מנחות נח

מנחות נח

וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, הַאי ״אֹתָם״ מַאי עָבֵיד לֵיהּ?

The Gemara asks: And what does Rabbi Yoḥanan, who maintains that the prohibition against bringing leftover portions up to the ramp applies to all of the items listed in the baraita, do with this term: “Them,” in the verse: “As an offering of first produce you may bring them” (Leviticus 2:12), from which Rabbi Elazar learns that only first fruits and the two loaves are included in the prohibition?

מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְתַנְיָא: יָכוֹל יְהֵא יָחִיד מִתְנַדֵּב וּמֵבִיא כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּהּ נְדָבָה, וְקוֹרֵא אֲנִי בָּהּ ״מוֹצֵא שְׂפָתֶיךָ תִּשְׁמֹר וְעָשִׂיתָ״?

The Gemara answers: He requires it for that which is taught in a baraita: One might have thought that an individual may donate and bring to the Temple a gift offering similar to those two loaves brought by the community, and in support I will read with regard to this offering the verse that deals with other gift offerings: “That which has gone out of your lips you shall observe and do; according to what you have vowed freely to the Lord your God, even that which you have promised with your mouth” (Deuteronomy 23:24), which would mean that the offering is consecrated and he must bring it as he declared.

תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״קׇרְבַּן רֵאשִׁית תַּקְרִיבוּ״, צִיבּוּר אָמַרְתִּי לְךָ, וְלֹא יָחִיד.

Therefore, the verse states: “As an offering of first produce you may bring.” The phrase: “You may bring,” is written in the plural, meaning that it is addressed to the community. Therefore, it is interpreted to mean: I said to you that a community may consecrate and bring the two loaves, which are an offering of first produce, but an individual may not consecrate and bring two loaves of this nature.

יָכוֹל לֹא יְהֵא יָחִיד מֵבִיא, שֶׁאֵינוֹ מֵבִיא חוֹבָתוֹ כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּהּ, אֲבָל יְהֵא צִיבּוּר מֵבִיא שֶׁמֵּבִיא חוֹבָתוֹ כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּהּ? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״אֹתָם״, וּמָה יֵשׁ לְךָ לְהָבִיא? שְׁתֵּי הַלֶּחֶם מִן הַשְּׂאוֹר, וּבִכּוּרִים מִן הַדְּבַשׁ.

The baraita continues: One might have thought that only an individual may not bring two loaves as a gift offering, as an individual does not bring his obligatory offering in a manner similar to those two loaves, i.e., perhaps specifically an individual, who never has an obligatory offering of two loaves, may not bring two loaves as a gift offering. But the community shall bring two loaves as a gift offering, as the community does bring its obligatory offering in a manner similar to those two loaves. Therefore, the verse states: “You may bring them,” to exclude the possibility of a communal gift offering of two loaves. The baraita concludes: And what is there left for you to bring as offerings that come from leaven and honey? The two loaves that come from leaven, and the first fruits that come from honey, i.e., sweet fruits.

וּשְׁתֵּי הַלֶּחֶם לֹא יִקְרְבוּ נְדָבָה? וְהָתַנְיָא: אִם נֶאֱמַר ״כׇּל שְׂאֹר״, לָמָּה נֶאֱמַר ״כׇּל דְּבַשׁ״? וְאִם נֶאֱמַר ״כׇּל דְּבַשׁ״, לָמָּה נֶאֱמַר ״כׇּל שְׂאֹר״? מִפְּנֵי שֶׁיֵּשׁ בַּשְּׂאוֹר מַה שֶּׁאֵין בַּדְּבַשׁ, וְיֵשׁ בַּדְּבַשׁ מַה שֶּׁאֵין בִּשְׂאוֹר.

The Gemara asks: And may the two loaves not be sacrificed as communal gift offerings? But isn’t it taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “As any leaven, and any honey, you shall not burn any of it” (Leviticus 2:11): If it is stated: “Any leaven,” why is it stated: “Any honey”? And if it is stated: “Any honey,” why is it stated: “Any leaven”? In other words, why is it necessary for the verse to repeat the inclusive term “any,” from which it is derived that offering an insufficient quantity of honey or leaven is included in the prohibition? The baraita answers: Both of these terms had to be stated, because there is a halakha that applies to leaven that is not applicable to honey, and there is another halakha that applies to honey that is not applicable to leaven.

שְׂאוֹר הוּתַּר מִכְּלָלוֹ בַּמִּקְדָּשׁ, דְּבַשׁ לֹא הוּתַּר מִכְּלָלוֹ בַּמִּקְדָּשׁ.

