כתובות קי

כתובות קי

מַתְנִי׳ הַמּוֹצִיא שְׁטַר חוֹב עַל חֲבֵרוֹ, וְהַלָּה הוֹצִיא שֶׁמָּכַר לוֹ אֶת הַשָּׂדֶה. אַדְמוֹן אוֹמֵר: יָכוֹל הוּא שֶׁיֹּאמַר: אִילּוּ הָיִיתִי חַיָּיב לְךָ — הָיָה לְךָ לְהִפָּרַע אֶת שֶׁלְּךָ כְּשֶׁמָּכַרְתָּ לִי אֶת הַשָּׂדֶה. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: זֶה הָיָה פִּקֵּחַ, שֶׁמָּכַר לוֹ אֶת הַקַּרְקַע מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא יָכוֹל לְמַשְׁכְּנוֹ.

MISHNA: With regard to one who produces a promissory note against another, and this borrower produced a bill of sale dated after the promissory note that states that the lender sold him a field of his, Admon says that the borrower can say: Were I really indebted to you, you should have collected your loan when you sold me the field, and you would not have needed to sell it. And the Rabbis say: This is no proof, as it is possible that this lender was perspicacious, as he sold the borrower the land for a good reason, because now he can take the field as collateral from him in lieu of the outstanding loan.

גְּמָ׳ מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבָּנַן? שַׁפִּיר קָאָמַר אַדְמוֹן! בְּאַתְרָא דְּיָהֲבִי זוּזֵי וַהֲדַר כָּתְבִי שְׁטָרָא — כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּמָצֵי אָמַר לֵיהּ: הָיָה לְךָ לִפְרוֹעַ אֶת שֶׁלְּךָ כְּשֶׁמָּכַרְתָּ לִי אֶת הַשָּׂדֶה.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is the rationale for the opinion of the Rabbis? After all, Admon is saying well. The Gemara explains: In a place where people first give money and only afterward they write the bill of sale, everyone agrees that the borrower can say to the lender: You should have collected your debt when you sold me the field, i.e., when you received money from me you should have said that it is not for the field but is repayment of the debt I owed you.

כִּי פְּלִיגִי, בְּאַתְרָא דְּכָתְבִי שְׁטָרָא וַהֲדַר יָהֲבִי זוּזֵי. אַדְמוֹן סָבַר: אִיבְּעִי לֵיהּ לְמִימְסַר מוֹדָעָא. וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: חַבְרָךְ חַבְרָא אִית לֵיהּ וְחַבְרָא דְּחַבְרָךְ חַבְרָא אִית לֵיהּ.

When they disagree is with regard to a place where people first write out the bill of sale and only afterward they give money. Admon holds that the lender should have put out a preemptive declaration, i.e., he should have earlier told witnesses that he is selling the field only so it can be used as collateral, and this transaction should not be taken as an indication that the buyer is not indebted to him. And the Rabbis hold that the lender may argue: Your friend has a friend and your friend’s friend has a friend, i.e., word of my intention to use the field as collateral would have come back to the borrower and he would not have agreed to the transaction, and that is why I did not issue any declaration.

מַתְנִי׳ שְׁנַיִם שֶׁהוֹצִיאוּ שְׁטַר חוֹב זֶה עַל זֶה, אַדְמוֹן אוֹמֵר: אִילּוּ הָיִיתִי חַיָּיב לְךָ — כֵּיצַד אַתָּה לֹוֶה מִמֶּנִּי?! וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: זֶה גּוֹבֶה שְׁטַר חוֹבוֹ, וְזֶה גּוֹבֶה שְׁטַר חוֹבוֹ.

MISHNA: With regard to two people who each produced a promissory note of a monetary debt against the other, Admon says: The one holding the note with the later date can say to the first: If I owed you money, how is it that you are borrowing from me? You should have sued to collect your debt. This is proof that your document is a forgery. And the Rabbis say: This one collects his promissory note, and that one collects his promissory note.

גְּמָ׳ אִתְּמַר: שְׁנַיִם שֶׁהוֹצִיאוּ שְׁטַר חוֹב זֶה עַל זֶה. רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר: זֶה גּוֹבֶה וְזֶה גּוֹבֶה. רַב שֵׁשֶׁת אָמַר: הַפּוֹכֵי מַטְרָתָא לָמָּה לִי. אֶלָּא זֶה עוֹמֵד בְּשֶׁלּוֹ וְזֶה עוֹמֵד בְּשֶׁלּוֹ.

GEMARA: It was stated that amora’im disputed the case of two people who each produced a promissory note against the other for the same value. Rav Naḥman said: This one collects his debt and that one collects his debt. Rav Sheshet said: Why do I need to shift donkey packs [matrata] from one side to the other? Rather, as each will retain the same sum, let this one stand with his money and let that one stand with his money.

דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא עִידִּית וְעִידִּית, בֵּינוֹנִית וּבֵינוֹנִית, זִיבּוּרִית וְזִיבּוּרִית — וַדַּאי הַפּוֹכֵי מַטְרָתָא הוּא.

