פסחים ט

פסחים ט

מַתְנִי׳ אֵין חוֹשְׁשִׁין שֶׁמָּא גֵּירְרָה חוּלְדָּה מִבַּיִת לְבַיִת וּמִמָּקוֹם לְמָקוֹם, דְּאִם כֵּן מֵחָצֵר לְחָצֵר וּמֵעִיר לָעִיר — אֵין לַדָּבָר סוֹף.

MISHNA: After conducting the search, one need not be concerned that perhaps a marten dragged leaven from house to house, or from place to place, placing leaven in a house that was already searched. As if so, one need also be concerned that perhaps leaven might have been dragged from courtyard to courtyard and from city to city. In that case, there is no end to the matter, and it would be impossible to rely on any search for leaven.

גְּמָ׳ טַעְמָא דְּלָא חֲזֵינָא דִּשְׁקַל, הָא חֲזֵינָא דִּשְׁקַל — חָיְישִׁינַן, וּבָעֵי בְּדִיקָה.

GEMARA: The Gemara infers from the mishna: The reason that one need not search again is that we did not see the marten drag the leaven from the house; however, if we saw the marten drag leaven from the house, we are indeed concerned that it dragged the leaven into the second house, and it therefore requires searching for leaven.

וְאַמַּאי? נֵימָא אֲכַלְתֵּיהּ! מִי לָא תְּנַן: מְדוֹרוֹת הַגּוֹיִם טְמֵאִים. וְכַמָּה יִשְׁהֶה בְּמָדוֹר וִיהֵא הַמָּדוֹר צָרִיךְ בְּדִיקָה — אַרְבָּעִים יוֹם.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But why is this so? Let us say that the marten ate the bread it took. Didn’t we learn in a mishna: The residences of gentiles are ritually impure, as their wives may have miscarried, and due to the fact that gentiles would bury their stillborn babies in their houses, all their residences are deemed ritually impure due to the possibility of impurity imparted by a corpse. And how long must a gentile have stayed in a residence for the residence to require searching? He must have lived there for forty days. The reason is that until forty days after conception the miscarried fetus is not classified as a stillborn, as it is not sufficiently developed before that stage.

וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין לוֹ אִשָּׁה. וְכׇל מָקוֹם שֶׁחוּלְדָּה וַחֲזִיר יְכוֹלִין לַהֲלוֹךְ — אֵין צָרִיךְ בְּדִיקָה!

This mishna continues: And this decree applies even though the gentile resident has no wife. In issuing the decree, the Sages did not distinguish between a married couple and a single man, so that people would not err in its application (Me’iri). And any place where a marten or a pig can enter unimpeded need not be searched, as presumably if a stillborn was buried there, one of these animals would have taken it. As this mishna indicates that there is a presumption that martens eat whatever they find, the Gemara suggests that the same should apply to leaven. Therefore, even if one actually saw the marten take the bread, he can assume that the animal ate it, obviating the need for an additional search.

אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא, לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא בְּבָשָׂר, וְהָא בְּלֶחֶם. בְּבָשָׂר — לָא מְשַׁיְּירָא. בְּלֶחֶם — מְשַׁיְּירָא.

Rabbi Zeira said: This is not difficult, as in this case, where no search is required, it is referring to flesh, whereas in that case, where one is required to search again, it is referring to bread. Rabbi Zeira elaborates: With regard to flesh, a marten does not leave remnants behind, and therefore the stillborn would have been entirely consumed. With regard to bread, however, the marten leaves remnants behind, requiring an additional search.

אָמַר רָבָא: הַאי מַאי? בִּשְׁלָמָא הָתָם — אֵימוֹר הֲוָה, אֵימוֹר לָא הֲוָה. וְאִם תִּמְצָא לוֹמַר הֲוָה — אֵימוֹר אֲכַלְתֵּיהּ. אֲבָל הָכָא, דְּוַדַּאי דַּחֲזֵינָא דִּשְׁקַל — מִי יֵימַר דַּאֲכַלְתֵּיהּ? הָוֵי סָפֵק וּוַדַּאי, וְאֵין סָפֵק מוֹצִיא מִידֵי וַדַּאי.

Rava said: What is this comparison? These cases are not comparable. Granted, there, with regard to the stillborn, one could say that it was in the house and one could say that it was not in the house. And even if you say it was there, say that the marten ate it. The very presence of the stillborn in the house is based on an assumption, and even if it was there, it was probably consumed. However, here, where one definitely saw the marten take the bread, who will say that the marten ate it? It is a conflict between an uncertainty whether or not the marten ate the bread, and a certainty that the bread was there. The principle is that an uncertainty does not override a certainty.

