פסחים עח

פסחים עח

אֶלָּא, לָא קַשְׁיָא: כָּאן — בְּיָחִיד, כָּאן — בְּצִיבּוּר.

Rather, it is not difficult: There, where Rabbi Yehoshua said that it is invalid ab initio, he was referring to the offering of an individual. Here, in the mishna, which states that it may be sacrificed even ab initio, it is referring to an offering involving the public.

נֵימָא מַתְנִיתִין דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי. דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: הַצִּיץ מְרַצֶּה עַל אֲכִילוֹת. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: אֵין הַצִּיץ מְרַצֶּה עַל אֲכִילוֹת.

The Gemara asks: Shall we say that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei? As it was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer says that the frontplate appeases God for the impurity of portions of offerings that are supposed to be eaten. Rabbi Yosei says that the frontplate does not appease God for the impurity of portions of offerings that are supposed to be eaten; it appeases God only for the impurity of the parts of offerings that are burned on the altar.

קָא סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ מִדְּקָאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: אֵין הַצִּיץ מְרַצֶּה עַל אֲכִילוֹת — כְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ סְבִירָא לֵיהּ, דְּאָמַר בָּעֵינַן תַּרְתֵּי. נֵימָא הַשְׁתָּא מַתְנִיתִין דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי?

The Gemara explains the question: It could enter your mind to say: From the fact that Rabbi Yosei said that the frontplate does not appease God for the impurity of portions of offerings that are supposed to be eaten, it can be inferred that he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, who said that we require the two parts of the offering, the blood and the meat, to be valid. If this were not the case, it would be sufficient for the frontplate to appease God for the impurity of the blood, and it would not be necessary for the frontplate to appease God for the impurity of the portions of offerings that are supposed to be eaten. Let us now say that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei.

לָא, רַבִּי יוֹסֵי כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר סְבִירָא לֵיהּ, דְּאָמַר: דָּם — אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין בָּשָׂר.

The Gemara rejects this assertion: No, Rabbi Yosei holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who said that the blood of an offering is accepted although there is no meat.

אִי הָכִי, לְמַאי הִלְכְתָא אֵין הַצִּיץ מְרַצֶּה עַל אֲכִילוֹת? וְלִיטַעְמָיךְ, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר דְּאָמַר: הַצִּיץ מְרַצֶּה, כֵּיוָן דְּאָמַר: דָּם — אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין בָּשָׂר, הַצִּיץ מְרַצֶּה עַל אֲכִילוֹת לְמַאי הִלְכְתָא?

The Gemara asks: If so, with regard to what halakha did Rabbi Yosei say that the frontplate does not appease God for the impurity of the portions of offerings that are supposed to be eaten? Even if it does not appease God for the impurity of these portions, the offering remains valid. The Gemara rejects the question: And according to your reasoning, with regard to Rabbi Eliezer himself, who said that the frontplate appeases God for the impurity of the portions that are supposed to be eaten, since he said that the blood may be sprinkled although there is no meat, with regard to what halakha did he make his other statement that the frontplate appeases God for the impurity of the portions of offerings that are supposed to be eaten? Clearly, whether the frontplate appeases God is significant for reasons other than ensuring that an offering is accepted.

אֶלָּא, לְמִיקְבְּעֵיהּ בְּפִיגּוּל וּלְאַפּוֹקֵי מִידֵי מְעִילָה קָמִיפַּלְגִי. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר סָבַר: מְרַצֵּה צִיץ עִילָּוֵיהּ וּמְשַׁוֵּי לֵיהּ כְּטָהוֹר, וְקָבַע לֵיהּ בְּפִיגּוּל, וּמַפֵּיק לֵיהּ מִידֵּי מְעִילָה.

Rather, the fact that they disagree about whether the frontplate appeases God for the impurity of the portions of offerings that are supposed to be eaten determines whether it is possible to establish the offering as one disqualified due to improper intent [piggul] and whether it is possible to exclude the offering from the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property. The dispute is to be understood in this light: Rabbi Eliezer holds that the frontplate appeases God for the impurity of the meat that is supposed to be eaten, and it renders it like pure meat that is not disqualified. Therefore, although the meat may not be eaten, it may be established as piggul. Similarly, because it is treated as though it were pure, the sprinkling of the blood of the offering excludes the meat from the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property.

וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי סָבַר: לָא מְרַצֵּה צִיץ עִילָּוֵיהּ, וְלָא מְשַׁוֵּי לֵיהּ כְּטָהוֹר, וְלָא קָבַע לֵיהּ בְּפִיגּוּל, וְלָא מַפֵּיק לֵיהּ מִידֵּי מְעִילָה.

And Rabbi Yosei holds that the frontplate does not appease God for the impurity of sacrificial meat that has become impure, and it does not render it like pure meat. Therefore, sprinkling the blood of the offering does not establish it as piggul and does not exclude it from the prohibition of misusing consecrated property.

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב מָרִי: נְהִי נָמֵי דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי סָבַר כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, בִּשְׁלָמָא זְבָחִים — אִיכָּא דָּם, עוֹמֶר נָמֵי — אִיכָּא קוֹמֶץ, לֶחֶם הַפָּנִים נָמֵי — אִיכָּא בָּזִיכִין.

Rav Mari strongly objects to this conclusion: Even granting that Rabbi Yosei holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer that an offering is accepted through the blood alone, even if the meat has become ritually impure, there is still a difficulty. Granted, in the case of animal offerings, which have two permitting factors, the blood and the meat, there is at least one of them, the blood, for which the frontplate appeases God and causes the offering to be accepted. With regard to the omer, too, there is the handful, for which the frontplate appeases God and is thereby validated. With regard to the shewbread, too, there are the bowls of frankincense, which permit the bread in the same manner that the handful permits a meal-offering.

אֶלָּא שְׁתֵּי הַלֶּחֶם, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?

But with regard to the two loaves, what is there to say? They are completely eaten, and nothing is brought on the altar. How can they be brought in a state of ritual impurity, as the mishna has stated, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei?

וְכִי תֵּימָא לִקְרַב עִמָּהֶן — הַיְינוּ שַׁלְמֵי צִיבּוּר. אִם כֵּן, הָווּ לְהוּ אַרְבָּעָה, וַאֲנַן — חֲמִשָּׁה תְּנַן!

And if you say that the two loaves are valid because the frontplate appeases God for the impurity of the two lambs that are sacrificed with them, this is the same as the communal peace-offerings that are mentioned separately in the mishna. If so, there are only four offerings listed in the mishna. But we learned in the mishna that there are five, because the two loaves and the communal peace-offerings are listed separately.

אֶלָּא, קָסָבַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: טוּמְאָה הוּתְּרָה בְּצִיבּוּר.

Rather, the previous suggestion is rejected. Instead, it is suggested that Rabbi Yosei holds that ritual impurity is permitted in cases involving the public, even without the frontplate. Therefore, the two loaves remain valid.

וְהָא תַּנְיָא: אֶחָד זֶה וְאֶחָד זֶה — מַזִּין עָלָיו כׇּל שִׁבְעָה מִכׇּל חַטָּאוֹת שֶׁהָיוּ שָׁם, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: אֵין מַזִּין עָלָיו אֶלָּא שְׁלִישִׁי וּשְׁבִיעִי בִּלְבַד.

The Gemara asks: But wasn’t the following baraita taught concerning the purity of both the High Priest on Yom Kippur and the priest who burns the red heifer, each of whom is separated from his house for seven days to ensure his purity? The baraita states: In the case of both this priest and that priest, one sprinkles on him all seven days of his separation from all the purification offerings, i.e., the ashes of the red heifers, that are there in the Temple. If he had become impure through contact with a corpse, he will be purified through the sprinkling of the purification offering. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yosei says: One does not sprinkle upon him on any day except for the third and seventh days of his separation. This ensures his purification.

וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ קָסָבַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי טוּמְאָה הוּתְּרָה בְּצִיבּוּר, לְמָה לִי הַזָּאָה כְּלָל? אֶלָּא מְחַוַּורְתָּא מַתְנִיתִין דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי.

