כתובות צז

כתובות צז

אִם בְּמַתָּנָה נוֹטְלָן לֹא כָּךְ יָפֶה כֹּחוֹ.

If he takes it as a gift, his power as a creditor is not enhanced in this manner. He is not served well because he would not be able to seize property sold to a third party in order to receive his gift. So too, the widow can sell property and then decide later for what purpose she sold it.

כֵּיצַד מוֹכֶרֶת? אָמַר רַבִּי דָּנִיאֵל בַּר רַב קַטִּינָא אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: מוֹכֶרֶת אַחַת לִשְׁנֵים עָשָׂר חֹדֶשׁ, וְלוֹקֵחַ מְפַרְנֵס אַחַת לִשְׁלשִׁים יוֹם. וְרַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר: מוֹכֶרֶת לְשִׁשָּׁה חֳדָשִׁים, וְלוֹקֵחַ מְפַרְנֵס אַחַת לִשְׁלשִׁים יוֹם.

§ The Gemara asks: How does a widow sell property to earn money for her support? Rabbi Daniel bar Rav Ketina said that Rav Huna said: She sells her late husband’s property once every twelve months and the buyer who purchased the property from her provides her with money once every thirty days. And Rav Yehuda said: She sells once every six months and the buyer provides her with money once every thirty days.

תַּנְיָא כְּווֹתֵיהּ דְּרַב הוּנָא: מוֹכֶרֶת לִשְׁנֵים עָשָׂר חֹדֶשׁ, וְלוֹקֵחַ מְפַרְנֵס אַחַת לִשְׁלשִׁים יוֹם. תַּנְיָא כְּווֹתֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוּדָה: מוֹכֶרֶת לְשִׁשָּׁה חֳדָשִׁים, וְלוֹקֵחַ מְפַרְנֵס אַחַת לִשְׁלשִׁים יוֹם.

The Gemara notes: It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav Huna: She sells once every twelve months, and the buyer provides her with support once every thirty days. So too, it is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yehuda: She sells once every six months, and the buyer provides her with money once every thirty days.

אָמַר אַמֵּימָר, הִלְכְתָא: מוֹכֶרֶת לְשִׁשָּׁה חֳדָשִׁים וְלוֹקֵחַ מְפַרְנֵס אַחַת לִשְׁלשִׁים יוֹם. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אָשֵׁי לְאַמֵּימָר: דְּרַב הוּנָא מַאי? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לָא שְׁמִיעַ לִי, כְּלוֹמַר: לָא סְבִירָא לִי.

Ameimar said: The halakha is that she sells once every six months and the buyer provides her with money once every thirty days, in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yehuda. Rav Ashi said to Ameimar: What do you have to say about the opinion of Rav Huna? He said to him: I did not hear about this statement; that is to say, I do not hold in accordance with it.

בְּעוֹ מִינֵּיהּ מֵרַב שֵׁשֶׁת: מוֹכֶרֶת לִמְזוֹנוֹת, מַהוּ שֶׁתַּחֲזוֹר וְתִטְרוֹף לִכְתוּבָּה?

§ The students raised a dilemma to Rav Sheshet: If a woman sells property for her sustenance, what is the halakha? Can she return and seize those very properties that she had sold, as payment for her marriage contract?

קָמִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ בִּדְרַב יוֹסֵף. דְּאָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: אַרְמַלְתָּא דְּזַבֵּין — אַחְרָיוּת אַיַּתְמֵי, וּבֵי דִינָא דְּזַבֵּין — אַחְרָיוּת אַיַּתְמֵי. מַאי?

The Gemara explains: They raised this dilemma in reference to a halakha established by Rav Yosef, as Rav Yosef said: In the case of a widow who sold liened property to a third party, the property guarantee rests upon the orphans. If the property was seized from the purchasers in payment of a previous debt, then the purchasers are reimbursed by the orphans. And so too, in the case of a court that sold property belonging to the deceased, the property guarantee rests upon the orphans. It is in light of this halakha that the dilemma was raised to Rav Sheshet: What is the halakha in this case?

