כתובות ס

כתובות ס

עַד כַּמָּה? אָמַר רָבָא אָמַר רַב יִרְמְיָה בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַב: שְׁלֹשָׁה חֳדָשִׁים, וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם. וְרַבִּי יִצְחָק אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: חֲמִשִּׁים יוֹם. אָמַר רַב שִׁימִי בַּר אַבָּיֵי: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יִצְחָק שֶׁאָמַר מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן. בִּשְׁלָמָא רַב וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן — כׇּל חַד וְחַד כִּי חוּרְפֵּיהּ. אֶלָּא לִשְׁמוּאֵל, כִּי הַאי גַּוְונָא מִי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ?

The Gemara asks: How old does the child have to be so that one can assume that he already recognizes his mother? Rava said that Rav Yirmeya bar Abba said that Rav said: Three months, and Shmuel said: Thirty days, and Rabbi Yitzḥak said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Fifty days. Rav Shimi bar Abaye said: The halakha is in accordance with what Rabbi Yitzḥak said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan. The Gemara asks: Granted, Rav and Rabbi Yoḥanan are in dispute with regard to the difference between fifty days and three months, as it is possible that each baby varies according to its intelligence, as one baby is sufficiently developed at fifty days, while another knows his mother at only three months. However, according to Shmuel, can you find a case like this, a one-month-old baby who recognizes his mother?

כִּי אֲתָא רָמֵי בַּר יְחֶזְקֵאל, אָמַר: לָא תְּצִיתִינְהוּ לְהָנֵי כְּלָלֵי דְּכָיֵיל יְהוּדָה אֲחִי מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל. הָכִי אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: כׇּל זְמַן שֶׁמַּכִּירָהּ.

The Gemara relates: When Rami bar Yeḥezkel came from Eretz Yisrael, he said: Do not listen to, i.e., do not accept, those principles that my brother Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel, as Shmuel did not establish a particular time with regard to this matter. Rather, this is what Shmuel said: Whenever he recognizes her, i.e., there is no fixed age at which this occurs. One must check each baby to see whether he recognizes his mother.

הָהִיא דַּאֲתַאי לְקַמֵּיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל. אֲמַר לֵיהּ לְרַב דִּימִי בַּר יוֹסֵף: זִיל בִּדְקֵהּ. אֲזַל אוֹתְבַהּ בְּדָרֵי דִנְשֵׁי, וְשַׁקְלֵיהּ לִבְרַהּ וְקָמְהַדַּר לֵיהּ עֲלַיְיהוּ. כִּי מְטָא לְגַבַּהּ, הֲוָת קָא מְסַוֵּי לְאַפַּהּ כְּבַשְׁתִּנְהִי לְעֵינַהּ מִינֵּיהּ. אֲמַר לַהּ: נְטֹף עֵינִיךְ, קוּם דְּרַי בְּרִיךְ. סוֹמֵא מְנָא יָדַע? אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: בְּרֵיחָא וּבְטַעְמָא.

The Gemara relates: A certain divorcée came before Shmuel, as she did not wish to nurse her son. He said to Rav Dimi bar Yosef: Go and check her, i.e., verify whether the child recognizes his mother. He went, placed her in a row of women, and took her son in his arms and passed him near them to see how the child would react. When the child reached her, he looked at her face with joy, and she averted her eyes from him, as she did not want to look at him. He said to her: Lift up your eyes, get up and take your son, as it is obvious that he knows you. The Gemara asks: If this is so, then how does a blind baby know and recognize his mother? Rav Ashi said: Through smell and through the taste of her milk.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: יוֹנֵק תִּינוֹק וְהוֹלֵךְ עַד עֶשְׂרִים וְאַרְבָּעָה חֹדֶשׁ, מִכָּאן וְאֵילָךְ — כְּיוֹנֵק שֶׁקֶץ, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר. רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אוֹמֵר: אֲפִילּוּ אַרְבַּע וְחָמֵשׁ שָׁנִים. פֵּירַשׁ לְאַחַר עֶשְׂרִים וְאַרְבָּעָה חֹדֶשׁ וְחָזַר — כְּיוֹנֵק שֶׁקֶץ.

§ Apropos the period of time during which a child nurses, the Gemara continues to debate different aspects of this matter. The Sages taught in a baraita: A child may continue to nurse until the age of twenty-four months, and from this point forward, if he continues to nurse, he is like one who nurses from a non-kosher animal, as a woman’s milk is forbidden to anyone other than a small child; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Yehoshua says: A child may continue to nurse even for four or five years, and this is permitted. However, if he ceased, i.e., was weaned, after twenty-four months and then resumed nursing, he is like one who nurses from a non-kosher animal.

אָמַר מָר: מִכָּאן וְאֵילָךְ כְּיוֹנֵק שֶׁקֶץ. וּרְמִינְהִי: יָכוֹל יְהֵא חֲלֵב מְהַלְּכֵי שְׁתַּיִם טָמֵא. וְדִין הוּא: וּמָה בְּהֵמָה שֶׁהֵקַלְתָּ בְּמַגָּעָהּ — הֶחְמַרְתָּ בַּחֲלָבָהּ, אָדָם שֶׁהֶחְמַרְתָּ בְּמַגָּעוֹ — אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁתַּחְמִיר בַּחֲלָבוֹ?

The Master said in the baraita: From this point forward he is like one who nurses from a non-kosher animal. The Gemara raises a contradiction from a baraita: One might have thought that the milk of bipeds, i.e., humans, would be non-kosher like that of a non-kosher animal, based on a logical derivation: Just as with regard to a non-kosher animal, where you were lenient with regard to its contact, meaning that it does not render people or items impure through contact when it is alive, you were stringent with regard to its milk, which is prohibited, even more so should this be true with regard to a person. An a fortiori inference would indicate that with regard to a person, where you were stringent about contact, as people can render other people and objects impure even when they are alive, one should be stricter. So isn’t it logical that you should be stringent with regard to his milk?

תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״אֶת הַגָּמָל כִּי מַעֲלֵה גֵרָה הוּא״, הוּא טָמֵא, וְאֵין חֲלֵב מְהַלְּכֵי שְׁתַּיִם טָמֵא, אֶלָּא טָהוֹר. יָכוֹל אוֹצִיא אֶת הֶחָלָב, שֶׁאֵינוֹ שָׁוֶה בַּכֹּל, וְלֹא אוֹצִיא אֶת הַדָּם שֶׁהוּא שָׁוֶה בַּכֹּל — תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״הוּא״ — הוּא טָמֵא, וְאֵין דַּם מְהַלְּכֵי שְׁתַּיִם טָמֵא, אֶלָּא טָהוֹר.

This is as the verse states: “But this you shall not eat, of those that only chew the cud, or of those that only part the hoof; the camel, because it chews the cud but does not part the hoof, it is impure for you” (Leviticus 11:4). The somewhat superfluous word “it” teaches that it alone is impure, but the milk of bipeds is not impure; rather, it is kosher. Furthermore, one might have thought that I should exclude the milk of humans from the prohibition against consumption, as this issue does not apply equally to everyone, since only women produce milk, but I should not exclude from the prohibition human blood, which does apply equally to everyone. Consequently, the verse states “it” with regard to a camel, to say that it alone is impure, whereas the blood of bipeds is not impure, but rather is kosher.

וְאָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: אֲפִילּוּ מִצְוַת פְּרִישָׁה אֵין בּוֹ.

And Rav Sheshet said about this ruling: There is not even a rabbinic command to refrain from consuming human milk. Therefore, this presents a contradiction to the statement that a child who nurses beyond a certain age is like one who nurses from a non-kosher animal.

לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא דְּפָרֵישׁ, הָא דְּלָא פָּרֵישׁ.

The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as this statement that the milk is permitted is referring to when it has been removed from the woman’s body, and that statement, that the milk is forbidden, is referring to when it has not been removed. Fundamentally, human milk is a permitted substance. However, it is prohibited by rabbinic law for anyone other than a very young child to nurse directly from a woman’s breasts, and one who does so is considered like one who consumes milk from a non-kosher animal.

וְחִילּוּפַהּ בְּדָם. כִּדְתַנְיָא: דָּם שֶׁעַל גַּבֵּי כִּכָּר — גּוֹרְרוֹ וְאוֹכְלוֹ. שֶׁבֵּין הַשִּׁינַּיִם — מוֹצְצוֹ וְאֵינוֹ חוֹשֵׁשׁ.

And the opposite applies to blood: Human blood that has been removed from the body is forbidden, but if it has not yet been removed, it is permitted. As it is taught in a baraita: If some human blood was on a loaf of bread, one scrapes off the blood and then he may eat the bread. Since the blood was detached from the body, it is forbidden by rabbinic law, but if blood was between the teeth, he may suck it and swallow it without concern, as the blood is permitted if it has not been removed from the body.

אָמַר מָר, רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אוֹמֵר: אֲפִילּוּ אַרְבַּע וְחָמֵשׁ שָׁנִים. וְהָתַנְיָא, רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אוֹמֵר: אֲפִילּוּ חֲבִילָתוֹ עַל כְּתֵיפָיו! אִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי חַד שִׁיעוּרָא הוּא. אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ.

The Master said in the aforementioned baraita: Rabbi Yehoshua says: A child may continue to nurse even for four or five years. But isn’t it taught in a different baraita: Rabbi Yehoshua says: Even if he can carry his package on his shoulder he can continue to nurse? The Gemara answers: This is not a contradiction, since both this and that are one, the same, measure, and the difference between them is only semantic. Rav Yosef said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua.

תַּנְיָא, רַבִּי מָרִינוּס אוֹמֵר: גּוֹנֵחַ — יוֹנֵק חָלָב בְּשַׁבָּת. מַאי טַעְמָא: יוֹנֵק מְפָרֵק כִּלְאַחַר יָד, וּבִמְקוֹם צַעֲרָא לָא גְּזַרוּ רַבָּנַן. אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי מָרִינוּס.

On the same topic it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Marinos says: One who is coughing due to an illness that requires milk but did not have milk available may suck milk directly from an animal’s udders on Shabbat, although milking is a prohibited labor on Shabbat. What is the reason? Sucking the milk in this way constitutes an act of extracting in an unusual manner. Although milking is an example of the labor of extracting, a subcategory of the primary category of threshing, it is prohibited by Torah law only when the labor is performed in its typical manner. One who nurses from an animal is extracting the milk in an unusual manner. Such labor is prohibited by rabbinic law, but in a situation involving pain, like one who is coughing, the Sages did not issue a decree. Rabbi Yosef said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Marinos.

תַּנְיָא, נַחוּם אִישׁ גַּלְיָא אוֹמֵר: צִינּוֹר שֶׁעָלוּ בּוֹ קַשְׁקַשִּׁין — מְמַעֲכָן בְּרַגְלוֹ בְּצִנְעָא בְּשַׁבָּת, וְאֵינוֹ חוֹשֵׁשׁ. מַאי טַעְמָא — מְתַקֵּן כִּלְאַחַר יָד הוּא, וּבִמְקוֹם פְּסֵידָא לָא גְּזַרוּ בַּהּ רַבָּנַן. אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: הֲלָכָה כְּנַחוּם אִישׁ גַּלְיָא.

A ruling similar to the previous halakha is taught in a baraita: Naḥum of Galia says: If a drainage pipe is blocked by weeds [kashkashin] and grass, preventing water from running through the pipe, one may crush them with his foot in private on Shabbat without concern that he is performing the labor of preparing a vessel. The Gemara explains: What is the reason for this leniency? This is an example of repairing a vessel in an unusual manner, since it is uncommon to fix an item without using a tool or one’s hands. Performing labor in an unusual manner is ordinarily prohibited by rabbinic decree, but in a situation involving financial loss, the Sages did not issue a decree. Rabbi Yosef said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Naḥum of Galia.

פֵּירַשׁ לְאַחַר עֶשְׂרִים וְאַרְבָּעָה חֹדֶשׁ וְחָזַר — כְּיוֹנֵק שֶׁקֶץ. וְכַמָּה? אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה בַּר חֲבִיבָא אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: שְׁלֹשָׁה יָמִים. אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי, תָּנֵי רַב יְהוּדָה בַּר חֲבִיבָא קַמֵּיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל: שְׁלֹשָׁה יָמִים.

The Gemara continues discussing the aforementioned baraita, which states: If the child ceased nursing after twenty-four months and then resumed, he is like one who nurses from a non-kosher animal. The Gemara asks: How long must he cease nursing to be considered weaned? Rav Yehuda bar Ḥaviva said that Shmuel said: Three days. There are those who say that this was not an amoraic statement, but rather a baraita that is taught by Rav Yehuda bar Ḥaviva before Shmuel: Weaning takes effect after three days.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: מֵינֶקֶת שֶׁמֵּת בַּעְלָהּ בְּתוֹךְ עֶשְׂרִים וְאַרְבָּעָה חֹדֶשׁ — הֲרֵי זוֹ לֹא תִּתְאָרֵס וְלֹא תִּינָּשֵׂא

§ The Gemara discusses other halakhot relating to nursing. The Sages taught: A nursing woman whose husband died within twenty-four months of her child’s birth may not be betrothed and may not get married

עַד עֶשְׂרִים וְאַרְבָּעָה חֹדֶשׁ, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה מַתִּיר בִּשְׁמוֹנָה עָשָׂר חֹדֶשׁ. אָמַר רַבִּי נָתָן בַּר יוֹסֵף: הֵן הֵן דִּבְרֵי בֵּית שַׁמַּאי, הֵן הֵן דִּבְרֵי בֵּית הִלֵּל. שֶׁבֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: עֶשְׂרִים וְאַרְבָּעָה חֹדֶשׁ, וּבֵית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים: שְׁמוֹנָה עָשָׂר חֹדֶשׁ.

until twenty-four months from the day the child was born. The reason for this decree is to protect the child. If she remarries she may become pregnant and may not be able to continue nursing, but her second husband will not be obligated to support the child who is not his son. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And Rabbi Yehuda permits getting married after eighteen months. Rabbi Natan bar Yosef said: These words are the same as the statement of Beit Shammai, and those words are the same as the statement of Beit Hillel, i.e., this is an ancient dispute, as Beit Shammai say: Twenty-four months, and Beit Hillel say: Eighteen months.

אָמַר רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל: אֲנִי אַכְרִיעַ. לְדִבְרֵי הָאוֹמֵר עֶשְׂרִים וְאַרְבָּעָה חֹדֶשׁ — מוּתֶּרֶת לִינָּשֵׂא בְּעֶשְׂרִים וְאֶחָד חֹדֶשׁ. לְדִבְרֵי הָאוֹמֵר בִּשְׁמוֹנָה עָשָׂר חֹדֶשׁ — מוּתֶּרֶת לְהִנָּשֵׂא בַּחֲמִשָּׁה עָשָׂר חֹדֶשׁ, לְפִי שֶׁאֵין הֶחָלָב נֶעְכָּר אֶלָּא לְאַחַר שְׁלֹשָׁה חֳדָשִׁים.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: I will decide. According to the one who says twenty-four months, she may marry after twenty-one months, since even if she gets pregnant, for the first three months of pregnancy she can still continue to nurse. According to the one who says eighteen months, she may marry after fifteen months, since the milk becomes spoiled due to pregnancy only after three months.

אָמַר עוּלָּא: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה. וְאָמַר מָר עוּקְבָא: לִי הִתִּיר רַבִּי חֲנִינָא לָשֵׂאת לְאַחַר חֲמִשָּׁה עָשָׂר חֹדֶשׁ. אֲרִיסֵיהּ דְּאַבָּיֵי אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּאַבָּיֵי, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַהוּ לֵיאָרֵס בַּחֲמִשָּׁה עָשָׂר חֹדֶשׁ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: חֲדָא, דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה — הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה. וְעוֹד: בֵּית שַׁמַּאי וּבֵית הִלֵּל — הֲלָכָה כְּבֵית הִלֵּל. וְאָמַר עוּלָּא: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, וְאָמַר מָר עוּקְבָא: לִי הִתִּיר רַבִּי חֲנִינָא לָשֵׂאת לְאַחַר חֲמִשָּׁה עָשָׂר חֹדֶשׁ, כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן דְּאַתְּ לֵיאָרֵס.

Ulla said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. And Mar Ukva said: Rabbi Ḥanina allowed me to marry a nursing woman after fifteen months. It is related that Abaye’s tenant farmer came before Abaye to ask a question. He said to him: What is the halakha with regard to betrothing a nursing woman after fifteen months? Abaye said to him: One reason it is permitted is that in disputes between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda, the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda. And furthermore, this is actually a dispute between earlier tanna’im, and when Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel dispute, the halakha is in accordance with Beit Hillel. And in addition, Ulla said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda. And Mar Ukva said: Rabbi Ḥanina allowed me to marry after fifteen months, and therefore all the more so you are permitted to betroth her, as you are only betrothing and not marrying her.

