּוֹחָה אֶת הַשַּׁבָּת. אַף אֲמִירָה לְגוֹי שְׁבוּת, וְאֵינָהּ דּוֹחָה אֶת הַשַּׁבָּת.

Just as sprinkling the water of purification is prohibited by rabbinic decree and does not override Shabbat, even for the purpose of a mitzva, so too, telling a gentile to perform a prohibited labor Shabbat is prohibited by rabbinic decree and does not override Shabbat. How, then, could Rabba suggest that they instruct a gentile and thus transgress a rabbinic decree?

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: וְלָא שָׁנֵי לָךְ בֵּין שְׁבוּת דְּאִית בֵּיהּ מַעֲשֶׂה לִשְׁבוּת דְּלֵית בֵּיהּ מַעֲשֶׂה? דְּהָא מָר לָא אֲמַר לְגוֹי: זִיל אַחֵים.

Rav Yosef said to him: But do you not differentiate between a rabbinic decree that involves an action and a rabbinic decree that does not involve an action? As the Master, Rabba, did not say to the gentile: Go and heat water on Shabbat, but only told him to transfer something from one domain to another, which does not involve an action and is therefore less severe.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבָּה בַּר רַב חָנָן לְאַבָּיֵי: מְבוֹאָה דְּאִית בֵּיהּ תְּרֵי גַּבְרֵי רַבְרְבֵי כְּרַבָּנַן, לָא לֶיהֱוֵי בֵּיהּ לָא עֵירוּב וְלֹא שִׁיתּוּף?! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַאי נַעֲבֵיד? מָר, לָאו אוֹרְחֵיהּ. אֲנָא, טְרִידְנָא בְּגִירְסַאי. אִינְהוּ, לָא מַשְׁגְּחִי.

Upon hearing of this incident and the ensuing discussion, Rabba bar Rav Ḥanan said to Abaye: In an alleyway that contains two such great people as the Sages Rabba and Abaye, is it possible that there could be neither an eiruv nor a merging of alleyways? Abaye said to him: What should we do? As for the Master, Rabba, it is not his manner to go and collect for the eiruv from all the residents of the alleyway. As for myself, I am busy with my studies and do not have time to take care of this issue. And they, the other residents of the alleyway, do not attend to such matters.

וְאִי אַקְנִי לְהוּ פִּיתָּא בְּסַלָּא — כֵּיוָן דְּאִי בָּעוּ לַהּ מִינַּאי וְלָא אֶפְשָׁר לִיתְּבַהּ נִהֲלַיְיהוּ, בָּטֵיל שִׁיתּוּף.

And if I were to transfer to the residents of the alleyway a share of the bread in my basket, so as to allow them to join a merging of alleyways, since if they would want to take it from me it would be impossible for me to give it to them because I am poor and need the small amount of bread that I can afford for myself, the merging of alleyways would therefore be invalid.

דְּתַנְיָא: אֶחָד מִבְּנֵי מָבוֹי שֶׁבִּיקֵּשׁ יַיִן וָשֶׁמֶן, וְלֹא נָתְנוּ לוֹ — בָּטֵל הַשִּׁתּוּף.

As it was taught in a baraita: If one of the residents of an alleyway requested wine or oil from the merging of alleyways, and they did not give him any, the merging of alleyways is invalid. This is because it has become evident that he is not considered a true partner in it.

וְנַקְנֵי לְהוּ מָר רְבִיעֲתָא דְחַלָּא בְּחָבִיתָא. תַּנְיָא, אֵין מִשְׁתַּתְּפִין בָּאוֹצָר.

Rabba bar Rav Ḥanin further asked: But let the Master transfer to them a quarter-log of vinegar in one of his barrels; certainly even Abaye could afford to provide such a small amount of vinegar for the rest of the residents. Abaye replied: It was taught in a baraita: One may not use food in a storeroom for a merging of alleyways, as it is not clear which specific portion of the food is being set aside for that purpose. The same halakha would apply to an unspecified quarter-log of vinegar in a barrel.

וְהָא תַּנְיָא מִשְׁתַּתְּפִין! אָמַר רַב אוֹשַׁעְיָא: לָא קַשְׁיָא, הָא — בֵּית שַׁמַּאי, הָא — בֵּית הִלֵּל.

Rabba bar Rav Ḥanin raised a difficulty. Wasn’t it taught in a different baraita: One may use stored food for a merging of alleyways? Rav Oshaya said: This is not difficult. This source, the baraita that states that one may not use stored food for a merging of alleyways, is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai. And that source, the baraita that states that it is permitted to do so, is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel. Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree about whether or not to apply the principle of retroactive clarification.

דִּתְנַן: הַמֵּת בַּבַּיִת, וְלוֹ פְּתָחִים הַרְבֵּה — כּוּלָּן טְמֵאִין.

As we learned in a mishna: If a corpse is in a house, and the house has many entrances, they are all ritually impure. It is currently unknown through which entrance the corpse will be removed from the house, and any of the entrances might be used for this purpose. Therefore, they all contract impurity imparted by a corpse in a tent as though the corpse had already passed through each of them.

נִפְתַּח אֶחָד מֵהֶן — הוּא טָמֵא, וְכוּלָּן טְהוֹרִין. חִישֵּׁב לְהוֹצִיאוֹ בְּאֶחָד מֵהֶן, אוֹ בַּחַלּוֹן שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ אַרְבָּעָה עַל אַרְבָּעָה — מַצִּיל עַל כׇּל הַפְּתָחִים כּוּלָּן.

However, if only one of them was open, that particular entrance is ritually impure, as the corpse will certainly be removed through it, while all of the others are ritually pure. If one decided from the outset to remove the corpse through one of the entrances, or through a window that is four by four handbreadths in size, it saves all of the other entrances from contracting impurity.

בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: וְהוּא שֶׁחִישֵּׁב עַד שֶׁלֹּא יָמוּת הַמֵּת. וּבֵית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים: אַף מִשֶּׁיָּמוּת הַמֵּת.

Beit Shammai say: This applies only if he had decided on an entrance before the person died, so that the entrance through which his body would be removed was already determined at the time of death. But Beit Hillel say: This applies even if he decided the matter only after the person had died, as the principle of retroactive selection is invoked and the entrance through which the deceased will be removed has been retroactively established. The same dispute applies to a merging of alleyways with an unspecified portion of stored food, and it revolves around whether it can be retroactively established that a specific portion had been set aside for the merging of alleyways.

הָהוּא יָנוֹקָא דְּאִישְׁתְּפוּךְ חַמִּימֵיהּ, אֲמַר לְהוּ רָבָא: נִישַׁיְּילַהּ לְאִימֵּיהּ אִי צְרִיכָא — נַחֵים לֵיהּ גּוֹי אַגַּב אִימֵּיהּ.

The Gemara relates another story about a certain baby whose warm water, which had been prepared for his Shabbat circumcision, spilled. Rava said to those who had brought the matter to his attention: Let us ask the baby’s mother. If the warm water is necessary for her health, let a gentile heat water for the baby indirectly, through his mother. In other words, the water may be heated for the mother, as a woman after childbirth is regarded as being in a life-threatening situation.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב מְשַׁרְשְׁיָא לְרָבָא: אִימֵּיהּ קָא אָכְלָה תַּמְרֵי. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֵימוֹר, תּוּנְבָּא בְּעָלְמָא הוּא דְּנָקֵט לַהּ.

Rav Mesharshiya said to Rava: The baby’s mother is healthy enough that she is eating dates. Certainly her condition is not precarious enough to necessitate the heating of water. Rava said to him: It is possible to say that it was merely a ravenous hunger that had seized her, and she is unaware of what she is eating, but in fact she is still dangerously ill.

הָהוּא יָנוֹקָא דְּאִישְׁתְּפוּךְ חַמִּימֵיהּ, אֲמַר לְהוּ רָבָא: פַּנּוּ לִי מָאנֵי מִבֵּי גַבְרֵי לְבֵי נְשֵׁי, וְאֵיזִיל וְאִיתֵּיב הָתָם וְאֶיבַטֵּיל לְהוּ הָא חָצֵר.

