מנחות ה

מנחות ה

דְּאָמַר מָר: גִּילַּח עַל אַחַת מִשְּׁלׇשְׁתָּן יָצָא.

as the Master said about the nazirite (Nazir 45a): And if he shaved after the sacrifice of any one of the three of them, i.e., after sacrificing his sin offering, burnt offering, or peace offering, he has fulfilled his obligation after the fact, i.e., he has successfully completed his term of naziriteship. Accordingly, there is no specific offering that renders him fit.

מֵיתִיבִי: אָשָׁם מְצוֹרָע שֶׁנִּשְׁחַט שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ, אוֹ שֶׁלֹּא נִיתַּן מִדָּמוֹ עַל גַּבֵּי בְּהוֹנוֹת – הֲרֵי זֶה עוֹלֶה לְגַבֵּי מִזְבֵּחַ, וְטָעוּן נְסָכִים, וְצָרִיךְ אָשָׁם אַחֵר לְהַכְשִׁירוֹ. תְּיוּבְתָּא דְרַב.

The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: With regard to the guilt offering of a leper that was slaughtered not for its own sake, or if none of its blood was placed on the leper’s right thumb and big toe, this guilt offering is offered up upon the altar and it requires libations, in accordance with the halakha of the guilt offering of a leper. But the leper must nevertheless bring another guilt offering to render him fit to partake of offerings. This baraita is a conclusive refutation of the statement of Rav, who said that the guilt offering of a leper that was slaughtered not for its own sake is entirely disqualified because it did not render the leper fit.

וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ אָמַר: מִנְחַת הָעוֹמֶר שֶׁקְּמָצָהּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ – כְּשֵׁירָה, וּשְׁיָרֶיהָ אֵין נֶאֱכָלִין עַד שֶׁתָּבִיא מִנְחַת הָעוֹמֶר אַחֶרֶת וְתַתִּירֶנָּה.

§ The Gemara returns to its discussion concerning the omer meal offering. And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says, with regard to an omer meal offering from which a priest removed a handful not for its own sake, that it is valid and the handful is burned on the altar. But its remainder may not be consumed by the priests until a priest brings another omer meal offering on the same day and thereby permits the first offering for consumption, as the prohibition against consuming the new crop remains in effect.

שֶׁשְּׁיָרֶיהָ אֵין נֶאֱכָלִין עַד שֶׁתָּבִיא מִנְחַת הָעוֹמֶר אַחֶרֶת, מִקְרָב הֵיכִי קָרְבָה? ״מִמַּשְׁקֵה יִשְׂרָאֵל״ – מִן הַמּוּתָּר לְיִשְׂרָאֵל.

The Gemara asks: But if its remainder may not be consumed by the priests until they bring another omer meal offering, how can the handful removed from this omer meal offering be sacrificed upon the altar? Before the omer meal offering is sacrificed, the new crop is forbidden for consumption, and the verse states: “From the well-watered pastures of Israel; for a meal offering, and for a burnt offering, and for peace offerings” (Ezekiel 45:15), from which it is derived that one may sacrifice only from that which is permitted to the Jewish people.

אָמַר רַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה: קָסָבַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, אֵין מְחוּסָּר זְמַן לְבוֹ בַּיּוֹם.

Rav Adda bar Ahava said in response: Reish Lakish holds that an offering is not considered one whose time has not yet arrived if it is to be brought on that day. Accordingly, since the new crop will be permitted for consumption on the same day that this handful was removed from the omer meal offering, it is already considered fit to be sacrificed upon the altar.

מֵתִיב רַב אַדָּא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יִצְחָק: יֵשׁ בָּעוֹפוֹת שֶׁאֵין בַּמְּנָחוֹת, יֵשׁ בַּמְּנָחוֹת שֶׁאֵין בָּעוֹפוֹת. יֵשׁ בָּעוֹפוֹת – שֶׁהָעוֹפוֹת בָּאִין בְּנִדְבַת שְׁנַיִם, אֲבָל מְנָחוֹת ״נֶפֶשׁ״ כְּתִיבָא.

