כתובות פד

כתובות פד

וְסָבַר רַב תְּנָאוֹ קַיָּים? וְהָא אִיתְּמַר: הָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֵין לְךָ עָלַי אוֹנָאָה, רַב אָמַר: יֵשׁ לוֹ עָלָיו אוֹנָאָה. וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: אֵין לוֹ עָלָיו אוֹנָאָה.

The Gemara asks: And does Rav actually hold that if one stipulates counter to Torah law, his condition is valid? But it was stated: One who says to another: I am selling this to you on the condition that you have no claim of fraud against me, i.e., though there is a prohibition against fraud by Torah law, the purchaser agrees to forgo his right to register a complaint on this basis. Rav said: He does have the right to a claim of fraud against him, and therefore the seller must reimburse the purchaser, as he cannot abrogate the Torah prohibition “And you shall not wrong one another” (Leviticus 25:17). And Shmuel said: He does not have the right to a claim of fraud against him. It is evident from here that according to Rav, one cannot make a stipulation that contradicts Torah law.

אֶלָּא: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל דְּאָמַר: הַמַּתְנֶה עַל מַה שֶּׁכָּתוּב בַּתּוֹרָה — תְּנָאוֹ בָּטֵל, וְלָאו מִטַּעְמֵיהּ, דְּאִילּוּ רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל סָבַר: מֵתָה — יִירָשֶׁנָּה, וְרַב סָבַר: מֵתָה — לֹא יִירָשֶׁנָּה.

Rather, Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who said: One who stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah, his condition is void, but not because of his line of reasoning. As Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that if the wife died, he inherits from her, and Rav holds that if she died he does not inherit from her.

הַאי מִטַּעְמֵיהּ וְלָא כְּהִילְכְתֵיהּ הוּא!

The Gemara asks: If this is what Rav meant, he should have said the opposite of what he said. This statement would be because of his line of reasoning but not in accordance with his halakha, whereas Rav said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel but not because of his line of reasoning.

אֶלָּא: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל דְּאָמַר אִם מֵתָה יִירָשֶׁנָּה, וְלָאו מִטַּעְמֵיהּ, דְּאִילּוּ רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל סָבַר בִּדְאוֹרָיְיתָא תְּנָאוֹ בָּטֵל — הָא בִּדְרַבָּנַן תְּנָאוֹ קַיָּים. וְרַב סָבַר אֲפִילּוּ בִּדְרַבָּנַן — תְּנָאוֹ בָּטֵל.

Rather, Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who said that if she died he inherits from her, but not because of his line of reasoning. As Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that in a case where one stipulated counter to Torah law his condition is void, indicating that in a case where his stipulation was counter to rabbinic law his condition is valid; and Rav holds that even in a case where one stipulated counter to rabbinic law, his condition is void.

הַאי כְּטַעְמֵיהּ וּכְהִילְכְתֵיהּ הוּא, וְרַב מוֹסִיף הוּא!

The Gemara asks: This statement would be in accordance with his line of reasoning and in accordance with his halakha, and Rav is merely adding a detail to the halakha of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

אֶלָּא: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל דְּאָמַר אִם מֵתָה יִירָשֶׁנָּה, וְלָאו מִטַּעְמֵיהּ, דְּאִילּוּ רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל סָבַר יְרוּשַּׁת הַבַּעַל דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, וְכׇל הַמַּתְנֶה עַל מַה שֶּׁכָּתוּב בַּתּוֹרָה — תְּנָאוֹ בָּטֵל. וְרַב סָבַר: יְרוּשַּׁת הַבַּעַל דְּרַבָּנַן, וַחֲכָמִים עָשׂוּ חִיזּוּק לְדִבְרֵיהֶם כְּשֶׁל תּוֹרָה.

Rather, Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who said that if she died he inherits from her, but not because of his line of reasoning. As Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that the inheritance of a husband is by Torah law, and whoever stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah, his condition is void; and Rav holds that the inheritance of a husband is by rabbinic law, but his stipulation is nevertheless void, as the Sages reinforced their pronouncements with the severity of Torah law and ruled that their laws cannot be abrogated.

וְרַב סָבַר יְרוּשַּׁת הַבַּעַל דְּרַבָּנַן? וְהָתְנַן, רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן בְּרוֹקָא אוֹמֵר: הַיּוֹרֵשׁ אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ, יַחְזִיר לִבְנֵי מִשְׁפָּחָה, וִינַכֶּה לָהֶן מִן הַדָּמִים.

The Gemara asks: And does Rav hold that the inheritance of a husband is by rabbinic law? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Bekhorot 52b) that Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka says: One who inherits from his wife must return the property to her family members in the Jubilee Year and deduct for them part of the monetary value of the property? He can claim only part, but not all, of the property’s value from the wife’s relatives.

וְהָוֵינַן בַּהּ: מַאי קָסָבַר? אִי קָסָבַר יְרוּשַּׁת הַבַּעַל דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, אַמַּאי יַחְזִיר? וְאִי דְּרַבָּנַן, דָּמִים מַאי עֲבִידְתַּיְיהוּ?

And we discussed this halakha: What does Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka hold? If he holds that the inheritance of a husband is by Torah law, why must he return the property to his wife’s relatives? An inheritance is not given back in the Jubilee Year. And if he holds that the inheritance is by rabbinic law, what is the purpose of the money that he receives from his wife’s relatives in exchange for the land? By Torah law, the property belongs to the woman’s family and they should not have to pay him anything.

וְאָמַר רַב: לְעוֹלָם קָסָבַר יְרוּשַּׁת הַבַּעַל דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, וּכְגוֹן שֶׁהוֹרִישַׁתּוּ אִשְׁתּוֹ בֵּית הַקְּבָרוֹת, מִשּׁוּם פְּגַם מִשְׁפָּחָה אֲמוּר רַבָּנַן לִישְׁקוֹל דְּמֵי וְלַיהְדַּר.

And Rav said: Actually, he holds that the inheritance of a husband is by Torah law, and he is discussing a case where his wife bequeathed to him her family’s graveyard. Due to the need to avoid a family flaw, i.e., harm to the family name if the wife’s family would have to be buried in plots belonging to others, the Sages said that he should take compensation from them and return the graveyard to them.

וּמַאי ״יְנַכֶּה לָהֶן מִן הַדָּמִים״ — דְּמֵי קֶבֶר אִשְׁתּוֹ. כִּדְתַנְיָא: הַמּוֹכֵר קִבְרוֹ, וְדֶרֶךְ קִבְרוֹ, מַעֲמָדוֹ, וּמְקוֹם הֶסְפֵּידוֹ — בָּאִין בְּנֵי מִשְׁפָּחָה וְקוֹבְרִין אוֹתוֹ בְּעַל כׇּרְחוֹ, מִשּׁוּם פְּגַם מִשְׁפָּחָה!

The Gemara continues: And what is the meaning of: And deduct for them part of the monetary value of the property? This is referring to the monetary value of his wife’s grave. A husband is obligated to pay for his wife’s burial, and therefore he must deduct the value of her burial plot from the value of the field. As it is taught in a baraita that there are halakhot connected with burial to uphold family honor: In the case of one who sells his grave, or the path to his grave, or the place where visitors would stand to comfort the mourners, or the place of his eulogies, the members of his family may come and bury him in his ancestral plot against the purchaser’s wishes due to the need to avoid a family flaw, i.e., harm to the family name if a member of their family had to be buried in a graveyard of strangers. In any case, it is evident from here that Rav believes that the inheritance of a husband is by Torah law, in contrast to what the Gemara had said earlier.

רַב לְטַעְמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן בְּרוֹקָא קָאָמַר, וְלֵיהּ לָא סְבִירָא לֵיהּ.

The Gemara answers: This is not proof that Rav himself is of the opinion that the inheritance of a husband is by Torah law, as Rav spoke in accordance with the reasoning of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka. In other words, he was explaining the reason for the ruling of the tanna, but he himself does not hold accordingly.

מַתְנִי׳ מִי שֶׁמֵּת וְהִנִּיחַ אִשָּׁה וּבַעַל חוֹב וְיוֹרְשִׁין, וְהָיָה לוֹ פִּקָּדוֹן אוֹ מִלְוָה בְּיַד אֲחֵרִים, רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן אוֹמֵר: יִנָּתְנוּ לַכּוֹשֵׁל שֶׁבָּהֶן. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: אֵין מְרַחֲמִין בַּדִּין, אֶלָּא יִנָּתְנוּ לַיּוֹרְשִׁין. שֶׁכּוּלָּן צְרִיכִין שְׁבוּעָה, וְאֵין הַיּוֹרְשִׁין צְרִיכִין שְׁבוּעָה.

