קידושין מא

קידושין מא

לֹא עָלְתָה בְּיָדוֹ אֶלָּא רַגְזָנוּתָא. וּלְאָדָם טוֹב מַטְעִימִים אוֹתוֹ מִפְּרִי מַעֲשָׂיו. וְכֹל שֶׁאֵינוֹ לֹא בַּמִּקְרָא וְלֹא בַּמִּשְׁנָה וְלֹא בְּדֶרֶךְ אֶרֶץ – דּוֹר הֲנָאָה מִמֶּנּוּ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וּבְמוֹשַׁב לֵצִים לֹא יָשָׁב״ – מוֹשָׁבוֹ מוֹשַׁב לֵצִים.

has managed to acquire only anger [ragzanuta], i.e., nothing beneficial comes through anger; in the end he is left with nothing but the anger itself. And a good person is given the fruit of his actions to taste. And with regard to any person who does not engage in the study of Bible, nor the study of Mishna, nor the desired mode of behavior, one should vow to not derive benefit from him, and one should have no contact with him, as it is stated: “Nor sat in the seat of the scornful” (Psalms 1:1). The seat of this person is certainly the seat of the scornful, as he is engaged in nothing but idle matters.

הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ הָאִשָּׁה נִקְנֵית

הָאִישׁ מְקַדֵּשׁ בּוֹ וּבִשְׁלוּחוֹ. הָאִשָּׁה מִתְקַדֶּשֶׁת בָּהּ וּבִשְׁלוּחָהּ. הָאִישׁ מְקַדֵּשׁ אֶת בִּתּוֹ כְּשֶׁהִיא נַעֲרָה, בּוֹ וּבִשְׁלוּחוֹ.

MISHNA: A man can betroth a woman by himself or by means of his agent. Similarly, a woman can become betrothed by herself or by means of her agent. A man can betroth his daughter to a man when she is a young woman, either by himself or by means of his agent.

גְּמָ׳ הַשְׁתָּא בִּשְׁלוּחוֹ מְקַדֵּשׁ, בּוֹ מִיבַּעְיָא?! אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: מִצְוָה בּוֹ יוֹתֵר מִבִּשְׁלוּחוֹ. כִּי הָא דְּרַב סָפְרָא מְחָרֵיךְ רֵישָׁא, רָבָא מָלַח שִׁיבּוּטָא.

GEMARA: The Gemara starts by questioning the need for the seemingly extraneous halakha stated in the mishna: Now that the mishna stated that one can betroth a woman by means of his agent, is it necessary to state that a man can betroth a woman by himself? Rav Yosef says: The mishna writes both halakhot to teach that although the betrothal is valid either way, it is more fitting that the mitzva be performed by the man himself than by means of his agent. This is like that story of Rav Safra, who would himself singe the head of an animal on Shabbat eve to prepare it to be eaten on Shabbat, and Rava, who would salt a turbot fish himself, to fulfill the mitzva to prepare for Shabbat, although this could have been done by others.

אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי: בְּהָא אִיסּוּרָא נָמֵי אִית בֵּהּ, כִּדְרַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב. דְּאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: אָסוּר לָאָדָם שֶׁיְּקַדֵּשׁ אֶת הָאִשָּׁה עַד שֶׁיִּרְאֶנָּה, שֶׁמָּא יִרְאֶה בָּהּ דָּבָר מְגוּנֶּה וְתִתְגַּנֶּה עָלָיו, וְרַחֲמָנָא אָמַר: ״וְאָהַבְתָּ לְרֵעֲךָ כָּמוֹךָ״.

There are those who say: With regard to this particular mitzva of betrothal, it also involves a prohibition, in accordance with that which Rav Yehuda says that Rav says, as Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: It is forbidden for a man to betroth a woman until he sees her, lest he see something repulsive in her after the betrothal, and she will become repugnant to him, which will cause him to hate her. And to prevent this violation of what the Merciful One states in the Torah: “And you shall love your neighbor as yourself” (Leviticus 19:18), the Sages ruled that a man must betroth a woman in person, to ensure that he approves of her.

וְכִי אִיתְּמַר דְּרַב יוֹסֵף – אַסֵּיפָא אִיתְּמַר, הָאִשָּׁה מִתְקַדֶּשֶׁת בָּהּ וּבִשְׁלוּחָהּ. הַשְׁתָּא בִּשְׁלוּחָהּ מִיקַּדְּשָׁא בָּהּ מִיבַּעְיָא?! אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: מִצְוָה בָּהּ יוֹתֵר מִבִּשְׁלוּחָהּ. כִּי הָא דְּרַב סָפְרָא מְחָרֵיךְ רֵישָׁא, רָבָא מָלַח שִׁיבּוּטָא.

And if there is a prohibition against a man betrothing a women by means of an agent, then when the statement of Rav Yosef was stated, that it is merely preferable that the betrothal be performed without an agent, it was stated with regard to the latter clause of the mishna: A woman can become betrothed by herself or by means of her agent. Now that the mishna stated that she can become betrothed by means of her agent, is it necessary to state that she can become betrothed by herself? It was in response to this that Rav Yosef says: It is more fitting that the mitzva be performed by the woman herself than by means of her agent. This is like that story of Rav Safra, who would himself singe the head of an animal on Shabbat eve to prepare it to be eaten on Shabbat, and Rava, who would himself salt a turbot fish.

אֲבָל בְּהָא אִיסּוּרָא לֵית בַּהּ, כִּדְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, דְּאָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: טָב לְמֵיתַב טַן דּוּ מִלְּמֵיתַב אַרְמְלוּ.

But in this case of a woman who appoints an agent, there is no prohibition, as that which Reish Lakish said. As Reish Lakish said: Women have a saying: It is better to sit as two bodies, i.e., be married, than to sit lonely like a widow. Once a woman has decided to marry, she will accept any husband whose betrothal her agent accepts on her behalf, and there is no concern that she will find her betrothed repulsive and violate the mitzva of loving one’s neighbor like oneself.

הָאִישׁ מְקַדֵּשׁ אֶת בִּתּוֹ כְּשֶׁהִיא נַעֲרָה. כְּשֶׁהִיא נַעֲרָה – אִין, כְּשֶׁהִיא קְטַנָּה – לָא. מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ לְרַב, דְּאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב וְאִיתֵּימָא רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: אָסוּר לְאָדָם שֶׁיְּקַדֵּשׁ אֶת בִּתּוֹ כְּשֶׁהִיא קְטַנָּה, עַד שֶׁתִּגְדַּל וְתֹאמַר: ״בִּפְלוֹנִי אֲנִי רוֹצָה״.

The mishna teaches: A man can betroth his daughter to a man when she is a young woman. The Gemara infers: When she is a young woman, yes, he can betroth her; when she is a minor, no, he cannot betroth her. This statement supports the opinion of Rav, as Rav Yehuda says that Rav says, and some say it was said by Rabbi Elazar: It is prohibited for a person to betroth his daughter to a man when she is a minor, until such time that she grows up and says: I want to marry so-and-so. If a father betroths his daughter when she is a minor and incapable of forming an opinion of the husband, she may later find herself married to someone she does not like.

שְׁלִיחוּת מְנָלַן? דְּתַנְיָא: ״וְשִׁלַּח״ – מְלַמֵּד שֶׁהוּא עוֹשֶׂה שָׁלִיחַ.

§ The mishna states that an agent has the power to effect betrothal. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that there is halakhic agency? The Gemara answers: As it is taught in a baraita: The Torah states with regard to one who divorces his wife: “That he writes her a bill of divorce, and gives it in her hand, and sends her [veshilleḥah] out of his house” (Deuteronomy 24:1). The verse employs the verb: And he sends [veshillaḥ]. The fact that the verse employs the term veshillaḥ, as opposed to another verb denoting divorce, vegereshah, teaches that he can appoint an agent [shaliaḥ], as both words share the root shin, lamed, ḥet. The husband does not have to personally give his wife the bill of divorce.

״וְשִׁלְּחָהּ״ – מְלַמֵּד שֶׁהִיא עוֹשָׂה ״שָׁלִיחַ״. ״וְשִׁלַּח״ ״וְשִׁלְּחָהּ״ – מְלַמֵּד שֶׁהַשָּׁלִיחַ עוֹשֶׂה שָׁלִיחַ.

