סנהדרין טו

סנהדרין טו

הָאוֹמֵר: ״עֵרֶךְ כְּלִי זֶה עָלַי״ – נוֹתֵן דָּמָיו. מַאי טַעְמָא? אָדָם יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁאֵין עֵרֶךְ לִכְלִי, וְגָמַר וְאָמַר לְשׁוּם דָּמִים. מִשּׁוּם הָכִי נוֹתֵן דָּמָיו. הַאי ״עֲרָכִין הַמִּטַּלְטְלִין״? ״עֲרָכִין שֶׁל מִטַּלְטְלִין״ מִבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ! תְּנִי: עֲרָכִין שֶׁל מִטַּלְטְלִין.

With regard to one who says: The valuation of this utensil is incumbent upon me to donate, he must give the monetary value of the utensil to the Temple treasury. What is the reason for this halakha? A person knows that a utensil has no valuation, i.e., that the term valuation is not relevant to a utensil, and therefore it must be that he decided to donate money and says this expression as a reference to its monetary value, using the term imprecisely. Due to that reason, he gives its monetary value. The Gemara challenges: According to this explanation, this term: Valuations that are movable property, is not precise; the tanna should have used the term: Valuations of movable property. The Gemara answers: Emend the statement and teach: Valuations of movable property.

רַב חִסְדָּא אָמַר אֲבִימִי: בְּמַתְפִּיס מִטַּלְטְלִין לַעֲרָכִין. הַאי ״עֲרָכִין הַמִּטַּלְטְלִין״? ״מִטַּלְטְלִין שֶׁל עֲרָכִין״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ! תְּנִי: מִטַּלְטְלִין שֶׁל עֲרָכִין.

Rav Ḥisda says that Avimi says a different explanation: Rav’s statement is discussing one who associates the object of his vow with movable property for the valuation. In other words, he took a vow to pay a valuation, and did not have actual money to pay the vow, so he consecrates movable property for this purpose. This property is then appraised by three experts. The Gemara challenges: According to this explanation, this term: Valuations that are movable property, is not precise; the tanna should have used the term: Movable property of valuations. The Gemara answers: Emend the statement and teach: Movable property of valuations.

רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ אָמַר: בְּאוֹמֵר ״עֶרְכִּי עָלַי״, בָּא כֹּהֵן לִגְבּוֹת מִמֶּנּוּ מִטַּלְטְלִין – בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה, קַרְקָעוֹת – בַּעֲשָׂרָה. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא מִדִּיפְתִּי לְרָבִינָא: בִּשְׁלָמָא לְאַפּוֹקֵי מֵהֶקְדֵּשׁ בָּעֵינַן שְׁלֹשָׁה, אֶלָּא לְעַיּוֹלֵי לְהֶקְדֵּשׁ שְׁלֹשָׁה לְמָה לִי?

Rabbi Abbahu says: Rav’s statement is discussing a case of one who says: My monetary valuation is incumbent upon me to donate. If the priest came to collect movable property from him to pay the vow, it must be evaluated by three experts, and if he came to collect land it must be evaluated by ten. Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: Granted, to take out property from consecration by redeeming it we require a panel of three experts, because if an error is made in the calculation, this will lead to the sin of misuse of consecrated property. But to elevate property to the status of consecration, why do I need three judges?

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: סְבָרָא הוּא, מָה לִי עַיּוֹלֵי, מָה לִי אַפּוֹקֵי? אַפּוֹקֵי מַאי טַעְמָא: דִילְמָא טָעֵי. עַיּוֹלֵי נָמֵי דִּילְמָא טָעֵי.

Ravina said to him: This is based on logical reasoning: What difference is it to me if he is elevating the property to consecration, and what difference is it to me if he is removing it? If he is removing it, what is the reason a court is needed? It is because perhaps he will err and set a price that is too low. When he is elevating it to consecration there is also a concern that perhaps he will err and cause a loss for the Temple treasury.

רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר כּוּ׳. אָמַר לֵיהּ רַב פָּפָּא לְאַבָּיֵי: בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, הַיְינוּ דִּכְתִיב ״כֹּהֵן״. אֶלָּא לְרַבָּנַן, ״כֹּהֵן״ לְמָה לְהוּ? קַשְׁיָא.

§ The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yehuda says that when calculating the valuation of consecrated property, one of the people consulted must be a priest. Rav Pappa said to Abaye: Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, this is understandable, as it is written in the Torah portion about redeeming consecrated property: “Priest” (see, e.g., Leviticus 27:14). But according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who say that any person is fit for this, why do they need the word “priest”? The Gemara concludes: Indeed, the matter is difficult.