MISHNA: With regard to one who died and left behind a wife, and a creditor to whom he owed money, and heirs, all of whom claim payment from his property, and he had a deposit or a loan in the possession of others, Rabbi Tarfon says: The deposit or the loan will be given to the weakest one of them, i.e., the one most in need of the money. Rabbi Akiva says: One is not merciful in judgment. If the halakha is that it belongs to one party, one follows the halakha and leaves aside considerations of mercy. Rather, the halakha is that the money will be given to the heirs, as all people who wish to exact payment from orphans require an oath before they collect their debt, but the heirs do not require an oath. They therefore have a more absolute right than the others to their father’s property.

הִנִּיחַ פֵּירוֹת תְּלוּשִׁין מִן הַקַּרְקַע, כׇּל הַקּוֹדֵם בָּהֶן — זָכָה בָּהֶן. זָכְתָה אִשָּׁה יוֹתֵר מִכְּתוּבָּתָהּ, וּבַעַל חוֹב יוֹתֵר עַל חוֹבוֹ, הַמּוֹתָר — רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן אוֹמֵר: יִנָּתְנוּ לַכּוֹשֵׁל שֶׁבָּהֶן. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: אֵין מְרַחֲמִין בַּדִּין, אֶלָּא יִנָּתְנוּ לַיּוֹרְשִׁין. שֶׁכּוּלָּם צְרִיכִין שְׁבוּעָה, וְאֵין הַיּוֹרְשִׁין צְרִיכִין שְׁבוּעָה.

If the deceased left behind produce that was detached from the ground, whoever first took possession of them as compensation for what was owed, whether the creditor, the wife, or the heirs, acquired the produce. If the wife acquired this produce and it was worth more than the payment of her marriage contract, or the creditor acquired this produce and it was worth more than the value of his debt, what should be done with the surplus? Rabbi Tarfon says: It will be given to the weakest one of them, either the creditor or the wife, depending on the circumstances. Rabbi Akiva says: One is not merciful in judgment. Rather, it will be given to the heirs, as all people who wish to exact payment from orphans require an oath before they collect their debt, but the heirs do not require an oath.

גְּמָ׳ לְמָה לִי לְמִיתְנֵי מִלְוָה, לָמָּה לִי לְמִיתְנֵי פִּקָּדוֹן? צְרִיכָא, דְּאִי תְּנָא מִלְוָה, בְּהָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן, מִשּׁוּם דְּמִלְוָה לְהוֹצָאָה נִיתְּנָה. אֲבָל פִּקָּדוֹן, דְּאִיתֵיהּ בְּעֵינֵיהּ — אֵימָא מוֹדֵי לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks about the wording of the mishna: Why do I need the tanna to teach this halakha in the case of a loan, and why do I need him to teach it in the case of a deposit? Either example alone would have sufficed. The Gemara explains: It is necessary to teach the halakha in both cases, for if he had taught the halakha only in the case of a loan, one could have said: In that case Rabbi Tarfon says what he says due to the fact that a loan is given to be spent. Since there is no already existing property here, but only an obligation to pay back the loan, it can be given to the weakest party. However, in the case of a deposit, which exists in its pure, unadulterated form and not just as an obligation, one might say that he concedes to Rabbi Akiva that it belongs to the heirs.

וְאִי תְּנָא הָא, בְּהָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, אֲבָל בְּהָךְ — אֵימָא מוֹדֵי לְרַבִּי טַרְפוֹן, צְרִיכָא.

And conversely, if the tanna had taught that halakha only in the case of a deposit, one could have said that in that case Rabbi Akiva says his ruling that the deposit belongs to the heirs. However, in this case of a loan, one could say that he concedes to Rabbi Tarfon that the loan is given to the weakest party. It is therefore necessary for the halakha to be taught in both cases.

מַאי ״לַכּוֹשֵׁל״? רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא אוֹמֵר: לַכּוֹשֵׁל שֶׁבִּרְאָיָה. רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: לִכְתוּבַּת אִשָּׁה, מִשּׁוּם חִינָּא.

The mishna taught that according to Rabbi Tarfon, the money should be given to the weakest party. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: To the weakest? Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says: It means that the money is given to the one whose proof is the weakest, i.e., the one with the latest date on the document attesting to the debt. His document is the weakest, as one can collect from property that was sold by the deceased only if it was sold subsequent to his incurring the debt. Therefore, the others can collect from property that has been sold before the date listed on his document. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It is referring to the wife’s marriage contract. The Sages instituted halakhot in marriage contracts that were to the advantage of women and to make them feel more secure in their marriages, due to the fact that they wanted men to find favor in the eyes of women.

כְּתַנָּאֵי, רַבִּי בִּנְיָמִין אוֹמֵר: לַכּוֹשֵׁל שֶׁבִּרְאָיָה, וְהוּא כָּשֵׁר. רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר: לִכְתוּבַּת אִשָּׁה, מִשּׁוּם חִינָּא.

The Gemara comments: This discussion is like a dispute between tanna’im: Rabbi Binyamin says: The money is given to the one whose proof is the weakest, and this is the proper way to act. Rabbi Elazar says: It is referring to the wife’s marriage contract, due to the fact that they wanted men to find favor with women.

הִנִּיחַ פֵּירוֹת הַתְּלוּשִׁין. וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, מַאי אִירְיָא מוֹתָר? כּוּלְּהוּ נָמֵי דְּיוֹרְשִׁין הָווּ? אִין הָכִי נָמֵי, וְאַיְּידֵי דְּאָמַר רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן מוֹתָר, תְּנָא אִיהוּ נָמֵי מוֹתָר.

§ The mishna taught that if the husband left behind produce that was detached, the claimant who first seizes it acquires it, and there is a dispute as to what should be done with the surplus. The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Akiva, why discuss specifically this case of the surplus? All of the produce, not only the surplus, also belongs to the heirs, as he holds that the entire property goes to the heirs, even if the others took possession of it first. The Gemara answers: Yes, it is indeed so. Certainly Rabbi Akiva does not distinguish between a deposit and detached produce, but since Rabbi Tarfon spoke of a surplus, he also taught his halakha with regard to a surplus. However, according to Rabbi Akiva, the halakha is the same with regard to detached produce.

וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, תְּפִיסָה לָא מַהְנְיָא כְּלָל? אָמַר רָבָא אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: וְהוּא שֶׁתָּפַס מֵחַיִּים.

The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Akiva, is the seizure of a debtor’s assets by a creditor, though there are others who have a more immediate right to the assets, not effective at all? Rava said that Rav Naḥman said: And this, that Rabbi Akiva agrees that the seizure of assets is effective, is the case provided that one seized the property from the debtor while he was alive. However, after his death the assets belong to the heirs.

וּלְרַבִּי טַרְפוֹן, דְּמַנְּחִי הֵיכָא? רַב וּשְׁמוּאֵל דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ: וְהוּא שֶׁצְּבוּרִין וּמוּנָּחִין בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים, אֲבָל בְּסִימְטָא — לֹא. וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ: אֲפִילּוּ בְּסִימְטָא.

The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Tarfon, who holds that whoever first takes possession of the produce has acquired it, where was this produce placed? The Gemara presents a dispute: There is the opinion of Rav and Shmuel, who both say: And this, that whoever first takes possession of the produce has acquired it, is the halakha provided that the produce is arranged in a pile and placed in the public domain. Since the public domain is not a suitable location for an act of acquisition, anyone can take the produce and acquire it. However, if it is situated in an alley [simta], a place adjacent to the public domain that is rarely frequented by the public, the produce does not belong to the first one who obtains it. Because an acquisition can be performed in an alley, any items that had belonged to the deceased are immediately acquired by the heirs. And there is the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish, who both say: Even if one seizes produce left in an alley, he acquires it.

דּוּן דַּיָּינֵי כְּרַבִּי טַרְפוֹן, וְאַהְדְּרֵיהּ רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ לְעוֹבָדָא מִינַּיְיהוּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: עָשִׂיתָ כְּשֶׁל תּוֹרָה.

The Gemara relates: There were judges who judged a case of this kind in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon, and Reish Lakish reversed their action. He dismissed the judges’ decision and restored the money to the heirs, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Yoḥanan criticized his ruling and said to him: You acted in this case like one acts with regard to a ruling of Torah law, where any incorrect action taken by the court must be corrected.