Additionally, the fact that the term “and he sends her [veshilleḥah]” can also be read as: And she sends [veshalleḥa], teaches that she too can appoint an agent to accept her bill of divorce. Furthermore, in this same passage the verb is repeated in the phrases “and he sends,” “and he sends her” (Deuteronomy 24:1–3), which serves to teach that an agent can appoint another agent.

אַשְׁכְּחַן בְּגֵירוּשִׁין, בְּקִידּוּשִׁין מְנָלַן? וְכִי תֵּימָא דְּיָלֵיף מִגֵּירוּשִׁין – מָה לְגֵירוּשִׁין, שֶׁכֵּן יֶשְׁנָן בְּעַל כׇּרְחָהּ! אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְיָצְאָה״ ״וְהָיְתָה״ – מַקִּישׁ הֲוָיָה לִיצִיאָה, מָה יְצִיאָה מְשַׁוֵּי שָׁלִיחַ – אַף הֲוָיָה נָמֵי מְשַׁוֵּי שָׁלִיחַ.

The Gemara asks: We found a source for agency with regard to divorce; from where do we derive that there is agency with regard to betrothal? And if you would say that it is derived from divorce, i.e., just as a wife can be divorced from her husband by means of an agent, she can become betrothed to him in the same way, the two cases are not similar: What is unique about divorce is that it can be effected against her will, while betrothal cannot. Therefore, a means of effecting divorce cannot necessarily be used to effect betrothal. The Gemara answers: The verse states: “And she departs out of his house, and goes and becomes another man’s wife” (Deuteronomy 24:2). Because the verse juxtaposes becoming married to leaving a marriage, just as a husband can appoint an agent for the purpose of leaving a marriage, so too he can appoint an agent for the purpose of becoming married.

וְאֶלָּא הָא דִּתְנַן: הָאוֹמֵר לִשְׁלוּחוֹ: ״צֵא תְּרוֹם״ – תּוֹרֵם כְּדַעַת בַּעַל הַבַּיִת. וְאִם אֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ דַּעַת בַּעַל הַבַּיִת – תּוֹרֵם בְּבֵינוֹנִית, אֶחָד מֵחֲמִשִּׁים.

The Gemara objects: But there is that which we learned in a mishna (Terumot 4:4): In the case of one who says to his agent: Go out and separate teruma from my field’s produce for me, the agent must separate teruma in accordance with the mindset of the owner. He must separate the amount that he assumes the owner would want to give, as there is no fixed measure for the amount that one must set aside as teruma. A generous person would give as much as one-fortieth of the produce as teruma, while a stingy person would give one-sixtieth. And if he does not know the mindset of the owner, he separates an intermediate measure, which is one-fiftieth of the produce.

פִּיחֵת עֲשָׂרָה אוֹ הוֹסִיף עֲשָׂרָה – תְּרוּמָתוֹ תְּרוּמָה. מְנָלַן? וְכִי תֵּימָא דְּיָלֵיף מִגֵּירוּשִׁין – מָה לְגֵירוּשִׁין, שֶׁכֵּן יֶשְׁנָן חוֹל! אָמַר קְרָא: ״אַתֶּם״, ״גַּם אַתֶּם״ – לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַשָּׁלִיחַ.

If the agent subtracted ten from the denominator and separated one-fortieth or added ten to the denominator and separated one-sixtieth, thereby giving more or less than the owner intended, his teruma is teruma. From where do we derive that one can appoint an agent to separate teruma? And if you would say that it is derived from divorce, one could argue: What is an aspect unique to divorce is that it is considered a non-sacred matter in relation to teruma and will have different halakhot, so one cannot learn from divorce that one can appoint an agent to separate teruma. The Gemara answers: The verse states with regard to teruma: “So you also shall set apart a gift unto the Lord of all your tithes” (Numbers 18:28). Once the verse states “you,” the addition of the word “also” in the term “you also” serves to include an agent.

וְנִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא בִּתְרוּמָה, וְנֵיתוֹ הָנָךְ וְנִגְמְרוּ מִינֵּיהּ! מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיכָּא לְמִפְרַךְ: שֶׁכֵּן יֶשְׁנָהּ בְּמַחְשָׁבָה.