הַקַּרְקָעוֹת תִּשְׁעָה וְכֹהֵן. מְנָהָנֵי מִילֵּי? אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: עֲשָׂרָה כֹּהֲנִים כְּתוּבִין בַּפָּרָשָׁה, חַד לְגוּפֵיהּ, הָנָךְ הָוֵי מִיעוּט אַחַר מִיעוּט, וְאֵין מִיעוּט אַחַר מִיעוּט אֶלָּא לְרַבּוֹת, דַּאֲפִילּוּ תִּשְׁעָה יִשְׂרָאֵל וְאֶחָד כֹּהֵן.

§ The mishna teaches that valuations of consecrated land are to be made by nine judges and one priest. The Gemara asks: From where is this matter derived? Shmuel says: Priests are written in this Torah portion ten times (Leviticus, chapter 27). One instance of the word “priest” is for the matter itself, i.e., to teach that there is a need for a priest. These other instances of the word are a restrictive expression following a restrictive expression, as every additional instance of “priest” is a restrictive term. And there is a hermeneutical principle that a restrictive expression following a restrictive expression serves only to amplify and include other matters, in this case teaching that even nine Israelites and one priest may perform the valuation.

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב נָתָן: אֵימָא, חֲמִשָּׁה כֹּהֲנִים וַחֲמִשָּׁה יִשְׂרְאֵלִים? קַשְׁיָא!

Rav Huna, son of Rav Natan, objects to this explanation: According to the principle that a restrictive expression following a restrictive expression serves only to amplify, say that the procedure should require five priests and five Israelites, as the first incidence of the word “priest” indicates an actual priest, the second time the term serves to amplify and teach that even an Israelite is fitting, and then the third time it again indicates specifically a priest. According to this analysis, the final result would require five priests and five Israelites. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, it poses a difficulty.

וְאָדָם כְּיוֹצֵא בָּהֶן. אָדָם מִי קָדוֹשׁ? אָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ: בְּאוֹמֵר ״דָּמַי עָלַי״. דְּתַנְיָא: הָאוֹמֵר ״דָּמַי עָלַי״ – שָׁמִין אוֹתוֹ כְּעֶבֶד הַנִּמְכָּר בַּשּׁוּק. וְעֶבֶד אִתַּקַּשׁ לְקַרְקָעוֹת.

§ The mishna teaches that just as the valuation of consecrated land is performed by nine judges and one priest, the valuation of a person for the purpose of a vow is performed in a similar manner. The Gemara asks: Can a person be consecrated? It is not possible to consecrate a person, and therefore it is unclear what sort of valuation would be necessary. Rabbi Abbahu says: The mishna is referring to one who says: My monetary value is incumbent upon me to donate to the Temple treasury. As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who says: My monetary value is incumbent upon me, the court appraises him as a slave who is sold in the market, and the price that would be paid for him as a slave is the amount he must give to the Temple treasury. And as a slave is compared to land with regard to halakhot of transactions, the valuation is performed by a panel of nine experts and a priest, as is done when land is appraised.

בָּעֵי רַבִּי אָבִין: שֵׂעָר הָעוֹמֵד לְיִגָּזֵז, בְּכַמָּה? כְּגָזוּז דָּמֵי, וּבִשְׁלֹשָׁה? אוֹ כִּמְחוּבָּר דָּמֵי, וּבַעֲשָׂרָה?

Rabbi Avin raises a dilemma: With regard to a person’s hair that was consecrated and which is ready to be shorn, by how many judges is the appraisal made? Is such hair deemed similar to hair that has already been shorn, and accordingly it is appraised like other movable property, i.e., by three judges, or is it considered as hair still attached to the body and accordingly appraised by ten judges?

תָּא שְׁמַע: הַמַּקְדִּישׁ אֶת עַבְדּוֹ – אֵין מוֹעֲלִין בּוֹ. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: מוֹעֲלִין בִּשְׂעָרוֹ. וְקַיְימָא לַן דְּבִשְׂעָרוֹ הָעוֹמֵד לִיגָּזֵז פְּלִיגִי. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution of the dilemma from a baraita: Concerning one who consecrates his slave, a person who derives benefit from the slave is not liable for misuse of consecrated property, since the slave’s body does not become consecrated. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: One who derives benefit from the slave’s hair is liable for misuse of consecrated property. And we maintain that it is with regard to hair that is ready to be shorn that they disagree. The Gemara concludes: Learn from here that the question of whether such hair is viewed as already shorn is a dispute between tanna’im.