And if it enters your mind that Rabbi Yosei holds that ritual impurity is permitted in cases involving the public, why do I need sprinkling at all? The offerings of Yom Kippur are communal offerings and may be sacrificed even in a state of ritual impurity. Rather, it is clear that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב פָּפָּא לְאַבָּיֵי: וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי שְׁטָרָא מְזַכֵּי לְבֵי תְרֵי הוּא?! דְּתַנְיָא, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: רוֹאֶה אֲנִי אֶת דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בִּזְבָחִים, וְדִבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בִּזְבָחִים, וְדִבְרֵי רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בִּמְנָחוֹת, וְדִבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בִּמְנָחוֹת.

With regard to Rabbi Yosei’s statement quoted earlier, Rav Pappa said to Abaye: Rabbi Yosei is like a document that awards something to two conflicting parties, as it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei said: I see as correct the statement of Rabbi Eliezer with regard to animal offerings, and the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua with regard to animal offerings, and the statement of Rabbi Eliezer with regard to meal-offerings, and the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua with regard to meal-offerings.

דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בִּזְבָחִים, שֶׁהָיָה אוֹמֵר: דָּם אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין בָּשָׂר. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בִּזְבָחִים, שֶׁהָיָה אוֹמֵר: אִם אֵין דָּם אֵין בָּשָׂר, אִם אֵין בָּשָׂר אֵין דָּם. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בִּמְנָחוֹת, שֶׁהָיָה אוֹמֵר: קוֹמֶץ — אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין שָׁם שִׁירַיִם. וְדִבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בִּמְנָחוֹת, שֶׁהָיָה אוֹמֵר: אִם אֵין שָׁם שִׁירַיִם אֵין קוֹמֶץ, אִם אֵין קוֹמֶץ אֵין שִׁירַיִם!

The statement of Rabbi Eliezer is correct with regard to animal offerings, as he would say that the blood brings atonement although there is no meat. The statement of Rabbi Yehoshua is correct with regard to animal offerings, as he would say that if there is no blood there is no meat, and if there is no meat there is no blood. The statement of Rabbi Eliezer is correct with regard to meal-offerings, as he would say that the handful is fit although there is no remainder. The statement of Rabbi Yehoshua is correct with regard to meal-offerings, as he would say that if there is no valid handful there is no remainder, and if there is no remainder there is no handful. Rabbi Yosei accepted several contradictory statements.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מִסְתַּבְּרָא קָאָמַר. כִּי קָאֵי בִּזְבָחִים, אָמַר: מִסְתַּבְּרָא כִּי הֵיכִי דִּפְלִיגִי בִּזְבָחִים — פְּלִיגִי נָמֵי בִּמְנָחוֹת. קָאֵי בִּמְנָחוֹת, אָמַר: מִסְתַּבְּרָא כִּי הֵיכִי דִּפְלִיגִי בִּמְנָחוֹת — פְּלִיגִי נָמֵי בִּזְבָחִים.

Abaye said to him: Rabbi Yosei did not intend to issue a halakhic ruling in favor of both opinions. Rather, he said what was reasonable. How so? When involved in studying the halakhot of animal offerings, he said: It is reasonable that just as they disagree with regard to animal offerings, they also disagree with regard to meal-offerings. When involved in studying the halakhot of meal-offerings, he said: It is reasonable that just as they disagree with regard to meal-offerings, they also disagree with regard to animal offerings.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ, הָתִינַח: כִּי קָאֵי בִּזְבָחִים אָמַר, מִסְתַּבְּרָא כִּי הֵיכִי דִּפְלִיגִי בִּזְבָחִים פְּלִיגִי נָמֵי בִּמְנָחוֹת, דְּעִיקָּר קְרָאֵי כִּי כְּתִיבִי — בִּזְבָחִים כְּתִיבִי. אֶלָּא, כִּי קָאֵי בִּמְנָחוֹת וְאָמַר, מִסְתַּבְּרָא כִּי הֵיכִי דִּפְלִיגִי בִּמְנָחוֹת פְּלִיגִי נָמֵי בִּזְבָחִים — וְהָא עִיקָּר קְרָאֵי בִּזְבָחִים הוּא דִּכְתִיבִי!

Rav Pappa said to him: It works out well to say that when he was involved in animal offerings, he said: It is reasonable that just as they disagree with regard to animal offerings, they also disagree with regard to meal-offerings, as the essential verses written about this topic are written with regard to animal offerings. But it does not seem realistic to say that when he was involved in meal-offerings, he said: It is reasonable that just as they disagree with regard to meal-offerings, they disagree with regard to animal offerings. Aren’t the essential verses about this topic written with regard to animal offerings? Clearly, meal-offerings would not serve as a model for animal-offerings.

אֶלָּא, לָא קַשְׁיָא: רוֹאֶה אֲנִי אֶת דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בְּנִטְמָא, וְדִבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בְּאָבוּד וְשָׂרוּף.

Rather, this answer has been refuted, and Rabbi Yosei’s statement is not difficult for a different reason. When he said: I see as correct the statement of Rabbi Eliezer, he was referring to cases in which part of the offering became impure. When he said that he agreed with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, he was referring to cases in which part of the offering was lost or burned. In other words, Rabbi Yosei partially accepts the opinions of both Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua.

בְּנִטְמָא מַאי טַעְמָא — מִשּׁוּם דִּמְרַצֵּי צִיץ. הָא שָׁמְעַתְּ לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי דְּאָמַר: אֵין הַצִּיץ מְרַצֶּה עַל אֲכִילוֹת!

The Gemara asks: In a case in which the offering became impure, what is the reason that Rabbi Yosei accepts the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer? It is because the frontplate appeases God for the impurity. But this is impossible, as you have heard that Rabbi Yosei said that the frontplate does not appease God for the impurity of the portions of offerings that are supposed to be eaten.

אֶלָּא, לָא קַשְׁיָא: רוֹאֶה אֲנִי אֶת דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בְּצִיבּוּר, רוֹאֶה אֲנִי אֶת דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בְּיָחִיד.

Rather, this answer should be rejected, and Rabbi Yosei’s opinion is not difficult for the following reason. When he said: I see as correct the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, he was referring to a case in which an offering involves the public. When he said: I see as correct the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, he was referring to the offering of an individual.

בְּצִיבּוּר מַאי טַעְמָא — מִשּׁוּם דְּטוּמְאָה הוּתְּרָה בְּצִיבּוּר? חֲדָא: דְּשָׁמְעַתְּ לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי דְּאָמַר טוּמְאָה דְּחוּיָה הִיא בְּצִיבּוּר, וְעוֹד: אִי בְּצִיבּוּר, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר מַכְשִׁיר וְלָא רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ?

The Gemara asks: With regard to an offering involving the public, what is the reason that Rabbi Yosei accepts the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer? It is because ritual impurity is permitted in cases involving the public. This explanation can be rejected for two reasons. One reason is that you have heard that Rabbi Yosei said that ritual impurity is merely overridden in cases involving the public; it is not wholly permitted. And furthermore, if Rabbi Yosei was referring to the offering of the public, is it only Rabbi Eliezer who validates the offering, and not Rabbi Yehoshua?

הָא אָמְרַתְּ, בְּצִיבּוּר אֲפִילּוּ רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ מוֹדֶה.

Didn’t you say that with regard to an offering involving the public, even Rabbi Yehoshua concedes that ritual impurity is permitted?

אֶלָּא: רוֹאֶה אֲנִי דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בְּדִיעֲבַד, וְדִבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ לְכַתְּחִלָּה. דִּיעֲבַד — אֲפִילּוּ רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ נָמֵי מוֹדֶה הוּא, דְּקָתָנֵי: מוֹדֶה רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ שֶׁאִם זָרַק — הוּרְצָה!

Rather, Rabbi Yosei’s statement should be understood differently. When he said: I see as correct the statement of Rabbi Eliezer, he was referring to after the fact. When he said: I see as correct the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua, he meant ab initio. The Gemara asks: After the fact Rabbi Yehoshua also concedes, as it teaches: Rabbi Yehoshua concedes that if one sprinkled the blood, it was accepted and the offering is valid.

הָא בְּטוּמְאָה, הָא בְּאָבוּד וְשָׂרוּף. כִּי קָתָנֵי: מוֹדֶה רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ שֶׁאִם זָרַק הוּרְצָה — בְּנִטְמָא, אֲבָל בְּאָבוּד וְשָׂרוּף לָא. כִּי קָאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: רוֹאֶה אֲנִי אֶת דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בְּדִיעֲבַד — בְּאָבוּד וְשָׂרוּף.

The Gemara responds: This case is with regard to ritual impurity, and that case is with regard to an offering that was lost or burned. The Gemara explains: When it teaches that Rabbi Yehoshua concedes that if one sprinkled the blood it is accepted, that is with regard to a case in which the meat of the offering became impure; but with regard to a case where the meat of the offering was lost or burned, he does not agree, even after the fact. When Rabbi Yosei said: I see as correct the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer after the fact, that was with regard to cases in which the meat was lost or burned, with regard to which Rabbi Yehoshua did not concede to Rabbi Eliezer.

מַתְנִי׳ נִטְמָא בָּשָׂר וְחֵלֶב קַיָּים — אֵינוֹ זוֹרֵק אֶת הַדָּם. נִטְמָא הַחֵלֶב וְהַבָּשָׂר קַיָּים — זוֹרֵק אֶת הַדָּם. וּבַמּוּקְדָּשִׁים אֵינוֹ כֵּן, אֶלָּא אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁנִּטְמָא הַבָּשָׂר וְהַחֵלֶב קַיָּים — זוֹרֵק אֶת הַדָּם.

MISHNA: If the meat of the Paschal lamb became ritually impure, and the fat remains pure and may be burned on the altar, one may not sprinkle the blood. On the other hand, if the fat became impure and the meat remains pure, one may sprinkle the blood because the meat remains fit to be eaten. This is the halakha with regard to a Paschal lamb, whose primary purpose is to be eaten by those who have registered for it. However, with regard to other offerings it is not so. Rather, although the meat has become impure and the fat remains pure, one may sprinkle the blood, because part of the offering still remains valid.

גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַב גִּידֵּל אָמַר רַב: אִם זָרַק — הוּרְצָה. וְהָא בָּעֵינַן אֲכִילָה! אֲכִילָה לָא מְעַכְּבָא.

GEMARA: Rav Giddel said that Rav said: If one sprinkled the blood despite the fact that the meat was ritually impure, it was nonetheless accepted; one is not obligated to observe the second Pesaḥ. The Gemara asks: Don’t we require that the Paschal lamb be eaten, which could not occur in this case? The Gemara answers: Failure to engage in eating the offering does not preclude it from being accepted.

וְהָא כְּתִיב: ״אִישׁ לְפִי אׇכְלוֹ״?! לְמִצְוָה.

The Gemara asks: Isn’t it written: “And if the household be too little for a lamb, then he and his neighbor who is close to his house shall take one according to the number of the souls; according to every man’s eating you shall make your count for the lamb” (Exodus 12:4)? This indicates that the Torah requires one to eat the Paschal lamb. The Gemara responds: This verse is stated as a mitzva only. It should be fulfilled, but it does not preclude acceptance of the offering.

וּלְעַכֵּב לָא? וְהָתַנְיָא: ״בְּמִכְסַת״, מְלַמֵּד שֶׁאֵין הַפֶּסַח נִשְׁחָט אֶלָּא לִמְנוּיָו. יָכוֹל שְׁחָטוֹ שֶׁלֹּא לִמְנוּיָו יְהֵא כְּעוֹבֵר עַל הַמִּצְוָה וְכָשֵׁר — תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״אִישׁ לְפִי אׇכְלוֹ תָּכֹסּוּ״, הַכָּתוּב שָׁנָה עָלָיו לְעַכֵּב.

The Gemara asks: And was it not stated to preclude acceptance of the offering if it cannot be eaten? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: “According to the number of the souls”; this teaches that the Paschal lamb is slaughtered only for those who have registered for it and have thereby included themselves in advance in the number of the souls? I might have thought that if one slaughtered it for those who have not registered for it, he is merely like one who violates a mitzva, but the offering is still valid after the fact. Therefore, the verse states: “According to every man’s eating you shall make your count”; the verse repeated that the Paschal lamb is eaten only by those registered in order to underscore that failure to register precludes the offering from being valid.

וְאִיתַּקַּשׁ אוֹכְלִין לִמְנוּיִין.

And those who are able to eat the offering, as opposed to the sick or elderly who are unable to eat it, are juxtaposed in the verse to those who registered. Therefore, just as a Paschal lamb is disqualified if it is slaughtered for those who did not register for it, it is disqualified if it cannot be eaten. This poses a difficulty for the opinion of Rav.

אֶלָּא רַב דְּאָמַר כְּרַבִּי נָתָן, דְּאָמַר: אֲכִילַת פְּסָחִים לָא מְעַכְּבָא.

The Gemara answers: Rather, Rav said his statement in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan, who said that failure to engage in eating the Paschal lamb does not preclude one from fulfilling one’s obligation to bring the offering, as the eating is a separate mitzva.

הֵי רַבִּי נָתָן? אִילֵּימָא הָא רַבִּי נָתָן דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי נָתָן אוֹמֵר: מִנַּיִן שֶׁכׇּל יִשְׂרָאֵל יוֹצְאִין בְּפֶסַח אֶחָד — תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְשָׁחֲטוּ אֹתוֹ כֹּל קְהַל עֲדַת יִשְׂרָאֵל בֵּין הָעַרְבָּיִם״, וְכִי כָּל הַקָּהָל שׁוֹחֲטִין? וַהֲלֹא אֵין שׁוֹחֵט אֶלָּא אֶחָד! אֶלָּא מְלַמֵּד שֶׁכׇּל יִשְׂרָאֵל יוֹצְאִין בְּפֶסַח אֶחָד.

The Gemara asks: Which statement of Rabbi Natan is this referring to? If we say it is this statement of Rabbi Natan, as it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Natan says: From where is it derived that all Jews may fulfill their obligation after the fact with one Paschal lamb? The verse states: “And the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it in the afternoon” (Exodus 12:6). He asked: And does the entire assembly slaughter it? Is it a mitzva for each individual to slaughter his own Paschal lamb? Is it not true that only one person slaughters for the entire group? Rather, this formulation of the verse teaches that all Jews may fulfill their obligation with one Paschal lamb. It is considered as though they all slaughtered it and fulfilled their obligation, although they cannot all eat an olive-bulk of the offering.

דִּילְמָא שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּאִי מִמַּשְׁכִי הָנֵי חֲזֵי לְהָנֵי, וְאִי מִמַּשְׁכִי הָנֵי חֲזֵי לְהָנֵי!

The Gemara responds that this is not comparable to the case at hand: Perhaps it is different there, as, if these withdraw from the offering, it is fit for those, and if those withdraw it is fit for these. Although it is impossible for all Jews to partake of the same offering, the offering is fit for each individual, who could eat an olive-bulk of it if enough other people would withdraw.

אֶלָּא, הָא רַבִּי נָתָן דְּתַנְיָא: נִמְנוּ עָלָיו חֲבוּרָה אַחַת, וְחָזְרוּ וְנִמְנוּ עָלָיו חֲבוּרָה אַחֶרֶת, רִאשׁוֹנִים שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהֶן כְּזַיִת, אוֹכְלִין — וּפְטוּרִין מִלַּעֲשׂוֹת פֶּסַח שֵׁנִי, אַחֲרוֹנִים שֶׁאֵין לָהֶם כַּזַּיִת, אֵין אוֹכְלִין — וְחַיָּיבִין לַעֲשׂוֹת פֶּסַח שֵׁנִי.

Rather, it is this statement of Rabbi Natan, as it was taught in a baraita: If one group registered for a Paschal lamb and then another group registered for it, and there was not enough meat to allow each person to eat an olive-bulk, the first ones, who have an olive-bulk of the Paschal lamb for each person, eat and are exempt from performing the ritual of the Paschal lamb on the second Pesaḥ; the latter ones, who do not have an olive-bulk available from the Paschal lamb for each person, do not eat and are obligated to perform the ritual of the Paschal lamb on the second Pesaḥ.

רַבִּי נָתָן אוֹמֵר: אֵלּוּ וְאֵלּוּ פְּטוּרִין מִלַּעֲשׂוֹת פֶּסַח שֵׁנִי, שֶׁכְּבָר נִזְרַק הַדָּם.

Rabbi Natan says: Both these and those are exempt from performing the ritual of the Paschal lamb on the second Pesaḥ, as the blood has already been sprinkled. Therefore, they have all fulfilled their obligation. This indicates that, according to the opinion of Rabbi Natan, eating is not essential.

אַכַּתִּי: דִּילְמָא שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּאִי מִמַּשְׁכִי הָנֵי חֲזֵי לְהוּ. אִם כֵּן, לִיתְנֵי: הוֹאִיל וּרְאוּיִים לִימָּשֵׁךְ, מַאי ״שֶׁכְּבָר נִזְרַק הַדָּם״? שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ בְּדָם תַּלְיָא מִילְּתָא, אֲבָל אֲכִילָה לָא מְעַכְּבָא.

The Gemara responds that one can still ask: Perhaps it is different there, as, if these members of the first group withdraw, it is fit for the members of the second group. The Gemara rejects the question: If so, let it teach that the second group is exempt from the second Pesaḥ since the members of the first group are fit to withdraw. What is the reason for the statement of the baraita that the blood has already been sprinkled? Learn from this that the matter depends on the blood, but failure to engage in eating the Paschal lamb does not preclude one from fulfilling his obligation.

מַאי דּוּחְקֵיהּ דְּרַב דְּמוֹקֵים לַהּ מַתְנִיתִין לְכַתְּחִלָּה, וְרַבִּי נָתָן? נוֹקְמַהּ כְּרַבָּנַן, וַאֲפִילּוּ דִּיעֲבַד נָמֵי לָא! רַב מַתְנִיתִין קְשִׁיתֵיהּ: אַמַּאי (תָּנֵי) ״אֵין זוֹרֵק אֶת הַדָּם״? לִיתְנֵי ״פָּסוּל״. אֶלָּא שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: ״אֵין זוֹרֵק״ — לְכַתְּחִלָּה, אֲבָל דִּיעֲבַד שַׁפִּיר דָּמֵי.

The Gemara asks: What compelled Rav to establish the mishna as teaching that the blood may not be sprinkled on the altar ab initio, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan? Let us establish the mishna in accordance with the view of the Rabbis and say that even after the fact, no, one does not fulfill his obligation. The Gemara answers: Rav had difficulty with the mishna: Why does it teach that one may not sprinkle the blood? It should teach that the offering is disqualified. Rather, learn from this use of language that one may not sprinkle the blood on the altar ab initio, but after the fact it seems well.

וּלְרַבִּי נָתָן, ״אִישׁ לְפִי אׇכְלוֹ״ לְמָה לִי? דְּבָעֵינַן גַּבְרָא דַּחֲזֵי לַאֲכִילָה.

The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Natan, why do I need the phrase “according to every man’s eating,” if it does not teach that the eating is essential? The Gemara answers: It is necessary, even according to the opinion of Rabbi Natan, to teach that we require a person who is fit for eating. Although it is possible to fulfill one’s obligation without actually eating the Paschal lamb, if one is physically unable to eat some of it, e.g., one who is sick or elderly, he does not fulfill his obligation.

מַאן תְּנָא לְהָא דְּתָנוּ רַבָּנַן: שָׁחֲטוּ לְאוֹכְלָיו וְזָרְקוּ דָּמוֹ שֶׁלֹּא לְאוֹכְלָיו — הַפֶּסַח עַצְמוֹ כָּשֵׁר, וְאָדָם יוֹצֵא בּוֹ יְדֵי חוֹבָתוֹ. כְּמַאן? נֵימָא רַבִּי נָתָן הִיא, וְלָא רַבָּנַן?

The Gemara raises a discussion based on the views cited above. Who is the tanna that taught this baraita? As the Sages taught: If one slaughtered it for individuals who are able to eat it and sprinkled its blood for individuals who cannot eat it, the Paschal lamb itself is valid, and one fulfills his obligation with it. In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? Let us say it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan, who holds that eating is not essential, and not in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis?

אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבָּנַן, אֵין מַחְשְׁבֶת אוֹכְלִין בִּזְרִיקָה.

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: The baraita can be understood even if you say it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. Everyone agrees that improper intent pertaining to those who will eat the offering disqualifies the offering only if it occurs during the slaughter; it does not disqualify the offering if it occurs during the sprinkling of the blood.

מַאן תְּנָא לְהָא דְּתָנוּ רַבָּנַן: הֲרֵי שֶׁהָיָה חוֹלֶה בִּשְׁעַת שְׁחִיטָה וְחָלִים בִּשְׁעַת זְרִיקָה, חָלִים בִּשְׁעַת שְׁחִיטָה וְחוֹלֶה בִּשְׁעַת זְרִיקָה. אֵין שׁוֹחֲטִין וְזוֹרְקִין עָלָיו, עַד שֶׁיְּהֵא חָלִים מִשְּׁעַת שְׁחִיטָה עַד שְׁעַת זְרִיקָה. כְּמַאן? נֵימָא רַבָּנַן הִיא, וְלָא רַבִּי נָתָן? אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבִּי נָתָן, גַּבְרָא דַּחֲזֵי לַאֲכִילָה בָּעֵינַן.

The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna that taught this baraita? As the Sages taught: With regard to one who was sick and not able to eat meat at the time of the slaughter and was healthy at the time of the sprinkling of the blood, or one who was healthy at the time of the slaughter and sick at the time of the sprinkling of the blood, one may not slaughter or sprinkle blood for him until he is healthy from the time of slaughter until the time of the sprinkling of the blood. In accordance with whose opinion is this? Let us say it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that eating the Paschal lamb is essential, and not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: The baraita can be understood even if you say it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan, because even Rabbi Natan holds that we require a person who is fit for eating.

מַאן תְּנָא לְהָא דְּתָנוּ רַבָּנַן: שְׁחָטוֹ בְּטׇהֳרָה, וְאַחַר כָּךְ נִטְמְאוּ הַבְּעָלִים — יִזָּרֵק הַדָּם בְּטׇהֳרָה, וְאַל יֵאָכֵל בָּשָׂר בְּטוּמְאָה. כְּמַאן?

The Gemara records a further discussion: Who is the tanna that taught this baraita? As the Sages taught: If one slaughtered the Paschal lamb in ritual purity, and after that the owners became ritually impure, the blood should be sprinkled in purity and the meat should not be eaten in impurity. In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita?

אָמַר רַבִּי (אֱלִיעֶזֶר): בְּמַחְלוֹקֶת שְׁנוּיָה, וְרַבִּי נָתָן הִיא. וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבָּנַן הִיא. הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן — בְּצִיבּוּר, דַּאֲפִילּוּ בְּטוּמְאָה נָמֵי עָבְדִי.

Rabbi Eliezer said: This halakha is subject to dispute, and it is taught in this baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan, who holds that eating is not essential, and not in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The baraita can be understood even if you say that it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. With what are we dealing here? With a situation in which the majority of the public is ritually impure, in which case everyone agrees that they perform the ritual of the Paschal lamb even in a state of impurity.

אִי בְּצִיבּוּר, אַמַּאי אֵין הַבָּשָׂר נֶאֱכָל בְּטוּמְאָה? גְּזֵירָה שֶׁמָּא יִטָּמְאוּ הַבְּעָלִים לְאַחַר זְרִיקָה, וְיֹאמְרוּ: אֶשְׁתָּקַד לֹא נִטְמֵאנוּ וְאָכַלְנוּ? הַשְׁתָּא נָמֵי נֵיכוֹל. וְלָא יָדְעִי דְּאֶשְׁתָּקַד כִּי אִיזְדְּרִיק דָּם, בְּעָלִים טְמֵאִים הֲווֹ, הַשְׁתָּא בְּעָלִים טְהוֹרִין הָווּ.

The Gemara asks: If it is in a case involving the public, why is the meat not eaten in a state of impurity? When the majority of the public is impure, they may sacrifice and even consume the Paschal lamb. The Gemara answers that this prohibition is due to a rabbinic decree lest the owners become impure after the sprinkling of the blood, and they will say: Last year, didn’t we become impure, and nevertheless we ate the Paschal lamb? Now too, we will eat. And they will not know that last year, when the blood was sprinkled the owners were already impure, and therefore the offering could be consumed in a state of impurity. Now, the owners were pure when the blood was sprinkled and became impure only afterward, and a Paschal lamb sacrificed in a state of purity cannot be eaten in a state of impurity, even if everyone is impure.