The baraita explains: In the case of leaven, although it may not be sacrificed on the altar, its general prohibition was permitted in certain circumstances in the Temple, as the two loaves and the bread of the thanks offering, i.e., the four loaves of the thanks offering that were eaten by the priests, are leavened bread. By contrast, with regard to honey, there are no circumstances in which its general prohibition was permitted in the Temple.

דְּבַשׁ הוּתַּר בִּשְׁיָרֵי מְנָחוֹת, שְׂאוֹר לֹא הוּתַּר בִּשְׁיָרֵי מְנָחוֹת. הָא מִפְּנֵי שֶׁיֵּשׁ בַּשְּׂאוֹר מַה שֶּׁאֵין בַּדְּבַשׁ, וְיֵשׁ בַּדְּבַשׁ מַה שֶּׁאֵין בִּשְׂאוֹר, הוּצְרַךְ לוֹמַר ״כׇּל שְׂאֹר״, וְהוּצְרַךְ לוֹמַר ״כׇּל דְּבַשׁ״.

There is a halakha that applies to honey but not to leaven, as the prohibition concerning honey is permitted in the case of the remainder of meal offerings, meaning that the priests may eat their portion of meal offerings with honey, whereas the prohibition concerning leaven is not permitted in the case of the remainder of meal offerings, since one may not leaven this remainder. The baraita summarizes: Due to the fact that there is a halakha that applies to leaven that is not applicable to honey, and there is a halakha that applies to honey that is not applicable to leaven, it was necessary for the verse to state: “Any leaven,” and it was also necessary for it to state: “Any honey.”

שְׂאוֹר דְּהוּתַּר מִכְּלָלוֹ בַּמִּקְדָּשׁ, מַאי נִיהוּ? לָאו שְׁתֵּי הַלֶּחֶם דְּקָרְבָה נְדָבָה? אָמַר רַב עַמְרָם: לָא, לִיקְרַב עִמָּהֶם.

The Gemara analyzes the baraita. When the baraita states concerning leaven that its general prohibition was permitted in certain circumstances in the Temple, what is this? Isn’t this referring to the halakha that the meal offering of the two loaves may be sacrificed by the community as a gift offering on the altar, as the two loaves of the communal offering themselves were not sacrificed on the altar? This would mean that two loaves may be brought as a gift offering by the community, which contradicts this claim of the previous baraita. Rav Amram said: No, the baraita is referring to the fact that the two loaves, which were leaven, are brought as an offering with the two lambs, which are brought up onto the altar as communal peace offerings. Since they are brought together, the two loaves and the two lambs are considered a single offering, and the lambs are sacrificed on the altar.

אִי הָכִי, בִּכּוּרִים נָמֵי, דִּתְנַן: הַגּוֹזָלוֹת שֶׁעַל גַּבֵּי הַסַּלִּין הָיוּ עוֹלוֹת, וְהַסַּלִּים שֶׁבְּיָדָם נִיתָּנִין לַכֹּהֲנִים. הָנְהוּ לְעַטֵּר בִּכּוּרִים הוּא דְּאָתוּ.

The Gemara asks: If so, in the case of first fruits also, the fruits should be considered part of the offering that was brought with them. As we learned in a mishna (Bikkurim 3:5): As for the fledglings that were placed on top of the baskets that contained the first fruits brought to the Temple, they would sacrifice these as burnt offerings, and the baskets themselves that were in the possession of those bringing the first fruits would be given to the priests. Accordingly, with regard to honey as well, its general prohibition was permitted in certain circumstances, as these first fruits containing honey are included with the sacrifice of burnt offerings. The Gemara answers: These fledglings came only to decorate the first fruits, despite the fact that they were later sacrificed as burnt offerings. Bringing the fledglings is not obligatory, and therefore cannot be considered part of the same offering as first fruits.

בָּעֵי רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא מֵרַב חִסְדָּא: הַמַּעֲלֶה מִבְּשַׂר חַטַּאת הָעוֹף עַל גַּבֵּי הַמִּזְבֵּחַ, מַהוּ?

§ The Gemara continues to discuss the prohibition against bringing leftover parts of offerings up to the altar after the sacrificial parts have been burned. Rami bar Ḥama asked Rav Ḥisda: With regard to one who offers up on the altar some of the meat of a bird sacrificed as a sin offering, which is meant to be eaten by the priests, what is the halakha? Is he liable to receive lashes for this action?

כֹּל שֶׁמִּמֶּנּוּ לָאִישִּׁים, אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא, וְהַאי אֵין מִמֶּנּוּ לָאִישִּׁים? אוֹ דִלְמָא כֹּל שֶׁשְּׁמוֹ קׇרְבָּן, וְהַאי נָמֵי שְׁמוֹ קׇרְבָּן? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: כֹּל שֶׁשְּׁמוֹ קׇרְבָּן, וְהַאי נָמֵי שְׁמוֹ קׇרְבָּן.

The Gemara clarifies the possibilities: The Merciful One states with regard to any item that has already had some portion of it burned in the fire on the altar that one who sacrifices any leftover part of it violates the prohibition. And as no part of this bird sacrificed as a sin offering is burned in the fire on the altar, is he therefore exempt? Or perhaps, any item that is called an offering is included in the prohibition, and since this bird is also called an offering, one is liable. Rav Ḥisda said to Rami bar Ḥama: Any item that is called an offering is included in the prohibition, and this bird sacrificed as a sin offering is also called an offering.

כְּתַנָּאֵי: רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: כֹּל שֶׁמִּמֶּנּוּ לָאִישִּׁים, רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: כֹּל שֶׁשְּׁמוֹ קׇרְבָּן.

The Gemara notes: Rami bar Ḥama’s dilemma is subject to a dispute between tanna’im, as is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer says: Only any item that has already had some portion of it burned in the fire on the altar is included in the prohibition: Do not burn. Rabbi Akiva says: Any item that is called an offering is included in this prohibition.

מַאי בֵּינַיְיהוּ? אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: בְּשַׂר חַטַּאת הָעוֹף אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ.

The Gemara asks: What is the difference between the opinions of Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Eliezer? Rav Ḥisda said: The difference between them concerns the case discussed earlier, of one who brings some of the meat of a bird sin offering up to the altar. Rabbi Akiva maintains that he is liable, as it is called an offering, whereas Rabbi Eliezer holds that he is exempt, as no portion of it is burned on the altar.

רַב אָמַר: לוֹג שֶׁמֶן שֶׁל מְצוֹרָע אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ, דְּתָנֵי לֵוִי: ״כׇּל קׇרְבָּנָם״ – לְרַבּוֹת לוֹג שֶׁמֶן שֶׁל מְצוֹרָע.

Rav said: The difference between them concerns the log of oil that accompanies the guilt offering of a recovered leper, as Levi teaches: Concerning the consecrated items given to priests as gifts, the verse states: “Every offering of theirs…shall be most holy for you and for your sons” (Numbers 18:9). The phrase “every offering” serves to include the log of oil of a leper. This oil is not burned on the altar. Nevertheless, Rabbi Akiva would deem one who brings some of this log up to the altar liable, as it is called an offering, whereas Rabbi Eliezer would deem him exempt, since no part of it is burned in the fire.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״שְׂאֹר … בַּל תַּקְטִירוּ״ – אֵין לִי אֶלָּא כּוּלּוֹ, מִקְצָתוֹ מִנַּיִן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״כׇל״. עֵירוּבוֹ מִנַּיִן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״כִּי כׇל״.

§ The Gemara returns to the discussion about the prohibition against sacrificing leaven. The Sages taught in a baraita: When the Torah states with regard to leaven: Do not burn it (see Leviticus 2:11), I have derived only that one who burns all of it is liable, as will be explained. From where is it derived that one who burns only part of it is also included in the prohibition? The verse states: “Any [kol] leaven,” which serves to include such a case. The baraita adds: This halakha has been derived only with regard to leaven in a pure state; from where is it derived that the same applies to one who sacrifices it in its mixed state, i.e., mixed with another substance? The verse states the additional expression: “As [ki] any leaven.”

מַאי קָאָמַר? אָמַר אַבָּיֵי, הָכִי קָאָמַר: ״שְׂאֹר בַּל תַּקְטִירוּ״ – אֵין לִי אֶלָּא כְּזַיִת, חֲצִי זַיִת מִנַּיִן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״כׇּל״, עֵירוּבוֹ מִנַּיִן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״כִּי כׇל״.

The Gemara analyzes this baraita: What is it saying? What is the meaning of the term: All of it, and the term: Part of it? Abaye said: This is what the baraita is saying: When the verse states about leaven: Do not burn it, I have derived only that this prohibition applies to an olive-bulk of leaven. From where is it derived that this prohibition applies if it is only half an olive-bulk? The verse states: “Any leaven.” Furthermore, from where is it derived that one is liable not only for leaven by itself, but also for leaven in its mixed state? The verse states: “As any leaven.”

רָבָא אָמַר: הָכִי קָאָמַר – ״שְׂאֹר בַּל תַּקְטִירוּ״ אֵין לִי אֶלָּא קוֹמֶץ, חֲצִי קוֹמֶץ מִנַּיִן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״כׇל״. עֵירוּבוֹ מִנַּיִן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״כִּי כׇל״.