The Gemara asks: And let the Merciful One write in the passage concerning teruma that one can appoint an agent, and the halakha that one can appoint an agent to act on his behalf in these other matters, i.e., divorce and betrothal, can come and be derived from it. The Gemara answers: Agency in these matters cannot be derived in this manner because the derivation can be refuted: Separating teruma is different, in that it is able to be separated by mere thought. It is enough for one to decide that a certain portion of his produce shall be teruma to have that status take effect. Just as there is this leniency unique to separating teruma, perhaps the leniency that enables one to appoint an agent is also unique to separating teruma.

וְהָא דִּתְנַן: חֲבוּרָה שֶׁאָבַד פִּסְחָהּ, וְאָמְרוּ לְאֶחָד: ״צֵא וּבַקֵּשׁ וּשְׁחוֹט עָלֵינוּ״, וְהָלַךְ וּמָצָא וְשָׁחַט, וְהֵן לָקְחוּ וְשָׁחֲטוּ, אִם שֶׁלּוֹ נִשְׁחַט רִאשׁוֹן – הוּא אוֹכֵל מִשֶּׁלּוֹ, וְהֵם אוֹכְלִים וְשׁוֹתִים עִמּוֹ.

The Gemara further clarifies the source for agency: Generally, the Paschal offering was brought by a group of people together. But there is that which we learned in a mishna (Pesaḥim 98b): In the case of a group whose Paschal offering was lost before it was sacrificed, and they said to one member of the group: Go and search for our Paschal offering, and when you find it, slaughter it on our behalf; and this person went and found the lost animal and slaughtered it on behalf of the entire group, but meanwhile, despairing of his return, they took a different animal and slaughtered it as a Paschal offering, the halakha is as follows: If his Paschal offering was slaughtered first, he eats from his offering, and they eat and drink with him. This demonstrates that one can act as an agent to slaughter the Paschal offering.

מְנָלַן? וְכִי תֵּימָא דְּיָלֵיף מֵהָנָךְ – מָה לְהָנָךְ, שֶׁכֵּן יֶשְׁנָן חוֹל אֵצֶל קָדָשִׁים!

From where do we derive this halakha, that one can appoint an agent to slaughter an offering? And if you would say that it is derived from these other instances of agency, i.e., divorce and teruma, one could refute this derivation by saying: What is unique about these is that they are considered non-sacred matters relative to offerings, and perhaps offerings have their own set of halakhot.

נָפְקָא לֵיהּ מִדְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן קׇרְחָה, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן קׇרְחָה: מִנַּיִן שֶׁשְּׁלוּחוֹ שֶׁל אָדָם כְּמוֹתוֹ? שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְשָׁחֲטוּ אֹתוֹ כֹּל קְהַל עֲדַת יִשְׂרָאֵל בֵּין הָעַרְבָּיִם״, וְכִי כָּל הַקָּהָל כּוּלָּן שׁוֹחֲטִין? וַהֲלֹא אֵינוֹ שׁוֹחֵט אֶלָּא אֶחָד! אֶלָּא מִכָּאן שֶׁשְּׁלוּחוֹ שֶׁל אָדָם כְּמוֹתוֹ.

The Gemara answers: He derives it from that which Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says, as Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says: From where is it derived that the legal status of a person’s agent is like that of himself? As it is stated with regard to the Paschal offering: “And the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it in the afternoon” (Exodus 12:6). Is it so that the whole assembly slaughters the offering? But only one person from each group slaughters it. Rather, it can be derived from here that the legal status of a person’s agent is like that of himself.

נִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא בְּקָדָשִׁים, וְנֵיתֵי הָנָךְ וְנִיגְמְרוּ מִינֵּיהּ! מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיכָּא לְמִפְרַךְ: מָה לְקָדָשִׁים, שֶׁכֵּן רוֹב מַעֲשֵׂיהֶן עַל יְדֵי שָׁלִיחַ.

In light of that exposition, the Gemara asks: Let the Merciful One write in the Torah the halakha of an agent with regard to offerings, and these, i.e., agency in the cases of betrothal, divorce, and teruma, can come and be derived from it. The Gemara answers: Agency in these matters cannot be derived in this manner because the derivation can be refuted: What is unique about offerings is that the majority of their actions are performed by means of an agent. Since most of the sacrificial service is performed by priests, who serve as the agents of those bringing the offerings, the general halakha of agency cannot be derived from there.

חֲדָא מֵחֲדָא לָא אָתְיָא, תֵּיתֵי חֲדָא מִתַּרְתֵּי? – הֵי תֵּיתֵי?

The Gemara continues to ask: For the reasons stated, the halakha of agency cannot be derived for any one of these from any other one of them. Still, derive one of these from the other two. The Gemara clarifies: Which of them will be derived from the others?

לָא נִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא בְּקָדָשִׁים וְתֵיתֵי מֵהָנָךְ – מָה לְהָנָךְ, שֶׁכֵּן יֶשְׁנָן חוֹל אֵצֶל קֳדָשִׁים. לָא נִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא בְּגֵירוּשִׁין וְתֵיתֵי מֵהָנָךְ – מָה לְהָנָךְ, שֶׁכֵּן יֶשְׁנָן בְּמַחְשָׁבָה.

If you say: Let the Merciful One not write the halakha of agency with regard to offerings and derive agency with regard to offerings from these, i.e., divorce and teruma, that derivation can be refuted: What is unique about these is that they are considered non-sacred matters relative to offerings, as even teruma is not sacred compared to offerings, and sacred procedures such as offerings may have their own halakhot. If you say: Let the Merciful One not write the halakha of agency with regard to divorce, and derive agency with regard to divorce from these, i.e., teruma and offerings, this too can be refuted: What is unique about these is they can be designated by means of thought, and therefore may be easier to effect than divorce.

אֶלָּא: לָא לִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא בִּתְרוּמָה, וְתֵיתֵי מֵהָנָךְ! הָכִי נָמֵי.

Rather, it is the third derivation that is possible: Let the Merciful One not write the halakha of agency with regard to teruma, and derive agency from these, i.e., offerings and divorce. Although teruma is sacred, offerings are more sacred, and yet the halakha of agency applies to them. Although the separating of teruma can be accomplished by means of thought, as opposed to divorce, offerings can also be designated by means of thought. The Gemara answers: It is indeed so; this is the derivation for the applicability of agency to teruma.

וְאֶלָּא ״אַתֶּם״ ״גַּם אַתֶּם״ לְמָה לִי? מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְרַבִּי יַנַּאי. דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יַנַּאי ״גַּם אַתֶּם״ – מָה אַתֶּם בְּנֵי בְּרִית, אַף שְׁלוּחֲכֶם בְּנֵי בְּרִית.

The Gemara asks: But then why do I need the derivation that once the verse states “you,” the addition of the word “also” in the term “you also” serves to include an agent? The Gemara answers: It is necessary to function as the source of the statement of Rabbi Yannai, as Rabbi Yannai says that from the term “you also,” the following is derived: Just as you, those who appoint agents, are members of the covenant, i.e., Jews, so too, your agents must be members of the covenant. A gentile cannot separate teruma even if appointed as an agent by a Jew.

הָא לְמָה לִי קְרָא? מִדְּרַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן נָפְקָא! דְּאָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: אֵין הָעֶבֶד נַעֲשֶׂה שָׁלִיחַ לְקַבֵּל גֵּט מִיַּד בַּעְלָהּ שֶׁל אִשָּׁה, לְפִי שֶׁאֵינוֹ בְּתוֹרַת גִּיטִּין וְקִידּוּשִׁין.

The Gemara asks: Why do I need a verse to teach this halakha? It is derived from that which Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says, as Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: A slave cannot become an agent to receive a bill of divorce from the hand of a woman’s husband on her behalf because he is not included in the laws of bills of divorce and betrothal. This indicates that there is a principle that if certain matters do not apply to a person, he cannot act as an agent with regard to those matters. Therefore, since gentiles are not commanded to separate teruma, they cannot be agents for its separation.

אִיצְטְרִיךְ, סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: עֶבֶד, דְּלָאו בַּר הֶיתֵּירָא הוּא כְּלָל. אֲבָל נׇכְרִי, הוֹאִיל וְאִיתֵיהּ בִּתְרוּמָה דְּנַפְשֵׁיהּ, דִּתְנַן: הַנׇּכְרִי וְהַכּוּתִי שֶׁתָּרְמוּ – תְּרוּמָתָן תְּרוּמָה, אֵימָא שָׁלִיחַ נָמֵי עָבֵיד, קָמַשְׁמַע לַן.

The Gemara answers: It was nevertheless necessary to derive this halakha for the case of teruma, because it cannot be derived from the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan. This is as it might enter your mind to say: It is a slave who cannot serve as an agent to receive a bill of divorce, since he cannot release a woman by divorce at all; but a gentile, since he is included in his own teruma, as we learned in a mishna (Terumot 3:9): A gentile or a Samaritan who separated teruma from their own produce, their teruma is considered teruma, despite the fact that they are not obligated to do so, I will say that he can also be appointed as an agent. To counter this argument, the term “you also” teaches us that only members of the covenant can act as agents for separating teruma; gentiles cannot.

וּלְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, דְּפָטַר, דִּתְנַן: תְּרוּמַת נׇכְרִי מְדַמַּעַת וְחַיָּיבִין עָלֶיהָ חוֹמֶשׁ וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן פּוֹטֵר, ״אַתֶּם״ ״גַּם אַתֶּם״ לְמָה לִי?

The Gemara asks: But according to Rabbi Shimon, who exempts one from paying an additional penalty for the teruma of a gentile, this explanation cannot be stated. As we learned in a mishna (Terumot 3:9): If the teruma of a gentile gets mixed with regular produce, it is considered to be a mixture of teruma and non-sacred produce, and if a non-priest eats this mixture unwittingly he is liable to pay for it an additional one-fifth beyond its value, just as is the halakha with regard to one who unwittingly eats teruma. But Rabbi Shimon exempts him from paying the additional one-fifth, as he holds that the teruma of a gentile possesses no sanctity and is considered a mere gift to a priest. If so, if there is no need to learn the additional halakha that a gentile cannot act as an agent with regard to the separating of teruma, why do I need the derivation from “you” and “you also”?

אִיצְטְרִיךְ, סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: הוֹאִיל וְאָמַר מָר: ״אַתֶּם״ – וְלֹא אֲרִיסִין, ״אַתֶּם״ – וְלֹא שׁוּתָּפִין, ״אַתֶּם״ – וְלֹא אַפּוֹטְרוֹפּוֹס, ״אַתֶּם״ – וְלֹא הַתּוֹרֵם אֶת שֶׁאֵינוֹ שֶׁלּוֹ, אֵימָא: ״אַתֶּם״ – וְלֹא שְׁלוּחֲכֶם נָמֵי, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

The Gemara answers: It was necessary to state this additional term, as it might enter your mind to say: Since the Master says that the word “you” is interpreted as a limitation, it means that “you,” but not sharecroppers, can separate teruma, as a sharecropper cannot separate teruma from the produce of the owner of the field; “you” can separate teruma but not partners from shared property without the consent of the other; “you” can separate teruma but not a steward [apotropos] from the estate that he is administering; and “you” can separate teruma but not one who separates teruma from produce that is not his, you might also say: “You” can separate teruma and not your agents. The verse therefore teaches us that “you also” indicates that one can appoint an agent to separate teruma.

הָנִיחָא לְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן קׇרְחָה. אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי יוֹנָתָן, דְּמַפֵּיק לֵיהּ לְהַאי קְרָא לִדְרָשָׁא אַחֲרִינָא, מְנָא לַן? דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי יוֹנָתָן אוֹמֵר: מִנַּיִן שֶׁכׇּל יִשְׂרָאֵל כּוּלָּן יוֹצְאִים

The Gemara poses a question with regard to the basic derivation of the halakha of agency: This works out well according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, who explains that the verse: “And the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it in the afternoon” (Exodus 12:6), teaches the halakha of agency with regard to offerings. But according to the opinion of Rabbi Yonatan, who derives a different exposition from this verse, from where do we derive the halakha of agency with regard to offerings? As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yonatan says: From where do we derive that all of the Jews can fulfill their obligations