נזיר לז

נזיר לז

בִּשְׁלָמָא לְדִידִי דְּאָמֵינָא מִשּׁוּם דְּהֶיתֵּר מִצְטָרֵף לְאִיסּוּר, כְּגוֹן דִּנְפִישִׁי חוּלִּין. אֶלָּא לְדִידָךְ דְּאָמְרַתְּ מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיכָּא כְּזַיִת בִּכְדֵי אֲכִילַת פְּרָס — כִּי נְפִישִׁי חוּלִּין מַאי הָוֵי?

Granted, according to my opinion, as I say that this is because permitted food combines with forbidden food, I can explain that this is referring to a case where there is more non-sacred produce than teruma, and the combination assumes the status of the forbidden item or teruma only when those are the majority. However, according to your opinion, that you say this is because there is an olive-bulk consumed in the time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread, then even if there is more non-sacred produce, what of it? In any case there is an olive-bulk of teruma eaten within the time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הַנַּח לִתְרוּמָה בַּזְּמַן הַזֶּה דְּרַבָּנַן.

Rav Dimi said to Abaye: Leave aside teruma in the present, as it applies by rabbinic law. Since the exile of the Jewish people from Eretz Yisrael, the halakhot of teruma and tithes apply by rabbinic law, not Torah law. This is the basis for the lenient ruling with regard to this mixture.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: מִמַּאי דְּהַאי ״מִשְׁרַת״ לְהֶיתֵּר מִצְטָרֵף לְאִיסּוּר הוּא דַּאֲתָא? דִּילְמָא לִיתֵּן טַעַם כְּעִיקָּר הוּא דַּאֲתָא!

Abaye said to him: From where do you derive that this verse: “Nor shall he drink anything soaked in grapes” (Numbers 6:3), comes to teach the principle that permitted food combines with forbidden food, as stated by Rabbi Yoḥanan (35b)? Perhaps instead it comes to establish the principle that the legal status of the flavor of a forbidden food is like that of its substance. This principle states that any food that absorbs the taste of a forbidden item assumes the status of this forbidden item itself.

וּלְאַבָּיֵי, מֵעִיקָּרָא קָא קַשְׁיָא לֵיהּ מַאי דְּקָאָמַר רַב דִּימִי, וְקָא מוֹתֵיב לֵיהּ כׇּל הָלֵין תְּיוּבָתָא. הֲדַר אֲמַר לֵיהּ, לִיתֵּן טַעַם כְּעִיקָּר?

The Gemara expresses surprise at Abaye’s question. And according to the opinion of Abaye, initially that which Rav Dimi said was difficult for him. Rav Dimi had cited Rabbi Yoḥanan as saying that permitted food combines with forbidden foods only in the case of naziriteship (36a), due to the term “soaked,” and Abaye had objected with all these aforementioned refutations to prove that this principle applies in all areas of Torah law. And yet he then said to him that one should derive a very different principle from that same verse, that the verse establishes the principle that the legal status of the flavor of a forbidden food is like that of its substance.

בָּתַר דְּשַׁנִּי לֵיהּ, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: דִּילְמָא לִיתֵּן טַעַם כָּעִיקָּר הוּא דַּאֲתָא?

The Gemara answers: After Rav Dimi resolved Abaye’s difficulties, and Abaye had accepted his answer that the principle that permitted food combines with forbidden food does not apply to the rest of Torah law, he said to Rav Dimi that perhaps the verse comes to establish that the legal status of the flavor of a forbidden food is like that of its substance, with the following application.

לְכִדְתַנְיָא: ״מִשְׁרַת״ לִיתֵּן טַעַם כְּעִיקָּר, שֶׁאִם שָׁרָה עֲנָבִים בְּמַיִם וְיֵשׁ בָּהֶן טַעַם יַיִן — חַיָּיב. וּמִכָּאן אַתָּה דָּן כׇּל אִיסּוּרִין שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה.

This is relevant for that which is taught in a baraita: The term “soaked” serves to establish the principle that the legal status of the flavor of a forbidden food is like that of its substance. As, if a nazirite soaked grapes in water and the water has the taste of wine, he is liable to receive punishment for drinking this liquid, as it assumes the status of wine. And from here you derive the halakha with regard to all prohibitions of the Torah; in all cases, the legal status of the taste of a forbidden food is like that of its substance. The fact that with regard to all other prohibitions, the legal status of the flavor of a forbidden food is like that of its substance, is derived from the halakhot of naziriteship.