Rava said that there is a different interpretation of the baraita: This is what the baraita is saying: When the verse states about leaven: Do not burn it, I have derived only that this prohibition applies to the entire handful that is removed from the meal offering. From where is it derived that this prohibition applies to half of the handful? The verse states: “Any leaven.” Furthermore, from where is it derived that one is liable not only for leaven by itself, but also for its mixed state? The verse states: “As any leaven.”

בְּמַאי קָא מִיפַּלְגִי? אַבָּיֵי סָבַר: יֵשׁ קוֹמֶץ פָּחוֹת מִשְּׁנֵי זֵיתִים,

The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do Abaye and Rava disagree? The Gemara answers: Abaye holds: There is such an entity as a handful that is less than the volume of two olives.

וְיֵשׁ הַקְטָרָה פְּחוּתָה מִכְּזַיִת.

And Abaye consequently maintains that there is such a matter as a halakhically significant burning of a handful even if it is less than the volume of an olive-bulk. It follows that the phrase “any leaven” teaches that if one sacrificed less than an olive-bulk of a handful that was leaven, he is liable.

וְרָבָא אָמַר: אֵין קוֹמֶץ פָּחוֹת מִשְּׁנֵי זֵיתִים, וְאֵין הַקְטָרָה פְּחוּתָה מִכְּזַיִת.

And Rava says: There is no such entity as a handful that is less than the size of two olives, and consequently the mitzva not to burn leaven is referring initially to a full handful of two olive-bulks. And Rava holds that there is no such matter as a halakhically significant burning of a handful if it is less than the volume of an olive-bulk. Therefore, one cannot derive from the phrase “as any leaven” that one can be liable for sacrificing leaven of less than one olive-bulk. Instead, the phrase must be referring to a case where half the handful is leaven.

אִיתְּמַר: הַמַּעֲלֶה מִשְּׂאוֹר וּמִדְּבַשׁ עַל גַּבֵּי הַמִּזְבֵּחַ, אָמַר רָבָא: לוֹקֶה מִשּׁוּם שְׂאוֹר, וְלוֹקֶה מִשּׁוּם דְּבַשׁ, לוֹקֶה מִשּׁוּם עֵירוּבֵי שְׂאוֹר, וּמִשּׁוּם עֵירוּבֵי דְּבַשׁ.

§ The Gemara discusses another dispute between Abaye and Rava on this topic: It was stated: With regard to one who offers up a mixture made of leaven and of honey on the altar, Rava says: He is flogged with four sets of lashes for this act, as the verse: “As any leaven and any honey, you shall not burn any of it as an offering made by fire to the Lord” (Leviticus 2:11), includes four separate prohibitions. He is flogged one set due to the prohibition against sacrificing leaven, and he is flogged a second set due to the prohibition against sacrificing honey, and he is flogged a third set due to the prohibition against sacrificing mixtures of leaven, and he is flogged a fourth set due to the prohibition against sacrificing mixtures of honey.

אַבָּיֵי אָמַר: אֵין לוֹקִין עַל לָאו שֶׁבִּכְלָלוֹת.

Abaye says: One is not flogged for a general prohibition, i.e., a single mitzva in the Torah that includes many different prohibited acts. Since all these actions are covered by the prohibition: “You shall not burn,” it is considered a general prohibition, for which one is not flogged.

אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי: חֲדָא מִיהָא לָקֵי.

The Gemara cites a dispute between the Sages with regard to the opinion of Abaye. There are those who say that Abaye concedes that in any event the offender is flogged with one set of lashes for sacrificing leaven, and he is also flogged a second set of lashes for sacrificing honey, as these are not considered general prohibitions. Since the phrase: “You shall not burn,” is referring to both leaven and honey, it is as though it were written: You shall not burn leaven; you shall not burn honey.

וְאִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי, חֲדָא נָמֵי לָא לָקֵי, דְּהָא לָא מְיַחַד לָאוֵיהּ כְּלָאו דַּחֲסִימָה.

And there are those who say that Abaye maintains that the offender is not even flogged with one set of lashes, as the prohibition he transgressed is not specific to one matter, like the prohibition against muzzling. The principle that one is liable to be flogged for violating a prohibition is derived from the juxtaposition of the mitzva: “You shall not muzzle an ox while it treads out the grain” (Deuteronomy 25:4), with the verses that mention lashes. It is inferred from this juxtaposition that one is not liable to be flogged for violating prohibitions whose circumstances are not similar to that of muzzling, e.g., a general prohibition that is not referring to one specific action.