לֵימָא בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי: דְּמָר סָבַר טָעָה בִּדְבַר מִשְׁנָה חוֹזֵר, וּמָר סָבַר טָעָה בִּדְבַר מִשְׁנָה אֵינוֹ חוֹזֵר?

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that they disagree about this: That one Sage, Reish Lakish, holds that if one erred in a matter that appears in the Mishna, the decision is revoked. And one Sage, Rabbi Yoḥanan, holds that if one erred in a matter that appears in the Mishna, the decision is not revoked.

לָא, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא טָעָה בִּדְבַר מִשְׁנָה חוֹזֵר. וְהָכָא בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי: מָר סָבַר הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא מֵחֲבֵירוֹ וְלֹא מֵרַבּוֹ, וּמָר סָבַר הֲלָכָה אֲפִילּוּ מֵרַבּוֹ.

The Gemara refutes this suggestion: No, it can be explained that according to everyone, where the judge erred in a matter that appears in the Mishna, the decision is revoked, and here they disagree about this: One Sage, Rabbi Yoḥanan, holds that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva in his disputes with his colleague, but not in his disputes with his teacher, and Rabbi Tarfon was Rabbi Akiva’s teacher. And one Sage, Reish Lakish, holds that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva even in his disputes with his teacher.

וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא מֵחֲבֵירוֹ וְלֹא מֵרַבּוֹ. וְהָכָא בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי: מָר סָבַר רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן רַבּוֹ הֲוָה, וּמָר סָבַר חֲבֵירוֹ הֲוָה.

And if you wish, say instead that everyone agrees that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva in his disputes with his colleague but not in his disputes with his teacher. And here they disagree about this: One Sage, Rabbi Yoḥanan, holds that Rabbi Tarfon was Rabbi Akiva’s teacher, and one Sage, Reish Lakish, holds that Rabbi Tarfon was his colleague.

וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא חֲבֵירוֹ הֲוָה, וְהָכָא בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי: מָר סָבַר הֲלָכָה אִיתְּמַר, וּמָר סָבַר מַטִּין אִיתְּמַר.

And if you wish, say instead that everyone agrees that Rabbi Tarfon was Rabbi Akiva’s colleague, and here they disagree about this: One Sage, Reish Lakish, holds that the principle that the law is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva was stated as the halakha. And one Sage, Rabbi Yoḥanan, holds that what was stated was that one is inclined to follow the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. Therefore, although Rabbi Akiva’s opinion is followed ab initio, the halakha was never established conclusively in accordance with it. As such, if judges went against the principle that the halakha follows Rabbi Akiva in opposition to his colleague, the Sages do not revoke their decision.

קָרִיבֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן תְּפוּס פָּרָה דְיַתְמֵי מִסִּימְטָא. אֲתוֹ לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, אֲמַר לְהוּ: שַׁפִּיר תְּפַסְתּוּהָ. אֲתוֹ לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ, אָמַר לְהוּ: זִילוּ אַהְדּוּר. אֲתוֹ לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן. אֲמַר לְהוּ: מָה אֶעֱשֶׂה? שֶׁכְּנֶגְדִּי חָלוּק עָלַי.

The Gemara relates: The relatives of Rabbi Yoḥanan seized a cow of orphans from an alley because the orphans’ father owed them money. They came before Rabbi Yoḥanan for judgment, and he said to them: It is well that you seized the cow and it is yours, in accordance with the ruling of Rabbi Tarfon. They subsequently came before Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, who said to them: Go and return the cow to the orphans. They again came before Rabbi Yoḥanan, complaining that Reish Lakish had told them they must give back the cow, in opposition to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s ruling. He said to them: What can I do, as one whose stature corresponds to my stature disagrees with me, and I cannot dismiss his opinion.

הָהוּא בַּקָּרָא דְיַתְמֵי דְּתָפְסִי תּוֹרָא מִינֵּיהּ. בַּעַל חוֹב אָמַר: מֵחַיִּים תְּפֵיסְנָא לֵיהּ. וּבַקָּרָא אָמַר: לְאַחַר מִיתָה תַּפְסֵיהּ. אֲתוֹ לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִית לְךָ סָהֲדֵי דְּתַפְסֵיהּ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לָאו. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מִגּוֹ דְּיָכוֹל לְמֵימַר ״לָקוּחַ הוּא בְּיָדִי״, יָכוֹל נָמֵי לְמֵימַר ״מֵחַיִּים תְּפֵיסְנָא לֵיהּ״.