וְאֵין סָפֵק מוֹצִיא מִידֵי וַדַּאי?! וְהָא תַּנְיָא: חָבֵר שֶׁמֵּת וְהִנִּיחַ מְגוּרָה מְלֵיאָה פֵּירוֹת, וַאֲפִילּוּ הֵן בְּנֵי יוֹמָן — הֲרֵי הֵן בְּחֶזְקַת מְתוּקָּנִין. וְהָא הָכָא, דְּוַדַּאי טְבִילִי הָנֵי פֵּירֵי, וְסָפֵק מְעוּשָּׂרִין וְסָפֵק לֹא מְעוּשָּׂרִין, וְקָאָתֵי סָפֵק וּמוֹצִיא מִידֵי וַדַּאי!

The Gemara raises a difficulty against this principle: And is it so that an uncertainty does not override a certainty? But wasn’t it taught in a baraita: With regard to a ḥaver who died and left a storehouse filled with produce, even if the produce was there only that day, the fruit has the presumptive status of produce that was ritually prepared, i.e., properly tithed. The assumption is that the owner tithed it himself or commanded others to do so. However, here, this produce was certainly untithed at the outset, and there is uncertainty whether they are tithed or whether they are not tithed. Despite this conflict, the uncertainty whether they were tithed comes and overrides the certainty that they were untithed produce.

הָתָם וַדַּאי וּוַדַּאי הוּא, דְּוַדַּאי מְעַשְּׂרִי, כִּדְרַבִּי חֲנִינָא חוֹזָאָה. דְּאָמַר רַבִּי חֲנִינָא חוֹזָאָה: חֲזָקָה עַל חָבֵר שֶׁאֵין מוֹצִיא מִתַּחַת יָדוֹ דָּבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ מְתוּקָּן.

The Gemara rejects this contention: There, the conflict is between certainty and certainty, as the produce is certainly tithed, in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Ḥanina Ḥoza’a. As Rabbi Ḥanina Ḥoza’a said: There is a presumption with regard to a ḥaver that he does not allow produce that is not ritually prepared, to leave his possession. It is therefore certain that the produce is tithed.

וְאִי בָּעֵית אֵימָא: סָפֵק וְסָפֵק הוּא, דִּילְמָא מֵעִקָּרָא אֵימוֹר דְּלָא טְבִילִי, כְּרַבִּי אוֹשַׁעְיָא.

And if you wish, say instead that in that case the conflict is between uncertainty and uncertainty, as perhaps one could say that the produce was never initially untithed. It is possible that there was never an obligation to tithe this produce, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Oshaya.

דְּאָמַר רַבִּי אוֹשַׁעְיָא: מַעֲרִים אָדָם עַל תְּבוּאָתוֹ, וּמַכְנִיסָהּ בַּמּוֹץ שֶׁלָּהּ, כְּדֵי שֶׁתְּהֵא בְּהֶמְתּוֹ אוֹכֶלֶת וּפְטוּרָה מִן הַמַּעֲשֵׂר.

As Rabbi Oshaya said: A person may employ artifice to circumvent obligations incumbent upon him in dealing with his grain, and bring it into the courtyard in its chaff so that his animal may eat from it. And this grain is exempt from tithes. Although the obligation to tithe produce that has been fully processed applies even to animal fodder, it is permitted to feed one’s animal untithed produce that has not been fully processed. In light of this halakha it is possible that the fruit of the ḥaver in the storehouse may not have been subject to the obligation to be tithed. Consequently, the aforementioned case involving produce is a conflict between two uncertain factors, as it is uncertain whether or not the owner was obligated to tithe the produce in the first place, and even if he was required to do so, it is uncertain whether or not the ḥaver tithed it.

וְאֵין סָפֵק מוֹצִיא מִידֵי וַדַּאי?! וְהָתַנְיָא אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה: מַעֲשֶׂה בְּשִׁפְחָתוֹ שֶׁל מֵצִיק אֶחָד בְּרִימּוֹן שֶׁהֵטִילָה נֵפֶל לְבוֹר,

The Gemara raises a further difficulty against Rava: And is it so that an uncertainty does not override a certainty? But wasn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda said: There was an incident involving the maidservant of a certain violent person in the city of Rimon, who threw a stillborn baby into a pit,