The Gemara analyses this dispute: Everyone agrees that if the field of one of the parties, which served as guarantee for the promissory note, was superior-quality land and the other person also had superior-quality land, or one had intermediate-quality land and the other had intermediate-quality land, or one had inferior-quality land and the other had inferior-quality land, this is certainly considered like shifting donkey packs, i.e., it is an exercise in futility, as there is no reason to exchange their money.

כִּי פְּלִיגִי, דְּאִית לֵיהּ לְחַד בֵּינוֹנִית וּלְחַד זִיבּוּרִית — רַב נַחְמָן סָבַר: זֶה גּוֹבֶה וְזֶה גּוֹבֶה. קָסָבַר: בְּשֶׁלּוֹ הֵן שָׁמִין.

When they disagree is in a case where one has intermediate-quality land and the other one has inferior-quality land. Rav Naḥman holds that this one collects his debt and that one collects his debt, as he holds that one assesses the quality of land on the basis of his own fields, i.e., if the borrower has different types of land, then his best land is classified as superior-quality land, the next best is considered intermediate-quality land, and his worst fields are called inferior-quality land.

אָתֵי בַּעַל זִיבּוּרִית וְגָבֵי לֵיהּ לְבֵינוֹנִית, דַּהֲוָה גַּבֵּיהּ עִידִּית, וַאֲתָא הָהוּא וְשָׁקֵיל זִיבּוּרִית.

Consequently, the owner of inferior-quality land, Reuven, will come and collect his debt from the intermediate-quality land of his debtor, Shimon, in accordance with the halakha that a creditor collects payment from intermediate-quality land. Since Shimon does not have any land that is inferior, Reuven necessarily takes his debt from that land. However, at this stage the land Reuven took from Shimon is considered for him superior-quality land, as all of his other fields are of lower quality than the field he took. And therefore, that other creditor, Shimon, comes to collect his debt from Reuven, and takes from inferior-quality land, as the intermediate-quality land that Reuven took from Shimon is now, relative to Reuven’s other field, classified as superior-quality land. Consequently, each debtor will take different fields from the other, despite the fact that they owe the same sum.

וְרַב שֵׁשֶׁת אָמַר: הַפּוֹכֵי מַטְרָתָא לָמָּה לִי, קָסָבַר: בְּשֶׁל כׇּל אָדָם הֵן שָׁמִין, סוֹף סוֹף כִּי אָתֵי הָהוּא — בֵּינוֹנִית דְּנַפְשֵׁיהּ קָשָׁקֵיל.

And Rav Sheshet, who said: Why do I need to shift donkey packs, holds that the quality of the land is not assessed differently for each individual borrower. Rather, one assesses the quality of land on the basis of the lands of all people, i.e., there is a standard measure of land quality which applies to everyone. If so, then ultimately, when that second debtor, Shimon, comes to collect from Reuven he will take back his own intermediate-quality land, i.e., the field that Reuven took from him only a short while earlier. Consequently, no purpose is served by going through this process.

וּלְרַב נַחְמָן: מַאי חָזֵית דְּאָתֵי בַּעַל זִיבּוּרִית בְּרֵישָׁא, לֵיתֵי בַּעַל בֵּינוֹנִית בְּרֵישָׁא וְלִיגְבֵּי זִיבּוּרִית, וְלֶיהְדַּר וְלִיגְבֵּי נִיהֲלֵיהּ!

The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rav Naḥman, what did you see that led you to establish that the owner of inferior-quality land will come and collect his debt first, as described above? Let the owner of intermediate-quality land come first and collect inferior-quality land from the other party, as that is all he possesses. In this scenario, the intermediate-quality land in the possession of the one who collected his debt will be classified as high quality, while his inferior-quality field will be considered of intermediate quality. And therefore let the other return and collect the same portion of land that he took from him. Once again, this is an apparently unnecessary exchange.

לָא צְרִיכָא, דִּקְדֵים תַּבְעֵיהּ. סוֹף סוֹף כִּי אֲתוֹ לְמִגְבֵּי, בַּהֲדֵי הֲדָדֵי קָאָתוּ!

The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary only in a case where the owner of the low-quality land happened to precede the other and claim from him first. The Gemara raises a difficulty: Ultimately, when they come to collect their respective debts, they come together, which means that they will pass the same portion of land back and forth.

אֶלָּא, לָא צְרִיכָא דְּאִית לֵיהּ לְחַד עִידִּית וּבֵינוֹנִית, וְאִית לֵיהּ לְחַד זִיבּוּרִית — מָר סָבַר: בְּשֶׁלּוֹ הֵן שָׁמִין, וּמָר סָבַר: בְּשֶׁל כׇּל אָדָם הֵן שָׁמִין.

Rather, the Gemara provides an alternative explanation: No, this dispute is necessary in a case where one has superior-quality land and intermediate-quality land, and the other one has only inferior-quality land. One Sage, Rav Naḥman, holds that one assesses the quality of land on the basis of his own fields. Consequently, the owner of the low-quality land stands to gain, as he collects intermediate-quality land from the other and pays low-quality land in return, regardless of the order of the claims. And one Sage, Rav Sheshet, holds that the court appraises the quality of land on the basis of the lands of all people, which means that they will be trading the same plot of land back and forth.

תְּנַן, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: זֶה גּוֹבֶה וְזֶה גּוֹבֶה! תַּרְגְּמַהּ רַב נַחְמָן אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַב שֵׁשֶׁת: כְּגוֹן שֶׁלָּוָה זֶה לְעֶשֶׂר וְזֶה לְחָמֵשׁ.

We learned in the mishna: And the Rabbis say: This one collects his promissory note and that one collects his promissory note. This ruling apparently contradicts the opinion of Rav Sheshet. Rav Naḥman himself interpreted the mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rav Sheshet: This is referring to a situation, for example, where this one borrowed for a period of ten years and that one borrowed for five years. In this case it makes sense to say that each collects as stated in the promissory note in his possession.

הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִילֵּימָא רִאשׁוֹן לְעֶשֶׂר וְשֵׁנִי לְחָמֵשׁ, בְּהָא לֵימָא אַדְמוֹן: אִילּוּ הָיִיתִי חַיָּיב לְךָ כֵּיצַד אַתָּה לֹוֶה מִמֶּנִּי? הָא לָא מְטָא זִמְנֵיהּ. אֶלָּא רִאשׁוֹן לְחָמֵשׁ, וְשֵׁנִי לְעֶשֶׂר.

The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of this case? If we say that the first one borrowed for ten years and the second for five, is this the case in which Admon would say: If I owed you money, how is it that you are borrowing from me? After all, the due date has not yet arrived for the second person to pay his debt. Perhaps the other creditor needs money to sustain himself for the next five years. Rather, the first one borrowed for five years and the second for ten years.

הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי דִּמְטָא זִמְנֵיהּ — מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבָּנַן. וְאִי דְּלָא מְטָא זִמְנֵיהּ — הָא לָא מְטָא זִמְנֵיהּ, וּמַאי טַעְמָא דְּאַדְמוֹן?

The Gemara continues to inquire: What are the circumstances? If this is referring to a case where the due date of the first promissory note had already arrived when the second loan was issued, what is the rationale for the ruling of the Rabbis? The second person should not have borrowed money from the first, as he should have instead collected payment on the debt owed to him. And if the due date had not yet arrived, the second person clearly cannot demand his money, as the due date had not yet arrived, and perhaps he simply was in need of available money. And if so, what is the rationale for the opinion of Admon?

לָא צְרִיכָא דַּאֲתָא בְּהָהוּא יוֹמָא דְּמִשְׁלַם חָמֵשׁ. מָר סָבַר: עֲבִיד אִינִישׁ דְּיָזֵיף לְיוֹמֵיהּ, וּמָר סָבַר: לָא עֲבִיד אִינִישׁ דְּיָזֵיף לְיוֹמֵיהּ.

The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary in a case where he came on exactly that day when the five years of the first loan were completed. The dispute is as follows: One Sage, the Rabbis, holds that a person will take out a loan even for one day, and one Sage, Admon, holds that a person will not take out a loan for one day, and therefore he would have waited one day to receive payment of the debt owed to him.

רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא אָמַר: הָכָא בְּיַתְמֵי עָסְקִינַן, דְּיַתְמֵי מִיגְבָּא גָּבֻי, אַגְבּוֹיֵי לָא מַגְבִּינַן מִינַּיְיהוּ. וְהָא ״זֶה גּוֹבֶה וְזֶה גּוֹבֶה״ קָתָנֵי! זֶה גּוֹבֶה, וְזֶה רָאוּי לִגְבּוֹת וְאֵין לוֹ.

Rami bar Ḥama stated a different answer: Here we are dealing with orphans, i.e., one of the debtors died without leaving any landed properties, as orphans collect debts owed to their father but others do not collect from them the debts their father owed. Consequently, the statement of the Rabbis that each collects based on the document in his possession has practical ramifications. The Gemara asks: But the mishna teaches that this one collects his promissory note and that one collects his promissory note, whereas according to this interpretation only the orphans collect the debts they are owed. The Gemara answers: The mishna means that this one collects, and that one has the potential to collect but he does not have any land from which he may legally collect his debt.

אָמַר רָבָא: שְׁתֵּי תְּשׁוּבוֹת בַּדָּבָר, חֲדָא: דְּזֶה גּוֹבֶה וְזֶה גּוֹבֶה קָתָנֵי. וְעוֹד, לַגְבִּינְהוּ אַרְעָא לְיַתְמֵי וְלֶיהְדַּר וְלִיגְבִּינְהוּ מִינַּיְיהוּ, כִּדְרַב נַחְמָן. דְּאָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ: יְתוֹמִים שֶׁגָּבוּ קַרְקַע בְּחוֹבַת אֲבִיהֶן — בַּעַל חוֹב חוֹזֵר וְגוֹבֶה אוֹתָהּ מֵהֶן. קַשְׁיָא.