The Gemara relates another incident: There was a certain herdsman caring for the cattle of orphans from whom a creditor seized an ox as payment for a debt of the orphans’ father. The creditor said: I seized it from the herdsman while the debtor was still alive. In such a case, the action is effective even according to Rabbi Akiva, as stated earlier. And the herdsman said: He seized it after the debtor’s death. They came before Rav Naḥman for a ruling. Rav Naḥman said to the herdsman: Do you have witnesses that he seized the ox from you? He said to him: No. Rav Naḥman said to him: In that case, since the claimant can say: It is in my possession because it was purchased by me, as there is no proof that he gained possession of the ox unlawfully, he can also say: I seized it from the herdsman while the deceased was still alive.

וְהָאָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: הַגּוֹדְרוֹת אֵין לָהֶן חֲזָקָה! שָׁאנֵי תּוֹרָא דִּמְסִירָה לְרוֹעֶה.

The Gemara asks: But didn’t Reish Lakish say that moving livestock, e.g., sheep and oxen, provide no presumption of ownership to whoever is in possession of them? Since they wander from place to place, a person cannot claim that his mere possession of livestock demonstrates ownership, because it may have wandered into his property on its own. The Gemara answers: An ox is different from other livestock, as it is handed over to a shepherd, who does not let it wander off. Consequently, possession of an ox does establish a presumption of ownership.

דְּבֵי נְשִׂיאָה תְּפוּס אַמְתָא דְיַתְמֵי מִסִּימְטָא. יְתֵיב רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ וְרַבִּי חֲנִינָא בַּר פַּפִּי וְרַבִּי יִצְחָק נַפָּחָא, וִיתֵיב רַבִּי אַבָּא גַּבַּיְיהוּ. אֲמַר לְהוּ: שַׁפִּיר תָּפְסִיתוּהָ. אֲמַר לְהוּ רַבִּי אַבָּא: מִשּׁוּם דְּבֵי נְשִׂיאָה נִינְהוּ מְחַנְּפִיתוּ לְהוּ? וְהָא דּוּן דַּיָּינֵי כְּרַבִּי טַרְפוֹן, וְאַהְדְּרֵיהּ רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ עוֹבָדָא מִינַּיְיהוּ.

The Gemara relates another incident: The members of the house of the prince of Eretz Yisrael seized hold of a maidservant of orphans in an alley, as payment for a debt owed to them by the orphans’ father. Rabbi Abbahu and Rabbi Ḥanina bar Pappi and Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa were sitting as judges, and Rabbi Abba was sitting with them. Rabbi Abbahu said to them: It is well that you seized the maidservant. Rabbi Abba said to the judges: Just because they are members of the house of the prince, will you curry favor with them by rendering an incorrect verdict? Isn’t it the halakha that there were judges who judged a case of this kind in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon, and Reish Lakish reversed their action, indicating that the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon?

יֵימַר בַּר חָשׁוּ הֲוָה מַסֵּיק בֵּיהּ זוּזֵי בְּהָהוּא גַּבְרָא, שְׁכֵיב וּשְׁבַק אַרְבָּא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ לִשְׁלוּחֵיהּ: זִיל, תְּפַסָה נִיהֲלִי. אֲזַל תַּפְסַהּ. פְּגַעוּ בֵּיהּ רַב פָּפָּא וְרַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ, אֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ: אַתְּ תּוֹפֵס לְבַעַל חוֹב בְּמָקוֹם שֶׁחָב לַאֲחֵרִים. וְאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַתּוֹפֵס לְבַעַל חוֹב בְּמָקוֹם שֶׁחָב לַאֲחֵרִים

The Gemara relates another incident: A man called Yeimar bar Ḥashu was owed money by a certain man who died and left behind a boat. Yeimar bar Ḥashu said to his agent: Go and seize the boat for me. The agent went and seized it. Rav Pappa and Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, encountered him. They said to him: You are seizing assets for a creditor in a situation where your action will cause a disadvantage for others, as the debtor owed money to other people as well. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said that one who seizes assets for a creditor in a situation that will result in a disadvantage for others