וּמָה נָזִיר שֶׁאֵין אִיסּוּרוֹ אִיסּוּר עוֹלָם, וְאֵין אִיסּוּרוֹ אִיסּוּר הֲנָאָה, וְיֵשׁ הֶיתֵּר לְאִיסּוּרוֹ — עָשָׂה בּוֹ טַעַם כְּעִיקָּר. כִּלְאֵי הַכֶּרֶם, שֶׁאִיסּוּרָן אִיסּוּר עוֹלָם, וְאִיסּוּרָן אִיסּוּר הֲנָיָיה, וְאֵין הֶיתֵּר לְאִיסּוּרָן — אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁיַּעֲשֶׂה בּוֹ טַעַם כְּעִיקָּר?!

The baraita explains the derivation: And just as with regard to a nazirite, whose prohibition against eating grapes is not a permanent prohibition, as he will be permitted to eat grapes once his term of naziriteship is over, and furthermore his prohibition is not a prohibition against deriving benefit from wine, and there is a way to permit his prohibition against eating grape products by requesting from a halakhic authority to dissolve his vow, and nevertheless, in his case the Torah rendered the legal status of the flavor of food like that of its substance. With regard to a forbidden mixture of diverse kinds in a vineyard, i.e., grain seeds sown with grape seeds, whose prohibition is a permanent prohibition and whose prohibition is a prohibition against deriving benefit, and there is no way to permit their prohibition, is it not right that the Torah should render the legal status of the flavor of its forbidden food like that of its substance?

וְהוּא הַדִּין לְעׇרְלָה בִּשְׁתַּיִם.

The baraita adds: And the same is true for the prohibition against eating the fruit of a tree during the first three years after its planting [orla], on two of three counts: Although the prohibition of orla is not a permanent prohibition, as one may eat the fruit of this tree after three years have passed, it is prohibited to derive benefit from orla, and this prohibition cannot be permitted, as the fruits that grow during the first three years remain forbidden. Similarly, all other prohibitions in the Torah are more severe than the case of a nazirite in one of these aspects, and therefore this principle is universal. Abaye is asking Rav Dimi: In any case doesn’t this entire derivation present a difficulty for Rabbi Yoḥanan, who derives a different halakha from the term “soaked”?

אֲמַר לֵיהּ הָהוּא מֵרַבָּנַן: רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ כִּי קָאָמַר לְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, הֵי רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא? אִילֵימָא רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא דְּהָכָא, דִּתְנַן: רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: אֲפִילּוּ שָׁרָה פִּיתּוֹ בְּיַיִן וְיֵשׁ בּוֹ כְּדֵי לְצָרֵף כְּזַיִת — חַיָּיב, וּמִמַּאי? דִּילְמָא הוּא דְּאִיכָּא כְּזַיִת בָּעֵינָא!

One of the Sages said to Abaye: When Rabbi Abbahu said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said that the principle of permitted food combining with forbidden food is derived from the term “soaked,” he spoke in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. The Gemara asks: To which statement of Rabbi Akiva is the Gemara referring? If we say it is referring to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva of this mishna, as we learned (Shevuot 21b) that Rabbi Akiva says: Even if a nazirite soaked his bread in wine, and the bread and the wine contain enough to combine to constitute an olive-bulk, he is liable; but from where do we know that Rabbi Akiva means an olive-bulk taken from the bread and the wine together? Perhaps that ruling applies only when there is an olive-bulk of wine as is, without the bread?

וְכִי תֵּימָא: מַאי לְמֵימְרָא? לְאַפּוֹקֵי מִתַּנָּא קַמָּא, דְּאָמַר: עַד שֶׁיִּשְׁתֶּה רְבִיעִית יַיִן!

And if you would say: In that case, what is the purpose of stating this ruling? What is the novelty of Rabbi Akiva’s statement if the mixture contains an olive-bulk of wine? One can say that it serves to exclude the opinion of the first tanna, who said that he is liable only if he drinks a quarter–log of wine. Rabbi Akiva emphasizes that one is liable even if he drinks the amount of an olive-bulk.

אֶלָּא, רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא דְּבָרַיְיתָא. דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: נָזִיר שֶׁשָּׁרָה פִּתּוֹ בְּיַיִן, וְאָכַל כְּזַיִת מִפַּת וּמִיַּיִן — חַיָּיב.

Rather, the reference is to the following statement of Rabbi Akiva in a baraita. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Akiva says: A nazirite who soaked his bread in wine and ate an olive-bulk of the mixture of bread and wine is liable. This baraita indicates that according to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva a permitted substance combines with a forbidden substance.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אַוְיָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: לְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא דְּקָא מוֹקֵים לֵיהּ לְהַאי ״וְכׇל מִשְׁרַת״ לְהֶיתֵּר מִצְטָרֵף לְאִיסּוּר, לִיתֵּן טַעַם כְּעִיקָּר מְנָא לֵיהּ? יָלֵיף מִבָּשָׂר בְּחָלָב. לָאו טַעַם בְּעָלְמָא הוּא, וְאָסוּר? הָכָא נָמֵי לָא שְׁנָא.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Avya, said to Rav Ashi: According to Rabbi Akiva, who establishes the verse “neither shall he drink anything soaked” (Numbers 6:3) as referring to the principle that the permitted combines with the forbidden, from where does he derive the principle that the legal status of the flavor is like that of the substance itself? The Gemara answers: He derives this principle from the prohibition of meat cooked in milk. Is it not the case that there is no actual milk present, and it is merely the taste of the milk absorbed in the meat, and yet the mixture is prohibited? Here too, in the case of other prohibitions, it is no different, and the legal status of the flavor is like that of the substance itself.

וְרַבָּנַן, מִבָּשָׂר בְּחָלָב לָא גָּמְרִינַן, דְּחִידּוּשׁ הוּא.

The Gemara asks: And with regard to the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Akiva and derive the halakha that the legal status of the flavor is like that of the substance itself from the phrase “neither shall he drink anything soaked,” why do they not derive this principle from the case of meat cooked in milk? The Gemara answers: The Rabbis claim that we do not derive other prohibitions from meat cooked in milk, as that prohibition is a novelty, and one does not learn general halakhot from unusual cases.

מַאי חִידּוּשֵׁיהּ? אִילֵּימָא דְּהַאי לְחוֹדֵיהּ וְהַאי לְחוֹדֵיהּ שְׁרֵי, וּבַהֲדֵי הֲדָדֵי אָסוּר, כִּלְאַיִם נָמֵי: הַאי לְחוֹדֵיהּ שְׁרֵי וְהַאי לְחוֹדֵיהּ שְׁרֵי, וּבַהֲדֵי הֲדָדֵי אָסוּר!

The Gemara asks: What is the novelty of that prohibition? If we say that it is unique in that this meat alone and that milk alone are each permitted, and yet together they are forbidden, that characteristic is not unique to meat cooked in milk. In the case of forbidden mixtures of diverse kinds too, this element alone and that element alone are each permitted, and yet together they are forbidden.

אֶלָּא: דְּאִי תָּרוּ לֵיהּ כּוּלֵּי יוֹמָא בַּחֲלָבָא — שְׁרֵי, וּמְבַשֵּׁיל לֵיהּ בַּשּׁוֹלֵי — אָסוּר.

The Gemara answers: Rather, the novelty is that if one soaks meat in milk all day, it is permitted by Torah law, despite the fact that the meat certainly absorbed some taste of the milk, whereas if one cooked meat in milk even for a short time, the mixture is forbidden by Torah law. The novelty is that it is not the fact that they are mixed together that renders meat and milk forbidden, but the act of cooking.

וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא נָמֵי, בָּשָׂר בְּחָלָב חִידּוּשׁ הוּא? אֶלָּא

The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Akiva too, he certainly agrees that the halakha of meat cooked in milk is a novelty. How can he derive a general principle from this case? Rather,

יָלֵיף מִגִּיעוּלֵי גוֹיִם, דְּאָמַר רַחֲמָנָא: ״כׇּל דָּבָר אֲשֶׁר יָבֹא בָאֵשׁ״, לְמֵימְרָא דַּאֲסִירִי. גִּיעוּלֵי גוֹיִם לָאו טַעְמָא בְּעָלְמָא הוּא וְאָסוּר, הָכָא נָמֵי לָא שְׁנָא.

Rabbi Akiva derives the principle: The legal status of the flavor of forbidden food is like that of the substance itself, from the vessels of gentiles that require purging [gi’ulei], where the Jews were commanded to purge the non-kosher flavor from the vessels they seized from the Midianites. As the Merciful One states in the section of the Torah that deals with the spoils of Midian: “Every thing that passes through the fire, you shall make it pass through the fire” (Numbers 31:23). That is to say that the vessels of gentiles that require purging are forbidden to be used until they have been purged through fire and purified. Isn’t there mere taste absorbed in the vessels through the process of cooking? And even so, these vessels are forbidden if this purging was not performed. Here, too, with regard to other matters of Torah law, it is no different; and the legal status of the flavor is like that of the substance itself.

