גיטין פ

גיטין פ

בַּת לֵוִי – מִן הַמַּעֲשֵׂר. בַּת כֹּהֵן – מִן הַתְּרוּמָה.

If she was the daughter of a Levite, through these two marriages she becomes prohibited from partaking of the tithe that is given to Levites. If she was the daughter of a priest, she becomes prohibited from partaking of teruma, even after she returns to the house of her father the priest.

וְאֵין יוֹרְשִׁין שֶׁל זֶה וְיוֹרְשִׁין שֶׁל זֶה יוֹרְשִׁים כְּתוּבָּתָהּ. וְאִם מֵתוּ – אָחִיו שֶׁל זֶה וְאָחִיו שֶׁל זֶה חוֹלְצִין, וְלֹא מְיַיבְּמִין.

And the heirs of this husband and the heirs of that husband do not inherit the rights to collect payment of her marriage contract if she dies. And if the husbands die, the brother of this first husband and the brother of that second husband perform ḥalitza, since she was betrothed to the second one as well, and they do not consummate the levirate marriage.

שִׁינָּה שְׁמוֹ, וּשְׁמָהּ, שֵׁם עִירוֹ, וְשֵׁם עִירָהּ – תֵּצֵא מִזֶּה וּמִזֶּה, וְכׇל הַדְּרָכִים הָאֵלּוּ בָּהּ.

The mishna proceeds to teach an additional halakha concerning a bill of divorce written not in accordance with its halakhot: If he changed his name, i.e., he wrote a different name in the bill of divorce, or he changed her name, or if he changed the name of his city or the name of her city, and she remarried on the basis of this bill of divorce, then she must leave both this first husband and that second husband. And all of those above-mentioned ways of penalizing a woman who remarried based on the bills of divorce detailed in the earlier clause of the mishna apply to her in this case as well.

כׇּל עֲרָיוֹת שֶׁאָמְרוּ ״צָרוֹתֵיהֶן מוּתָּרוֹת״ –

The mishna teaches another halakha associated with the previous halakhot: With regard to all of those cases in which they said that a man who died without children and left behind a widow who is, to the man’s brother, one of those with whom relations are forbidden, e.g., she is his wife’s sister, not only is there no levirate bond for her, but the rival wives of the brother who died are also permitted to marry without either levirate marriage or ḥalitza.

הָלְכוּ הַצָּרוֹת הָאֵלּוּ וְנִישְּׂאוּ, וְנִמְצְאוּ אֵלּוּ אַיְילוֹנִיֹּת – תֵּצֵא מִזֶּה וּמִזֶּה, וְכׇל הַדְּרָכִים הָאֵלּוּ בָּהּ.

The mishna discusses another case: These rival wives went and married another man without ḥalitza, and these widows with whom relationships were forbidden were found to be sexually underdeveloped women incapable of bearing children [ailonit]. Therefore, it became clear, retroactively, that the marriage to the dead brother was never valid, and accordingly, the rival wives were never exempt from the obligation of levirate marriage due to their being the rival wives of a forbidden relationship. Consequently, the rival wives were forbidden to marry anyone else without ḥalitza, and the rival wives must leave both this man whom they remarried, and that yavam, i.e., they cannot enter into levirate marriage with him. And all of those above-mentioned ways of penalizing a woman who remarried based on the bills of divorce detailed in the earlier clause of the mishna apply to her in this case as well.

הַכּוֹנֵס אֶת יְבִמְתּוֹ, וְהָלְכָה צָרָתָהּ וְנִישֵּׂאת לְאַחֵר, וְנִמְצֵאת זוֹ – שֶׁהָיְתָה אַיְילוֹנִית; תֵּצֵא מִזֶּה וּמִזֶּה, וְכׇל הַדְּרָכִים הָאֵלּוּ בָּהּ.

Similarly, with regard to one who marries his yevama, and her rival wife went and got married to another man, and it was found that this yevama was a sexually underdeveloped woman, the rival wife must leave this man whom she remarried and that yavam, i.e., she cannot enter into levirate marriage with him. Because the yevama was a sexually underdeveloped woman, the obligation of levirate marriage never applied to her, and her levirate marriage did not exempt her rival wife. And all of those aforementioned ways of penalizing a woman who remarried based on the bills of divorce detailed in the earlier clause of the mishna apply to her in this case as well.

כָּתַב סוֹפֵר גֵּט לָאִישׁ, וְשׁוֹבָר לָאִשָּׁה; וְטָעָה וְנָתַן גֵּט לָאִשָּׁה, וְשׁוֹבָר לָאִישׁ, וְנָתְנוּ זֶה לָזֶה;

The mishna now discusses another case: A scribe wrote a bill of divorce for a man, so that the man could divorce his wife with it; and he wrote a receipt for the woman, for her to give to her husband upon receiving payment of her marriage contract, verifying that she received the payment. And the scribe erred and gave the bill of divorce to the woman and the receipt to the man, and not knowing what was written in the documents that were in their possession, they gave what they received from the scribe to each other. The woman gave her husband a bill of divorce and the husband gave his wife a receipt, and consequently, there was no divorce at all.

וּלְאַחַר זְמַן הֲרֵי הַגֵּט יוֹצֵא מִיַּד הָאִישׁ וְשׁוֹבָר מִיַּד הָאִשָּׁה – תֵּצֵא מִזֶּה וּמִזֶּה, וְכׇל הַדְּרָכִים הָאֵלּוּ בָּהּ.

And after some time, the bill of divorce is in the possession of the man, and the receipt is in the possession of the woman, and they discover that the divorce never actually transpired. If the woman had remarried another man, she must leave this, the first husband, and that, the second husband. And all of those above-mentioned ways of penalizing a woman who remarried based on the bills of divorce detailed in the earlier clause of the mishna apply to her in this case as well.

רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר: אִם לְאַלְתַּר יָצָא, אֵין זֶה גֵּט; אִם לְאַחַר זְמַן יָצָא, הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט – לֹא כָּל הֵימֶנּוּ מִן הָרִאשׁוֹן לְאַבֵּד זְכוּתוֹ שֶׁל שֵׁנִי.

Rabbi Elazar says: If the bill of divorce is immediately [le’altar] in the husband’s possession, this is not a valid bill of divorce, since he clearly never gave it to her. But if it is in his possession after some time, then this is a valid bill of divorce, since it is not in the power of the first husband to eliminate the right of the second husband. The assumption is that the husband did in fact give her the bill of divorce in the correct manner, but at some point, he took it back from her.

גְּמָ׳ מַאי ״מַלְכוּת שֶׁאֵינָהּ הוֹגֶנֶת״? רוֹמִי. וְאַמַּאי קָרֵי לַהּ מַלְכוּת שֶׁאֵינָהּ הוֹגֶנֶת? מִשּׁוּם דְּאֵין לָהֶם לֹא כְּתָב, וְלֹא לָשׁוֹן.

GEMARA: It was stated in the mishna that if one wrote the date on a bill of divorce according to a kingdom that is not legitimate, it is invalid. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the description: A kingdom that is not legitimate? The Gemara answers: This is referring to the Roman Empire, and he wrote the bill of divorce in a different country, such as Babylonia, where the Romans were not in power. And why is it called: A kingdom that is not legitimate? Because they have neither their own script, nor their own language, but rather, they took them from other nations.

אָמַר עוּלָּא: מִפְּנֵי מָה תִּיקְּנוּ מַלְכוּת בְּגִיטִּין – מִשּׁוּם שְׁלוֹם מַלְכוּת.

Ulla said: For what reason did the Sages institute that the date should be written according to the years of the local kingdom, in bills of divorce? Due to the need to maintain peaceful relations with the kingdom, as the government is particular that important documents issued in its domain be written with the date of that government.

וּמִשּׁוּם שְׁלוֹם מַלְכוּת – תֵּצֵא וְהַוָּלָד מַמְזֵר?!

The Gemara asks: But due to an ordinance instituted by the Sages solely for the sake of maintaining peaceful relations with the kingdom, would they be so stringent that the woman would be forced to leave her husband, and they would declare the status of the offspring is a mamzer?

אִין, רַבִּי מֵאִיר לְטַעְמֵיהּ – דְּאָמַר רַב הַמְנוּנָא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּעוּלָּא, אוֹמֵר הָיָה רַבִּי מֵאִיר: כָּל הַמְשַׁנֶּה מִמַּטְבֵּעַ שֶׁטָּבְעוּ חֲכָמִים בְּגִיטִּין – הַוָּלָד מַמְזֵר.

The Gemara answers: Yes. Rabbi Meir conforms to his line of reasoning. As Rav Hamnuna says in the name of Ulla: Rabbi Meir would say that anyone deviating from the formula coined by the Sages for bills of divorce, even if it is only a minor deviation, the bill of divorce is invalid, and if the woman remarried on the basis of this bill of divorce, then the offspring from that marriage is a mamzer.

לְשׁוּם מַלְכוּת יָוָן. וּצְרִיכָא; דְּאִי אַשְׁמוֹעִינַן מַלְכוּת שֶׁאֵינָהּ הוֹגֶנֶת – מִשּׁוּם דִּמְלִיכָא; אֲבָל מַלְכוּת מָדַי וּמַלְכוּת יָוָן – מַאי דַהֲוָה הֲוָה;

It was stated in the mishna: If he wrote the date on a bill of divorce in the name of the Greek Empire, then the bill of divorce is invalid. The Gemara comments: And it is necessary to state this halakha and the other halakhot as well. As, if the mishna had taught us this halakha only with regard to a kingdom that is not legitimate, one could say that the bill of divorce is invalid because this kingdom is currently ruling, and the local government where he is writing the bill of divorce therefore objects to his writing the date of an another kingdom. But with regard to the kingdom of Media, and the Greek Empire, it is not necessary to invalidate the bill of divorce, since what was, was, and since these kingdoms are no longer in power, the local government is not particular if they are mentioned in a document.

וְאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן מַלְכוּת מָדַי וּמַלְכוּת יָוָן – מִשּׁוּם דְּמַלְכְוָתָא הָווּ; אֲבָל בִּנְיַן הַבַּיִת – מַאי דַהֲוָה הֲוָה;

And if the mishna had taught us this halakha with regard to the kingdom of Media and the Greek Empire, one could understand the concern, because they were kingdoms, and the current government objects to another kingdom being mentioned in a document. But if he wrote the date counting to the building of the Temple, then one could say what was, was, and the local government is not particular if this is mentioned in a document. Consequently, it was necessary for the mishna to teach us this halakha as well.

וְאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן בִּנְיַן הַבַּיִת – דְּאָמְרִי: קָמַדְכְּרִי שְׁבָחַיְיהוּ; אֲבָל חוּרְבַּן הַבַּיִת, דְּצַעֲרָא הוּא – אֵימָא לָא; צְרִיכָא.

And if the mishna had taught us this halakha with regard to the building of the Temple, then one could say that the reason why this is problematic is because the governments will say: The Jews mention their own praise, instead of honoring the ruling government. But with regard to the destruction of the Temple, which is a cause of anguish for us, say that no, the government is not particular about this. Therefore it is necessary to mention all of these halakhot.

הָיָה בַּמִּזְרָח וְכָתַב בַּמַּעֲרָב: מַאן? אִילֵּימָא בַּעַל, הַיְינוּ ״שִׁינָּה שְׁמוֹ וּשְׁמָהּ, שֵׁם עִירוֹ וְשֵׁם עִירָהּ״!

§ It was stated in the mishna, that if he was in the east and he wrote the location in the bill of divorce as in the west, then the bill of divorce is invalid. The Gemara asks: Who is the mishna discussing? If we say that the place of the husband was changed, then this is the same as what is stated later on in the mishna: He changed his name, or her name; the name of his city or the name of her city.

אֶלָּא לָאו סוֹפֵר – כְּדַאֲמַר לְהוּ רַב לְסָפְרֵיהּ, וְכֵן אֲמַר לְהוּ רַב הוּנָא לְסָפְרֵיהּ: כִּי יָתְבִיתוּ בְּשִׁילֵי, כְּתוּבוּ בְּשִׁילֵי; וְאַף עַל גַּב דְּמִימַּסְרָן לְכוּ מִילֵּי בְּהִינֵי. וְכִי יָתְבִיתוּ בְּהִינֵי, כְּתוּבוּ בְּהִינֵי; וְאַף עַל גַּב דְּמִימַּסְרָן לְכוּ מִילֵּי בְּשִׁילֵי.

Rather, is it not referring to a scribe who changed the place in which the bill of divorce was written, and did not record the correct location where he was when he wrote the bill of divorce? As Rav said to his scribes, and similarly, Rav Huna said to his scribes: When you are situated in the place called Shili, write the location of the document as: In Shili, even though the matters were presented to you, i.e., the transaction recorded in the document took place, in the place called Hini. And when you are situated in the place called Hini, write: In Hini, even though the matters were presented to you in Shili. One must be careful to write the precise location where the document was written and not somewhere else, as that is considered an illegitimate deviation.

אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל:

Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says:

זוֹ דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר, אֲבָל חֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אֲפִילּוּ לֹא כָּתַב אֶלָּא לְשֵׁם סַנְטָר שֶׁבָּעִיר – הֲרֵי זוֹ מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת.

This is the statement of Rabbi Meir, who is particular about maintaining peaceful relations with the kingdom, with regard to bills of divorce. But the Rabbis say: Even if he wrote a date on the bill of divorce only in the name of the guardsman [santar] in the city, she is divorced, since it is irrelevant which calendrical system was used for the date.

הָהוּא גִּיטָּא דַּהֲוָה כְּתִיב בֵּיהּ לְשֵׁם אִיסְטַנְדְּרָא דְּבַשְׁכָּר, שַׁלְחֵהּ רַב נַחְמָן בַּר רַב חִסְדָּא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבָּה: כִּי הַאי גַוְונָא, מַאי?

It is related that there was a certain bill of divorce in which the date was written in the name of the governor [istandera] of the city of Bascar, i.e., the date was marked according to the years of his government. Rav Naḥman bar Rav Ḥisda sent this dilemma before Rabba: What is the halakha in a case like this?

שְׁלַח לֵיהּ: בְּהָא אֲפִילּוּ רַבִּי מֵאִיר מוֹדֵי, מַאי טַעְמָא? מֵאוֹתָהּ מַלְכוּת הוּא.

He sent him in response: With regard to this, even Rabbi Meir concedes that the bill of divorce is valid. What is the reason? The governor is an official from that kingdom, so the ruler of the kingdom does not mind.

וּמַאי שְׁנָא מִסַּנְטָר שֶׁבָּעִיר? הָתָם זִילָא לְהוּ מִילְּתָא, הָכָא שְׁבִיחָא לְהוּ מִילְּתָא.

The Gemara asks: And in what way is this case different from the guardsman in the city? The Gemara answers: There, it is demeaning for them that the date is written in the name of an unimportant official. Here, with regard to the governor, it is complimentary for them that the date is written in the name of a senior official.

אָמַר רַבִּי אַבָּא אָמַר רַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַב: זוֹ דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר, אֲבָל חֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: הַוָּלָד כָּשֵׁר. וּמוֹדִים חֲכָמִים לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר, שֶׁאִם שִׁינָּה שְׁמוֹ וּשְׁמָהּ, שֵׁם עִירוֹ וְשֵׁם עִירָהּ – שֶׁהַוָּלָד מַמְזֵר.

Rabbi Abba says that Rav Huna says that Rav says: This mishna is in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Meir, who is stringent with regard to this bill of divorce and holds that the child is a mamzer. But the Rabbis say: The lineage of the offspring is unflawed. And the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Meir, that if he changed his name or her name, the name of his city or the name of her city, the offspring is a mamzer.

אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי, אַף אֲנַן נָמֵי תְּנֵינָא: שִׁינָּה שְׁמוֹ וּשְׁמָהּ, שֵׁם עִירוֹ וְשֵׁם עִירָהּ – תֵּצֵא מִזֶּה וּמִזֶּה, וְכׇל הַדְּרָכִים הָאֵלּוּ בָּהּ.

Rav Ashi says: We, too, learn in the mishna: If he changed his name or her name, the name of his city or the name of her city, and she remarried on the basis of this bill of divorce, then she must leave this husband and that husband, and all of those ways of penalizing a woman who remarried based on the bills of divorce detailed in the earlier clause of the mishna apply to her.

הָא מַאן קָתָנֵי לַהּ? אִילֵּימָא רַבִּי מֵאִיר – לִיעָרְבִינְהוּ וְלִיתְנִינְהוּ! אֶלָּא שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ רַבָּנַן; שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.

It is necessary to clarify who teaches this halakha? If we say that it is Rabbi Meir, let him combine the case of one who writes a different kingdom, and the case of one who changes the names, and teach them both as one halakha. Rather, conclude from it that this halakha is the opinion of the Rabbis. The Gemara concludes: Conclude from it that until this point the mishna was quoting the statement of Rabbi Meir, but subsequently it is the statement of the Rabbis that is quoted, that in a case of such a fundamental change, even in their opinion such a bill of divorce is invalid.

כׇּל עֲרָיוֹת שֶׁאָמְרוּ כּוּ׳. נִישְּׂאוּ – אֵין, זִינּוּ – לָא;

§ It was taught in the mishna that in all of those cases in which they said that a man who died and left behind a widow who is to the yavam one of those with whom relations are forbidden, and the rival wives were thought to be permitted to remarry, if it later became clear that the forbidden relation was an ailonit and therefore they were in fact forbidden from remarrying, then they must leave the man whom they remarried, and they cannot enter into levirate marriage with the yavam, and many other penalties apply to them as well. The Gemara comments: It is possible to deduce from the language used by the mishna that only if they married other men, then yes, these halakhot apply to them. But if the rival wives engaged in licentious sexual intercourse, then no, these halakhot do not apply to them.

לֵימָא תֶּיהְוֵי תְּיוּבְתָּא דְּרַב הַמְנוּנָא – דְּאָמַר רַב הַמְנוּנָא: שׁוֹמֶרֶת יָבָם שֶׁזִּינְּתָה, אֲסוּרָה לִיבָמָהּ!

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Hamnuna, as Rav Hamnuna says: A widow awaiting her brother-in-law to perform levirate marriage who engaged in licentious sexual intercourse is likened to a married woman who committed adultery, and she is prohibited from entering into levirate marriage with her yavam.

לָא; נִישְּׂאוּ – וְהוּא הַדִּין לְזִינּוּ. וְהַאי דְּקָתָנֵי נִישְּׂאוּ – לִישָּׁנָא מְעַלְּיָא נָקֵט.

The Gemara rejects this: No, this is not a refutation, since it is possible to explain that the mishna gave the example that they married, and the same is true in a case where they engaged in licentious sexual intercourse. And this that the mishna teaches: If they married, is because it employed a euphemistic expression, to refrain from discussing a case of licentiousness.

וְאִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי: נִישְּׂאוּ – וְהוּא הַדִּין לְזִינּוּ;

And there are those who say that the exchange went as follows: From the mishna’s statement about the rival wives that remarried, one can understand that the halakha is so if they married, and the same is true in a case where they engaged in licentious sexual intercourse.

לֵימָא מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ לְרַב הַמְנוּנָא – דְּאָמַר רַב הַמְנוּנָא: שׁוֹמֶרֶת יָבָם שֶׁזִּינְּתָה – אֲסוּרָה לִיבָמָהּ?

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that it supports the opinion of Rav Hamnuna, as Rav Hamnuna says: A widow awaiting her brother-in-law to perform levirate marriage who engaged in licentious sexual intercourse is prohibited from entering into levirate marriage with her yavam.

לָא; נִישְּׂאוּ דַּוְוקָא, מִשּׁוּם דְּמִיחַלְּפָא בְּאִשָּׁה שֶׁהָלַךְ בַּעְלָהּ לִמְדִינַת הַיָּם.

The Gemara rejects this: No, it is specifically when they married that they are forbidden, because she is confused with a woman whose husband traveled to a country overseas and she went and remarried. In that case she is certainly prohibited from marrying both the first and the second husband. Similarly, they instituted the same decree for a yevama who married someone else. By contrast, in the case of a yevama who engaged in licentious sexual intercourse, which is completely different, they did not institute this decree.

הַכּוֹנֵס אֶת יְבִמְתּוֹ כּוּ׳. וּצְרִיכָא; דְּאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן בְּהָךְ קַמַּיְיתָא – מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא אִיקַּיַּים מִצְוַת יִבּוּם;

§ It was taught in the mishna that one who marries his yevama, and her rival wife went and married another man, and ultimately the yevama was found to be an ailonit, then the rival wife must leave her husband, and she cannot enter into levirate marriage with the yavam, and many other penalties apply to her as well. The Gemara comments: And it is necessary to teach this halakha as well, although it seemingly deals with the same issue as the previous halakha. As, if the mishna had taught us this halakha only with regard to the first case of a rival wife of a woman who is forbidden to the yavam, then one could say that the halakha is so, because the mitzva of levirate marriage was not fulfilled at all, since the rival wife married someone else, and the yavam did not perform levirate marriage.

אֲבָל הָכָא – דְּאִיקַּיַּים מִצְוַת יִבּוּם, אֵימָא לָא;

But here, in this latter case, where the mitzva of levirate marriage was fulfilled in some way when he married the yevama, although ultimately it became clear that it was not a legitimate levirate marriage, say that the rival wives are not penalized, since she is not guilty by not having waited.

וְאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן הָכָא – מִשּׁוּם דְּקָא רַמְיָא קַמֵּיהּ; אֲבָל הָתָם – דְּלָא רַמְיָא קַמֵּיהּ, אֵימָא לָא; צְרִיכָא.

And if the mishna had taught us this halakha here, with regard to a yavam who married a yevama who was ultimately found to be an ailonit, then one could say that specifically here there is reason to penalize her, because this rival wife who remarried was also placed before the yavam, as he could have entered into levirate marriage with any of his brother’s wives. Therefore, she could have waited to see if the levirate marriage was effective before remarrying. But there, in the first case of a yevama who is forbidden to the yavam, that she is not placed before him, as all of them are entirely exempt from levirate marriage, say that the rival wives are not penalized. Therefore, it is necessary to state both halakhot.

כָּתַב הַסּוֹפֵר וְטָעָה, וְנָתַן גֵּט לָאִשָּׁה וְשׁוֹבָר וְכוּ׳; רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר אִם לְאַלְתַּר יָצָא וְכוּ׳.

§ It was taught in the mishna that if the scribe wrote a bill of divorce, and erred and gave the bill of divorce to the woman and the receipt to the man, and consequently the husband gave his wife a receipt and she gave him a bill of divorce, Rabbi Eliezer says: If the bill of divorce is immediately in the husband’s possession, it is not a valid bill of divorce. But if it is in his possession after some time, the assumption is that she was divorced in a correct manner and the bill of divorce was returned to him later.

הֵיכִי דָּמֵי לְאַלְתַּר, וְהֵיכִי דָּמֵי לְאַחַר זְמַן? אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: כׇּל זְמַן שֶׁיּוֹשְׁבִין וַעֲסוּקִין בְּאוֹתוֹ עִנְיָן – זֶהוּ לְאַלְתַּר; עָמְדוּ – זֶהוּ לְאַחַר זְמַן.

The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances in which the bill of divorce is immediately in the husband’s hand and what are the circumstances in which it is in his possession after some time? Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: All the while that they are sitting and are engaged in the issue of the divorce, this is considered immediately. If they already arose and concluded the proceedings, this is considered after some time.

וְרַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה אָמַר: לֹא נִישֵּׂאת – זֶהוּ לְאַלְתַּר; נִישֵּׂאת – זֶהוּ לְאַחַר זְמַן.

And Rav Adda bar Ahava says: If she was not married to someone else, this is considered immediately, since they can rectify the situation by requiring him to give the bill of divorce properly. If she was married, this is considered after some time.

תְּנַן: לֹא כׇּל הֵימֶנּוּ מִן הָרִאשׁוֹן לְאַבֵּד זְכוּתוֹ שֶׁל שֵׁנִי. בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה – הַיְינוּ דְּקָתָנֵי ״שֵׁנִי״, אֶלָּא לִשְׁמוּאֵל – מַאי ״שֵׁנִי״?

The Gemara asks: We learned in the mishna with regard to Rabbi Elazar’s statement: It is not in the power of the first husband to eliminate the right of the second husband. Granted, according to the opinion of Rav Adda bar Ahava, this explanation is consistent with that which is taught: The second husband, since the mishna is discussing a case in which she remarried and has a second husband. But according to the opinion of Shmuel, what is the reference to a second husband? Shmuel’s opinion is that as soon as they arise and conclude the proceedings, it is considered to be after some time, and in this case there is no second husband. According to Shmuel’s opinion, how does Rabbi Elazar’s statement apply?