וּבָא כֹּהֵן וְהֵצִיץ בּוֹ לֵידַע אִם זָכָר הוּא אִם נְקֵבָה הִיא. וּבָא מַעֲשֶׂה לִפְנֵי חֲכָמִים, וְטִיהֲרוּהוּ, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁחוּלְדָּה וּבַרְדְּלָס מְצוּיִין שָׁם.

and a priest came and glanced at the baby to ascertain whether it is male or whether it is female, as a woman who has just given birth, even to a stillborn, is ritually impure for different lengths of time, depending on whether she gave birth to a male or a female (see Leviticus 12). And the incident came before the Sages, to rule whether or not the priest contracted ritual impurity when standing over the corpse, and they deemed him ritually pure. The basis for this ruling was due to the fact that as a marten and a polecat [bardelas] are found there, it is likely that the baby was dragged away before the priest arrived at the pit.

וְהָא הָכָא — דְּוַדַּאי הֵטִילָה, וְסָפֵק גֵּרְרוּהוּ וְסָפֵק לֹא גֵּרְרוּהוּ הָהִיא שַׁעְתָּא, וְקָאָתֵי סָפֵק וּמוֹצִיא מִידֵי וַדַּאי! לָא תֵּימָא ״שֶׁהֵטִילָה נֵפֶל לְבוֹר״, אֶלָּא אֵימָא: ״שֶׁהִפִּילָה כְּמִין נֵפֶל לְבוֹר״, וְהָוֵי סָפֵק וְסָפֵק.

And yet here, where it is certain that she threw the stillborn baby into the pit, and it is uncertain whether a marten or polecat dragged it away and it is uncertain whether it did not drag it away at that time, the Sages nevertheless ruled that an uncertainty comes and overrides a certainty. The Gemara rejects this contention: Do not say in the baraita that she certainly threw a stillborn into a pit; rather, say that she threw an object similar to a stillborn into a pit. Perhaps it was not a stillborn baby; it might have simply been congealed blood, which does not transmit impurity. And therefore, this is a conflict between uncertainty and uncertainty. It is unclear whether there was anything in the pit that could have rendered the priest ritually impure, and even if there was, it might have already been dragged away.

וְהָא ״לֵידַע אִם זָכָר הוּא אִם נְקֵבָה הִיא״ קָתָנֵי! הָכִי קָאָמַר: לֵידַע אִם רוּחַ הִפִּילָה, אִם נֵפֶל הִפִּילָה. וְאִם תִּמְצָא לוֹמַר נֵפֶל הִפִּילָה: לֵידַע אִם זָכָר הוּא וְאִם נְקֵבָה הִיא.

The Gemara retorts: But isn’t it taught in the baraita: To ascertain whether it is male or whether it is female, indicating that the only uncertainty was with regard to gender; it was certainly a stillborn baby. The Gemara rejects this proof, as this is what the baraita is saying: The priest sought to ascertain whether she miscarried mere wind, i.e., an amorphous mass, or if she miscarried a stillborn baby. And if you say that she miscarried a stillborn, he sought to ascertain whether it is male or whether it is female.

וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: הָתָם וַדַּאי וּוַדַּאי הוּא, כֵּיוָן דְּחוּלְדָּה וּבַרְדְּלָס מְצוּיִין שָׁם — וַדַּאי גֵּרְרוּהוּ בְּהָהִיא שַׁעְתָּא. נְהִי דְּשַׁיּוֹרֵי מְשַׁיְּירָא — מִיגְרָר מִיהַת וַדַּאי גֵּרְרוּם בְּהָהִיא שַׁעְתָּא. (לִישָּׁנָא אַחֲרִינָא: נְהִי דְּוַדַּאי אֲכָלוּם לָא אָמְרִינַן, וַדַּאי גֵּרְרוּהוּ לְחוֹרַיְיהוּ — אָמְרִינַן.)

And if you wish, say instead: There it is not a conflict between certainty and uncertainty; rather it is between certainty and certainty. Since a marten and a polecat are found there, they certainly dragged it away at that time, without delay. Although martens leave part of their food, in any case they certainly dragged the baby to their holes at that time. Another version of this answer: Although we do not say that they certainly ate the stillborn, we do say that they certainly dragged it to their holes. Consequently, the ruling in this case does not contradict the general principle that an uncertainty does not override a certainty.

וּמִי אָמְרִינַן אֵין חוֹשְׁשִׁין שֶׁמָּא גֵּרְרָה חוּלְדָּה? וְהָא קָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: מַה שֶּׁמְּשַׁיֵּיר יַנִּיחֶנּוּ בְּצִנְעָה, שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵא צָרִיךְ בְּדִיקָה אַחֲרָיו.