וּלְרַבָּנַן נָמֵי תִּיפּוֹק לְהוּ מִגִּיעוּלֵי גוֹיִם? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הָתָם חִידּוּשׁ הוּא. דְּהָא בְּכׇל הַתּוֹרָה כּוּלָּהּ נוֹתֵן טַעַם לִפְגָם מוּתָּר,

Rav Aḥa further suggested to Rav Ashi: And according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who derive this principle from the verse: “Neither shall he drink anything soaked” (Numbers 6:3), let them also derive it from the vessels of gentiles that require purging, as does Rabbi Akiva. Rav Ashi said to him: The Rabbis maintain that there the halakha of purging vessels of gentiles is also a novelty. What is the novelty of this halakha? As with regard to all dietary laws in the Torah, anything that gives flavor, i.e., contributes taste, that renders the food tainted, is permitted. If the taste added by the forbidden food does not enhance the permitted food, it does not render that food forbidden.

וְגַבֵּי גִּיעוּלֵי גוֹיִם אָסוּר.

But here, with regard to the halakha of vessels of gentiles that require purging, the Torah states that even if they contribute taste that renders the food tainted, nevertheless they are forbidden. If twenty-four hours have passed since food was cooked in a pot, the assumption is that the flavor released from the pot will contribute a deleterious taste to any foods subsequently cooked in the pot. Even so, vessels taken from gentiles remain forbidden until they have been purged, despite the fact that the taste they contribute taints the food.

וּלְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא נָמֵי הָא חִידּוּשׁ הוּא! אָמַר רַב הוּנָא בַּר חִיָּיא: לֹא אָסְרָה תּוֹרָה אֶלָּא לִקְדֵירָה בַּת יוֹמָא, דְּלָאו נוֹתֵן טַעַם לִפְגָם הוּא.

The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva too, the case of vessels of gentiles that require purging is apparently a novelty. Rabbi Akiva derives this principle from the required purging of the vessels of gentiles. How then does he respond to the previous claim? Rav Huna, son of Ḥiyya, said: The Torah prohibited the use of unpurged vessels of gentiles only in the case of a pot that was used on that day, which is not a case where the pot gives flavor that renders the food tainted. Accordingly, it is not a novelty that the vessels were forbidden.

וְרַבָּנַן? קְדֵירָה בַּת יוֹמָא נָמֵי, אִי אֶפְשָׁר דְּלָא פָּגְמָה פּוּרְתָּא.

The Gemara asks: And why don’t the Rabbis derive the halakha from there, as it is no longer a novelty? The Gemara answers: They hold that even in the case of a pot used on that day, it is impossible that the vessel does not slightly taint the food absorbed in the vessel. Consequently, the halakha of purging vessels of gentiles is a novelty, from which general principles cannot be derived.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אַוְיָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: מִדְּרַבָּנַן נִשְׁמַע לְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא. לָאו אָמְרִי רַבָּנַן הַאי ״מִשְׁרַת״ — לִיתֵּן טַעַם כְּעִיקָּר, וּמִכָּאן אַתָּה דָּן לְכׇל אִיסּוּרִין שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה. לְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא נָמֵי, דְּקָא מוֹקֵים לֵיהּ לְהַאי ״מִשְׁרַת״ לְהֶיתֵּר מִצְטָרֵף לְאִיסּוּר — לֵימָא מִכָּאן אַתָּה דָּן לְכׇל אִיסּוּרִין שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה!

§ Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Avya, said to Rav Ashi: From the opinion of the Rabbis, we infer the proper understanding of the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. Don’t the Rabbis say that the term “soaked” teaches that the principle that the legal status of the flavor of forbidden food is like that of its substance applies not only to a nazirite, but that from here you derive the halakha with regard to all prohibitions of the Torah? According to Rabbi Akiva as well, who establishes this term: “Soaked,” as teaching that the permitted substance combines with the forbidden substance with regard to a nazirite, let us say that from here you derive the halakha with regard to all prohibitions of the Torah. This explanation runs counter to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who applies this principle only to a nazirite.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מִשּׁוּם דְּהָוֵי נָזִיר וְחַטָּאת שְׁנֵי כְתוּבִין הַבָּאִין כְּאֶחָד, וְכׇל שְׁנֵי כְתוּבִין הַבָּאִין כְּאֶחָד אֵין מְלַמְּדִין: נָזִיר — הָא דַּאֲמַרַן. חַטָּאת מַאי הִיא?