כִּי אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב יוֹסֵף, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: רַב וּשְׁמוּאֵל דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ: צְרִיכָה לְהַמְתִּין עֶשְׂרִים וְאַרְבָּעָה חֹדֶשׁ, חוּץ מִיּוֹם שֶׁנּוֹלַד בּוֹ וְחוּץ מִיּוֹם שֶׁנִּתְאָרְסָה בּוֹ. רְהַט בָּתְרֵיהּ תְּלָתָא פַּרְסֵי וְאָמְרִי לַהּ פַּרְסָא בְּחָלָא, וְלָא אַדְרְכֵיהּ.

When Abaye came before Rav Yosef and told him of the incident, Rav Yosef said to him in response: Rav and Shmuel both say: She must wait twenty-four months before even becoming betrothed, excluding the day that the child was born and excluding the day she became betrothed. When Abaye heard this, he ran three parasangs after his tenant farmer, and some say that he ran one parasang [parsa] through sand. He wanted to inform him that he should not rely on the leniency, but rather he should act in accordance with Rav and Shmuel, who prohibited the betrothal, but he did not succeed in catching up to him.

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: הַאי מִילְּתָא דַאֲמוּר רַבָּנַן אֲפִילּוּ בֵּיעֲתָא בְּכוּתָּחָא לָא לִישְׁרֵי אִינִישׁ בִּמְקוֹם רַבֵּיהּ, לָא מִשּׁוּם דְּמִיחֲזֵי כְּאַפְקִירוּתָא, אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא מִסְתַּיְּיעָא מִילְּתָא לְמֵימְרָא. דְּהָא אֲנָא הֲוָה גְּמִירְנָא לֵיהּ לְהָא דְּרַב וּשְׁמוּאֵל, אֲפִילּוּ הָכִי לָא מִסְתַּיְּיעָא לִי מִילְּתָא לְמֵימַר.

Abaye said that he learned from this situation that which the Sages said: A person should not permit even eating an egg in kutaḥ, a dish made with milk, in his teacher’s vicinity. This is a very simple ruling, as an egg is not meat and may unquestionably be eaten with milk. There are no stringencies that apply to this case, but nevertheless one should not rule even on such a halakha in his teacher’s vicinity. Abaye explained that this is not because it appears disrespectful to teach halakha in one’s teacher’s vicinity, as this is a simple matter that does not require great knowledge of halakha, rather because he will not be successful in saying the matter correctly. An illustration of this principle is what just happened, since I had learned this halakha of Rav and Shmuel, and even so I was unsuccessful in saying it correctly, as I ruled in the vicinity of my teacher, Rav Yosef.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: נָתְנָה בְּנָהּ לְמֵינֶקֶת, אוֹ גְּמָלַתּוּ, אוֹ מֵת — מוּתֶּרֶת לִינָּשֵׂא מִיָּד. רַב פָּפָּא וְרַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ סְבוּר לְמִיעְבַּד עוֹבָדָא כִּי הָא מַתְנִיתָא. אֲמַרָה לְהוּ הָהִיא סָבְתָּא: בְּדִידִי הֲוָה עוֹבָדָא, וַאֲסַר לִי רַב נַחְמָן.

§ The Sages taught: If a woman gave her child to a wet nurse during the waiting period, or weaned him, or the child died, she is permitted to marry immediately. It is related that Rav Pappa and Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, thought to act in accordance with this baraita. However, a certain old woman said to them: There was an incident in which I was involved with regard to this issue and Rav Naḥman prohibited it for me.

אִינִי?! וְהָא רַב נַחְמָן שְׁרָא לְהוּ לְבֵי רֵישׁ גָּלוּתָא! שָׁאנֵי בֵּי רֵישׁ גָּלוּתָא דְּלָא הָדְרִי בְּהוּ.

The Gemara asks: Is that so? Didn’t Rav Naḥman permit this for the members of the Exilarch’s household? The Gemara answers: The Exilarch’s household is different, since people employed by them do not renege out of fear of the consequences. Consequently, if a woman from that household arranges a wet nurse for her child, it is certain that the wet nurse will keep her commitment, whereas with other people there is a danger that if the mother remarries the child might be left without anyone to feed him.

אֲמַר לְהוּ רַב פַּפֵּי: וְאַתּוּן לָא תִּסְבְּרוּהָ — מֵהָא דְּתַנְיָא: הֲרֵי שֶׁהָיְתָה רְדוּפָה לֵילֵךְ לְבֵית אָבִיהָ, אוֹ שֶׁהָיָה לָהּ כַּעַס בְּבֵית בַּעְלָהּ, אוֹ שֶׁהָיָה בַּעְלָהּ חָבוּשׁ בְּבֵית הָאֲסוּרִין, אוֹ שֶׁהָלַךְ בַּעְלָהּ לִמְדִינַת הַיָּם, אוֹ שֶׁהָיָה בַּעְלָהּ זָקֵן, אוֹ חוֹלֶה, אוֹ שֶׁהָיְתָה עֲקָרָה וּזְקֵנָה אַיְילוֹנִית וּקְטַנָּה, וְהַמַּפֶּלֶת אַחַר מִיתַת בַּעְלָהּ, וְשֶׁאֵינָהּ רְאוּיָה לֵילֵד — כּוּלָּן צְרִיכוֹת לְהַמְתִּין שְׁלֹשָׁה חֳדָשִׁים, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר.

Rav Pappi said to Rav Pappa and Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua: And do you not maintain that such a marriage is prohibited from that which is taught in a baraita: If a woman frequently went to her father’s house and had been there for a long time; or she had been angry with her husband and separated from him while still in his house; or her husband had been incarcerated in prison; or her husband had gone overseas; or her husband had been old or ill; or if she was a barren woman, or elderly, or a sexually underdeveloped woman, or a minor girl; or if she had miscarried after the death of her husband; or if she was unfit to give birth for any other reason, although in any of these cases there is no concern that she might be pregnant, they must all wait at least three months. The Sages said that a woman must wait for three months between marriages, so there would be no doubt as to who is the father of any child she may give birth to, and they did not distinguish between different women with regard to this decree. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

רַבִּי יוֹסֵי מַתִּיר לֵיאָרֵס וְלִינָּשֵׂא מִיָּד. וְאָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר בִּגְזֵירוֹתָיו.

However, Rabbi Yosei permits all the aforementioned women to be betrothed and to marry immediately, since there is no concern that they may be pregnant. And Rav Naḥman said that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir with regard to all of his decrees. In every place where Rabbi Meir was stringent so as to avoid possibility of error, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion. Consequently, this ruling should apply also to a nursing mother who wishes to remarry; the restriction should apply equally to a woman who had given her child to a wet nurse, or who had weaned him, or whose child had died.

אָמְרִי לֵיהּ: לָאו אַדַּעְתִּין. וְהִלְכְתָא: מֵת — מוּתָּר, גְּמָלַתּוּ — אָסוּר. מָר בַּר רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ מֵת נָמֵי אָסוּר, דִּלְמָא קָטְלָה לֵיהּ וְאָזְלָא וּמִינַּסְבָא. הֲוָה עוֹבָדָא וַחֲנַקְתֵּיהּ. וְלָא הִיא, הָהִיא שׁוֹטָה הֲוַאי, דְּלָא עָבְדִי נְשֵׁי דְּחָנְקָן בְּנַיְיהוּ.

They answered him: The matter was not in our mind, meaning that we had forgotten this principle. Nevertheless, the Gemara concludes: The halakha is that if a nursing mother’s child died, the mother is permitted to marry immediately, but if she had weaned him, she is prohibited from marrying, lest she forcibly wean him prematurely. Mar bar Rav Ashi said: Even if the child died, she is also prohibited from marrying, because if it were permitted when the child dies, there would be concern that she might kill him and then go and get married. It is related that there was an incident where a woman strangled her child for this reason. The Gemara concludes that that is not so, i.e., this incident does not affect the halakha. That woman was insane, and since women do not ordinarily strangle their children, one need not be concerned about this happening.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הֲרֵי שֶׁנָּתְנוּ לָהּ בֵּן לְהָנִיק — הֲרֵי זוֹ לֹא תָּנִיק עִמּוֹ לֹא בְּנָהּ וְלֹא בֶּן חֲבֶרְתָּהּ. פָּסְקָה קִימְעָא — אוֹכֶלֶת הַרְבֵּה. לֹא תֹּאכַל עִמּוֹ דְּבָרִים הָרָעִים לְחָלָב.

§ The Sages taught: If someone gave a child to a wet nurse, and she agreed to nurse him for payment, she may not nurse her own child or another woman’s child together with him, in order that she not take away milk from the child she is being paid to nurse. Even if she fixed a small allowance for food with the payment for nursing, she must nevertheless eat large quantities so that she will have enough milk. And she may not eat together with him, i.e., while she is nursing the child, things that are bad for her milk.

הַשְׁתָּא בְּנָהּ אָמְרַתְּ לָא, בֶּן חֲבֶרְתָּהּ מִיבַּעְיָא?! מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: בְּנָהּ הוּא דְּחָיְיסָ[א] עִילָּוֵיהּ מַמְצְיָא לֵיהּ טְפֵי. אֲבָל בֶּן חֲבֶרְתָּהּ, אִי לָאו דַּהֲוָה לַהּ מוֹתָר לָא הֲוָה מַמְצְיָא לֵיהּ, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

The Gemara asks about this baraita: Now that you said that she may not nurse her own child together with her client’s child, is it necessary to say that she cannot nurse another woman’s child? The Gemara answers: Lest you say that the prohibition is limited to her child, as there is a concern that since she favors him, she will feed him more milk than the other child, but with regard to another woman’s child, if she did not have surplus milk she would not feed him, and therefore it should be permitted, the baraita therefore teaches us not to distinguish between the cases.

פָּסְקָה קִימְעָא — אוֹכֶלֶת הַרְבֵּה. מֵהֵיכָא? אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: מִשֶּׁלָּהּ.

The baraita said that even if she fixed a small allowance for food, she must eat large quantities. The Gemara asks: From where should she get this food if the allowance cannot cover it? Rav Sheshet said: From her own funds. Because she accepted an obligation to nurse the child, she must take the necessary steps to fulfill her obligation.

לֹא תֹּאכַל עִמּוֹ דְּבָרִים הָרָעִים. מַאי נִינְהוּ? אָמַר רַב כָּהֲנָא: כְּגוֹן כְּשׁוּת וַחֲזִיז וְדָגִים קְטַנִּים וַאֲדָמָה. אַבָּיֵי אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ קָרָא וַחֲבוּשָׁא. רַב פָּפָּא אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ קוֹרָא וְכוּפְרָא. רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ כַּמְכָּא וְהַרְסָנָא. מִינַּיְיהוּ פָּסְקִי חֲלָבָא, מִינַּיְיהוּ עָכְרִי חֲלָבָא.

The baraita said: She may not eat together with him things that are bad for her milk. The Gemara asks: What are these foods that are detrimental for milk? Rav Kahana said: For example, hops; and young, green grain sprouts; small fish; and soil. Abaye said: Even pumpkin and quince. Rav Pappa said: Even pumpkin and palm branches with small, unripe dates. Rav Ashi said: Even kutaḥ [kamka] and small fried fish. All these items are bad, as some cause milk to dry up and some cause milk to spoil.

דִּמְשַׁמְּשָׁא בֵּי רִיחְיָא — הָווּ לַהּ בְּנֵי נִכְפֵּי. דִּמְשַׁמְּשָׁא עַל אַרְעָא — הָווּ לַהּ בְּנֵי שְׁמוּטֵי. דְּדָרְכָא עַל (רְמָא) [דְּמָא] דַּחֲמָרָא — הָווּ לַהּ בְּנֵי גִּירְדָּנֵי. דְּאָכְלָה חַרְדְּלָא — הָווּ לַהּ בְּנֵי זַלְזְלָנֵי. דְּאָכְלָה תַּחְלֵי — הָווּ לַהּ בְּנֵי דּוּלְפָנֵי. דְּאָכְלָה מוֹנִינֵי — הָווּ לַהּ בְּנֵי מְצִיצֵי עֵינָא. דְּאָכְלָה גַּרְגּוּשְׁתָּא — הָווּ לַהּ בְּנֵי מְכוֹעָרֵי. דְּשָׁתְיָא שִׁיכְרָא — הָווּ לַהּ בְּנֵי אוּכָּמֵי. דְּאָכְלָה בִּישְׂרָא וְשָׁתְיָא חַמְרָא — הָווּ לַהּ בְּנֵי

The Gemara cites other possible consequences of a mother’s behavior that could affect her children: A woman who engages in intercourse in a mill will have epileptic children; one who engages in intercourse on the ground will have long-necked children; one who steps on a donkey’s dung when pregnant will have bald children; one who eats mustard during pregnancy will have gluttonous children; one who eats garden cress [taḥlei] will have tearful children; one who eats fish brine [moninei] will have children with blinking eyes; one who eats soil will have ugly children; one who drinks intoxicating liquor will have black children; one who eats meat and drinks wine during pregnancy will have children who are