נדה נא

נדה נא

בְּטוּמְאָה חֲמוּרָה שֶׁכֵּן אֵינָהּ עוֹשָׂה כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּהּ, תֹּאמַר בְּטוּמְאָה קַלָּה שֶׁעוֹשָׂה כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּהּ.

in a case of severe ritual impurity, i.e., when the carcass of a kosher bird renders one’s garments impure while it is in his throat, which does not render impure another item similar to it, i.e., a person who is rendered impure by the carcass does not render another man impure; shall you also say that there is no requirement of thought in the case of lenient impurity, i.e., when the carcass transmits impurity as food, which does render impure another item similar to it? Food that became impure transmits impurity to other food, albeit by rabbinic law.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: כֹּל דְּכֵן הוּא, וּמָה טוּמְאָה חֲמוּרָה דְּקִילָּא, דְּאֵינָהּ עוֹשָׂה כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּהּ — מְטַמְּאָה שֶׁלֹּא בְּמַחְשָׁבָה, טוּמְאָה קַלָּה דַּחֲמִירָא, דְּעוֹשֶׂה כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּהּ — אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁמְּטַמְּאָה שֶׁלֹּא בְּמַחְשָׁבָה?

Abaye said to Rava: But in that case, all the more so impurity as food should apply without thought. If severe impurity, i.e., the unique impurity of the carcass of a kosher bird, which is lenient in the sense that it does not render impure another item similar to it, nevertheless imparts impurity without thought, i.e., without one knowing what is in his throat, then with regard to lenient impurity, i.e., the carcass’s impurity as food, which is more severe in the sense that it renders impure another item similar to it, isn’t it logical that it should impart impurity without thought?

אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת, הָכִי קָאָמַר: לֹא אִם אָמַרְתָּ בְּטוּמְאָה חֲמוּרָה שֶׁכֵּן אֵינָהּ צְרִיכָה הֶכְשֵׁר, תֹּאמַר בְּטוּמְאָה קַלָּה שֶׁצְּרִיכָה הֶכְשֵׁר.

Rather, Rav Sheshet said that this is what the Rabbis, who replied to Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri, are saying: No, if you said that thought is not required with regard to severe impurity, i.e., the carcass of a kosher bird in the throat, as it does not require contact with a liquid for it to be rendered susceptible to ritual impurity, shall you also say that thought is not required with regard to lenient impurity, i.e., its impurity as food, where it does require contact with a liquid for it to be rendered susceptible to ritual impurity?

וּמִי צְרִיכָה הֶכְשֵׁר? וְהָתְנַן: שְׁלֹשָׁה דְּבָרִים נֶאֶמְרוּ בְּנִבְלַת עוֹף טָהוֹר: צְרִיכָה מַחְשָׁבָה, וְאֵינָהּ מְטַמְּאָה אֶלָּא בְּבֵית הַבְּלִיעָה, וְאֵינָהּ צְרִיכָה הֶכְשֵׁר!

The Gemara asks: And does the carcass of a kosher bird require contact with a liquid for it to be rendered susceptible to impurity as food? But didn’t we learn in a baraita: Three matters were stated with regard to the carcass of a kosher bird: In order for it to be susceptible to impurity as food, it requires a person’s intent to eat it; and it transmits impurity to garments by rendering one who swallows it ritually impure only when an olive-bulk of it is in the throat; and it does not require contact with a liquid for it to be rendered susceptible to ritual impurity?

נְהִי דְּהֶכְשֵׁר שֶׁרֶץ לָא בָּעֲיָא, הֶכְשֵׁר מַיִם בָּעֲיָא.

The Gemara answers: Although it does not require contact with a creeping animal for it to be rendered susceptible to impurity, i.e., it is inherently impure, nevertheless it does require contact with water or another liquid for it to be rendered susceptible to ritual impurity.

מַאי שְׁנָא הֶכְשֵׁר שֶׁרֶץ דְּלָא בָּעֲיָא, כִּדְתָנָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל? הֶכְשֵׁר מַיִם נָמֵי לָא תִּבְעֵי, כִּדְתָנָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל,

The Gemara asks: What is different about being rendered susceptible to ritual impurity by contact with a creeping animal that it does not require this contact? This ruling is in accordance with that which the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught. If so, it should also not require contact with water or another liquid for it to be rendered susceptible to ritual impurity, likewise in accordance with that which the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught.

דְּתָנָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל: ״עַל כׇּל זֶרַע זֵרוּעַ אֲשֶׁר יִזָּרֵעַ״.

As the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught in a baraita: The verse states that seeds contract impurity from the carcass of a creeping animal only if they first come into contact with water: “And if any part of their carcass fall upon any sowing seed that is to be sown, it is pure. But if water be put upon the seed, and any part of their carcass fall thereon, it is impure unto you” (Leviticus 11:37–38). This passage teaches that as long as water did not fall on the seeds, they are not susceptible to ritual impurity. This halakha applies to all items similar to seeds.

מָה זְרָעִים, שֶׁאֵין סוֹפָן לְטַמֵּא טוּמְאָה חֲמוּרָה, צְרִיכִין הֶכְשֵׁר, אַף כֹּל שֶׁאֵין סוֹפָן לְטַמֵּא טוּמְאָה חֲמוּרָה — צְרִיכִין הֶכְשֵׁר. יָצְתָה נִבְלַת עוֹף טָהוֹר שֶׁסּוֹפָהּ לְטַמֵּא טוּמְאָה חֲמוּרָה, שֶׁאֵין צָרִיךְ הֶכְשֵׁר.

Accordingly, just as seeds, which will never transmit impurity severe enough to transmit to humans, like any food, require contact with liquid to be rendered susceptible to impurity, so too, all items that will never transmit severe impurity require contact with liquid to be rendered susceptible to impurity. This excludes the carcass of a kosher bird, which will ultimately transmit impurity severe enough to be transmitted to a human, i.e., when it is in his throat, and therefore it does not require contact with liquid for it to be rendered susceptible to ritual impurity.

אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא, וְאִיתֵּימָא רַב פָּפָּא: שׁוּם טוּמְאָה חֲמוּרָה בְּעוֹלָם, שׁוּם טוּמְאָה קַלָּה בָּעוֹלָם.

Rather, Rava said, and some say that it was Rav Pappa who said: The Rabbis’ rejection of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri’s a fortiori inference is not based on the specific halakha of impurity of food imparted by the carcass of a bird. Rather, they are referring to the fact that in general there is no item under the common name of severe impurity that requires contact with a liquid for it to be rendered susceptible to ritual impurity. By contrast, with regard to the common name of lenient impurity as food, in general the items in this category require contact with a liquid for them to be rendered susceptible to impurity, despite the fact that the particular case of the carcass of a kosher bird is an exception. Therefore, intent is required for lenient impurity even in the case of a carcass of a kosher bird.

אָמַר רָבָא: וּמוֹדֶה רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן לְעִנְיַן מַעֲשֵׂר, דְּמַחְשֶׁבֶת חִיבּוּר שְׁמָהּ מַחְשָׁבָה. אָמַר רָבָא: מְנָא אָמֵינָא לַהּ? דִּתְנַן: הַסֵּיאָה וְהָאֵזוֹב וְהַקּוֹרְנִית שֶׁבֶּחָצֵר, אִם הָיוּ נִשְׁמָרִין — חַיָּיבִין.

§ Rava says: And Rabbi Yoḥanan concedes with regard to the obligation to tithe, that intent while the produce is attached to the ground is considered intent. Rava said: From where do I say that this is the halakha? It is as we learned in a mishna (Ma’asrot 3:9) that deals with the obligation to tithe: Savory, hyssop [veha’ezov], and thyme [vehakoranit], i.e., various types of hyssop plants, that were growing in a courtyard, are eaten by some people although they are not specifically intended for human consumption. Therefore, if they were protected by the owners, those owners are obligated to separate tithes from them.

הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? אִילֵּימָא דְּזַרְעִינְהוּ מִתְּחִלָּה לָאָדָם — צְרִיכָא לְמֵימַר? אֶלָּא לָאו דְּזַרְעִינְהוּ מִתְּחִלָּה לִבְהֵמָה, וְקָתָנֵי: אִם הָיוּ נִשְׁמָרִין — חַיָּיבִין.

The Gemara clarifies the mishna: What are the circumstances of this ruling? If we say that it is referring to a case where one initially planted them for human consumption, does it need to be said that there is an obligation to tithe if they are protected by the owners? It is clear that in such a situation the criteria for the obligation to tithe, i.e., that it is human food which is protected, have been met. Rather, is it not referring to a case where one initially planted them to be fed to an animal, and nevertheless the mishna teaches: If the owner reconsidered their designation and decided to use them for human consumption and they were protected by the owners, the owners are obligated to tithe them. This apparently indicates that intent while the produce is attached to the ground is considered intent.

אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: הָכָא בְּחָצֵר שֶׁעָלוּ מֵאֵילֵיהֶן עָסְקִינַן, וּסְתָמָא לְאָדָם קָיְימִי, וְהָכִי קָאָמַר: אִם הֶחָצֵר מְשַׁמֶּרֶת פֵּירוֹתֶיהָ — חַיָּיבִין, וְאִם לָאו — פְּטוּרִין.

Rav Ashi said that Rava’s proof is inconclusive, for the following reason: Here we are dealing with a courtyard where these various types of hyssop plants grew by themselves, and where they are unspecified, they are intended for human consumption. Therefore, they meet the first criteria for the obligation to tithe, as they are considered food. And the mishna addresses the second requirement, that the food must be protected, and this is what it is saying: If the courtyard protects its produce, the owners are obligated in tithes, and if not, they are exempt.

מֵתִיב רַב אָשֵׁי: ״כֹּל שֶׁחַיָּיבִין בַּמַּעַשְׂרוֹת — מִטַּמְּאִין טוּמְאַת אֳוכָלִין״, וְאִם אִיתַאּ, הָא אִיכָּא הָנֵי (דְּקָחַיָּיבִין) [דְּחַיָּיבִין] בְּמַעֲשֵׂר וְאֵין מִטַּמְּאִין טוּמְאַת אֳוכָלִין!

Rav Ashi raises a further objection to Rava’s explanation from a mishna (50a): Any food from which one is obligated to separate tithes becomes impure with the ritual impurity of food. But if it is so, as Rava claimed, that intent while the produce is attached to the ground is considered intent with respect to the obligation to tithe, despite the fact that it is not considered intent with regard to impurity, then the mishna’s blanket statement is inaccurate. Rav Ashi elaborates: After all, there are these endives that were initially planted in order to feed to an animal and later the owner reconsidered their designation and decided to use them for human consumption, from which one is obligated to separate tithe, but which do not become impure with the ritual impurity of food.

אָמַר רָבָא: הָכִי קָאָמַר — כׇּל מִין שֶׁחַיָּיב בְּמַעֲשֵׂר, מִטַּמֵּא טוּמְאַת אֳוכָלִין.

Rava said in response that this is what the mishna is saying: Any type of food from which one is obligated to separate tithe becomes impure with the ritual impurity of food. In other words, this is referring to types of food, not to all situations. It is possible for a particular circumstance to be an exception to this principle.

הָכִי נָמֵי מִסְתַּבְּרָא, מִדְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: כֹּל שֶׁחַיָּיב בְּרֵאשִׁית הַגֵּז — חַיָּיב בַּמַּתָּנוֹת, וְיֵשׁ שֶׁחַיָּיב בַּמַּתָּנוֹת וְאֵין חַיָּיב בְּרֵאשִׁית הַגֵּז.

The Gemara adds that this too stands to reason, that the mishna is referring only to types of food, not situations, from the fact that the latter clause teaches (51b): With regard to any animal from which the owner is obligated to give the first shearing of its wool, he is obligated to have gifts of the priesthood taken from it, i.e., the foreleg, the jaw, and the maw, if it was slaughtered. And there are animals from which one is obligated to have gifts of the priesthood taken from it, but from which he is not obligated to give the first shearing.

וְאִם אִיתָא, הָאִיכָּא טְרֵפָה, דְּחַיֶּיבֶת בְּרֵאשִׁית הַגֵּז וְאֵינָהּ חַיֶּיבֶת בַּמַּתָּנוֹת!

And if it is so, that the principles of the mishna are all-inclusive, one can raise the following difficulty: But there is the specific case of an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months [tereifa], from which one is obligated to give the first shearing, but one is not obligated to have gifts of the priesthood taken from it, as it may not be eaten. This proves that Rava is correct, that the mishna is not referring to all circumstances, but only to general categories.

אָמַר רָבִינָא: הָא מַנִּי? רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הִיא, דִּתְנַן: רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן פּוֹטֵר אֶת הַטְּרֵפָה מֵרֵאשִׁית הַגֵּז.

Ravina said, rejecting this proof: It is possible that the mishna is referring to all circumstances, and as for the difficulty with regard to a tereifa, one can say that in accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, as we learned in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon exempts the owner of a tereifa from the mitzva of the first shearing.

אָמַר רַב שִׁימִי בַּר אָשֵׁי, תָּא שְׁמַע: הַמַּפְקִיר אֶת כַּרְמוֹ, וְהִשְׁכִּים בַּבֹּקֶר וּבְצָרוֹ — חַיָּיב בַּפֶּרֶט, וּבָעוֹלֵלוֹת, וּבַשִּׁכְחָה, וּבַפֵּאָה, וּפָטוּר מִן הַמַּעֲשֵׂר.

Rav Shimi bar Ashi said: Come and hear a proof from a baraita that the mishna is not referring to all circumstances, but only to general categories: With regard to one who declares his vineyard ownerless, and who arose the next morning and picked grapes from the vineyard before anyone else took possession of them, he is obligated in the mitzva of leaving for the poor individual fallen grapes [peret], and in the mitzva of leaving for them incompletely formed clusters of grapes [uve’olelot], and in the mitzva of forgotten clusters, and in pe’a. The Torah includes such cases in the phrase: “Leave them for the poor and for the stranger” (Leviticus 19:10, 23:22), which is written with regard to all these mitzvot. And he is exempt from the obligation to separate the tithe from the grapes. Since the vineyard is ownerless, there is no obligation to tithe the produce.

וְהָא אֲנַן תְּנַן: כֹּל שֶׁחַיָּיב בַּפֵּאָה — חַיָּיב בַּמַּעַשְׂרוֹת! אֶלָּא לָאו שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: מִין קָתָנֵי, שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.

The Gemara explains the proof: But didn’t we learn in the mishna (50a): With regard to any produce from which one is obligated to designate pe’a, one is likewise obligated to separate tithes? Rather, must one not conclude from the mishna that Rava is correct in asserting that the mishna is teaching only principles with regard to each type of produce, but there are exceptions in certain circumstances? The Gemara answers that one should in fact conclude from the mishna that Rava is correct.

תְּנַן הָתָם: מוֹדִים חֲכָמִים לְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא בְּזוֹרֵעַ שֶׁבֶת אוֹ חַרְדָּל בִּשְׁנַיִם וּשְׁלֹשָׁה מְקוֹמוֹת, שֶׁנּוֹתֵן פֵּאָה מִכׇּל אֶחָד וְאֶחָד.

§ With regard to the obligations of pe’a and tithes, the Gemara notes that we learned in a mishna elsewhere (Pe’a 3:2): The Rabbis and Rabbi Akiva disagree with regard to a case where one harvested several separate patches in a field. Rabbi Akiva rules that each patch requires its own pe’a, whereas the Rabbis maintain that one pe’a is required for all of the patches. Nevertheless, the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Akiva in the case of one who sows dill or mustard in two or three separate locations in a single field, that he leaves pe’a for each and every one of these plots on its own, rather than one corner for all of them.

וְהָא שֶׁבֶת דְּמִיחַיַּיב בְּפֵאָה וּמִיחַיַּיב בְּמַעֲשֵׂר, דִּתְנַן: כֹּל שֶׁחַיָּיב בַּפֵּאָה חַיָּיב בַּמַּעֲשֵׂר.

The Gemara asks: But with regard to dill, from which one is obligated to designate pe’a, as stated in the mishna, one must also be obligated to separate tithe, since if the obligation of pe’a applies then the obligation of tithes likewise applies. As we learned in the mishna (50a): With regard to any produce from which one is obligated to designate pe’a, one is likewise obligated to separate tithe.

וּמִדְּחַיָּיב בַּמַּעֲשֵׂר — מִטַּמֵּא טוּמְאַת אֳוכָלִין, אַלְמָא: כֹּל מִילֵּי דַּעֲבִיד לְטַעְמָא — מִטַּמֵּא טוּמְאַת אֳוכָלִין, דְּהַאי שֶׁבֶת לְטַעְמָא עֲבִידָא.

And from the fact that with regard to dill one is obligated to separate tithe, it follows that it becomes impure with the ritual impurity of food. As the mishna on 50a states: Any food that is obligated in tithes becomes impure with the ritual impurity of food. Apparently, any item that is prepared in order to add taste to food, such as dill, becomes impure with the ritual impurity of food, as this dill is prepared in order to add taste to food.

וּרְמִינְהִי: הַקּוֹשְׁטְ, וְהַחִימּוּם, וְרָאשֵׁי בְשָׂמִים, וְהַתִּיאָה, וְהַחִלְתִּית, וְהַפִּלְפְּלִים, וְחַלַּת חָרִיעַ — נִקָּחִין בְּכֶסֶף מַעֲשֵׂר, וְאֵין מִטַּמְּאִין טוּמְאַת אֳוכָלִין, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא.

And the Gemara raises a contradiction to this conclusion from a mishna (Okatzin 3:5), which deals with the ritual impurity of food: With regard to spices such as costus, amomum, chief spices, root of crowfoot, asafoetida, peppers, and a cake of safflower, although their function is merely to add taste to food, they are considered food for the purposes of the following halakha: They may be bought with second-tithe money, which must be taken to Jerusalem and used to purchase food. But they are not considered food insofar as they do not become impure with the ritual impurity of food. This is the statement of Rabbi Akiva.

אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן נוּרִי: אִם נִקָּחִין בְּכֶסֶף מַעֲשֵׂר, מִפְּנֵי מָה אֵין מִטַּמְּאִין טוּמְאַת אֳוכָלִין? וְאִם אֵינָן מִטַּמְּאִין, אַף הֵם לֹא יִלָּקְחוּ בְּכֶסֶף מַעֲשֵׂר!

Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri said to Rabbi Akiva: If they are considered food to the extent that they may be bought with second-tithe money, for what reason are they not considered food in terms of becoming impure with the ritual impurity of food? And if they do not become impure with the ritual impurity of food because they are not considered food, then they should also not be bought with second-tithe money.

וְאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן נוּרִי: נִמְנוּ וְגָמְרוּ שֶׁאֵין נִקָּחִין בְּכֶסֶף מַעֲשֵׂר, וְאֵין מִטַּמְּאִין טוּמְאַת אֳוכָלִין.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri said with regard to this halakha: They counted the opinions of the Sages, and they concluded that these spices may not be bought with second-tithe money, and they do not become impure with the ritual impurity of food. This apparently contradicts the previous claim that dill, which is a spice, becomes impure with the ritual impurity of food.

אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: כִּי תַנְיָא הַהִיא — בְּשֶׁבֶת הָעֲשׂוּיָה לְכָמָךְ.

Rav Ḥisda says the following resolution of the difficulty: When that baraita, which indicates that dill is considered food and can contract the impurity of food, is taught, it is referring to dill that is prepared for a spice dish [likhmakh], i.e., to be ground and placed in a Babylonian spice, kutaḥ, which is used as a dip.

אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: אַמְרִיתַהּ לִשְׁמַעְתָּיה קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב כָּהֲנָא, (אֲמַר): לָא תֵּימָא בְּשֶׁבֶת הָעֲשׂוּיָה לְכָמָךְ, הָא סְתָמָא לִקְדֵרָה, אֶלָּא סְתָם שֶׁבֶת לְכָמָךְ עֲשׂוּיָה, דִּתְנַן: הַשֶּׁבֶת מִשֶּׁנָּתְנָה טַעַם בַּקְּדֵרָה — אֵין בָּהּ מִשּׁוּם תְּרוּמָה, וְאֵינָהּ מִטַּמְּאָה טוּמְאַת אֳוכָלִין.

Rav Ashi said: I said this halakha of Rav Ḥisda’s before Rav Kahana, and he commented: Do not say that the baraita is referring specifically to a case where the dill was prepared for a spice dish from the outset, which would indicate that if dill is undesignated then it is intended to be an ingredient in a pot of food. Rather, undesignated dill is also prepared for a spice dish. As we learned in a mishna (Okatzin 3:4): With regard to teruma dill, once it imparted flavor in a pot of food and was removed from the pot, it is no longer subject to the prohibition of a non-priest partaking of teruma, and it can no longer become impure with the ritual impurity of food.

הָא, עַד שֶׁלֹּא נָתְנָה טַעַם בַּקְּדֵרָה — יֵשׁ בָּהּ מִשּׁוּם תְּרוּמָה, וּמִטַּמְּאָה טוּמְאַת אֳוכָלִין. וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ סְתָמָא לִקְדֵרָה — כִּי לֹא נָתְנָה נָמֵי סְתָמָא לִקְדֵרָה! אֶלָּא לָאו שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ סְתָמָא לְכָמָךְ עֲשׂוּיָה. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.

Rav Kahana explains the proof: It can be inferred from this mishna that until the dill has imparted flavor in a pot of food it is subject to the prohibition of a non-priest partaking of teruma, and it can become impure with the ritual impurity of food. And if it enters your mind that undesignated dill is intended as an ingredient in a pot of food, then even when one did not place the dill in a pot, the same halakha with respect to teruma and impurity should apply, as when it is undesignated the dill is intended as an ingredient in a pot of food. Rather, must one not conclude from the mishna that undesignated dill is prepared for a spice dish? The Gemara concludes: Learn from the mishna that this is the case.

מַתְנִי’ כֹּל שֶׁחַיָּיב בְּרֵאשִׁית הַגֵּז — חַיָּיב בַּמַּתָּנוֹת, וְיֵשׁ שֶׁחַיָּיב בַּמַּתָּנוֹת וְאֵינוֹ חַיָּיב בְּרֵאשִׁית הַגֵּז.

MISHNA: With regard to any animal, i.e., sheep and rams, from which one is obligated by Torah law (see Deuteronomy 18:4) to give the first shearing of its wool to a priest, he is obligated to have gifts of the priesthood, i.e., the foreleg, the jaw, and the maw, which must be removed from slaughtered animals, taken from it (see Deuteronomy 18:3). And there are animals from which one is obligated to have gifts of the priesthood taken from them, e.g., cattle and goats, but from which he is not obligated to give the first shearing.

כֹּל שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ בִּיעוּר — יֵשׁ לוֹ שְׁבִיעִית, וְיֵשׁ שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ שְׁבִיעִית — וְאֵין לוֹ בִּיעוּר.

The mishna teaches a similar principle: For all Sabbatical-Year produce to which there applies the obligation of eradication from the house when it ceases to be available to the animals in the field, there is the sanctity of Sabbatical-Year produce upon it, i.e., it may not be used for commerce and is ownerless while it is attached to the ground. And there is produce for which there is the sanctity of Sabbatical-Year produce, but for which there is no obligation of eradication from the house, e.g., produce that is preserved in the ground and does not cease to be available in the field.

גְּמָ’ כְּגוֹן עֲלֵה הַלּוּף שׁוֹטֶה וְהַדַּנְדַּנָּה, יֵשׁ שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ שְׁבִיעִית וְאֵין לוֹ בִּיעוּר, עִיקַּר הַלּוּף שׁוֹטֶה וְעִיקַּר הַדַּנְדַּנָּה.

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that the sanctity of Sabbatical-Year produce applies to any produce upon which there is an obligation of eradication, but the converse is not necessarily the case. The Gemara cites an example of plants whose various parts illustrate these halakhot: Plants such as the wild arum leaf and the ceterach, which cease to be available in the field during the rainy season, are subject to eradication and to the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year. Examples of the second halakha of the mishna, that there is produce for which there is the sanctity of Sabbatical-Year produce but for which there is no obligation of eradication from the house, include the root of the wild arum and the root of the ceterach.

דִּכְתִיב ״וְלִבְהֶמְתְּךָ וְלַחַיָּה אֲשֶׁר בְּאַרְצֶךָ תִּהְיֶה כׇל תְּבוּאָתָהּ לֶאֱכֹל״, כׇּל זְמַן שֶׁחַיָּה אוֹכֶלֶת מִן הַשָּׂדֶה — אַתָּה מַאֲכִיל לִבְהֶמְתֶּךָ בַּבַּיִת, כָּלָה לַחַיָּה מִן הַשָּׂדֶה — כַּלֵּה לִבְהֶמְתֶּךָ שֶׁבַּבַּיִת, וְהָנֵי לָא כָּלוּ לְהוּ.

The Gemara explains that it is written in connection to the Sabbatical Year: “And for the cattle and the beasts that are in your land, all its produce may be eaten” (Leviticus 25:7), from which it is derived: As long as the undomesticated animals eat a type of produce from the field, you may feed that type of produce to your domesticated animal in the house, as it still remains in the field. But if that type of produce has ceased for the undomesticated animals in the field, you must cease feeding it to your domesticated animal in the house. This is the obligation of eradication. And these, the root of the wild arum and the ceterach, have not ceased for undomesticated animals in the field, and therefore there is no obligation of eradication.

מַתְנִי’ כֹּל שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ קַשְׂקֶשֶׂת — יֵשׁ לוֹ סְנַפִּיר, וְיֵשׁ שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ סְנַפִּיר וְאֵין לוֹ קַשְׂקֶשֶׂת. כֹּל שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ קַרְנַיִם — יֵשׁ לוֹ טְלָפַיִם, וְיֵשׁ שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ טְלָפַיִם וְאֵין לוֹ קַרְנַיִם.

MISHNA: It is written: “Whatever has fins and scales in the waters, in the seas, and in the rivers, you may eat them” (Leviticus 11:9). There is a principle with regard to the signs indicating that fish are kosher: Any fish that has scales has fins; and there are fish that have fins but do not have scales. Similarly, with regard to kosher animals it is written: “Whatever parts the hoof, and is wholly cloven-footed, and chews the cud, among the beasts, that you may eat” (Leviticus 11:3). Any animal that has horns has hooves; and there are animals that have hooves but do not have horns.

גְּמָ’ כֹּל שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ קַשְׂקֶשֶׂת — דָּג טָהוֹר, יֵשׁ שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ סְנַפִּיר וְאֵין לוֹ קַשְׂקֶשֶׂת — דָּג טָמֵא. מִכְּדֵי אֲנַן אַקַּשְׂקֶשֶׂת סָמְכִינַן, ״סְנַפִּיר״ דִּכְתַב רַחֲמָנָא לְמָה לִי?

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that any fish that has scales also has fins and therefore is a kosher fish. The mishna also stated that there are fish that have fins but do not have scales. Such a fish is a non-kosher fish. The Gemara asks: Since we rely exclusively upon the sign of the scales, as a fish that has scales necessarily has fins as well, why do I need the sign of fins that the Merciful One writes in the Torah as one of the criteria of kosher fish?

אִי לָא כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא סְנַפִּיר, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: מַאי ״קַשְׂקֶשֶׂת״ דִּכְתִיב? סְנַפִּיר, וַאֲפִילּוּ דָּג טָמֵא — כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״סְנַפִּיר וְקַשְׂקֶשֶׂת״.

The Gemara answers: If the Merciful One had not also written the sign of fins in the Torah, I would say: What does the word kaskeset, scales, that is written in the Torah mean? It does not mean scales, but fins. And I would therefore say that even a non-kosher fish, which has fins but no scales, is permitted. Therefore, the Merciful One writes both signs, fins and scales.

וְהַשְׁתָּא דִּכְתַב רַחֲמָנָא סְנַפִּיר וְקַשְׂקֶשֶׂת, מְנָלַן דְּקַשְׂקֶשֶׂת לְבוּשָׁא הוּא? דִּכְתִיב: ״וְשִׁרְיוֹן קַשְׂקַשִּׂים הוּא לָבוּשׁ״.

The Gemara further asks: But now that the Merciful One wrote in the Torah fins and kaskeset, from where do we derive that kaskeset denotes clothing, i.e., scales, rather than fins? The Gemara answers: We derive it from a verse, as it is written about Goliath the Philistine: “And he was clad with a coat of mail [kaskasim]” (I Samuel 17:5).

וְלִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא ״קַשְׂקֶשֶׂת״ וְלָא בָּעֵי סְנַפִּיר! אָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ, וְכֵן תָּנָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל: ״יַגְדִּיל תּוֹרָה וְיַאְדִּיר״.

The Gemara asks: But if there is proof that kaskeset means scales, the question returns: Let the Merciful One write only “scales” and then there would be no need to write “fins.” Rabbi Abbahu says, and likewise a Sage of the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught, that this is in accordance with the verse: “The Lord was pleased, for His righteousness’ sake, to make Torah great and glorious” (Isaiah 42:21).In this context, this means that it is fitting for the Torah to state all the characteristics of a kosher animal rather than merely state that which is absolutely necessary.

מַתְנִי’ כֹּל הַטָּעוּן בְּרָכָה לְאַחֲרָיו — טָעוּן בְּרָכָה לְפָנָיו, וְיֵשׁ שֶׁטָּעוּן בְּרָכָה לְפָנָיו וְאֵין טָעוּן בְּרָכָה לְאַחֲרָיו.

MISHNA: This mishna teaches a generalization that is similar to the previous ones: Anything that requires a blessing after one partakes of it requires a blessing beforehand. And there exist items that require a blessing before but do not require a blessing thereafter.

גְּמָ’ לְאֵתוֹיֵי מַאי? לְאֵתוֹיֵי יָרָק. וּלְרַבִּי יִצְחָק דִּמְבָרֵךְ אַיָּרָק, לְאֵתוֹיֵי מַאי? לְאֵתוֹיֵי מַיָּא.

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that there are items that require a blessing before but not after. The Gemara inquires: What case does this halakha in the mishna add? The Gemara answers: It serves to add the case of vegetables, as one recites a blessing before eating them but not afterward. The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yitzḥak, who maintains that one recites a blessing on vegetables after eating them, what case does this halakha in the mishna add? The Gemara answers: It serves to add the case of water, as one recites a blessing before drinking it but not afterward.

וּלְרַב פָּפָּא דִּמְבָרֵךְ אַמַּיָּא, לְאֵתוֹיֵי מַאי? לְאֵתוֹיֵי מִצְוֹת. וְלִבְנֵי מַעְרְבָא דִּמְבָרְכִי בָּתַר דְּסַלִּיקוּ תְּפִילַּיְיהוּ ״אֲשֶׁר קִדְּשָׁנוּ בְּמִצְוֹתָיו וְצִוָּנוּ לִשְׁמוֹר חוּקָּיו״, לְאֵתוֹיֵי מַאי? לְאֵתוֹיֵי

The Gemara further asks: And according to the opinion of Rav Pappa, who rules that one recites a blessing on water after drinking it, what case does this halakha in the mishna serve to add? The Gemara answers that the mishna, which does not explicitly mention food, serves to add mitzvot. In other words, one recites a blessing before performing a mitzva, e.g., wearing ritual fringes or taking the lulav and the like, but one does not recite a blessing after its fulfillment. The Gemara asks: And according to the residents of the West, Eretz Yisrael, who recite the following blessing after they remove their phylacteries: Who sanctified us with His mitzvot and commanded us to keep His laws, what does this halakha in the mishna come to add? The Gemara answers: It serves to add the case of