The Gemara relates yet another similar incident: There was once a certain baby whose warm water, which had been prepared for his Shabbat circumcision, spilled. Rava, who had water in his courtyard but had not established a joint eiruv with the adjacent courtyard where the baby was located, said to those who asked him about the matter: Clear away my belongings from the men’s chamber, which opens directly into my courtyard, to the inner women’s chamber, which does not. Rava was concerned that he would come to carry his belongings into the courtyard, which would be prohibited once he had renounced his rights to it. And I will go and sit there, in the women’s chamber, and I will renounce my rights to this courtyard in favor of the residents of the baby’s courtyard, so that they will be able to transfer the warm water from one courtyard to the other.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרָבָא, וְהָאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: אֵין בִּיטּוּל רְשׁוּת מֵחָצֵר לְחָצֵר?! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֲנָא כְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן סְבִירָא לִי, דְּאָמַר: יֵשׁ בִּיטּוּל מֵחָצֵר לְחָצֵר.

Ravina said to Rava: Didn’t Shmuel say: There is no renunciation of rights from one courtyard to another. How, then, can you renounce your rights to your courtyard in this manner? Rava said to him: I hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said: There is renouncing of rights from one courtyard to another.

וְאִי לָא סָבַר לַהּ מָר כִּשְׁמוּאֵל

Ravina then asked Rava: But if the Master does not hold in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel,

נִיתֵּיב מָר בְּדוּכְתֵּיהּ, וְנִיבַטֵּיל לְהוּ לְדִידְהוּ, וְנִיהְדְּרוּ אִינְהוּ וְנִיבַטְּלוּ לֵיהּ לְמָר, דְּהָא אָמַר רַב: מְבַטְּלִין, וְחוֹזְרִין וּמְבַטְּלִין.

let the Master remain in his place, i.e., in the men’s chamber, and renounce his rights to his courtyard in favor of the residents of the baby’s courtyard, so that they may transfer the water from one courtyard to the other. And then, after the water has been moved, let them renounce their rights in favor of the Master, so that he may once again carry in his courtyard. As Rav said: If two people who live in the same courtyard forgot to establish an eiruv, one person may renounce his rights in favor of the other when he needs it, and the second person may then renounce his rights in favor of the first when he needs it.

אֲנָא בְּהָא כִּשְׁמוּאֵל סְבִירָא לִי, דְּאָמַר: אֵין מְבַטְּלִין וְחוֹזְרִין וּמְבַטְּלִין.

Rava replied: In this regard, I hold in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, who said: One person may not renounce his rights in favor of the other and then subsequently have the second person renounce his rights in favor of the first.

וְלָאו חַד טַעְמָא הוּא? מַאי טַעְמָא אֵין מְבַטְּלִין וְחוֹזְרִין וּמְבַטְּלִין — לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּכֵיוָן דְּבַטְּלֵיהּ לִרְשׁוּתֵיהּ, אִסְתַּלַּק לֵיהּ מֵהָכָא לִגְמָרֵי, וְהָוֵה לֵיהּ כְּבֶן חָצֵר אַחֶרֶת, וְאֵין בִּיטּוּל רְשׁוּת מֵחָצֵר לְחָצֵר. מָר נָמֵי, לָא נִיבַטֵּיל.

Ravina raised a difficulty: Isn’t the reason for both halakhot one and the same? What is the reason that one may not renounce his rights in favor of the other and then subsequently have the other renounce his rights in favor of the first? Is it not because it is assumed that since he renounced his rights to the courtyard, it is as if he has completely removed himself from here, and he is now considered like the resident of a different courtyard, and Shmuel holds that there is no renouncing of rights from one courtyard to another? If so, the Master should likewise not renounce his rights to his courtyard. If you accept Shmuel’s opinion with regard to subsequent renouncing, you should likewise accept his opinion with regard to renunciation of rights from one courtyard to another.

הָתָם הַיְינוּ טַעְמָא: כִּי הֵיכִי דְּלָא לֶיהֱוֵי מִלְּתָא דְּרַבָּנַן כְּחוּכָא וְאִטְלוּלָא.

Rava responded: That is not Shmuel’s reason for prohibiting subsequent renunciations. There, this is the rationale for his opinion: So that the words of the Sages should not be a subject of laughter and mockery. If it is permitted for one person to renounce his rights in favor of another and then for the second person to renounce his rights in favor of the first, the Sages’ enactment will lose all meaning.