כֵּיוָן דְּאַחְרָיוּת אַיַּתְמֵי, טָרְפָא, אוֹ דִלְמָא מָצֵי אָמְרִי לַהּ: נְהִי דְּאַחְרָיוּת דְּעָלְמָא לָא קַבֵּילְתְּ עִילָּוָךְ, אַחְרָיוּת דְּנַפְשָׁךְ מִי לָא קַבּוֹלֵי קַבֵּילְתְּ?

Is the halakha that since the property guarantee rests on the orphans, she is able to seize the property? Or perhaps the buyers are able to say to her: Granted, you did not accept upon yourself a property guarantee for everyone, and it is the heirs and not you who have to reimburse us if our property is seized; however, did you not accept a guarantee about your own actions, that you as the seller will not return and seize the property from us?

אֲמַר לֵיהּ, תְּנֵיתוּהָ: מוֹכֶרֶת וְהוֹלֶכֶת עַד כְּדֵי כְתוּבָּתָהּ, וְסֶמֶךְ לָהּ שֶׁתִּגְבֶּה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ מִן הַשְּׁאָר. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: שַׁיַּירָא — אִין, לָא שַׁיַּירָא — לָא.

Rav Sheshet said to the one who raised the dilemma: You learned in a baraita: A widow sells the deceased’s property for her sustenance, and she continues to do so until there is nothing left except the value of her marriage contract, and she relies upon the fact that she will collect payment of her marriage contract from the remainder of the property. Learn from this that if she left property equal in value to her marriage contract, then yes, she can sell it as payment of her marriage contract; but if she did not leave property, then no, she cannot collect her marriage contract. If she could simply seize the land from the buyers, she would not need to set aside part of her husband’s property to use as payment for her marriage contract. She could sell all the land for sustenance and afterward return and seize the property from the purchasers.

וְדִלְמָא עֵצָה טוֹבָה קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן, דְּלָא לִיקְרוֹ לַהּ הַדְרָנִיתָא. אִם כֵּן, לִיתְנֵי: ״גּוֹבָה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ מִן הַשְּׁאָר״, מַאי ״סֶמֶךְ לָהּ״? שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: שַׁיַּירָא — אִין, לָא שַׁיַּירָא — לָא.

The Gemara rejects this proof: But perhaps the baraita teaches us good advice, so that they will not call her a retractor and say that she is an untrustworthy individual who goes back on agreements into which she entered. However, legally, she is able to seize the property from the buyers. The Gemara answers: If that is so, and the baraita intended only to give advice, let it simply teach: She collects payment of her marriage contract from the remainder. What is the purpose of the added emphasis of: She relies? Learn from this that the baraita is worded in a precise manner and teaches that if she left property, yes, she can collect payment of her marriage contract. If she did not leave over, no, she cannot collect payment of her marriage contract.

אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: זַבֵּין וְלָא אִיצְטְרִיכוּ לֵיהּ זוּזֵי, הָדְרִי זְבִינֵי, אוֹ לָא הָדְרִי זְבִינֵי?

§ A dilemma was raised before the scholars: If someone sold properties because he needed money for a certain purpose and in the end he did not need the money for that purpose, is this considered a sale conducted in error, so that the seller can renege on the deal and the sale is reversed? Or, is the sale not reversed and what is done is done?

תָּא שְׁמַע: דְּהָהוּא גַּבְרָא דְּזַבֵּין אַרְעָא לְרַב פָּפָּא, דְּאִצְטְרִיכוּ לֵיהּ זוּזֵי לְמִיזְבַּן תּוֹרֵי. לְסוֹף לָא אִיצְטְרִיכוּ לֵיהּ, וְאַהְדְּרַיהּ נִיהֲלֵיהּ רַב פָּפָּא לְאַרְעֵיהּ. רַב פָּפָּא לִפְנִים מִשּׁוּרַת הַדִּין הוּא דַּעֲבַד.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof: There was a certain man who sold land to Rav Pappa because he needed money to buy oxen. In the end, he did not need the money and regretted having sold the land, and Rav Pappa returned his land to him. The Gemara rejects this: This is not a proof, as Rav Pappa acted in a manner that was beyond the letter of the law.

תָּא שְׁמַע: דְּהָהוּא בִּצּוּרְתָּא דַּהֲוָת בִּנְהַרְדְּעָא, זַבְּנִינְהוּ כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לְאַפַּדְנַיְיהוּ, לְסוֹף אֲתוֹ חִיטֵּי. אֲמַר לְהוּ רַב נַחְמָן: דִּינָא הוּא דְּהָדְרִי אַפַּדְנֵי לְמָרַיְיהוּ.

Come and hear another proof: There was a certain drought in Neharde’a during which everyone sold his mansion [appadna] in order to buy wheat. In the end, wheat arrived, driving down the price, rendering their sale unnecessary. Rav Naḥman said to them: The halakha is that the mansions are returned to their previous owners. It is evident that he holds that a sale that was prompted by the need for money is voided if it becomes clear that the seller no longer needs the money.

הָתָם נָמֵי: זְבִינֵי בְּטָעוּת הֲווֹ, דְּאִיגַּלַּאי מִילְּתָא דְּאַרְבָּא בְּעִקּוּלֵי הֲוָה קָיְימָא.

The Gemara answers: There too, the sale was conducted in error, as it became known that the ship with the wheat was already in the bays of the river at the time when the mansions were sold. Had they known that the ship was so close, they would not have sold their property. This is a case of an error at the time of the sale, which is different from a case where the circumstances changed after the sale.

אִי הָכִי, הַיְינוּ דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ רָמֵי בַּר שְׁמוּאֵל לְרַב נַחְמָן: אִם כֵּן נִמְצֵאתָ מַכְשִׁילָן לֶעָתִיד לָבֹא! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אַטּוּ כׇּל יוֹמָא בִּצּוּרְתָּא שְׁכִיחָא? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִין, בִּצּוּרְתָּא בִּנְהַרְדְּעָא מִשְׁכָּח שְׁכִיחָא.

The Gemara offers proof that the error was already present at the time of the transaction: If so, this is what Rami bar Shmuel said to Rav Naḥman when he questioned his ruling: If this is so, and the mansions need to be restored to their previous owners, you find yourself obstructing them for the future. As a result of this ruling, people will not want to buy land because they will worry that the seller will change his mind. Rav Naḥman said to him: Is that to say that it is so common, that there is a drought every day? I said that the properties are returned only in these specific circumstances. He said to him: Yes, in Neharde’a drought is a frequent occurrence.

וְהִלְכְתָא: זַבֵּין וְלָא אִיצְטְרִיכוּ לֵיהּ זוּזֵי — הָדְרִי זְבִינֵי.

The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is that if one sold properties for a certain purpose and in the end did not need the money for that reason, the sale is reversed.

מַתְנִי׳ אַלְמָנָה, בֵּין מִן הָאֵירוּסִין בֵּין מִן הַנִּשּׂוּאִין — מוֹכֶרֶת שֶׁלֹּא בְּבֵית דִּין.

MISHNA: A widow, whether widowed from betrothal or from marriage, sells her husband’s property when not in court.

רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: מִן הַנִּשּׂוּאִין מוֹכֶרֶת שֶׁלֹּא בְּבֵית דִּין, מִן הָאֵירוּסִין לֹא תִּמְכּוֹר אֶלָּא בְּבֵית דִּין, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁאֵין לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת. וְכֹל שֶׁאֵין לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת — לֹא תִּמְכּוֹר אֶלָּא בְּבֵית דִּין.

Rabbi Shimon says: A widow from marriage sells when not in court, but a widow from betrothal may sell only in court, because she does not receive sustenance from her husband’s property. She receives only her marriage contract, and anyone who does not receive sustenance may sell only in court.

גְּמָ׳ בִּשְׁלָמָא מִן הַנִּשּׂוּאִין — מִשּׁוּם מְזוֹנֵי,

GEMARA: The Gemara elaborates: Granted, a widow from marriage may sell when not in court due to the fact that her sustenance is a pressing concern, so one does not make her wait until she finds a court that will oversee her sale.

אֶלָּא מִן הָאֵירוּסִין מַאי טַעְמָא? אָמַר עוּלָּא: מִשּׁוּם חִינָּא. רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: לְפִי שֶׁאֵין אָדָם רוֹצֶה שֶׁתִּתְבַּזֶּה אִשְׁתּוֹ בְּבֵית דִּין.

However, what is the reason that a widow from betrothal may sell property when not in court? Ulla said: Due to desirability. The Sages enacted several ordinances on behalf of women, so that men will want to marry them. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Because a man does not want his wife to be disgraced by being involved in court proceedings.

מַאי בֵּינַיְיהוּ? אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ גְּרוּשָׁה. לְמַאן דְּאָמַר מִשּׁוּם חִינָּא — גְּרוּשָׁה נָמֵי בָּעֲיָא חֵן, לְמַאן דְּאָמַר לְפִי שֶׁאֵין אָדָם רוֹצֶה שֶׁתִּתְבַּזֶּה אִשְׁתּוֹ בְּבֵית דִּין — גְּרוּשָׁה לָא אִיכְפַּת לֵיהּ.

The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between the two opinions? The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is in the case of a divorcée. According to the one who says that it is due to desirability, a divorcée also requires desirability. But according to the one who says that it is because a man does not want his wife to be disgraced in court, a man does not care if his ex-wife is disgraced.

תְּנַן: וּגְרוּשָׁה לֹא תִּמְכּוֹר אֶלָּא בְּבֵית דִּין. בִּשְׁלָמָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר לְפִי שֶׁאֵין אָדָם רוֹצֶה שֶׁתִּתְבַּזֶּה אִשְׁתּוֹ בְּבֵית דִּין — גְּרוּשָׁה לָא אִיכְפַּת לֵיהּ. אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר מִשּׁוּם חִינָּא, גְּרוּשָׁה נָמֵי בָּעֲיָא חֵן!

We learned in the mishna (97b): And a divorcée may sell only in court. The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the one who says that this is because a man does not want his wife to be disgraced in court, here he does not care if his ex-wife is disgraced. However, according to the one who says that it is due to desirability, a divorcée also requires desirability, so why should she be required to sell in court?

הָא מַנִּי — רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הִיא.

The Gemara answers: In accordance with whose opinion is this continuation of the mishna? It is according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon in the mishna, who explains that anyone who is selling property to receive payment of her marriage contract and not for sustenance is required to sell only in court, and a divorcée does not receive sustenance.

אִי רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, הָא תְּנָא לֵיהּ רֵישָׁא: מִן הָאֵירוּסִין לֹא תִּמְכּוֹר כּוּ׳?

The Gemara asks: If this is according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, then wasn’t it already taught in the first clause that a widow from betrothal sells only in court because she does not receive sustenance? Since the same reasoning applies to a divorcée, why would the mishna have to teach the halakha again in this case?

מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: אַלְמָנָה מִן הָאֵירוּסִין הוּא דְּלָא נְפִישׁ חֵן דִּידַהּ, אֲבָל גְּרוּשָׁה דִּנְפִישׁ חֵן דִּידַהּ, אֵימָא תִּיבְּעֵי חֵן.

The Gemara answers: It was necessary, lest you say: In the case of a widow from betrothal, she is not in great need of her desirability, as she has not been tarnished through sexual relations and men will not hold back from marrying her, and therefore she can go to the court to manage her affairs; however, a divorcée, who is in great need of her desirability and needs assistance in getting remarried, say that she requires desirability so that she will not be disgraced and she is allowed to take care of her affairs out of court. Lest you make this argument, the halakha was clearly stated in the mishna.

הָא נָמֵי תְּנֵינָא: ״כֹּל שֶׁאֵין לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת״. לְאֵתוֹיֵי מַאי? לָאו לְאֵתוֹיֵי גְּרוּשָׁה?

The Gemara asks: Didn’t we already learn this halakha, as it also says in the mishna the following generalization: And anyone who does not receive sustenance may sell only in court? This halakha was intended to add what? Was it not meant to add the case of a divorcée and teach that she can sell only in court, in which case the concluding remark of the mishna about the divorcée is superfluous?

לָא, לְאֵתוֹיֵי ״מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת וְאֵינָהּ מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת״ — כִּדְרַבִּי זֵירָא. דְּאָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא: כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁאָמְרוּ מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת וְאֵינָהּ מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת — בַּעַל חַיָּיב בִּמְזוֹנוֹתֶיהָ.

The Gemara rejects this: No, it is to include a woman about whom there is uncertainty whether she is divorced or whether she is not divorced, and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Zeira, as Rabbi Zeira said: Wherever it was said: A woman that there is uncertainty whether she is divorced or whether she is not divorced, her husband is obligated to provide her sustenance until the divorce is final, and a woman in this situation may sell out of court as well.

תָּא שְׁמַע: כְּשֵׁם שֶׁמּוֹכֶרֶת שֶׁלֹּא בְּבֵית דִּין, כָּךְ יוֹרְשֶׁיהָ יוֹרְשֵׁי כְתוּבָּתָהּ מוֹכְרִים שֶׁלֹּא בְּבֵית דִּין. בִּשְׁלָמָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר לְפִי שֶׁאֵין אָדָם רוֹצֶה שֶׁתִּתְבַּזֶּה אִשְׁתּוֹ בְּבֵית דִּין, כִּי הֵיכִי דְּאִיהִי לָא נִיחָא לֵיהּ דְּתִתְבַּזֵּי — יוֹרְשֶׁיהָ נָמֵי לָא נִיחָא לֵיהּ דְּלִיבַּזּוּ, אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר מִשּׁוּם חִינָּא, יוֹרְשֶׁיהָ מַאי חֵן אִיכָּא? תַּרְגְּמַהּ עוּלָּא: כְּגוֹן שֶׁיְּרָשַׁתָּה בִּתָּהּ אוֹ אֲחוֹתָהּ.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof: Just as the widow sells when not in court, so too, her heirs, those who inherit her marriage contract, sell when not in court. Granted, according to the one who says that the reason why she may sell out of court is because a man does not want his wife to be disgraced by having to appear in court, it is possible to say that just as he is not amenable to the idea that she will be disgraced, he also is not amenable to the idea that her heirs will be disgraced. However, according to the one who says that she sells out of court due to desirability, what desirability do her heirs need to have? Ulla interpreted it: This could take place, for example, when her daughter or her sister inherited from her, and they too need desirability.

מַתְנִי׳ מָכְרָה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ אוֹ מִקְצָתָהּ, מִשְׁכְּנָה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ אוֹ מִקְצָתָהּ, נָתְנָה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ לְאַחֵר אוֹ מִקְצָתָהּ — לֹא תִּמְכּוֹר אֶת הַשְּׁאָר אֶלָּא בְּבֵית דִּין. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: מוֹכֶרֶת הִיא אֲפִילּוּ אַרְבָּעָה וַחֲמִשָּׁה פְּעָמִים. וּמוֹכֶרֶת לִמְזוֹנוֹת שֶׁלֹּא בְּבֵית דִּין, וְכוֹתֶבֶת ״לִמְזוֹנוֹת מָכַרְתִּי״. וּגְרוּשָׁה לֹא תִּמְכּוֹר אֶלָּא בְּבֵית דִּין.

MISHNA: If a woman sold all or part of her marriage contract, or if she mortgaged all or part of her marriage contract, or if she gave away as a gift all or part of her marriage contract to another, then she sells the remainder only in court. And the Rabbis say: She sells even four or five times, and she is not obligated to sell everything at one time. And despite selling several times, she sells for her sustenance even when not in court, and she writes in the bill of sale: I sold this for my sustenance. And a divorcée, who does not receive sustenance, sells only in court.

גְּמָ׳ מַתְנִיתִין מַנִּי? רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הִיא. דְּתַנְיָא: מָכְרָה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ, מִשְׁכְּנָה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ, עָשְׂתָה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ אַפּוֹתֵיקֵי לְאַחֵר — אֵין לָהּ מְזוֹנוֹת, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא מָכְרָה וְלֹא מִשְׁכְּנָה כְּתוּבָּתָהּ אֶלָּא מַחֲצִיתָהּ — אִבְּדָה מְזוֹנוֹתֶיהָ.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? The Gemara answers: It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, as it is taught in a baraita: If she sold all of her marriage contract, or mortgaged her marriage contract, or if she made her marriage contract designated repayment to another, she does not receive sustenance any longer; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Shimon says: Although she has not sold or mortgaged her entire marriage contract, but only half of it, she has lost her right to sustenance. Therefore, she can only sell the rest of her marriage contract in court.

לְמֵימְרָא דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן סָבַר דְּלָא אָמְרִינַן מִקְצָת כֶּסֶף כְּכׇל כֶּסֶף, וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי אָמְרִינַן מִקְצָת כֶּסֶף כְּכׇל כֶּסֶף?

The Gemara asks: Is this to say that Rabbi Shimon holds that we do not say that part of the money has a status like the entire sum of money? Since she no longer has a claim to the entire sum of her marriage contract, it is as though she no longer has a marriage contract and loses her right to sustenance, and the Rabbis hold that we do say part of the money is like the entire money.

הָא אִיפְּכָא שָׁמְעִינַן לְהוּ! דְּתַנְיָא: ״וְהוּא אִשָּׁה בִּבְתוּלֶיהָ״ — פְּרָט לְבוֹגֶרֶת שֶׁכָּלוּ בְּתוּלֶיהָ, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן מַכְשִׁירִין בְּבוֹגֶרֶת.

Didn’t we hear them say the opposite? As it is taught in a baraita concerning the verse that speaks about the High Priest (Leviticus 21:13): “And he shall take a wife in her virginity,” to exclude a grown woman whose sign of virginity has diminished because when a girl goes through puberty her hymen wears away; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon declare as fit even a grown woman for the High Priest. This implies that they are of the opinion that the absence of a part is not considered the absence of the whole, and although part of her sign of virginity has been diminished, it is still present.

הָתָם בִּקְרָאֵי פְּלִיגִי. רַבִּי מֵאִיר סָבַר: ״בְּתוּלָה״ — אֲפִילּוּ מִקְצָת בְּתוּלִים. ״בְּתוּלֶיהָ״ — עַד דְּאִיכָּא כּוּלְּהוּ בְּתוּלִים. ״בִּבְתוּלֶיהָ״, בִּכְדַרְכָּהּ — אִין, שֶׁלֹּא כְּדַרְכָּהּ — לָא.

The Gemara answers: There they disagree with regard to the interpretation of the verses. Rabbi Meir holds that were it stated in the verse a virgin, this general term would have indicated that as long as she is a virgin, even if she has only part of her sign of virginity, she could marry the High Priest. However, since the verse states: “Her virginity,” it means to say until there is a sign of virginity in its entirety. The addition of the prefix “in” to the phrase “in her virginity” teaches that if she engaged in sexual intercourse in the typical manner, i.e., in the place where her sign of virginity lies, then yes, it is considered that she has engaged in sexual intercourse and is no longer considered a virgin. But if she engaged in sexual intercourse in an atypical manner, i.e., anal intercourse, then she is not considered to have engaged in sexual intercourse.

רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן סָבְרִי: ״בְּתוּלָה״ — שְׁלֵמָה מַשְׁמַע, ״בְּתוּלֶיהָ״ — אֲפִילּוּ מִקְצָת בְּתוּלִים.

By contrast, Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon hold that the word virgin implies a complete virgin, whose sign of virginity is completely intact. Therefore, when the verse says: “Her virginity,” it indicates that even if she has only part of her sign of virginity, in this regard she is still considered a virgin.