Rav Ashi said to him: This cannot serve as a proof, due to the fact that the halakhot of a nazirite and those of a sin-offering are from two verses that come as one, i.e., to teach the same matter, and any two verses that come as one do not teach their common aspect to apply to other cases. The Gemara comments: The derivation that a permitted substance joins together with a forbidden substance in the case of a nazirite is that which we stated, from the term “soaked.” With regard to a sin-offering, what is the derivation that a permitted substance combines with a forbidden substance?

דְּתַנְיָא: ״כֹּל אֲשֶׁר יִגַּע בִּבְשָׂרָהּ יִקְדָּשׁ״. יָכוֹל אֲפִילּוּ שֶׁלֹּא בָּלַע — תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״בִּבְשָׂרָהּ״, עַד שֶׁיִּבָּלַע בִּבְשָׂרָהּ.

It is as it is taught in a baraita with regard to the verse discussing a sin-offering “Anything that touches in its flesh shall become consecrated” (Leviticus 6:20). One might have thought that non-sacred meat that touched any part of a sin-offering is consecrated even if it did not absorb the taste of the sin-offering it touched. Therefore, the verse states: “In its flesh,” to teach that this meat is not consecrated until the taste of the sin-offering is absorbed within its flesh.

״יִקְדָּשׁ״ — לִהְיוֹת כָּמוֹהָ, שֶׁאִם פְּסוּלָה הִיא — יִפָּסֵל, וְאִם כְּשֵׁרָה — תֵּאָכֵל כֶּחָמוּר שֶׁבָּהּ.

The baraita continues: “Shall become consecrated,” means that its legal status becomes like that of the sin-offering itself; that is, if the sin-offering is disqualified, the non-sacred meat that touched it will also be disqualified. And if the sin-offering is valid, the non-sacred meat that touched it may be eaten in accordance with the more stringent standards of a sin-offering, with regard to when and where it may be eaten. The principle that a permitted substance combines with a forbidden substance is thereby stated in the case of a sin-offering as well. Consequently, the principle cannot be extended to the entire Torah, as a halakha stated in two cases is not applied elsewhere.

וְרַבָּנַן: צְרִיכִי, דְּאִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא גַּבֵּי חַטָּאת, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: נָזִיר לָא אָתֵי מִינַּהּ, מִשּׁוּם דְּנָזִיר מִקֳּדָשִׁים לָא יָלְפִינַן.

And the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Akiva, would maintain that both these sources are necessary, as neither the case of a nazirite nor the case of a sin-offering could be derived from the other. Therefore, this is not a case of two verses that come as one. The Gemara elaborates: For had the Merciful One written this halakha only with regard to a sin-offering, I would say that the case of a nazirite cannot be derived from it, due to the fact that we do not derive the halakha of a nazirite from that of consecrated items. This is because the prohibitions of naziriteship are unrelated to the Temple and offerings, and therefore it is possible that the halakha in question is unique to consecrated items.

וְאִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא גַּבֵּי נָזִיר, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: מִנָּזִיר לָא יָלְפִינַן, מִשּׁוּם דַּחֲמִיר אִיסּוּרֵיהּ, דַּאֲפִילּוּ חַרְצָן אֲסִיר לֵיהּ, הִלְכָּךְ לָא אָתְיָא מִינֵּיהּ.

And conversely, had the Merciful One written this halakha only with regard to a nazirite, I would say that we do not derive the halakha of a sin-offering from that of a nazirite due to the fact that its prohibition is stringent. In what way? It is stringent as even a grape seed is forbidden to a nazirite, although the seeds are not usually eaten. Therefore, the halakha of a sin-offering cannot be derived from the case of a nazirite, which means that this is not a case of two verses that come as one. Consequently, one can derive a general halakha from them.

וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אָמַר לָךְ: לְמַאי צְרִיכִי? בִּשְׁלָמָא אִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא חַטָּאת, לָא גָּמַר נָזִיר מִינַּהּ — דְּחוּלִּין מִקֳּדָשִׁים לָא גָּמְרִינַן. אֶלָּא לִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא בְּנָזִיר, וְתֵיתֵי חַטָּאת מִינֵּיהּ, דְּהָא כׇּל אִיסּוּרִין שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה קָא גָמְרִי מִנָּזִיר.

And Rabbi Akiva could have said to you, in rebuttal of this claim: Why are these cases both necessary? Granted, if the Merciful One had written this principle only with regard to a sin-offering, one would not derive the halakha of a nazirite from it, as we do not derive halakhot of non-sacred items from those of consecrated items. Certain stringencies and strictures apply only to consecrated property. However, let the Merciful One write this principle with regard to a nazirite, and you could derive the case of the sin-offering from that of a nazirite, just as the application of this principle to all prohibitions in the Torah is derived from the halakha of a nazirite. Since it is not necessary to state this principle in both cases, one cannot derive a general principle from them.

וְרַבָּנַן אָמְרִי לָךְ: חַטָּאת לְהֶיתֵּר מִצְטָרֵף לְאִיסּוּר, וְחוּלִּין מִקֳּדָשִׁים לָא גָּמְרִינַן.

The Gemara asks: And the Rabbis, who maintain that the principle that the legal status of the flavor of a forbidden substance is like that of the substance itself is not limited to these two cases, would say to you that both sources are required. The case of a sin-offering is necessary to derive the principle that a permitted substance combines with a forbidden substance, and this stringency is not extrapolated to other prohibitions, in accordance with the principle that one cannot derive the halakhot of non-sacred items from consecrated items.

וּ״מִשְׁרַת״ — לִיתֵּן טַעַם כְּעִיקָּר, מִכָּאן אַתָּה דָּן לְכׇל אִיסּוּרִין שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה.

And the term “soaked,” which appears in the context of a nazirite, teaches the principle that the legal status of the flavor of forbidden food is like that of its substance. Since both examples are necessary, they are not considered two verses that come as one, and it is therefore possible to derive a general principle from them. And consequently, from here you derive the halakha with regard to all of the prohibitions of the Torah.

וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, תַּרְוַיְיהוּ לְהֶיתֵּר מִצְטָרֵף לְאִיסּוּר, וְהָווּ לְהוּ שְׁנֵי כְתוּבִין הַבָּאִין כְּאֶחָד, וְכׇל שְׁנֵי כְתוּבִין הַבָּאִים כְּאֶחָד — אֵין מְלַמְּדִין.

The Gemara asks: And how would Rabbi Akiva respond to this claim? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Akiva would say that both cases teach the principle that a permitted substance combines with a forbidden substance, and they are two verses that come as one, to teach about the same issue. And the rule is that any two verses that come as one do not teach their common aspect to apply to other cases.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אָשֵׁי לְרַב כָּהֲנָא: אֶלָּא הָא דְּתַנְיָא: ״מִכֹּל אֲשֶׁר יֵעָשֶׂה מִגֶּפֶן הַיַּיִן״, לִימֵּד עַל אִיסּוּרֵי נָזִיר שֶׁהֵן מִצְטָרְפִין זֶה עִם זֶה, לְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, הַשְׁתָּא יֵשׁ לוֹמַר הֶיתֵּר מִצְטָרֵף לְאִיסּוּר, אִיסּוּר לְאִיסּוּר מִבַּעְיָא?

§ Rav Ashi said to Rav Kahana: But consider that which is taught in a baraita. The verse “He shall not eat anything that is made of the grapevine” (Numbers 6:4) taught with regard to prohibitions of a nazirite that these substances combine with each other. If a nazirite ate only a small amount of each substance, which together amount to the measure that determines liability, he is liable. According to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, now that one says that permitted substances combine with forbidden substances, is it necessary to teach that one forbidden substance combines with another forbidden substance? According to Rabbi Akiva’s opinion, this derivation is apparently unnecessary.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הֶיתֵּר לְאִיסּוּר — בְּבַת אַחַת, אִיסּוּר לְאִיסּוּר — אֲפִילּוּ בְּזֶה אַחַר זֶה.

Rav Kahana said to Rav Ashi that this derivation is necessary because the two cases are not identical: Permitted substances combine with forbidden substances only when they are eaten simultaneously, whereas forbidden substances combine with other forbidden substances even when eaten one after the other. Therefore, according to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, if a nazirite eats half an olive-bulk of grape skins and then eats half an olive-bulk of grape seeds, he is liable.

וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן

The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Shimon,