Rava said: There are two responses to this explanation. One is that the mishna teaches that this one collects his promissory note and that one collects his promissory note, which indicates that each actually collects what is owed to him, not that one is entitled to collect it but may not do so in practice. And furthermore, let him give land to the orphans and return and collect it from them, in accordance with the opinion of Rav Naḥman. As Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: With regard to orphans who collected land in payment of their father’s debt, a creditor may come back and collect it from them. The Gemara comments: This does pose a difficulty for the explanation of Rami bar Ḥama.

וְלוֹקְמַהּ דְּאִית לְהוּ לְיַתְמֵי זִיבּוּרִית, וְאִית לֵיהּ לְדִידֵיהּ עִידִּית וּבֵינוֹנִית, דְּאָזְלִי יַתְמֵי גָּבוּ בֵּינוֹנִית, וּמַגְבּוּ לֵיהּ זִיבּוּרִית. דְּאִי נָמֵי בְּשֶׁל כׇּל אָדָם הֵן שָׁמִין, הָא אֵין נִפְרָעִין מִנִּכְסֵי יְתוֹמִים אֶלָּא מִזִּיבּוּרִית!

§ The Gemara asks: And let us establish the mishna as referring to a case where the orphans have inferior-quality land, and he himself, the other creditor, has both superior-quality land and intermediate-quality land. In this scenario the orphans go and collect intermediate-quality land from him, while they give him inferior-quality land in payment of the debt owed to him by their father. The reason is that even if the halakha is that one assesses the quality of land on the basis of the lands of all people, and therefore the other creditor should be able to collect intermediate-quality land from the orphans, there is a principle that one collects a debt from the property of orphans only from inferior-quality land.

הָנֵי מִילֵּי הֵיכָא דְּלָא תְּפַס, אֲבָל הֵיכָא דִּתְפַס — תְּפַס.

The Gemara answers: This applies only to a case where the lender has not as yet seized any land from the orphans in payment of his debt. However, where he has seized intermediate-quality land, he has seized that land. Since he is already in possession of a field, it is not taken from him. In these circumstances there is no significance to each party collecting from the other.

מַתְנִי׳ שָׁלֹשׁ אֲרָצוֹת לְנִשּׂוּאִין: יְהוּדָה וְעֵבֶר הַיַּרְדֵּן וְהַגָּלִיל — אֵין מוֹצִיאִין מֵעִיר לָעִיר וּמִכְּרַךְ לִכְרַךְ. אֲבָל בְּאוֹתָהּ הָאָרֶץ — מוֹצִיאִין מֵעִיר לְעִיר וּמִכְּרַךְ לִכְרַךְ.

MISHNA: Eretz Yisrael is divided into three separate lands with regard to marriage: Judea, Transjordan, and the Galilee. If a man marries a woman in one of these lands he may not remove her from one town to another town in another of these lands or from one city to another city, i.e., he cannot compel her to move to another land. However, in the same land one may remove her from one town to another town or from one city to another city.

אֲבָל לֹא מֵעִיר לִכְרַךְ, וְלֹא מִכְּרַךְ לְעִיר.

However, even within the same land one may not force his wife to move from a town to a city, nor from a city to a town.

מוֹצִיאִין מִנָּוֶה הָרַע(ה) לְנָוֶה הַיָּפֶה, אֲבָל לֹא מִנָּוֶה הַיָּפֶה לְנָוֶה הָרַע(ה). רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: אַף לֹא מִנָּוֶה רַע(ה) לְנָוֶה יָפֶה, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהַנָּוֶה הַיָּפֶה בּוֹדֵק.

The mishna adds: One may remove his wife from a noxious residence to a pleasant residence, even if it is in another land. However, one may not compel his wife to move from a pleasant residence to a noxious residence. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: One may also not remove her from a noxious residence to a pleasant residence, because a pleasant residence tests the individual, i.e., one accustomed to certain environments can suffer even in more comfortable living quarters.

גְּמָ׳ בִּשְׁלָמָא מִכְּרַךְ לָעִיר — דְּבִכְרַךְ שְׁכִיחִי כֹּל מִילֵּי, בְּעִיר לָא שְׁכִיחִי כֹּל מִילֵּי. אֶלָּא מֵעִיר לִכְרַךְ מַאי טַעְמָא?

GEMARA: With regard to the statement in the mishna that one may not force one’s spouse to move from a city to a town or from a town to a city, the Gemara asks: Granted, one may not remove her from a city to a town, as all items are readily available in a city, whereas in a town all items are not as available, and therefore the wife can argue that living in a town is inconvenient for her. However, what is the reason that the husband cannot compel her to move from a town to the city?

מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר חֲנִינָא. דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר חֲנִינָא: מִנַּיִן שֶׁיְּשִׁיבַת כְּרַכִּים קָשָׁה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וַיְבָרְכוּ הָעָם לְכֹל הָאֲנָשִׁים הַמִּתְנַדְּבִים לָשֶׁבֶת בִּירוּשָׁלִָים״.

The Gemara answers: This supports the opinion of Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina, as Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina said: From where is it derived that dwelling in cities is difficult? As it is stated: “And the people blessed all the men who willingly offered themselves to dwell in Jerusalem” (Nehemiah 11:2). This shows that living in a city is difficult, due to the noise and the general hubbub of an urban area.

רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר כּוּ׳. מַאי ״בּוֹדֵק״? כְּדִשְׁמוּאֵל. דְּאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: שִׁינּוּי וֶסֶת תְּחִלַּת חוֹלִי מֵעַיִם. כָּתוּב בְּסֵפֶר בֶּן סִירָא: ״כׇּל יְמֵי עָנִי רָעִים״. וְהָאִיכָּא שַׁבָּתוֹת וְיָמִים טוֹבִים? כְּדִשְׁמוּאֵל. דְּאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: שִׁינּוּי וֶסֶת תְּחִלַּת חוֹלִי מֵעַיִם.

§ The mishna taught: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that a pleasant residence tests the individual. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the term tests in this context? The Gemara explains: This is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, as Shmuel said: A change in one’s eating habits [veset] or in one’s place of residence is the start of intestinal disease. Similarly, it is written in Sefer Ben Sira: All the days of the poor are terrible. And yet there are Shabbatot and Festivals, when even the poor eat well. Once again, the Gemara answers: This is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, as Shmuel said: A change in one’s eating habits or in one’s place of residence is the start of intestinal disease, and as a result the poor suffer even from a change for the better.

בֶּן סִירָא אוֹמֵר: ״אַף לֵילוֹת, בִּשְׁפַל גַּגִּים גַּגּוֹ, וּבִמְרוֹם הָרִים כַּרְמוֹ, מִמְּטַר גַּגִּים לְגַגּוֹ, וּמֵעֲפַר כַּרְמוֹ לִכְרָמִים״.

Since the Gemara quoted from Sefer Ben Sira, it cites the rest of the passage concerning the terrible days of the poor. Ben Sira says: Even the nights of the poor are bad. His roof is at the low point of the roofs, i.e., his residence is at the lowest point in the city, and his vineyard is at the mountain peaks, at the highest point of the slope, which means that the rain of roofs washes down to his roof, and the soil of his vineyard to other vineyards, i.e., the rain washes away the soil in his vineyard and carries it away to the vineyards below.

מַתְנִי׳ הַכֹּל מַעֲלִין לְאֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל, וְאֵין הַכֹּל מוֹצִיאִין. הַכֹּל מַעֲלִין לִירוּשָׁלַיִם, וְאֵין הַכֹּל מוֹצִיאִין. אֶחָד הָאֲנָשִׁים וְאֶחָד הַנָּשִׁים.

MISHNA: All may force their family to ascend to Eretz Yisrael, i.e., one may compel his family and household to immigrate to Eretz Yisrael, but all may not remove others from Eretz Yisrael, as one may not coerce one’s family to leave. Likewise, all may force their family to ascend to Jerusalem, and all may not, i.e., no one may, remove them from Jerusalem. Both men and women may force the other spouse to immigrate to Eretz Yisrael or to move to Jerusalem.

נָשָׂא אִשָּׁה בְּאֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל וְגֵרְשָׁהּ בְּאֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל — נוֹתֵן לָהּ מִמְּעוֹת אֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל. נָשָׂא אִשָּׁה בְּאֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל וְגֵרְשָׁהּ בְּקַפּוֹטְקְיָא — נוֹתֵן לָהּ מִמְּעוֹת אֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל. נָשָׂא אִשָּׁה בְּקַפּוֹטְקְיָא וְגֵרְשָׁהּ בְּאֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל — נוֹתֵן לָהּ מִמְּעוֹת אֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: נוֹתֵן לָהּ מִמְּעוֹת קַפּוֹטְקְיָא. נָשָׂא אִשָּׁה בְּקַפּוֹטְקְיָא וְגֵרְשָׁהּ בְּקַפּוֹטְקְיָא — נוֹתֵן לָהּ מִמְּעוֹת קַפּוֹטְקְיָא.

The mishna lists other halakhic distinctions between various geographic locations: If one married a woman in Eretz Yisrael and divorced her in Eretz Yisrael, and the currency of the sum in the marriage contract was not specified, he gives her the sum of her marriage contract in the currency of Eretz Yisrael. If one married a woman in Eretz Yisrael and divorced her in Cappadocia, where the currency holds greater value, he gives her the currency of Eretz Yisrael. If one married a woman in Cappadocia and divorced her in Eretz Yisrael, he likewise gives her the currency of Eretz Yisrael. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: He gives her the currency of Cappadocia. Everyone agrees that if one married a woman in Cappadocia and divorced her in Cappadocia, he gives her the currency of Cappadocia.

גְּמָ׳ ״הַכֹּל מַעֲלִין״ לְאֵתוֹיֵי מַאי? לְאֵתוֹיֵי עֲבָדִים.

GEMARA: The mishna stated: All can force the members of their family to ascend. The Gemara asks: This inclusive phrase serves to include what case? The Gemara answers: It comes to include slaves, i.e., Hebrew slaves as well may be coerced to immigrate to Eretz Yisrael with their master’s family against their will.

וּלְמַאן דְּתָנֵי עֲבָדִים בְּהֶדְיָא, לְאֵתוֹיֵי מַאי? לְאֵתוֹיֵי מִנָּוֶה הַיָּפֶה לְנָוֶה הָרַע(ה).

The Gemara asks: And according to the one whose text of the mishna expressly teaches the case of slaves, this phrase comes to include what case? As stated later in the Gemara, there are some editions of the mishna that state that this halakha applies equally to men, women, and slaves. The Gemara answers: It comes to include one who moves from a pleasant residence to a noxious residence, i.e., one may coerce his family to ascend to Eretz Yisrael even from a good residence abroad to an inferior one in Eretz Yisrael.

״וְאֵין הַכֹּל מוֹצִיאִין״ לְאֵתוֹיֵי מַאי? לְאֵתוֹיֵי עֶבֶד שֶׁבָּרַח מֵחוּצָה לָאָרֶץ לָאָרֶץ, דְּאָמְרִינַן לֵיהּ: זַבְּנֵיהּ הָכָא וְזִיל, מִשּׁוּם יְשִׁיבַת אֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל.

§ The mishna further taught: But all may not remove others. Once again the Gemara asks: This phrase comes to include what case? The Gemara answers: It comes to include a Canaanite slave who ran away from his master and came from outside Eretz Yisrael to Eretz Yisrael, as we say to the master: Sell your slave here, in Eretz Yisrael, and then you may go and return abroad, but you may not take the slave abroad with you, due to the mitzva of settling Eretz Yisrael.

״הַכֹּל מַעֲלִין לִירוּשָׁלַיִם״ לְאֵתוֹיֵי מַאי? לְאֵתוֹיֵי מִנָּוֶה הַיָּפֶה לְנָוֶה הָרַע(ה).

§ The mishna taught: All may force others to ascend to Jerusalem. The Gemara asks once again: This phrase comes to include what case? The Gemara answers: It comes to include a move from a pleasant residence elsewhere in Eretz Yisrael to a noxious residence in Jerusalem.

״וְאֵין הַכֹּל מוֹצִיאִין״ לְאֵתוֹיֵי מַאי? לְאֵתוֹיֵי אֲפִילּוּ מִנָּוֶה הָרַע(ה) לְנָוֶה הַיָּפֶה. וְאַיְּידֵי דִּתְנָא רֵישָׁא ״אֵין מוֹצִיאִין״, תְּנָא סֵיפָא נָמֵי ״אֵין מוֹצִיאִין״.

§ The mishna taught: And all may not remove them from Jerusalem. The Gemara asks: This phrase comes to include what case? The Gemara answers: It comes to include even a move from a noxious residence to a pleasant residence. The Gemara adds: And since the tanna of the mishna taught: But one may not remove, in the first clause, he also taught: But one may not remove, in the latter clause, despite the fact that this halakha could have been inferred from the first clause.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הוּא אוֹמֵר לַעֲלוֹת, וְהִיא אוֹמֶרֶת שֶׁלֹּא לַעֲלוֹת — כּוֹפִין אוֹתָהּ לַעֲלוֹת, וְאִם לָאו — תֵּצֵא בְּלֹא כְּתוּבָּה. הִיא אוֹמֶרֶת לַעֲלוֹת, וְהוּא אוֹמֵר שֶׁלֹּא לַעֲלוֹת — כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ לַעֲלוֹת, וְאִם לָאו — יוֹצִיא וְיִתֵּן כְּתוּבָּה.

§ The Sages taught: If the husband says that he wishes to ascend, i.e., to immigrate to Eretz Yisrael, and his wife says that she does not wish to ascend, one forces her to ascend. And if she will not do so, as she resists all attempts to force her to make the move, she is divorced without receiving her marriage contract, i.e., she forfeits her rights to the benefits outlined in the marriage contract. If she says that she wishes to ascend to Eretz Yisrael and he says that he does not wish to ascend, one forces him to ascend. And if he does not wish to immigrate, he must divorce her and give her the marriage contract.

הִיא אוֹמֶרֶת לָצֵאת, וְהוּא אוֹמֵר שֶׁלֹּא לָצֵאת — כּוֹפִין אוֹתָהּ שֶׁלֹּא לָצֵאת, וְאִם לָאו — תֵּצֵא בְּלֹא כְּתוּבָּה. הוּא אוֹמֵר לָצֵאת, וְהִיא אוֹמֶרֶת שֶׁלֹּא לָצֵאת — כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ שֶׁלֹּא לָצֵאת, וְאִם לָאו — יוֹצִיא וְיִתֵּן כְּתוּבָּה.

If she says that she wishes to leave Eretz Yisrael, and he says that he does not wish to leave, one forces her not to leave. And if she does not wish to stay in Eretz Yisrael and resists all attempts to force her to stay, she is divorced without receiving her marriage contract. If he says that he wishes to leave Eretz Yisrael and she says that she does not wish to leave, one forces him not to leave. And if he does not wish to stay in Eretz Yisrael, he must divorce her and give her the marriage contract.

נָשָׂא אִשָּׁה כּוּ׳. הָא גּוּפַהּ קַשְׁיָא:

§ The mishna taught that if one married a woman in Eretz Yisrael and divorced her in Cappadocia, he must pay her the marriage contract in the currency of Eretz Yisrael. The same is true if he married her in Cappadocia and divorced her in Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara asks: This matter itself is difficult, i.e., there is an internal contradiction in the rulings provided by the mishna.

קָתָנֵי: נָשָׂא אִשָּׁה בְּאֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל וְגֵרְשָׁהּ בְּקַפּוֹטְקְיָא, נוֹתֵן לָהּ מִמְּעוֹת אֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל — אַלְמָא בָּתַר שִׁיעְבּוּדָא אָזְלִינַן. אֵימָא סֵיפָא: נָשָׂא אִשָּׁה בְּקַפּוֹטְקְיָא וְגֵרְשָׁהּ בְּאֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל, נוֹתֵן לָהּ מִמְּעוֹת אֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל — אַלְמָא בָּתַר גּוּבְיָינָא אָזְלִינַן!

The Gemara elaborates: The mishna first teaches that if one married a woman in Eretz Yisrael and divorced her in Cappadocia, he gives her the currency of Eretz Yisrael. Apparently, one follows the customs of the place of the lien, i.e., he pays with the currency of the location of the wedding, where the obligation came into force. Now, say the latter clause of the mishna: If one married a woman in Cappadocia and divorced her in Eretz Yisrael, he likewise gives her currency of Eretz Yisrael. Apparently, one follows the place of the collection of the money.

אָמַר רַבָּה: מִקּוּלֵּי כְתוּבָּה שָׁנוּ כָּאן. קָסָבַר כְּתוּבָּה דְּרַבָּנַן.

Rabba said: The Sages taught here one of the leniencies that apply to a marriage contract. The leniency is that the husband pays with the less valuable currency of Eretz Yisrael in both cases, whether the wedding or the divorce occurred there. This is because the tanna of this mishna holds that a marriage contract applies by rabbinic law.

רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: נוֹתֵן לָהּ מִמְּעוֹת קַפּוֹטְקְיָא. קָסָבַר כְּתוּבָּה דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא.

§ The mishna taught that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that if one married a woman in Cappadocia and divorced her in Eretz Yisrael, he pays her the marriage contract in the currency of Cappadocia. The Gemara explains that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that a marriage contract applies by Torah law, which means that its debt must be paid according to its highest possible value. Consequently, one follows the place in which the obligation was formed, which is the halakha for all deeds and contracts, and there is no room for leniency in this matter.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הַמּוֹצִיא שְׁטַר חוֹב עַל חֲבֵירוֹ, כָּתוּב בּוֹ בָּבֶל — מַגְבֵּהוּ מִמְּעוֹת בָּבֶל, כָּתוּב בּוֹ אֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל — מַגְבֵּהוּ מִמְּעוֹת אֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל. כָּתוּב בּוֹ סְתָם, הוֹצִיאוֹ בְּבָבֶל — מַגְבֵּהוּ מִמְּעוֹת בָּבֶל, הוֹצִיאוֹ בְּאֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל — מַגְבֵּהוּ מִמְּעוֹת אֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל. כָּתוּב בּוֹ כֶּסֶף סְתָם — מַה שֶּׁיִּרְצֶה לֹוֶה מַגְבֵּהוּ. מַה שֶּׁאֵין כֵּן בִּכְתוּבָּה.

§ The Sages taught: With regard to one who produces a promissory note against another, if Babylonia is written in it, he pays it with the currency of Babylonia; if Eretz Yisrael is written in it, he pays it with currency of Eretz Yisrael. In a case where it is written without specification as to where the document was written, if he produced it in Babylonia he pays it with the currency of Babylonia and if he produced it in Eretz Yisrael he pays it with currency of Eretz Yisrael. If the note mentions money without specification of what type of coins are to be used, the borrower may pay it with any type of coin he likes, even the smallest denomination available. However, this is not the case with regard to a marriage contract.

אַהֵיָיא? אָמַר רַב מְשַׁרְשְׁיָא: אַרֵישָׁא, לְאַפּוֹקֵי מִדְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, דְּאָמַר כְּתוּבָּה דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא.