Rav Adda, son of Rav Yitzḥak, raises an objection to Rav Adda bar Ahava’s explanation from a baraita: There is a halakha that applies to birds that does not apply to meal offerings, and there is a halakha that applies to meal offerings that does not apply to birds. The baraita elaborates: There is a halakha that applies to birds that does not apply to meal offerings, as birds may be brought as a gift offering on behalf of two people, i.e., two people may take a vow to bring a single bird offering jointly. But with regard to meal offerings it is written: “And when one brings a meal offering” (Leviticus 2:1), indicating that only individuals may vow to bring a meal offering.

וּמְחוּסְּרֵי כַפָּרָה: זָב, וְזָבָה, יוֹלֶדֶת, וּמְצוֹרָע.

The baraita continues: And another halakha that applies to birds but not meal offerings involves one who has not yet brought his atonement offering, i.e., a man who experienced a gonorrhea-like discharge [zav], or woman who experienced a discharge of uterine blood after her menstrual period [zava], or a woman after childbirth, or a leper, all of whom must bring an offering to complete their atonement process. They bring a bird offering, not a meal offering.

וְהוּתְּרוּ מִכְּלַל אִיסּוּרָן בַּקּוֹדֶשׁ, מַה שֶּׁאֵין כֵּן בַּמְּנָחוֹת.

And furthermore, with regard to birds, their general prohibition was permitted when they are consecrated, i.e., killing a non-sacred bird by pinching the nape of its neck renders it a carcass, whose consumption is prohibited, and yet pinching the nape of a bird offering enables it to be sacrificed upon the altar and permits it for consumption, which is not so with regard to meal offerings, i.e., there is no prohibition that applies to the non-consecrated ingredients of a meal offering that does not apply to actual meal offerings as well.

וְיֵשׁ בַּמְּנָחוֹת – שֶׁהַמְּנָחוֹת טְעוּנוֹת כְּלִי, וּתְנוּפָה וְהַגָּשָׁה, וְיֶשְׁנָן בַּצִּיבּוּר כְּבַיָּחִיד, מַה שֶּׁאֵין כֵּן בָּעוֹפוֹת.

The baraita continues: And there is a halakha that applies to meal offerings that does not apply to birds. As meal offerings require placement in a service vessel, and they require waving and bringing, i.e., they must be brought to the corner of the altar prior to removal of the handful. And lastly, there are meal offerings of the community just as there are meal offerings of individuals, e.g., the omer meal offering is a communal meal offering, which is not so with regard to birds. Bird offerings do not require the use of service vessels, they do not require waving or bringing, and there are no communal bird offerings.

וְאִם אִיתָא, בִּמְנָחוֹת נָמֵי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ, דְּהוּתְּרוּ מִכְּלַל אִיסּוּרָן בַּקּוֹדֶשׁ, וּמַאי נִיהוּ? מִנְחַת הָעוֹמֶר.

Rav Adda, son of Rav Yitzḥak, explains his objection: And if it is so that a handful that was removed from an omer meal offering not for its own sake is fit for burning upon the altar, then with regard to meal offerings as well, you find that their general prohibition was permitted when they are consecrated. And what is this meal offering that was permitted? It is the omer meal offering from which a handful was removed not for its own sake, as although the new crop remains prohibited to the Jewish people until another omer meal offering is brought, the handful of this meal offering may be sacrificed upon the altar.

כֵּיוָן דְּאֵין מְחוּסַּר זְמַן לְבוֹ בַּיּוֹם, לָאו אִיסּוּרָא הוּא.

The Gemara answers: Since an offering is not considered one whose time has not yet arrived if it is to be brought on that day, the sacrificing of that handful is not a prohibition that was permitted. Instead, it was initially fit for sacrifice upon the altar, as though another omer meal offering had already been brought to permit it.

מֵתִיב רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: הִקְדִּים מַתַּן שֶׁמֶן לְמַתַּן דָּם – יְמַלְּאֶנּוּ שֶׁמֶן וְיַחֲזוֹר וְיִתֵּן שֶׁמֶן אַחַר מַתַּן דָּם, מַתַּן בְּהוֹנוֹת לְמַתַּן שֶׁבַע – יְמַלְּאֶנּוּ שֶׁמֶן וְיַחֲזוֹר וְיִתֵּן מַתַּן בְּהוֹנוֹת אַחַר מַתַּן שֶׁבַע.

Rav Sheshet raises an objection from a baraita that discusses the ritual purification of a leper: If the priest performed the placement of oil on the leper’s right thumb and big toe before the placement of blood from the leper’s guilt offering on the leper’s right thumb and big toe, i.e., his actions were in the opposite order from those prescribed in the Torah (see Leviticus 14:14–17), he fills the vessel that holds a log of oil and he then puts oil on the leper’s right thumb and big toe again after the placement of blood. If the priest performed the placement of oil on the leper’s right thumb and big toe before the placement of seven sprinklings of oil before the Lord, he fills the vessel that holds a log of oil and he again puts oil on the leper’s right thumb and big toe after the placement of seven sprinklings.

וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ אֵין מְחוּסַּר זְמַן לְבוֹ בַּיּוֹם, אַמַּאי יַחְזוֹר וְיִתֵּן? מַאי דַּעֲבַד עֲבַד!

Rav Sheshet explains his objection: And if you say that an offering is not considered as one whose time has not yet arrived if it is to be brought on that day, then why should the priest place the oil on the leper’s right thumb and big toe again? What he performed, he already performed, i.e., since the oil was going to be placed on the leper’s right thumb and big toe on that day, the placement should be valid even when done out of order.

אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: שָׁאנֵי הִלְכוֹת מְצוֹרָע, דִּכְתִיבָא בְּהוּ הֲוָיָיה, דְּאָמַר הַכָּתוּב: ״זֹאת תִּהְיֶה תּוֹרַת הַמְּצוֹרָע״, ״תִּהְיֶה״ – בַּהֲוָיָיתָהּ תְּהֵא.

Rav Pappa said in response: The halakhot of a leper are different, as it is written concerning them an expression of being, as the verse states: “This shall be the law of the leper” (Leviticus 14:2). The term “shall be” indicates that it shall be as it is, i.e., the purification process of a leper must be performed in accordance with the precise order prescribed in the Torah.

מֵתִיב רַב פָּפָּא: הִקְדִּים חַטָּאתוֹ לַאֲשָׁמוֹ – לֹא יִהְיֶה אַחֵר מְמָרֵס בְּדָמָהּ, אֶלָּא תְּעוּבַּר צוּרָתָהּ וְתֵצֵא לְבֵית הַשְּׂרֵיפָה.

Rav Pappa raises an objection from a baraita: If the priest performed the slaughter of a leper’s sin offering before the slaughter of his guilt offering, i.e., the priest’s actions were in the opposite order from those prescribed in the Torah (see Leviticus 14:13–19), there should not be another priest stirring the blood of the leper’s sin offering to prevent it from congealing in order that his guilt offering may be slaughtered and its blood sprinkled before the blood of his sin offering. Rather, the sin offering is left until its form decays, i.e., until the next morning, at which point it is definitively disqualified due to remaining in the Temple overnight and can be taken out to the place designated for burning. The objection is as follows: If an offering that is to be brought on that day is not considered one whose time has not yet arrived, why must this sin offering be left to decay? It should be considered as though it was slaughtered after the guilt offering.

אַמַּאי קָא מוֹתֵיב רַב פָּפָּא? וְהָא רַב פָּפָּא הוּא דְּאָמַר: שָׁאנֵי הִלְכוֹת מְצוֹרָע, דִּכְתִיבָא בְּהוּ הֲוָיָיה! אֶלָּא רַב פָּפָּא הָכִי קָא קַשְׁיָא לֵיהּ: אֵימָא הָנֵי מִילֵּי עֲבוֹדָה, שְׁחִיטָה לָאו עֲבוֹדָה הִיא, וְאִי אֵין מְחוּסַּר זְמַן לְבוֹ בַּיּוֹם – יְהֵא אַחֵר מְמָרֵס בְּדָמָהּ, וְלַקְרֵיב אָשָׁם, וַהֲדַר לַיקְרֵב חַטָּאת!

The Gemara asks: Why does Rav Pappa raise this objection? But isn’t it Rav Pappa himself who said: The halakhot of a leper are different, as it is written concerning them an expression of being, which indicates that the order of slaughter of a leper’s offerings must be preserved? Rather, this is what is difficult to Rav Pappa from the baraita: You can say that this statement, the halakha that the order is indispensable to the purification process of a leper, applies only to a sacrificial rite, whereas the act of slaughter is not considered a rite. And if an offering is not considered one whose time has not yet arrived if it is to be brought on that day, then another priest should be stirring the blood of the leper’s sin offering to prevent it from congealing, and a priest should sacrifice the guilt offering and present its blood in the meantime, and afterward he should sacrifice the sin offering.

אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: הַיְינוּ טַעְמָא דְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, דְּקָסָבַר הֵאִיר מִזְרָח מַתִּיר, דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ: אֲפִילּוּ בִּזְמַן שֶׁבֵּית הַמִּקְדָּשׁ קַיָּים,

Rather, Rav Pappa said: This is the reason of Reish Lakish, who said that the handful of an omer meal offering that was removed not for its own sake is valid and may be burned upon the altar: It is that he holds that the illumination of the eastern horizon on the morning of the sixteenth of Nisan permits the new crop to the Jewish people even before the omer meal offering is sacrificed, as Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish both say: Even when the Temple is standing,

הֵאִיר מִזְרָח מַתִּיר.

the illumination of the eastern horizon permits the new crop.

וְהָא דְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ לָאו בְּפֵירוּשׁ אִיתְּמַר, אֶלָּא מִכְּלָלָא אִיתְּמַר, דִּתְנַן: אֵין מְבִיאִין מִנְחַת בִּכּוּרִים וּמִנְחַת בְּהֵמָה קוֹדֶם לָעוֹמֶר, דְּבָעֵינַן ״מִמַּשְׁקֵה יִשְׂרָאֵל״, וְאִם הֵבִיא – פָּסוּל.

The Gemara notes: And this statement of Reish Lakish was not stated explicitly; rather, it was stated by inference, i.e., it is evident from a different statement of Reish Lakish that this is his opinion. As we learned in a mishna (68b): One may not bring a meal offering, the first fruits, or the meal offering brought with the libations accompanying an animal offering, from the new crop, prior to the sacrifice of the omer. The Gemara interrupts its citation of the mishna to add that the reason is that we require that an offering be “from the well-watered pastures of Israel,” i.e., it must be brought from that which is permitted to the Jewish people, and the new crop has not yet been permitted to them. The mishna concludes: And if he brought these offerings from the new crop they are unfit.

קוֹדֶם לִשְׁתֵּי הַלֶּחֶם לֹא יָבִיא, מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיקְּרוּ ״בִּכּוּרִים״, וְאִם הֵבִיא – כָּשֵׁר.

The mishna continues: After the omer but prior to the two loaves one may not bring those offerings from the new crop. The Gemara explains that this is because the two loaves are called first fruits, and therefore they should precede all other offerings from the new crop. The mishna adds: But if he brought those offerings from the new crop, they are fit.

וְאָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא בְּאַרְבָּעָה עָשָׂר וּבַחֲמִשָּׁה עָשָׂר, אֲבָל בְּשִׁשָּׁה עָשָׂר אִם הֵבִיא – כָּשֵׁר, וְקַשְׁיָא לִי: לִיהְווֹ כַּמְחוּסַּר זְמַן! אַלְמָא קָסָבַר הֵאִיר הַמִּזְרָח מַתִּיר.

And Rav Yitzḥak says that Reish Lakish says: The Sages taught that a meal offering that was brought from the new crop before the omer meal offering is disqualified only if it was brought on the fourteenth or on the fifteenth of Nisan. But if it was on the sixteenth, then even if he brought it prior to the omer meal offering, it is valid. He continues: And this statement poses a difficulty for me: Why should meal offerings be valid when sacrificed on the sixteenth if they were sacrificed before the omer meal offering? Let them be considered like offerings whose time has not yet arrived. The Gemara comments: Apparently, Reish Lakish holds that the illumination of the eastern horizon permits the new crop.

וְרָבָא אָמַר: מִנְחַת הָעוֹמֶר שֶׁקְּמָצָהּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ – כְּשֵׁירָה, וּשְׁיָרֶיהָ נֶאֱכָלִין, וְאֵינָהּ צְרִיכָה מִנְחַת הָעוֹמֶר אַחֶרֶת לְהַתִּירָהּ, שֶׁאֵין מַחְשָׁבָה מוֹעֶלֶת אֶלָּא בְּמִי שֶׁרָאוּי לָעֲבוֹדָה, וּבְדָבָר הָרָאוּי לָעֲבוֹדָה, וּבִמְקוֹם הָרָאוּי לָעֲבוֹדָה.

§ The Gemara previously cited the opinion of Rav that an omer meal offering from which a handful was removed not for its own sake is disqualified. The Gemara also cited the opinion of Reish Lakish that this meal offering is valid but another omer meal offering is necessary to permit the new crop for consumption. And Rava says: With regard to an omer meal offering from which the priest removed a handful not for its own sake, it is valid and its remainder is consumed, and it does not require another omer meal offering to permit it for consumption. The reason is that improper intent is effective [mo’elet] to disqualify an offering only when it is expressed by one who is fit for the Temple service, and with regard to an item that is fit for the Temple service, and in a place that is fit for the Temple service.

בְּמִי שֶׁרָאוּי לָעֲבוֹדָה – לְאַפּוֹקֵי כֹּהֵן בַּעַל מוּם, וּבְדָבָר הָרָאוּי לָעֲבוֹדָה – לְאַפּוֹקֵי מִנְחַת הָעוֹמֶר דְּלָא חַזְיָא, דְּחִדּוּשׁ הוּא, וּבִמְקוֹם הָרָאוּי לָעֲבוֹדָה – לְאַפּוֹקֵי נִפְגַּם הַמִּזְבֵּחַ.

Rava elaborates: The condition that improper intent disqualifies only when expressed by one who is fit for the Temple service serves to exclude the intent of a blemished priest, who is disqualified from performing the Temple service. The condition that it disqualifies only when expressed with regard to an item that is fit for the Temple service serves to exclude the omer meal offering, which is generally unfit for the Temple service, as it is a novelty, in that it is brought from barley whereas most meal offerings are brought from wheat. And finally, the condition that it disqualifies only when expressed in a place that is fit for the Temple service serves to exclude sacrificial rites that were performed with improper intent while the altar was damaged. At such a time improper intent does not disqualify an offering, and therefore if the altar is repaired on the same day, the offering may be sacrificed upon the altar.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: כְּשֶׁהוּא אוֹמֵר ״מִן הַבָּקָר״ לְמַטָּה, שֶׁאֵין תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר, אֶלָּא לְהוֹצִיא אֶת הַטְּרֵפָה.

§ The Gemara discusses the prohibition against sacrificing an item that is prohibited to the Jewish people. The Sages taught in a baraita: It is derived from a passage in the Torah that discusses burnt offerings: “You shall bring your offering from the cattle, even from the herd or from the flock” (Leviticus 1:2), that certain animals are prohibited for sacrifice upon the altar (see Temura 28a). When it states later, in the next verse: “If his offering is a burnt offering of the herd” (Leviticus 1:3), this is difficult, as there is no need for the verse to state this, as it was already written earlier. Rather, this serves to exclude an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months [tereifa] from being brought as an offering.

וַהֲלֹא דִּין הוּא: וּמָה בַּעַל מוּם שֶׁמּוּתֶּרֶת לַהֶדְיוֹט – אֲסוּרָה לַגָּבוֹהַּ, טְרֵיפָה שֶׁאֲסוּרָה לַהֶדְיוֹט – אֵין דִּין שֶׁאֲסוּרָה לַגָּבוֹהַּ? חֵלֶב וָדָם יוֹכִיחוּ, שֶׁאֲסוּרִין לַהֶדְיוֹט וּמוּתָּרִין לַגָּבוֹהַּ!

The baraita questions the need for this derivation: But could this not be derived through an a fortiori inference? And if a blemished animal, which is permitted to an ordinary person [lehedyot] for consumption, is nevertheless prohibited as an offering for the Most High (see Leviticus 22:19), then certainly with regard to a tereifa, which is forbidden to an ordinary person for consumption (see Exodus 22:30), is it not logical that it is prohibited for the Most High? The baraita responds: Fat [ḥelev] and blood prove that this a fortiori inference is not valid, as they are forbidden to an ordinary person and yet they are permitted for the Most High.

מָה לְחֵלֶב וָדָם, שֶׁכֵּן בָּאִין מִכְּלַל הֶיתֵּר, תֹּאמַר בִּטְרֵיפָה שֶׁכּוּלָּהּ אֲסוּרָה, וְלֹא תְּהֵא מוּתֶּרֶת לַגָּבוֹהַּ!

The baraita rejects this suggestion: What is notable about fat and blood? They are notable in that they come from an item that is generally permitted, i.e., the animal from which they come is itself permitted for consumption. Will you say the same with regard to a tereifa, which is entirely forbidden for eating, and therefore should not be permitted for the Most High?

מְלִיקָה תּוֹכִיחַ, שֶׁכּוּלָּהּ אִיסּוּר, וַאֲסוּרָה לַהֶדְיוֹט, וּמוּתֶּרֶת לַגָּבוֹהַּ.

The baraita responds: The pinching of bird offerings will prove that one cannot derive by means of an a fortiori inference that a tereifa is disqualified. As a bird killed by the pinching of its nape is also entirely forbidden, and yet although it is forbidden for consumption to an ordinary person, as it is rendered a carcass, it is nevertheless permitted for the Most High, as bird offerings are killed by the pinching of their napes. The verse is therefore necessary to disqualify a tereifa.

מָה לִמְלִיקָה, שֶׁכֵּן קְדוּשָּׁתָהּ אוֹסַרְתָּהּ, בִּשְׁעַת קְדוּשָּׁתָהּ לַמִּזְבֵּחַ הִיא נֶאֶסְרָה לַהֶדְיוֹט, דְּהַיְינוּ מְלִיקָתָהּ, אֲבָל קוֹדֶם לָכֵן לֹא נֶאֶסְרָה לַהֶדְיוֹט, מַה שֶּׁאֵין כֵּן בִּטְרֵיפָה, שֶׁאֵין קְדוּשָּׁתָהּ אוֹסַרְתָּהּ!

The baraita rejects this suggestion as well: What is notable about pinching? It is notable in that its sanctity prohibits it, i.e., only at the time when it becomes sanctified for the altar does it become prohibited for consumption to an ordinary person, which is at the time of its pinching. But before this time it is not yet prohibited to an ordinary person for consumption. This is not the case with regard to a tereifa, as its sanctity does not prohibit it for consumption, since it is always prohibited to eat it. Accordingly, by logical inference alone one can arrive at the conclusion that a tereifa should not be permitted for the Most High.

וְאִם הֵשַׁבְתָּה, כְּשֶׁהוּא אוֹמֵר ״מִן הַבָּקָר״ לְמַטָּה, שֶׁאֵין תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר, לְהוֹצִיא אֶת הַטְּרֵיפָה.

The baraita concludes with a statement that will soon be explained: And if you have responded, i.e., if you succeeded in rejecting the a fortiori inference, then when the verse states later: “Of the herd” (Leviticus 1:3), as there is no need for the verse to state this phrase, it serves to exclude a tereifa.

מָה ״אִם הֵשַׁבְתָּה״? (סִימָן: רְקִיחַ, מָר, אַדָּא, לְשֵׁישֵׁיהּ).

The Gemara asks: What response is alluded to by the statement: If you have responded? The conclusion of the baraita had indicated that the a fortiori inference must be accepted. The Gemara cites several suggestions, for which it provides the following mnemonic: Rekiaḥ, Mar, Adda, Leshisheih. These terms allude to the names of some of the Sages mentioned in the following discussion: Rav; Rabbi Akiva; Rav Aḥa; Mar, son of Ravina; Rav Adda; and Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi.

אָמַר רַב, מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיכָּא לְמֵימַר: מִנְחַת הָעוֹמֶר תּוֹכִיחַ, שֶׁאֲסוּרָה לַהֶדְיוֹט וּמוּתֶּרֶת לַגָּבוֹהַּ. מָה לְמִנְחַת הָעוֹמֶר, שֶׁכֵּן מַתֶּרֶת חָדָשׁ!

Rav said that this is the response: The halakha that a tereifa is unfit for sacrifice must be derived from a verse because it may be said that the omer meal offering proves that the halakha concerning a tereifa cannot be derived by the a fortiori inference, as the omer is prohibited for consumption to an ordinary person, since it comes from the new crop, and yet it is permitted as an offering for the Most High. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: What is notable about the omer meal offering? It is notable in that the omer renders the new crop permitted for consumption, whereas a tereifa does not render anything permitted.

בַּשְּׁבִיעִית – שְׁבִיעִית נָמֵי, שֶׁכֵּן מַתֶּרֶת סְפִיחִין בַּשְּׁבִיעִית, כְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, דְּאָמַר: סְפִיחִין אֲסוּרִים בִּשְׁבִיעִית.

The Gemara responds: Although the omer meal offering generally renders the new crop permitted, the omer brought during a Sabbatical Year does not render the crop permitted, as it is prohibited to plant during the Sabbatical Year, and consequently there is no new crop for the omer offering to permit. The Gemara counters this suggestion: The omer meal offering brought during a Sabbatical Year also renders something permitted, as it permits produce that grew without being purposely planted [sefiḥin] during the Sabbatical Year. The Gemara responds: Nevertheless, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who says that sefiḥin are prohibited during the Sabbatical Year, the omer meal offering brought during a Sabbatical Year does not render the new crop permitted for consumption, and yet it is permitted for the Most High. A verse is therefore necessary to derive that a tereifa may not be sacrificed.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא בַּר אַבָּא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: לְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא נָמֵי לִפְרוֹךְ, מָה לְמִנְחַת הָעוֹמֶר שֶׁכֵּן מַתֶּרֶת חָדָשׁ בְּחוּצָה לָאָרֶץ?

Rav Aḥa bar Abba said to Rav Ashi: According to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva as well, let us refute the statement of Rav, as what is notable about the omer meal offering? It is notable in that the omer permits the new crop for consumption outside of Eretz Yisrael, where the prohibitions of the Sabbatical Year do not apply.

וַאֲפִילּוּ לְמַאן דְּאָמַר: חָדָשׁ בְּחוּץ לָאָרֶץ לָאו דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, שֶׁכֵּן בָּאָה לְהַתִּיר לָאו שֶׁבְּתוֹכָהּ.

And even according to the one who says that the consumption of produce from the new crop grown outside of Eretz Yisrael is not prohibited by Torah law, Rav’s statement can be refuted in another manner: What is notable about the omer meal offering? It is notable in that the omer comes to permit a prohibition that applies to a substance that was previously within it, i.e., the burning upon the altar of a handful from the omer meal offering renders the remainder of the meal offering permitted to the priests, whereas a tereifa is entirely forbidden.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא מִדִּיפְתִּי לְרָבִינָא: אִי הָכִי, טְרֵיפָה נָמֵי תִּקְרַב וְתַתִּיר לָאו שֶׁבְּתוֹכָהּ! אֶלָּא פָּרֵיךְ הָכִי: מָה לְמִנְחַת הָעוֹמֶר, שֶׁכֵּן מִצְוָתָהּ בְּכָךְ.

Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: This is not a refutation, as, if that is so, then with regard to a tereifa as well, you should sacrifice it and you will thereby permit a prohibition that applies to a substance that was previously within it, and its meat will become permitted to the priests for consumption. Therefore, a verse is needed to exclude a tereifa. Rather, one can refute the statement of Rav like this: What is notable about the omer meal offering? It is notable in that its mitzva is in this manner, i.e., the Torah requires the omer meal offering to be brought from the new crop in order to permit the new crop for consumption. By contrast, there is no mitzva to sacrifice specifically a tereifa.

רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיכָּא לְמֵימַר מְפַטֵּם הַקְּטֹרֶת יוֹכִיחַ, שֶׁאָסוּר לַהֶדְיוֹט וּמוּתָּר לַגָּבוֹהַּ. מְפַטֵּם גַּבְרָא הוּא!

Reish Lakish said that this is the response alluded to at the end of the baraita: The halakha that a tereifa is unfit for sacrifice must be derived from a verse because it can be said that the one who prepares the incense proves that the halakha concerning a tereifa may not be derived by the a fortiori inference, as this is prohibited to an ordinary person, and is nevertheless permitted for the Most High. The Gemara questions the terminology of Reish Lakish: But the one who prepares the incense is a person. How can it be said that a person is prohibited to an ordinary person?

אֶלָּא, פִּטּוּם הַקְּטֹרֶת יוֹכִיחַ, שֶׁאָסוּר לַהֶדְיוֹט וּמוּתָּר לַגָּבוֹהַּ. מָה לְפִטּוּם הַקְּטֹרֶת, שֶׁכֵּן מִצְוָתוֹ בְּכָךְ.

Rather, Reish Lakish meant that the preparation of the incense proves it, as it is prohibited to prepare the incense mixture for use by an ordinary person (see Exodus 30:37), and yet it is permitted to do so for the Most High. The Gemara refutes this claim: What is notable about preparation of the incense? It is notable in that its mitzva is in this manner. By contrast, there is no mitzva to sacrifice specifically a tereifa.

מָר בְּרֵיהּ דְּרָבִינָא אָמַר, מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיכָּא לְמֵימַר: שַׁבָּת תּוֹכִיחַ, שֶׁאֲסוּרָה לַהֶדְיוֹט וּמוּתֶּרֶת לַגָּבוֹהַּ.

Mar, son of Ravina, said that this is the response of the baraita: The halakha that a tereifa is unfit for sacrifice must be derived from a verse because it can be said that Shabbat proves that the halakha concerning a tereifa cannot be derived by the a fortiori inference, as it is prohibited for an ordinary person to perform labor on Shabbat, and yet the labor involved in the Temple service is permitted on Shabbat for the Most High. Without the verse, one might similarly conclude that a tereifa is permitted for the Most High despite the fact that it is prohibited for consumption.

מָה לְשַׁבָּת, שֶׁכֵּן הוּתְּרָה מִכְּלָלָהּ אֵצֶל הֶדְיוֹט בְּמִילָה!

The Gemara rejects this: What is notable about Shabbat? It is notable in that the general prohibition against labor on Shabbat was permitted with regard to an ordinary person in the case of circumcision, as the mitzva of circumcision must be performed in its proper time, even on Shabbat, despite the fact that the act of circumcision is generally prohibited on Shabbat.

אַטּוּ מִילָה צוֹרֶךְ הֶדְיוֹט הוּא? מִילָה מִצְוָה הִיא! אֶלָּא, מָה לְשַׁבָּת שֶׁכֵּן מִצְוָתָהּ בְּכָךְ.

The Gemara asks: Is that to say that circumcision is considered a requirement of an ordinary person, whose performance was exempted from the general prohibition against labor on Shabbat for one’s private needs? Circumcision is a mitzva. Rather, the statement of Mar, son of Ravina, can be refuted like this: What is notable about Shabbat? It is notable in that its mitzva is in this manner, i.e., the Torah requires that offerings be brought on Shabbat. By contrast, there is no mitzva to sacrifice specifically a tereifa.

רַב אַדָּא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר: מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיכָּא לְמֵימַר, כִּלְאַיִם תּוֹכִיחַ, שֶׁאֲסוּרִין לַהֶדְיוֹט וּמוּתָּרִין לַגָּבוֹהַּ.

Rav Adda bar Abba said that this is the response mentioned in the baraita: The halakha that a tereifa is unfit for sacrifice must be derived from a verse because it can be said that the prohibition against diverse kinds proves that the halakha of a tereifa cannot be derived from the a fortiori inference, as it is prohibited for an ordinary person to wear garments sewn from a mixture of diverse kinds (Deuteronomy 22:11), and yet such garments are permitted for the Most High, as the belt of the priestly vestments was fashioned from a mixture of diverse kinds.

מָה לְכִלְאַיִם, שֶׁכֵּן הוּתְּרוּ מִכְּלָלָן אֵצֶל הֶדְיוֹט בְּצִיצִית? אַטּוּ צִיצִית צוֹרֶךְ הֶדְיוֹט הִיא? מִצְוָה הִיא! אֶלָּא

The Gemara rejects this: What is notable about the prohibition against diverse kinds? It is notable in that the general prohibition against wearing a garment sewn from diverse kinds was permitted in the case of an ordinary person with regard to ritual fringes, as a string of sky-blue wool must be placed on a four-cornered garment even if that garment is made from linen. The Gemara asks: Is that to say that ritual fringes are considered a requirement of an ordinary person, whose performance was exempted from the general prohibition concerning diverse kinds with regard to one’s private needs? Placing ritual fringes on a garment is a mitzva. Rather, the claim of Rav Adda bar Abba can be refuted like this: