נדה כב

נדה כב

כִּי פְּלִיגִי בַּחֲתִיכָה. מָר סָבַר: דַּרְכָּהּ שֶׁל אִשָּׁה לִרְאוֹת דָּם בַּחֲתִיכָה, וּמַר סָבַר: אֵין דַּרְכָּהּ שֶׁל אִשָּׁה לִרְאוֹת דָּם בַּחֲתִיכָה.

When they disagree, it is with regard to the case of blood that is found in a piece of tissue. One Sage, the first tanna, who follows the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, holds that it is the manner of a woman to see menstrual blood in a piece of tissue that she discharges. Therefore, the term “in her flesh” applies to the blood in the cracks. And one Sage, i.e., the Rabbis, holds that it is not the manner of a woman to see menstrual blood in a piece of tissue that she discharges. Therefore, the blood found in the piece of tissue is not considered menstrual blood, and it does not render the woman impure.

רָבָא אָמַר: דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא אֵין דַּרְכָּהּ שֶׁל אִשָּׁה לִרְאוֹת דָּם בַּחֲתִיכָה.

Rava says there is another explanation of this dispute: Everyone, both the first tanna and the Rabbis, agrees that it is not the manner of a woman to see menstrual blood in a piece of tissue that she discharges. Consequently, the blood that emerges from the cracks in the piece of tissue is not considered menstrual blood, and it does not render the woman impure.

וְהָכָא, בְּאִשָּׁה טְהוֹרָה וּמְקוֹר מְקוֹמוֹ טָמֵא קָמִיפַּלְגִי, דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר סָבַר: אִשָּׁה טְהוֹרָה וְדָם טָמֵא, דְּהָא אָתֵי דֶּרֶךְ מָקוֹר, וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: אִשָּׁה טְהוֹרָה, וּמָקוֹר מְקוֹמוֹ טָהוֹר.

And here, they disagree as to whether it is possible that the woman herself is pure but the location of the source, i.e., the uterus, is impure. As Rabbi Eliezer holds that the woman is pure, i.e., she was not rendered a menstruating woman with the discharge of the blood, but the blood is impure, despite the fact that it emerged in a piece of tissue, as it emerged through the source, which is impure. Therefore, when the blood comes into contact with the woman’s body she contracts first-degree impurity, and the woman subsequently transmits impurity to foods that she touches. And the Rabbis hold that the woman is entirely pure, and the location of the source is also pure. Therefore, pure food that she touches is not rendered impure.

בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רַבָּה מֵרַב הוּנָא: הָרוֹאֶה קֶרִי בְּקֵיסָם מַהוּ? מִמֶּנּוּ אֲמַר רַחֲמָנָא — עַד דְּנָפֵיק מִבְּשָׂרוֹ, וְלֹא בְּקֵיסָם, אוֹ דִלְמָא הַאי ״מִמֶּנּוּ״ — עַד שֶׁתֵּצֵא טוּמְאָתוֹ לַחוּץ, וַאֲפִילּוּ בְּקֵיסָם נָמֵי?

§ Rabba asked Rav Huna a similar question to the case of the tube: With regard to a man who sees semen by extracting it from his penis with a sliver of wood, what is the halakha? Does he assume the impurity status of one who experiences a seminal emission? The Gemara explains the question. The verse states: “A man from whom the flow of semen emerges” (Leviticus 22:4). Since the Merciful One states: “From whom,” is it derived that the man is not impure unless the semen emerges from his flesh by itself, and not when it is extracted with a sliver of wood? Or perhaps from this term: “From whom,” it is derived merely that the man is not impure unless his impurity, i.e., his semen, emerges outside his body, but he is impure even if this is achieved with a sliver of wood.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: תִּיפּוֹק לֵיהּ דְּהוּא עַצְמוֹ אֵינוֹ מְטַמֵּא אֶלָּא בַּחֲתִימַת פִּי הָאַמָּה.

Rav Huna said to Rabba: Derive that the man is pure from the fact that semen itself becomes impure only in a case where the discharge is substantial enough to cause a blockage of the tip of the penis. Since this amount cannot be extracted with a sliver of wood, it is not impure.

לְמֵימְרָא דְּנוֹגֵעַ הָוֵי? אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, אַל יִסְתּוֹר בְּזִיבָה!

Rabba replied to Rav Huna: Since a minimum measure is required for this impurity, is this to say that the reason a man who experiences a seminal emission is impure is that his penis touches the semen after it is emitted? If he was rendered impure merely by the emission of the semen then no minimum measure would apply, as is the halakha with regard to a menstruating woman. But if that is so, then a seminal emission should not negate the count of seven clean days for a man who experienced a gonorrhea-like discharge [ziva]. A zav does not stop his counting when he touches a source of impurity, e.g., the carcass of a creeping animal.

אַלְּמָה תַּנְיָא: ״זֹאת תּוֹרַת הַזָּב וַאֲשֶׁר תֵּצֵא מִמֶּנּוּ שִׁכְבַת זָרַע״ — מָה זִיבָה סוֹתֶרֶת, אַף שִׁכְבַת זֶרַע נָמֵי סוֹתֵר?

If so, why is it taught in a baraita: It is derived from the verse’s juxtaposition between a zav and one who experienced a seminal emission: “This is the law of the zav, and of one from whom the flow of semen emerges” (Leviticus 15:32), that just as ziva during the seven clean days negates the count, so too, a seminal emission negates the count. If it is not the emission itself that renders the man impure but only his contact with the semen, why does the emission negate the count of seven clean days?

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: סְתִירָה — הַיְינוּ טַעְמָא דְּסוֹתֵר, לְפִי שֶׁאִי אֶפְשָׁר לָהּ בְּלֹא צִחְצוּחֵי זִיבָה.

Rav Huna said to Rabba in response: The halakha of negation is not difficult, as this is the reason that a seminal emission negates the count of seven clean days: Because it is impossible for a zav to experience a seminal emission without it containing bits of [tzaḥtzoḥei] ziva.

אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, תִּסְתּוֹר כׇּל שִׁבְעָה? אַלְּמָה תַּנְיָא: ״זֹאת תּוֹרַת הַזָּב וְגוֹ׳״, מָה זִיבָה סוֹתֶרֶת, אַף שִׁכְבַת זֶרַע סוֹתֶרֶת.

Rabba further objected: If that is so, then a seminal emission should negate the entire count of seven clean days, just like an emission of ziva, not merely the day on which the seminal emission occurred. But then why is it taught in the baraita: It is derived from the verse: “This is the law of the zav, and of one from whom the flow of semen emerges, so that he is impure by it” (Leviticus 15:32), that just as ziva during the seven clean days negates the count, so too, a seminal emission negates the count.

אִי מָה זִיבָה סוֹתֶרֶת כׇּל שִׁבְעָה, אַף שִׁכְבַת זֶרַע נָמֵי סוֹתֶרֶת כׇּל שִׁבְעָה? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״לְטׇמְאָה בָהּ״ — אֵין לְךָ בָּהּ אֶלָּא מָה שֶׁאָמוּר בָּהּ, סוֹתֶרֶת יוֹם אֶחָד.

The baraita continues: If a seminal emission is compared to ziva, then it might be suggested that just as ziva negates the entire count of seven days, so too, a seminal emission should also negate the entire count of seven days. Therefore, the verse states: “So that he is impure by it,” to teach that in the case of a seminal emission you have a negation of the count that is equivalent only to the impurity that is stated by it, i.e., impurity for one day. Accordingly, a seminal emission negates only one day of the count, not the entire count. This apparently contradicts Rav Huna’s statement that the reason a seminal emission negates the count at all is that the seminal emission of a zav always contains ziva.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: גְּזֵירַת הַכָּתוּב הִיא, זִיבָה גְּמוּרָה דְּלָא עֲרִבָה בַּהּ שִׁכְבַת זֶרַע — סָתְרָא כׇּל שִׁבְעָה, צִחְצוּחֵי זִיבָה דַּעֲרִבָה בַּהּ שִׁכְבַת זֶרַע — לָא סָתְרָא אֶלָּא יוֹם אֶחָד.

Rav Huna said to Rabba: It is a Torah edict that an emission that is purely ziva, when semen is not mixed in it, negates the entire count of seven days, whereas bits of ziva in which some semen is mixed negate only one day of the count.

בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא מֵרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: דָּם יָבֵשׁ מַהוּ? ״כִּי יָזוּב זוֹב דָּמָהּ״ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא — עַד דְּמֵידָב דָּיֵיב לֵיהּ, לַח — אִין, יָבֵשׁ — לָא, אוֹ דִלְמָא: הַאי ״כִּי יָזוּב זָב דָּמָה״ אוֹרְחָא דְּמִילְּתָא הִיא, וּלְעוֹלָם אֲפִילּוּ יָבֵשׁ נָמֵי?

§ Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, asked Rabbi Elazar: If a woman discharges dry blood, what is the halakha? Does she have the status of a menstruating woman? The Gemara explains the dilemma: Since the Merciful One states: “And if a woman has a flow of her blood many days” (Leviticus 15:25), does this indicate that the woman is not impure unless the blood flows, i.e., if it is wet, yes, she is impure, whereas if it is dry she is not impure? Or perhaps this phrase: “If a woman has a flow of her blood,” is merely referring to the normal manner that menstrual blood emerges, but actually even dry blood renders the woman impure.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: תְּנֵיתוּהָ, דַּם הַנִּדָּה וּבְשַׂר הַמֵּת מְטַמְּאִין לַחִים וִיבֵשִׁים. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לַח וְנַעֲשָׂה יָבֵשׁ — לָא קָא מִיבַּעְיָא לִי, כִּי מִיבַּעְיָא לִי — יָבֵשׁ מֵעִיקָּרָא.

Rabbi Elazar said to him: You learned the solution to your dilemma in a mishna (54b): The blood of a menstruating woman and the flesh of a corpse impart impurity whether they are wet or dry. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said to him in response: I do not raise the dilemma about blood that was wet when it came out and subsequently dried, as such blood is certainly impure. When I raise the dilemma, it is with regard to blood that was dry at the outset, when it emerged.

הָא נָמֵי תְּנֵיתוּהָ: הַמַּפֶּלֶת כְּמִין קְלִיפָּה, כְּמִין שְׂעָרָהּ, כְּמִין עָפָר, כְּמִין יַבְחוּשִׁין אֲדוּמִּין — תָּטִיל לַמַּיִם,

Rabbi Elazar responded: You learned the solution to this dilemma as well, in the mishna here: In the case of a woman who discharges an item similar to a shell, or similar to a hair, or similar to soil, or similar to mosquitoes, if these are red, she should cast them into water to ascertain their nature.

אִם נִמּוֹחוּ טְמֵאָה. אִי הָכִי, בְּלֹא נִמּוֹחוּ נָמֵי? אָמַר רַבָּה: כִּי לֹא נִמּוֹחוּ — בְּרִיָּה בִּפְנֵי עַצְמָהּ הִיא.

If they dissolved, it is blood, and the woman is impure; and if not, she is ritually pure. Evidently, dry blood is impure, as these items are all dry until they are soaked in water. The Gemara asks: If so, that dry blood is impure, these items are impure also in a case where they do not dissolve in water. Why is this examination necessary at all? Rabba says: In a case where they do not dissolve, this indicates that the item is not blood at all; rather, it is a distinct entity.

וּמִי אִיכָּא כִּי הַאי גַוְונָא? אִין, וְהָתַנְיָא: אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בְּרַבִּי צָדוֹק: שְׁנֵי מַעֲשִׂים הֶעֱלָה אַבָּא מִטִּבְעִין לְיַבְנֶה.

The Gemara asks with regard to these instances discussed in the mishna: But are there actually cases like this? The Gemara answers: Yes there are, and it is taught likewise in a baraita that Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Tzadok, says: My father raised two incidents from Tivin to the Sages in Yavne for discussion.

מַעֲשֶׂה בְּאִשָּׁה שֶׁהָיְתָה מַפֶּלֶת כְּמִין קְלִיפּוֹת אֲדוּמּוֹת, וּבָאוּ וְשָׁאֲלוּ אֶת אַבָּא, וְאַבָּא שָׁאַל לַחֲכָמִים, וַחֲכָמִים שָׁאֲלוּ לָרוֹפְאִים, וְאָמְרוּ לָהֶם: אִשָּׁה זוֹ מַכָּה יֵשׁ לָהּ בְּתוֹךְ מֵעֶיהָ, שֶׁמִּמֶּנָּה מַפֶּלֶת כְּמִין קְלִיפּוֹת. תָּטִיל לַמַּיִם, אִם נִמּוֹחוּ — טְמֵאָה.

The first was an incident involving a woman who would repeatedly discharge items similar to red shells, and the local residents came and asked my father whether this rendered the woman impure. And my father asked the other Sages, and the Sages asked the doctors what causes this to happen. And the doctors said to them: This woman has a wound in her womb from which she discharges red items similar to shells. The Sages therefore ruled that the woman should cast them into water to ascertain their nature. If they dissolved, it is blood and the woman is impure.

וְשׁוּב מַעֲשֶׂה בְּאִשָּׁה שֶׁהָיְתָה מַפֶּלֶת כְּמִין שְׂעָרוֹת אֲדוּמּוֹת, וּבָאָה וְשָׁאֲלָה אֶת אַבָּא, וְאַבָּא שָׁאַל לַחֲכָמִים, וַחֲכָמִים לָרוֹפְאִים, וְאָמְרוּ לָהֶם: שׁוּמָא יֵשׁ לָהּ בְּתוֹךְ מֵעֶיהָ, שֶׁמִּמֶּנָּה מַפֶּלֶת כְּמִין שְׂעָרוֹת אֲדוּמּוֹת. תָּטִיל לַמַּיִם, אִם נִמּוֹחוּ — טְמֵאָה.

And again there was a similar incident involving a woman who would discharge items similar to red hairs, and she came and asked my father whether she was impure. And my father asked the other Sages, and the Sages asked the doctors, and the doctors said to them: The woman has a mole in her womb from which she discharges items similar to red hairs. The Sages therefore ruled that the woman should cast them into water, and if they dissolved, she is impure.

אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: וּבְפוֹשְׁרִין. תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי: תָּטִיל לְמַיִם, וּבְפוֹשְׁרִין. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: מְמַעַכְתּוֹ בְּרוֹק עַל גַּבֵּי הַצִּפּוֹרֶן. מַאי בֵּינַיְיהוּ? אָמַר רָבִינָא: מָעוּךְ עַל יְדֵי הַדְּחָק אִיכָּא בֵינַיְיהוּ.

§ Reish Lakish says: And this examination is conducted only with lukewarm [uvefoshrin] water. This is also taught in a baraita: The woman should cast the item into water, and this examination is conducted only with lukewarm water. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: The woman mashes the item with saliva, using the fingers of one hand on a fingernail of her other hand. The Gemara asks: What is the difference between the two opinions? Ravina says: The difference between them is whether an item is considered blood if it can be mashed by pressing on it, or only if the item dissolves by itself.

הָתָם תְּנַן: כַּמָּה הִיא שְׁרִיָּיתָן בְּפוֹשְׁרִין? מֵעֵת לְעֵת. הָכָא מַאי? מִי בָּעֵינָא מֵעֵת לְעֵת, אוֹ לָא?

We learned in the mishna there (54b) with regard to an animal carcass or the carcass of a creeping animal that dried up, which is examined by soaking it in water to determine whether or not it still imparts impurity: For how long is its soaking in lukewarm water necessary? It is for a twenty-four-hour period. The Gemara asks: Here, with regard to the examination of an item discharged by a woman, what is the halakha? Do I need it to be soaked in lukewarm water for a twenty-four-hour period, or not?

שֶׁרֶץ וּנְבֵלָה, דַּאֲקוֹשֵׁי — בָּעֵינַן מֵעֵת לְעֵת, אֲבָל דַּם דְּרַכִּיךְ — לָא. אוֹ דִלְמָא לָא שְׁנָא? תֵּיקוּ.

The Gemara explains the question: Perhaps with regard to a carcass of a creeping animal and an unslaughtered animal carcass, which are hard when they dry up, we require soaking for a twenty-four-hour period, but blood, which is relatively soft after it dries up, does not need to be soaked for that long. In other words, if the item did not dissolve after even a shorter period of time, it is not blood. Or perhaps the examination of a discharged item is no different, and it also must be soaked for twenty-four hours. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

הַמַּפֶּלֶת כְּמִין דָּגִים. וְלִיפְלוֹג נָמֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בְּהָא!

§ The mishna teaches: In the case of a woman who discharges an item similar to fish or to grasshoppers, repugnant creatures, or creeping animals, if blood emerges with it, the woman is impure, and if not, she is pure. The Gemara asks: But let Rabbi Yehuda disagree with the Rabbis with regard to this halakha as well, just as he disagrees with them in the first clause of the mishna, in the case where a woman discharges an amorphous piece of tissue, as he maintains that she is impure whether or not blood emerges with it.

אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: בְּמַחְלוֹקֶת שְׁנוּיָה, וְרַבָּנַן הִיא. וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, עַד כַּאן לָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הָתָם אֶלָּא גַּבֵּי חֲתִיכָה, דְּעָבֵיד דָּם דְּקָרֵישׁ וְהָוֵי חֲתִיכָה, אֲבָל בְּרִיָּה — לָא הָוֵי.

Reish Lakish says: This case is also subject to the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis, and the opinion cited in the mishna is that of the Rabbis. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: You may even say that the ruling of the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as when Rabbi Yehuda says that the woman is impure even if blood does not emerge, it is only there, in the case of an amorphous piece of tissue, as the blood is likely to dry and turn into the form of a piece of tissue. But blood is not likely to become the form of a creature, such as a fish or a grasshopper.

וּלְהָךְ לִישָּׁנָא דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, בְּאִי אֶפְשָׁר לִפְתִיחַת הַקֶּבֶר בְּלֹא דָּם קָמִיפַּלְגִי, לִפְלוֹג נָמֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בְּהָא!

The Gemara challenges: But this is difficult according to that version in which Rabbi Yoḥanan says that Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis disagree with regard to whether opening of the womb is impossible without a discharge of blood (see 21b). Since Rabbi Yehuda holds that blood automatically emerges whenever the womb opens, and therefore the woman is impure even if she did not notice any blood, he should disagree with the Rabbis in this case too, i.e., if a woman discharges an item similar to a fish or one of the other creatures.

מַאן דְּמַתְנֵי הָךְ לִישָּׁנָא, מַתְנֵי הָכִי: רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ, בְּמַחְלוֹקֶת שְׁנוּיָה, וְרַבָּנַן הִיא.

The Gemara answers: The one who teaches that version of the above discussion teaches an alternative version of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion here as well, like this: With regard to a woman who discharges an item similar to fish, or to grasshoppers, repugnant creatures, or creeping animals, Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish both say that this case is subject to a dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis, and the opinion stated in the mishna is that of the Rabbis.

הַמַּפֶּלֶת כְּמִין בְּהֵמָה [וְכוּ׳].

§ The mishna teaches: In the case of a woman who discharges tissue in the form of a type of domesticated animal, undomesticated animal, or bird, whether of a kosher or non-kosher species, if it is male, the woman observes the periods of impurity and purity for a woman who gives birth to a male. If it is female, the woman observes the periods of impurity and purity for a woman who gives birth to a female. And if its sex is unknown, the woman observes the strictures of a woman who gave birth to both a male and a female. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר? הוֹאִיל וְנֶאֶמְרָה בּוֹ יְצִירָה כְּאָדָם.

Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Meir, that a woman who discharges a fetus in the form of an animal has the same status as one who discharges a fetus with human form or gives birth to a human? It is since the Torah uses a similar formulation in the two cases, as a term of formation is stated with regard to the creation of these types of animals, in the verse: “And out of the ground the Lord God formed every animal of the field, and every fowl of the air” (Genesis 2:19), just as it is stated with regard to the creation of man: “And the Lord God formed man” (Genesis 2:7).

אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, הַמַּפֶּלֶת דְּמוּת תַּנִּין, תְּהֵא אִמּוֹ טְמֵאָה לֵידָה, הוֹאִיל (ונאמר) [וְנֶאֶמְרָה] בּוֹ יְצִירָה כְּאָדָם, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וַיִּבְרָא אֱלֹהִים אֶת הַתַּנִּינִים הַגְּדוֹלִים״!

The Gemara asks: If that is so, then with regard to a woman who discharges an item with the form of a sea monster, its mother should be impure with the impurity of a woman after childbirth, since the concept of formation is stated with regard to its creation, just as it is stated with regard to the creation of man. As it is stated: “And God created the great sea monsters” (Genesis 1:21).

אָמְרִי: דָּנִין יְצִירָה מִיצִירָה, וְאֵין דָּנִין בְּרִיאָה מִיצִירָה.

The Sages say in response: One derives halakhot of a matter with regard to which formation is stated by means of a verbal analogy from another matter with regard to which formation is stated, but one does not derive halakhot of a matter with regard to which creation is stated from a matter with regard to which formation is stated.

מַאי נָפְקָא מִינַּהּ? הָא תָּנָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל: ״וְשָׁב הַכֹּהֵן״ ״וּבָא הַכֹּהֵן״ — זוֹ הִיא שִׁיבָה זוֹ הִיא בִּיאָה!

The Gemara asks: What difference is there between formation and creation? A verbal analogy can be drawn between different words with similar meanings. For example, the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught a verbal analogy with regard to leprosy of houses. The verse states: “And the priest shall return [veshav] on the seventh day” (Leviticus 14:39), and another verse with regard to the priest’s visit seven days later states: “And the priest shall come [uva] and look” (Leviticus 14:44). This returning and this coming have the same meaning, and one can therefore derive by verbal analogy that the halakha that applies if the leprosy had spread at the conclusion of the first week applies if it had spread again by the end of the following week.

וְעוֹד, נִגְמַר בְּרִיאָה מִבְּרִיאָה, דִּכְתִיב ״וַיִּבְרָא אֱלֹהִים אֶת הָאָדָם בְּצַלְמוֹ״!

And furthermore, the halakha of a woman who discharges an item similar to a sea monster, with regard to which creation is stated, can be derived by a different verbal analogy from the halakha of human offspring, since here it also states creation, as it is written: “And God created man in His own image” (Genesis 1:27).

אָמְרִי: ״וַיִּבְרָא״ לְגוּפֵיהּ, ״וַיִּיצֶר״ לְאַפְנוֹיֵי, וְדָנִין יְצִירָה מִיצִירָה.

The Sages say in response: The verse “And God created man” is necessary to teach the matter itself, i.e., the creation of man. By contrast, the term “And the Lord God formed man,” serves to render it free, i.e., the mention of the formation of man is superfluous in its context and was stated for the purpose of establishing a verbal analogy. And therefore one derives the halakhot of animals, with regard to which formation is stated, from the halakhot of man, with regard to which formation is stated.

אַדְּרַבָּה: ״וַיִּיצֶר״ לְגוּפֵיהּ, ״וַיִּבְרָא״ לְאַפְנוֹיֵי, וְדָנִין בְּרִיאָה מִבְּרִיאָה!

The Gemara raises a difficulty: On the contrary, one can say that the verse “And the Lord God formed man” was stated to teach the matter itself, whereas the term “And God created man” serves to render it free; and therefore one derives the halakhot of sea monsters, with regard to which creation is stated, from the halakhot of man, with regard to which creation is stated.

אֶלָּא: ״וַיִּיצֶר״ מוּפְנֶה מִשְּׁנֵי צְדָדִין, מוּפְנֶה גַּבֵּי אָדָם וּמוּפְנֶה גַּבֵּי בְּהֵמָה, ״וַיִּבְרָא״ גַּבֵּי אָדָם מוּפְנֶה, גַּבֵּי תַּנִּינִים אֵינוֹ מוּפְנֶה.

The Gemara answers: Rather, the reason it is animals and not sea monsters that are compared to man is that the term “and…formed” is free on both sides, i.e., it is free with regard to man and it is free with regard to animals. By contrast, the term “and…created” is free with regard to man, but it is not free with regard to sea monsters.

מַאי מוּפְנֶה גַּבֵּי בְּהֵמָה? אִילֵּימָא מִדִּכְתִיב ״וַיַּעַשׂ אֱלֹהִים אֶת חַיַּת הָאָרֶץ״, וּכְתִיב ״וַיִּיצֶר [ה׳] אֱלֹהִים מִן הָאֲדָמָה כׇּל חַיַּת הַשָּׂדֶה״, גַּבֵּי תַּנִּין נָמֵי אִפְּנוֹיֵי מוּפְנֶה, דִּכְתִיב ״וְאֵת כׇּל רֶמֶשׂ הָאֲדָמָה״, וּכְתִיב ״וַיִּבְרָא אֱלֹהִים אֶת הַתַּנִּינִים הַגְּדוֹלִים״!

The Gemara asks: What is the reason that the term “and…formed” that appears with regard to animals is considered free? If we say it is due to the fact that it is written: “And God made the animals of the earth after its kind, and the cattle after their kind, and everything that creeps on the ground after its kind” (Genesis 1:25), and it is similarly written: “And out of the ground the Lord God formed every animal of the field” (Genesis 2:19), and therefore this verse is superfluous, but with regard to the sea monster as well, the expression “and…created” is free, as it is written: “And God made…and everything that creeps on the ground after its kind” (Genesis 1:25), and it is also written: “And God created the great sea monsters.” Consequently, the term “and…created” is also free on both sides of the verbal analogy.

״רֶמֶשׂ״ דִּכְתִיב הָתָם, דְּיַבָּשָׁה הוּא. וּמַאי נָפְקָא מִינַּהּ בֵּין מוּפְנֶה מִצַּד אֶחָד לְמוּפְנֶה מִשְּׁנֵי צְדָדִין?

The Gemara answers: The creeping animal that is written there is referring to creeping animals of the land, not of the sea. Therefore, the term: “And…created,” stated with regard to sea monsters is not superfluous. The Gemara asks: But what difference is there between a verbal analogy that is free on one side and a verbal analogy that is free on both sides?

נָפְקָא מִינַּהּ דְּאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל: כׇּל גְּזֵרָה שָׁוָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ מוּפְנָה כׇּל עִיקָּר — אֵין לְמֵדִין הֵימֶנָּה. מוּפְנָה מִצַּד אֶחָד, לְרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל — לְמֵדִין וְאֵין מְשִׁיבִין, לְרַבָּנַן — לְמֵדִין וּמְשִׁיבִין. מוּפְנָה מִשְּׁנֵי צְדָדִין, דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל — לְמֵדִין וְאֵין מְשִׁיבִין.

The Gemara answers: The difference is with regard to that which Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel says in the name of Rabbi Yishmael, with regard to the exegetical principle of verbal analogy: With regard to any verbal analogy that is not free at all, one cannot derive halakhot from it. If the verbal analogy is free on one side, according to Rabbi Yishmael one can derive halakhot from it, and one cannot refute it through logic, even if there are valid counterarguments. According to the Rabbis, one can derive halakhot from it, but one can also refute it logically if there are grounds to distinguish between the two cases. If a verbal analogy is free on both sides, everyone agrees that one can derive halakhot from it and one cannot refute it logically.

וְרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל, מַאי אִיכָּא בֵּין מוּפְנָה מִצַּד אֶחָד לְמוּפְנָה מִשְּׁנֵי צְדָדִין? נָפְקָא מִינַּהּ, דְּהֵיכָא דְּאִיכָּא מוּפְנָה מִצַּד אֶחָד וּמוּפְנָה מִשְּׁנֵי צְדָדִין — שָׁבְקִינַן מוּפְנָה מִצַּד אֶחָד

The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Yishmael, what difference is there between a verbal analogy that is free on one side and a verbal analogy that is free on both sides? In both cases, he holds that one can derive halakhot from it and one cannot refute it. The Gemara answers: He holds that the difference is that in a case where there are two mutually exclusive verbal analogies, one that is free on one side and one that is free on both sides, we disregard the analogy that is free on one side,