The Gemara asks: With regard to this last statement, that this is not the case with regard to a marriage contract: To which part of the baraita is this referring? Rav Mesharshiyya said: It is referring back to the first clause, that if the promissory note mentions Babylonia one pays with Babylonian currency. This indicates that one invariably pays based on the place where the document was written. The tanna adds that this principle does not apply to a marriage contract, as one pays based on the place where a marriage contract was written only if this would lead to a leniency, as explained above (Rid). This ruling comes to exclude the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who said that that a marriage contract applies by Torah law and must always be paid in the currency of the place in which the obligation was first formed.

כָּתוּב בּוֹ כֶּסֶף סְתָם — מַה שֶּׁיִּרְצֶה לֹוֶה מַגְבֵּהוּ. וְאֵימָא נְסָכָא? אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: דִּכְתִיב בֵּיהּ מַטְבֵּעַ. וְאֵימָא פְּרִיטֵי? אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: פְּרִיטֵי דְכַסְפָּא לָא עָבְדִי אִינָשֵׁי.

§ The Gemara continues to analyze the baraita, which teaches: If the note mentions money [kesef ] without specification, the borrower may pay it with any type of coin he likes. The Gemara asks: But can’t one say that perhaps the document was not speaking of coins but of silver [kesef ] strips? Rabbi Elazar said: The baraita is referring to a case in which it is written in the document: Coins, although it does not specify which ones. The Gemara further asks: And can’t one say that one may pay off the debt with perutot, a small denomination? Rav Pappa said: People do not ordinarily mint perutot of silver, as they reserve silver for larger denominations.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: לְעוֹלָם יָדוּר אָדָם בְּאֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל אֲפִילּוּ בְּעִיר שֶׁרוּבָּהּ גּוֹיִם, וְאַל יָדוּר בְּחוּצָה לָאָרֶץ וַאֲפִילּוּ בְּעִיר שֶׁרוּבָּהּ יִשְׂרָאֵל, שֶׁכׇּל הַדָּר בְּאֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל דּוֹמֶה כְּמִי שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ אֱלוֹהַּ, וְכׇל הַדָּר בְּחוּצָה לָאָרֶץ דּוֹמֶה כְּמִי שֶׁאֵין לוֹ אֱלוֹהַּ. שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״לָתֵת לָכֶם אֶת אֶרֶץ כְּנַעַן לִהְיוֹת לָכֶם לֵאלֹהִים״.

§ In relation to the basic point raised by the mishna concerning living in Eretz Yisrael, the Sages taught: A person should always reside in Eretz Yisrael, even in a city that is mostly populated by gentiles, and he should not reside outside of Eretz Yisrael, even in a city that is mostly populated by Jews. The reason is that anyone who resides in Eretz Yisrael is considered as one who has a God, and anyone who resides outside of Eretz Yisrael is considered as one who does not have a God. As it is stated: “To give to you the land of Canaan, to be your God” (Leviticus 25:38).

וְכֹל שֶׁאֵינוֹ דָּר בָּאָרֶץ אֵין לוֹ אֱלוֹהַּ? אֶלָּא לוֹמַר לָךְ: כׇּל הַדָּר בְּחוּצָה לָאָרֶץ כְּאִילּוּ עוֹבֵד עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה. וְכֵן בְּדָוִד הוּא אוֹמֵר: ״כִּי גֵרְשׁוּנִי הַיּוֹם מֵהִסְתַּפֵּחַ בְּנַחֲלַת ה׳ לֵאמֹר לֵךְ עֲבוֹד אֱלֹהִים אֲחֵרִים״, וְכִי מִי אָמַר לוֹ לְדָוִד לֵךְ עֲבוֹד אֱלֹהִים אֲחֵרִים? אֶלָּא לוֹמַר לָךְ: כׇּל הַדָּר בְּחוּצָה לָאָרֶץ — כְּאִילּוּ עוֹבֵד עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה.

The Gemara expresses surprise: And can it really be said that anyone who resides outside of Eretz Yisrael has no God? Rather, this comes to tell you that anyone who resides outside of Eretz Yisrael is considered as though he is engaged in idol worship. And so it says with regard to David: “For they have driven me out this day that I should not cleave to the inheritance of the Lord, saying: Go, serve other gods” (I Samuel 26:19). But who said to David: Go, serve other gods? Rather, this comes to tell you that anyone who resides outside of Eretz Yisrael is considered as though he is engaged in idol worship.

רַבִּי זֵירָא הֲוָה קָמִשְׁתְּמִיט מִינֵּיהּ דְּרַב יְהוּדָה דִּבְעָא לְמִיסַּק לְאֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל, דְּאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה: כׇּל הָעוֹלֶה מִבָּבֶל לְאֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל עוֹבֵר בַּעֲשֵׂה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר:

§ The Gemara relates: Rabbi Zeira was avoiding being seen by his teacher, Rav Yehuda, as Rabbi Zeira sought to ascend to Eretz Yisrael and his teacher disapproved. As Rav Yehuda said: Anyone who ascends from Babylonia to Eretz Yisrael transgresses a positive mitzva, as it is stated: