כתובות קח

כתובות קח

שׁוֹקֵל לוֹ אֶת שִׁקְלוֹ, וּפוֹרֵעַ אֶת חוֹבוֹ, וּמַחֲזִיר לוֹ אֲבֵידָתוֹ. וּבְמָקוֹם שֶׁנּוֹטְלִין שָׂכָר — תִּפּוֹל הֲנָאָה לַהֶקְדֵּשׁ.

the other may contribute his shekel for him, i.e., it is permitted for the second individual to donate the half-shekel from his own money to the Temple on behalf of the first one, who is prohibited by the vow from deriving benefit; and he may repay his debt for him, i.e., if the one prohibited by the vow owes money to a third party, the one from whom he may not derive benefit may pay off that debt on his behalf. And he may return to him his lost object, and in a place where one takes a wage for returning a lost article, the benefit paid for the return of the item goes to the Temple treasury of consecrated property.

בִּשְׁלָמָא שׁוֹקֵל לוֹ אֶת שִׁקְלוֹ — מִצְוָה קָעָבֵיד. דִּתְנַן: תּוֹרְמִין עַל הָאָבוּד וְעַל הַגָּבוּי וְעַל הֶעָתִיד לִגָּבוֹת.

The Gemara discusses this mishna: Granted, he may contribute his shekel for him, as he thereby performs a mitzva. The one prohibited by the vow from deriving benefit does not derive any direct benefit from this action, as even if he did not pay the half-shekel, all Jews have a share in the communal offerings brought in the Temple, as we learned in a baraita: One performs the collection of money from the chamber with the intention that the ceremony apply to money that is lost, and money that has already been gathered but has not yet been brought to the Temple, and money that will be gathered in the future. This shows that even if one did not give a half-shekel, the communal offerings are nevertheless sacrificed in his name.

וּמַחֲזִיר לוֹ אֲבֵידָתוֹ נָמֵי מִצְוָה קָעָבֵיד. אֶלָּא פּוֹרֵעַ לוֹ אֶת חוֹבוֹ, הָא קָמִשְׁתָּרְשִׁי לֵיהּ!

And concerning the halakha that he may return to him his lost object, he also performs a mitzva by means of this action. However, with regard to the statement that he may repay his debt for him, this is problematic because it provides a gain for the one prohibited by the vow from deriving benefit; if he did not repay the person’s debt, that person would have to pay it from his own pocket. Consequently, it should be considered as though the one prohibited from deriving benefit received money.

אָמַר רַב אוֹשַׁעְיָא: הָא מַנִּי? חָנָן הִיא, דְּאָמַר: אִיבֵּד אֶת מְעוֹתָיו.

Rav Oshaya said: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Ḥanan, who said in the mishna: He has lost his money. In other words, this is referring to a case in which he repays a debt that the other does not really have to repay at all, and therefore he is doing a favor to the creditor, not to the one who is prohibited from deriving benefit.

וְרָבָא אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבָּנַן, הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן, שֶׁלָּוָה עַל מְנָת שֶׁלֹּא לִפְרוֹעַ.

And Rava said: You can even say that this is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and here we are dealing with a situation where the borrower borrowed money on the condition that he need not pay it back until he chooses to do so. In that case, if the one from whom this borrower may not derive benefit repaid the debt for him, he performed a favor only to the lender, not to the borrower.

בִּשְׁלָמָא רָבָא לָא אָמַר כְּרַב אוֹשַׁעְיָא: דְּמוֹקֵים לַהּ כְּרַבָּנַן. אֶלָּא רַב אוֹשַׁעְיָא, מַאי טַעְמָא לָא אָמַר כְּרָבָא? אָמַר לָךְ רַב אוֹשַׁעְיָא: נְהִי דַּהֲנָאָה לֵית לֵיהּ,

The Gemara analyzes these opinions: Granted, Rava did not say his statement in accordance with the explanation of Rav Oshaya, as he establishes the mishna in Nedarim not only in accordance with the view of Ḥanan, but also in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. However, what is the reason that Rav Oshaya did not say that the mishna is referring to a loan that did not have to be repaid, in accordance with the explanation of Rava? The Gemara answers that Rav Oshaya could have said to you: Although in this type of loan there is no benefit to the borrower, as he need not repay it within a certain period of time,

כִּיסּוּפָא מִי לֵית לֵיהּ? הָתָם נָמֵי אִית לֵיהּ הֲנָאָה בְּהָהִיא הֲנָאָה דְּמִיכְּסִיף מִינֵּיהּ.

doesn’t he have shame due to his failure to repay the debt? There too, in the case of one prohibited by a vow, he has benefit; namely, the benefit that he is ashamed before him until the loan is repaid.

מַתְנִי׳ אַדְמוֹן אוֹמֵר, שִׁבְעָה: מִי שֶׁמֵּת וְהִנִּיחַ בָּנִים וּבָנוֹת, בִּזְמַן שֶׁהַנְּכָסִים מְרוּבִּין — הַבָּנִים יוֹרְשִׁים, וְהַבָּנוֹת נִזּוֹנוֹת. וּבִנְכָסִים מוּעָטִים — הַבָּנוֹת יִזּוֹנוּ, וְהַבָּנִים — יְחַזְּרוּ עַל הַפְּתָחִים. אַדְמוֹן אוֹמֵר: בִּשְׁבִיל שֶׁאֲנִי זָכָר הִפְסַדְתִּי?! אָמַר רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל: רוֹאֶה אֲנִי אֶת דִּבְרֵי אַדְמוֹן.

MISHNA: Admon states a dissenting opinion to that of the Rabbis in seven cases. The mishna elaborates: With regard to one who died and left behind both sons and daughters, when the estate is large the sons inherit the property and the daughters are provided with sustenance from it. And with regard to a small estate, which is insufficient to provide for both the sons and the daughters, the daughters are provided with sustenance and the sons have neither inheritance nor sustenance, and therefore, if they have no other means with which to support themselves, they must go round begging at the doors. Admon says: Because I am a male, will I lose out? Rabban Gamliel said: I see as correct the statement of Admon.

גְּמָ׳ מַאי קָאָמַר? אָמַר אַבָּיֵי, הָכִי קָאָמַר: בִּשְׁבִיל שֶׁאֲנִי זָכָר וְרָאוּי לַעֲסוֹק בַּתּוֹרָה — הִפְסַדְתִּי?

GEMARA: With regard to Admon’s statement: Because I am a male will I lose out, the Gemara asks: What is he saying? What is the significance of the fact that one is male? Abaye said that this is what he is saying: Because I am a male and, unlike women, I am fit to engage in Torah study, should I lose out?

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: מַאן דְּעָסֵיק בַּתּוֹרָה הוּא דְּיָרֵית, מַאן דְּלָא עָסֵיק בַּתּוֹרָה לָא יָרֵית?! אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא, הָכִי קָאָמַר: בִּשְׁבִיל שֶׁאֲנִי זָכָר וְרָאוּי לִירַשׁ בִּנְכָסִים מְרוּבִּין — הִפְסַדְתִּי בִּנְכָסִים מוּעָטִין?!

Rava said to him: Is that to say that it is one who is engaged in Torah study who inherits, whereas one who is not engaged in Torah study does not inherit? What does the study of Torah have to do with the matter at hand? Rather, Rava said that this is what Admon is saying: Because I am a male, who has a greater right to the property by Torah law, and therefore it is fitting for me to inherit when the estate is large, will I now lose out entirely in a case of a small estate?

מַתְנִי׳ הַטּוֹעֵן אֶת חֲבֵירוֹ כַּדֵּי שֶׁמֶן וְהוֹדָה בַּקַּנְקַנִּים, אַדְמוֹן אוֹמֵר: הוֹאִיל וְהוֹדָה בְּמִקְצָת הַטְּעָנָה — יִשָּׁבַע. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אֵין הוֹדָאַת מִקְצָת מִמִּין הַטַּעֲנָה. אָמַר רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל: רוֹאֶה אֲנִי אֶת דִּבְרֵי אַדְמוֹן.

MISHNA: The mishna cites another case involving a dispute between Admon and the Rabbis. With regard to one who claims that another owes him jugs of oil, and the other admits to the claim of pitchers but not the oil, Admon says: Since he made a partial admission to the claim, he takes an oath swearing that he owes only what he has admitted to and no more. And the Rabbis say: The partial admission in this case is not of the same type as the claim, as the claim specified oil and the admission referred to pitchers. Rabban Gamliel said: I see as correct the statement of Admon.

גְּמָ׳ שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ לְרַבָּנַן: טְעָנוֹ חִטִּין וּשְׂעוֹרִין וְהוֹדָה בִּשְׂעוֹרִין — פָּטוּר.

GEMARA: One can conclude from here that according to the opinion of the Rabbis, if one claimed that another owed him wheat and barley, and the other party partially admitted that the claim was true only with regard to the barley, he is exempt, just as he is exempt in this case when the claim was for jugs of oil and the admission referred only to jugs.

לֵימָא תִּהְוֵי תְּיוּבְתָּא דְּרַב נַחְמָן אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל, דְּאָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: טְעָנוֹ חִטִּין וּשְׂעוֹרִים וְהוֹדָה לוֹ בְּאֶחָד מֵהֶן — חַיָּיב!

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that it is a conclusive refutation of the opinion that Rav Naḥman said that Shmuel said. As Rav Naḥman said that Shmuel said: If one claimed against another that he owed him wheat and barley, and the other admitted to owing one of the types, he is obligated to take an oath, as he partially admitted to the claim.

אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: בְּטוֹעֲנוֹ מִדָּה. אִי הָכִי, מַאי טַעְמָא דְּאַדְמוֹן?

Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: The mishna is not referring to a case where one claimed that another owed him oil and pitchers. Rather, he claimed that another owed him a certain measure of oil, i.e., an amount of oil that would fill a certain number of jugs, while he did not claim the jugs at all. Consequently, the admission was not of the same type as the claim at all. The Gemara asks: If so, what is the rationale for the ruling of Admon that he must take an oath? Clearly, the admission and the claim do not refer to the same objects.

אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא הֵיכָא דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ ״מְלֹא עֲשָׂרָה כַּדֵּי שֶׁמֶן יֵשׁ לִי בְּבוֹרֶךָ״, שֶׁמֶן קָטָעֵין לֵיהּ, קַנְקַנִּים לָא קָטָעֵין לֵיהּ. ״עֲשָׂרָה כַּדֵּי שֶׁמֶן מְלֵאִים יֵשׁ לִי אֶצְלְךָ״ — שֶׁמֶן וְקַנְקַנִּים קָטָעֵין לֵיהּ.

Rather, Rava said: Everyone agrees that in a case where he said to him: I have ten jugfuls of oil in your pit, he is claiming oil from him and he is not claiming pitchers from him at all. In this case, it is clear that admitting to owing pitchers is not a partial admission whatsoever that would lead to an obligation to take an oath. Similarly, if he said to him: I have ten full jugs of oil with you, he is claiming from him both oil and pitchers, and therefore if the other party concedes to owing pitchers, this is a partial admission to the claim and everyone agrees that he must take an oath.

כִּי פְּלִיגִי הֵיכָא דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ ״עֲשָׂרָה כַּדֵּי שֶׁמֶן יֵשׁ לִי אֶצְלְךָ״. אַדְמוֹן אוֹמֵר: יֵשׁ בַּלָּשׁוֹן הַזֶּה לְשׁוֹן קַנְקַנִּים, וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: אֵין בַּלָּשׁוֹן הַזֶּה לְשׁוֹן קַנְקַנִּים.

When they disagree in the mishna is in a case where he said to him simply: I have ten jugs of oil with you. Admon says: This expression includes a reference to the pitchers, while the Rabbis hold that this expression does not include a reference to the pitchers.

אֶלָּא טַעְמָא דְּאֵין בַּלָּשׁוֹן הַזֶּה לְשׁוֹן קַנְקַנִּים, הָא יֵשׁ בַּלָּשׁוֹן הַזֶּה לְשׁוֹן קַנְקַנִּים — חַיָּיב. לֵימָא תֶּיהְוֵי תְּיוּבְתָּא דְּרַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא. דְּאָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא: טְעָנוֹ חִטִּין וּשְׂעוֹרִים וְהוֹדָה לוֹ בְּאֶחָד מֵהֶם — פָּטוּר!

The Gemara infers: Rather, the reason for the ruling of the Rabbis is specifically that the expression does not include a reference to pitchers, which indicates that if the expression includes a reference to pitchers, one is obligated to take an oath. If so, let us say that this is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba. As Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said: If one claimed against another that he owed him wheat and barley, and the other admitted to one of the types, he is exempt from an oath.

אָמַר רַב שִׁימִי בַּר אָשֵׁי: נַעֲשָׂה כְּמִי שֶׁטְּעָנוֹ רִימּוֹן בִּקְלִיפָּתוֹ. מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רָבִינָא: רִימּוֹן בְּלֹא קְלִיפָּתוֹ לָא מִינְּטַר, שֶׁמֶן מִינְּטַר בְּלֹא קַנְקַנִּים!

Rav Shimi bar Ashi said: The case of the mishna is not similar to that of wheat and barley, as those two types are not connected to one another. Rather, the case of jugs of oil is more like that of one who claimed that the other owed him a pomegranate in its peel, as the jugs are as necessary for the oil as the peel of a pomegranate protecting its fruit. Ravina strongly objects to this: The comparison between these cases does not bear close scrutiny. A pomegranate without its peel cannot be preserved, and therefore it is obvious that when one claims a pomegranate, he must be referring to the peel as well. By contrast, oil can be preserved without the pitchers, as it can be placed in another receptacle.

אֶלָּא, הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן, דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ: עֲשָׂרָה כַּדֵּי שֶׁמֶן יֵשׁ לִי אֶצְלְךָ, וַאֲמַר לֵיהּ אִידַּךְ: שֶׁמֶן — לֹא הָיוּ דְבָרִים מֵעוֹלָם, קַנְקַנִּים נָמֵי — חַמְשָׁה אִית לָךְ, וְחַמְשָׁה לֵית לָךְ.

Rather, here we are dealing with a case where one said to another: I have ten jugs of oil with you, and the other said to him: With regard to the oil, these matters never occurred; I never borrowed oil from you. Concerning the pitchers as well, you do have five of them with me and these I admit I took from you, but you do not have the other five you claim.

אַדְמוֹן אוֹמֵר: יֵשׁ בַּלָּשׁוֹן הַזֶּה לְשׁוֹן קַנְקַנִּים, וּמִגּוֹ דְּקָמִשְׁתְּבַע אַקַּנְקַנִּים מִשְׁתְּבַע נָמֵי אַשֶּׁמֶן עַל יְדֵי גִּלְגּוּל. וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: אֵין בַּלָּשׁוֹן הַזֶּה לְשׁוֹן קַנְקַנִּים. מַה שֶּׁטְּעָנוֹ לֹא הוֹדָה לוֹ, וּמַה שֶּׁהוֹדָה לוֹ — לֹא טָעֲנוּ.

Admon says: This expression includes a reference to pitchers, and since he takes an oath about the pitchers, as he partially admitted to owing them, he takes an oath about the oil as well, by means of an extension of the first oath. And the Rabbis hold that this expression does not include a reference to the pitchers, and therefore that which the first person claimed from him the second person did not admit to at all, and that which the second person admitted to, the first person had not claimed from him. The second individual denied owing any oil, and as for his partial admission with regard to the pitchers, there was no claim about pitchers at all. Consequently, no oath is required whatsoever.

מַתְנִי׳ הַפּוֹסֵק מָעוֹת לַחֲתָנוֹ, וּפָשַׁט לוֹ אֶת הָרֶגֶל —

MISHNA: The mishna states another case involving a ruling of Admon. With regard to one who promises and apportions money for his son-in-law as a dowry, and he went bankrupt, and he now claims that he does not have the money to fulfill his financial obligations,