The Gemara proceeds to analyze a more fundamental aspect of the mishna: And do we say that one need not be concerned that perhaps a marten dragged the leaven? But isn’t it taught in the last clause, in the next mishna: With regard to the leaven that one leaves after the search, he should place it in a concealed location, so that it will not require searching after it? Apparently, there is concern lest a marten take some of the remaining leaven.

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: לָא קַשְׁיָא הָא — בְּאַרְבָּעָה עָשָׂר, הָא — בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה עָשָׂר. בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה עָשָׂר דִּשְׁכִיחַ רִיפְתָּא בְּכוּלְּהוּ בָּתֵּי — לָא מַצְנְעָא. בְּאַרְבָּעָה עָשָׂר דְּלָא שְׁכִיחָא רִיפְתָּא בְּכוּלְּהוּ בָּתֵּי — מַצְנְעָא.

Abaye said: This is not difficult; this ruling is referring to the fourteenth of Nisan, whereas that ruling is referring to the thirteenth. The Gemara elaborates: On the thirteenth of Nisan, when bread is still found in every house, the marten does not conceal the leaven, and therefore there is no concern that perhaps the marten dragged the leaven elsewhere and concealed it. However, on the fourteenth of Nisan, when bread is not found in any of the houses, the marten hides the leaven.

אָמַר רָבָא: וְכִי חוּלְדָּה נְבִיאָה הִיא! דְּיָדְעָא דְּהָאִידָּנָא אַרְבֵּיסַר, וְלָא אָפֵי עַד לְאוּרְתָּא, וּמְשַׁיְּירָא וּמְטַמְּרָא?! אֶלָּא, אָמַר רָבָא: מַה שֶּׁמְּשַׁיֵּיר — יַנִּיחֶנּוּ בְּצִנְעָה, שֶׁמָּא תִּטּוֹל חוּלְדָּה בְּפָנֵינוּ, וִיהֵא צָרִיךְ בְּדִיקָה אַחֲרָיו.

Rava said in surprise: And is the marten a prophetess that knows that now is the fourteenth of Nisan and no one will bake until the evening, and it leaves over bread and conceals it in its hole? Rather, Rava rejected Abaye’s answer and said: With regard to the leaven that one leaves after the search, he should place it in a concealed location, lest a marten take it before us and it will require searching after it. Only if one actually sees the marten take the leaven, is he required to search after it.

תַּנְיָא כְּווֹתֵיהּ דְּרָבָא: הָרוֹצֶה לֶאֱכוֹל חָמֵץ אַחַר בְּדִיקָה, כֵּיצַד יַעֲשֶׂה? מַה שֶּׁמְּשַׁיֵּיר יַנִּיחֶנּוּ בְּצִנְעָה, שֶׁלֹּא תָּבוֹא חוּלְדָּה וְתִיטּוֹל בְּפָנֵינוּ, וִיהֵא צָרִיךְ בְּדִיקָה אַחֲרָיו.

It was taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rava: One who wishes to eat leavened bread after his search, what should he do? With regard to the leaven that one leaves after the search, he should place it in a concealed location, so that a marten will not come and take it before us, and he will need to search the house after it.

רַב מָרִי אָמַר: גְּזֵירָה שֶׁמָּא יַנִּיחַ עֶשֶׂר וְיִמְצָא תֵּשַׁע.

Rav Mari said that there is a different resolution of the apparent contradiction between the baraitot: One conceals the leaven that he found, due to a decree lest he place ten pieces of bread and find only nine. Since the tenth piece is missing, he will be obligated to conduct an additional search.

תֵּשַׁע צִיבּוּרִין שֶׁל מַצָּה וְאֶחָד שֶׁל חָמֵץ, וַאֲתָא עַכְבָּר וּשְׁקַל. וְלָא יָדְעִינַן אִי מַצָּה שְׁקַל אִי חָמֵץ שְׁקַל — הַיְינוּ תֵּשַׁע חֲנוּיוֹת. פֵּירֵשׁ, וַאֲתָא עַכְבָּר וּשְׁקַל — הַיְינוּ סֵיפָא.

Apropos the issue of leaven taken by a rodent, the Gemara analyzes a series of similar cases. In a case where there were nine piles of matza and one pile of leavened bread, and one saw a mouse come and take a morsel from a pile, and we do not know if it took matza or if it took leavened bread, this is akin to the case of nine stores in the mishna cited below. If a portion became separated from one of the piles and we did not know if it was matza or leaven, and one saw a mouse come and take it, that is akin to the case mentioned in the latter clause of that mishna.

דִּתְנַן: תֵּשַׁע חֲנוּיוֹת, כּוּלָּן מוֹכְרִין בְּשַׂר שְׁחוּטָה, וְאַחַת מוֹכֶרֶת בְּשַׂר נְבֵלָה, וְלָקַח מֵאַחַת מֵהֶן, וְאֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ מֵאֵיזֶה מֵהֶן לָקַח — סְפֵיקוֹ אָסוּר.

The Gemara elaborates. As we learned in a baraita: With regard to nine stores in a city, all of which sell kosher meat from a slaughtered animal, and one other store that sells meat from unslaughtered animal carcasses, and a person took meat from one of them and he does not know from which one he took the meat, in this case of uncertainty, the meat is prohibited. This ruling is based on the principle: The legal status of an item fixed in its place is that of an uncertainty that is equally balanced. In this case, when it comes to determining whether or not this meat comes from a kosher store, the two types of stores are regarded as though they were equal in number.

וּבַנִּמְצָא — הַלֵּךְ אַחַר הָרוֹב.

This baraita continues: And in the case of meat found outside, follow the majority. If most stores in the city sell kosher meat one can assume that the meat he found is kosher, based on the principle: Any item separated, i.e., not fixed in its place, is presumed to have been separated from the majority. By the same token, if most stores in that city sell non-kosher meat, the meat found is presumed to be non-kosher. These two principles can be applied to the cases involving piles of matza and leaven: If the morsel was separated from the piles when taken by the mouse, follow the majority. However, if the mouse took the morsel from one of the piles, the legal status of the morsel is that of an equally balanced uncertainty concerning whether it was taken from a pile of matza or a pile of leaven, and the owner is required to conduct an additional search.

שְׁנֵי צִיבּוּרִין, אֶחָד שֶׁל מַצָּה וְאֶחָד שֶׁל חָמֵץ. וְלִפְנֵיהֶם שְׁנֵי בָתִּים, אֶחָד בָּדוּק וְאֶחָד שֶׁאֵינוֹ בָּדוּק. וַאֲתוֹ שְׁנֵי עַכְבָּרִים, אֶחָד שְׁקַל מַצָּה, וְאֶחָד שְׁקַל חָמֵץ. וְלָא יָדְעִינַן הֵי לְהַאי עָיֵיל וְהֵי לְהַאי עָיֵיל, הַיְינוּ שְׁתֵּי קוּפּוֹת.

The Gemara discusses another case: There are two piles, one of matza and one of leavened bread, and before them there are two houses, one which was searched and one which was not searched, and two mice came, and in our presence one took matza and one took leavened bread. Each mouse went into a different house, and we do not know which mouse entered this house and which mouse entered that house. It is unclear whether or not the mouse that took the leaven entered the house that was searched. This situation is akin to the case of two baskets.

דִּתְנַן: שְׁתֵּי קוּפּוֹת, אַחַת שֶׁל חוּלִּין וְאַחַת שֶׁל תְּרוּמָה. וְלִפְנֵיהֶם שְׁנֵי סְאִין, אֶחָד שֶׁל חוּלִּין וְאֶחָד שֶׁל תְּרוּמָה. וְנָפְלוּ אֵלּוּ לְתוֹךְ אֵלּוּ — מוּתָּרִין. שֶׁאֲנִי אוֹמֵר, חוּלִּין לְתוֹךְ חוּלִּין נָפְלוּ, וּתְרוּמָה לְתוֹךְ תְּרוּמָה נָפְלָה.

As we learned in the Tosefta: There are two baskets, one filled with non-sacred produce and the other one filled with teruma, and before them are two vessels each containing a se’a of produce, one filled with non-sacred produce and the other one filled with teruma. And these, the contents of each of the baskets, fell into those, each of the se’a vessels. It is possible that the teruma fell into the non-sacred produce, and it is prohibited for non-priests to eat a mixture of teruma and non-sacred produce. Nevertheless, the contents of the se’a vessel containing the non-sacred produce is permitted, as I say that the non-sacred produce fell into the non-sacred produce and the teruma fell into the teruma. Likewise, with regard to leaven, presumably the mouse took the leaven into the house that had not been searched, and there is no need to conduct an additional search of the house that was already searched.

אֵימוֹר דְּאָמְרִינַן ״שֶׁאֲנִי אוֹמֵר״

The Gemara rejects this comparison: Say that we state and apply the principle: As I say, and assume that everything occurred in a way that preserves the produce in its permitted state