גּוּפָא, רַב אָמַר: מְבַטְּלִין וְחוֹזְרִין וּמְבַטְּלִין, וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: אֵין מְבַטְּלִין וְחוֹזְרִין וּמְבַטְּלִין.

The Gemara proceeds to examine in greater detail the issue raised in the previous discussion. Returning to the matter itself, Rav said: If two people who live in the same courtyard forgot to establish an eiruv, one may renounce his rights in favor of the other, and then the second person may renounce his rights in favor of the first. And Shmuel said: One may not renounce his rights in favor of the other and then subsequently have the second person renounce his rights in favor of the first.

לֵימָא רַב וּשְׁמוּאֵל בִּפְלוּגְתָּא דְּרַבָּנַן וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר קָא מִיפַּלְגִי.

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that Rav and Shmuel disagree about the same point of dispute as the Rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer. Elsewhere it is taught that Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis disagree with regard to the halakha in a case where one of the residents of a courtyard forgot to join in the eiruv, but subsequently renounced his rights to the courtyard on Shabbat. The dispute revolves around the status of this resident’s house. Rabbi Eliezer holds that it is prohibited for him to carry in and out of his house, while the other residents of the courtyard are permitted to do so. However, the Rabbis hold that the other residents are prohibited from carrying in and out of his house as well.

דְּרַב דְּאָמַר כְּרַבָּנַן וּשְׁמוּאֵל דְּאָמַר כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר.

The suggestion is that Rav stated his ruling in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that even one who renounces his rights to his courtyard does not renounce his rights to his house. As he has not completely removed himself from the courtyard, the other residents may later go back and renounce their rights in his favor. And Shmuel stated his ruling in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. He maintains that this resident has completely removed himself from the courtyard. Therefore, there is no possibility of others subsequently renouncing their rights in his favor, as he is no longer considered a resident of the courtyard.

אָמַר לְךָ רַב, אֲנָא דַּאֲמַרִי אֲפִילּוּ לְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר הָתָם הַמְּבַטֵּל רְשׁוּת חֲצֵירוֹ — רְשׁוּת בֵּיתוֹ בִּיטֵּל, מִשּׁוּם דִּבְבַיִת בְּלָא חָצֵר לָא דָּיְירִי אִינָשֵׁי. אֲבָל לְעִנְיַן אִיסְתַּלּוֹקֵי, מִי אָמַר?

The Gemara rejects this comparison: Rav could have said to you: What I said is even in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Eliezer stated his opinion there, that one who renounces his rights to his courtyard also renounces his rights to his house, only because people do not live in a house without a courtyard, and therefore it is evident that he has renounced his rights to his house as well. However, with regard to whether or not the person himself is considered entirely removed from the courtyard to the extent that the others would be unable to then renounce their rights in his favor, did he state this? According to this explanation, it is possible that Rav’s opinion concurs with Rabbi Eliezer’s statement.

וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: אֲנָא דַּאֲמַרִי אֲפִילּוּ כְּרַבָּנַן, עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמְרִי רַבָּנַן הָתָם אֶלָּא מַאי דְּבַטֵּיל בַּטֵּיל, וּדְלָא בַּטֵּיל לָא בַּטֵּיל. אֲבָל מַאי דְּבַטֵּיל — מִיהָא אִיסְתַּלַּק לִגְמָרֵי.

And Shmuel could have said: What I said is even in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. The Rabbis stated their opinion only there, where they ruled: That which he has renounced, i.e., his rights to his courtyard, is renounced; and that which he has not renounced, i.e., his rights in his house, is not renounced. However, from that which he has renounced, he has removed himself completely. Consequently, all agree that one who renounces his rights to his courtyard is no longer considered a resident of that place.

אָמַר רַב אַחָא בַּר חָנָא אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת, כְּתַנָּאֵי: מִי שֶׁנָּתַן רְשׁוּתוֹ, וְהוֹצִיא, בֵּין בְּשׁוֹגֵג בֵּין בְּמֵזִיד — אוֹסֵר, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: בְּמֵזִיד — אוֹסֵר, בְּשׁוֹגֵג — אֵינוֹ אוֹסֵר.

Rav Aḥa bar Ḥana said that Rav Sheshet said: This dispute between Rav and Shmuel is like an earlier dispute between tanna’im. We learned elsewhere in a mishna: If one gave away his rights to his share of the courtyard to the other residents of the courtyard by renouncing them after having forgotten to establish an eiruv with the other residents on the previous day, and then he carried something out from his house into the courtyard, whether he did so unwittingly, forgetting that he had renounced his rights, or intentionally, he once again renders carrying prohibited for all the residents of the courtyard, as his action cancels his renunciation. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: If he did so intentionally, he renders carrying prohibited for the other residents; but if he did it unwittingly, he does not render carrying prohibited for them.

מַאי לָאו, בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי: דְּמָר סָבַר מְבַטְּלִין וְחוֹזְרִין וּמְבַטְּלִין, וּמַר סָבַר אֵין מְבַטְּלִין וְחוֹזְרִין וּמְבַטְּלִין.

What, is it not that they disagree with regard to this: One Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that a person who renounces his rights does not remove himself completely from his domain, and therefore one person may renounce his rights in favor of another, and the second person may then renounce his rights in favor of the first. As a result, even an inadvertent act of carrying serves to cancel the renunciation. And one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, holds that one who renounces his rights removes himself completely from his domain, and therefore one person may not renounce his rights in favor of another and then subsequently have the second person renounce his rights in favor of the first. In that case, only an intentional act of carrying can cancel the renunciation.

אָמַר רַב אַחָא בַּר תַּחְלִיפָא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא: לָא, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא אֵין מְבַטְּלִין וְחוֹזְרִין וּמְבַטְּלִין, וְהָכָא בְּקָנְסוּ שׁוֹגֵג אַטּוּ מֵזִיד קָא מִיפַּלְגִי. מָר סָבַר: קָנְסוּ שׁוֹגֵג אַטּוּ מֵזִיד, וּמָר סָבַר: לֹא קָנְסוּ שׁוֹגֵג אַטּוּ מֵזִיד.

Rav Aḥa bar Taḥalifa said in the name of Rava: No, everyone agrees that a person who renounces his rights removes himself completely from his domain, and therefore one person may not renounce his rights in favor of another and then subsequently have the second person renounce his rights in favor of the first. And here, they disagree with regard to the question: Did the Sages penalize an unwitting offender due to an intentional offender? One Sage, Rabbi Meir, who states that the resident always renders carrying prohibited for the others, holds that they penalized an unwitting offender due to an intentional offender. And one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, who states that the resident renders carrying prohibited for the others only if he acted intentionally, holds that they did not penalize an unwitting offender due to an intentional offender.

רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: רַב וּשְׁמוּאֵל בִּפְלוּגְתָּא דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר וְרַבָּנַן קָא מִיפַּלְגִי.

Rav Ashi, disagreeing with the Gemara’s refutation, said: Rav and Shmuel disagree in the same dispute as do Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis.

אָמַר רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל: מַעֲשֶׂה בְּצַדּוּקִי אֶחָד שֶׁהָיָה דָּר עִמָּנוּ. צַדּוּקִי מַאן דְּכַר שְׁמֵיהּ?

It was stated in the mishna that Rabban Gamliel said: There was an incident involving a certain Sadducee who lived with us in the same alleyway in Jerusalem, who renounced his rights in the alleyway before Shabbat. The mishna then continues with a discussion about how and whether the alleyway may be used on Shabbat. The Gemara first poses a question: A Sadducee; who mentioned his name? The mishna had thus far spoken only of a gentile, so why does Rabban Gamliel invoke an incident involving a Sadducee?

חַסּוֹרֵי מִיחַסְּרָא וְהָכִי קָתָנֵי: צַדּוּקִי הֲרֵי הוּא כְּגוֹי, וְרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: צַדּוּקִי אֵינוֹ כְּגוֹי. וְאָמַר רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל: מַעֲשֶׂה בְּצַדּוּקִי אֶחָד שֶׁהָיָה דָּר עִמָּנוּ בְּמָבוֹי בִּירוּשָׁלַיִם, וְאָמַר לָנוּ אַבָּא: מַהֲרוּ וְהוֹצִיאוּ אֶת הַכֵּלִים לַמָּבוֹי, עַד שֶׁלֹּא יוֹצִיא וְיֶאֱסֹר עֲלֵיכֶם.

The Gemara answers: The mishna is incomplete. It is missing an important element, and this is what it is teaching: The legal status of a Sadducee is like that of a gentile, and Rabban Gamliel says: The legal status of a Sadducee is not like that of a gentile. And Rabban Gamliel further said: There was an incident involving a certain Sadducee who lived with us in the same alleyway in Jerusalem, who renounced his rights in the alleyway before Shabbat, and Father said to us: Hurry and take out your utensils to the alleyway to establish possession of it before he changes his mind and takes out his utensils, in which case he would render it prohibited for you to use the entire alleyway.

וְהָתַנְיָא: הַדָּר עִם הַנׇּכְרִי, צַדּוּקִי, וּבַיְתּוֹסִי — הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ אוֹסְרִין עָלָיו. (רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: צַדּוּקִי וּבַיְתּוֹסִי אֵינָן אוֹסְרִין.) וּמַעֲשֶׂה בְּצַדּוּקִי אֶחָד שֶׁהָיָה דָּר עִם רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל בְּמָבוֹי בִּירוּשָׁלַיִם, וְאָמַר לָהֶם רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל לְבָנָיו: בָּנַי, מַהֲרוּ וְהוֹצִיאוּ מַה שֶּׁאַתֶּם מוֹצִיאִין וְהַכְנִיסוּ מַה שֶּׁאַתֶּם מַכְנִיסִין, עַד שֶׁלֹּא יוֹצִיא הַתּוֹעֵב הַזֶּה וְיֶאֱסֹר עֲלֵיכֶם, שֶׁהֲרֵי בִּיטֵּל רְשׁוּתוֹ לָכֶם, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר.

And similarly, wasn’t it taught in a baraita that the status of a Sadducee is a matter of dispute between tanna’im: If one lives with a gentile, a Sadducee, or a Boethusian in the same alleyway, they render carrying prohibited for him. Rabban Gamliel says: A Sadducee or a Boethusian do not prohibit one from carrying. There was an incident involving a certain Sadducee who lived with Rabban Gamliel in the same alleyway in Jerusalem, and he renounced his rights to the alleyway before Shabbat. Rabban Gamliel said to his sons: Hurry and take out those utensils that you wish to take out, and bring in those utensils that you wish to bring in, before that loathsome person retracts his renunciation and takes out his utensils and prohibits you from using the alleyway, as he renounced his rights in your favor; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: בְּלָשׁוֹן אַחֶרֶת — מַהֲרוּ וַעֲשׂוּ צוֹרְכֵיכֶם בַּמָּבוֹי, עַד שֶׁלֹּא תֶּחְשַׁךְ וְיֶאֱסֹר עֲלֵיכֶם.

Rabbi Yehuda says: Rabban Gamliel spoke to them with a different formulation, saying: Hurry and do whatever you must do in the alleyway prior to Shabbat, before night falls and he prohibits you from using the alleyway.

אָמַר מָר: הוֹצִיאוּ מַה שֶּׁאַתֶּם מוֹצִיאִין, וְהַכְנִיסוּ מַה שֶּׁאַתֶּם מַכְנִיסִין, עַד שֶׁלֹּא יוֹצִיא הַתּוֹעֵב הַזֶּה וְיֶאֱסֹר עֲלֵיכֶם. לְמֵימְרָא דְּכִי מַפְּקִי אִינְהוּ וַהֲדַר מַפֵּיק אִיהוּ לָא אָסַר?!

The Gemara proceeds to analyze this baraita. The Master said previously: Take out those utensils that you wish to take out, and bring in those utensils that you wish to bring in, before that loathsome person takes out his utensils and prohibits you from using the alleyway. The Gemara poses a question: Is that to say that, according to Rabbi Meir, if they took out their utensils and then afterward the gentile or Sadducee took out his utensils on Shabbat, he does not render carrying prohibited for them?