נֵימָא: הָנֵי תַּנָּאֵי כְּהָנֵי תַּנָּאֵי. דִּתְנַן, רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: יֵשׁ דְּבָרִים שֶׁהֵן כַּקַּרְקַע וְאֵינָן כַּקַּרְקַע, וְאֵין חֲכָמִים מוֹדִים לוֹ. כֵּיצַד? עֶשֶׂר גְּפָנִים טְעוּנוֹת מָסַרְתִּי לָךְ, וְהַלָּה אוֹמֵר: אֵינָן אֶלָּא חָמֵשׁ – רַבִּי מֵאִיר מְחַיֵּיב, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: כׇּל הַמְחוּבָּר לַקַּרְקַע הֲרֵי הוּא כַּקַּרְקַע.

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the opinion of these tanna’im is like the opinion of those tanna’im. As we learned in a mishna (Shevuot 42b): Rabbi Meir says: There are entities that are like land in one aspect, and are not like land in other aspects; and the Rabbis do not concede to him. How so? If one said to another: I gave you ten vines laden with grapes and I want to receive their value, and the other says: There were only five, Rabbi Meir deems the defendant liable to take an oath, in accordance with the halakha concerning one who admits to part of a claim. And the Rabbis say: Any item that is attached to the land is viewed as the land itself, and the halakha is that there is no oath in cases of claims with regard to land.

וְאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר חֲנִינָא: בַּעֲנָבִים הָעוֹמְדוֹת לִיבָּצֵר עָסְקִינַן. מָר סָבַר: כִּבְצוּרוֹת דָּמְיָין, וּמָר סָבַר: לָאו כִּבְצוּרוֹת דָּמְיָין. לָא, אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבִּי מֵאִיר. עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר הָתָם, (כֹּל) כַּמָּה דְּשָׁבְקַתְּ לְהוּ מִיכְחָשׁ כָּחֲשִׁי. אֲבָל שְׂעָרוֹ, (כֹּל) כַּמָּה דְּשָׁבְקַתְּ לְהוּ אַשְׁבּוֹחֵי מַשְׁבַּח.

And Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina says: In this mishna, we are dealing with grapes that are ready to be picked. One Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds they are considered as grapes that have been picked, i.e., movable property, and one Sage, the Rabbis, holds they are not considered as grapes that have been picked. This suggestion is rejected: No, this cannot be proven from here, as you may even say that the opinion of the Rabbis with regard to the hair is similar to the opinion of Rabbi Meir in the mishna. Only there, with regard to the vines, Rabbi Meir says that they are viewed as already picked, because the more he leaves them on the vine, the more they become lean and deteriorate. Consequently, the grapes are viewed as picked. But in the case of his hair, the more he leaves it on his head the more it improves, as longer hair has a greater value. Consequently, it cannot be said that hair that is ready to be shorn is viewed as already shorn.

דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת כּוּ׳. קָא פָּסֵיק וְתָנֵי, לָא שְׁנָא רוֹבֵעַ זָכָר וְלָא שְׁנָא רוֹבֵעַ נְקֵבָה. בִּשְׁלָמָא רוֹבֵעַ נְקֵבָה, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְהָרַגְתָּ אֶת הָאִשָּׁה וְאֶת הַבְּהֵמָה״. אֶלָּא רוֹבֵעַ זָכָר, מְנָא לַן?

§ The mishna teaches that cases of capital law are judged by twenty-three judges, and that an animal that copulated with a person is also judged by twenty-three judges. The Gemara comments: The mishna categorically teaches this halakha, indicating that there is no difference if this was an ox that copulated with a male, and there is no difference if it was an ox that copulated with a female. The Gemara asks: Granted, the source for this halakha is clear in the case where it copulated with a female, as it is written explicitly: “And if a woman approaches any animal and lies down with it, you shall kill the woman and the animal” (Leviticus 20:16). But with regard to an ox that copulated with a male, from where do we derive that the animal is to be killed?

דִּכְתִיב: ״כׇּל שֹׁכֵב עִם בְּהֵמָה מוֹת יוּמָת״. אִם אֵינוֹ עִנְיָן לְשׁוֹכֵב, תְּנֵיהוּ עִנְיָן לְנִשְׁכָּב. וְאַפְּקֵיהּ רַחֲמָנָא בִּלְשׁוֹן שׁוֹכֵב, לְאַקּוֹשֵׁי נִשְׁכָּב לְשׁוֹכֵב: מָה שׁוֹכֵב – הוּא וּבְהֶמְתּוֹ בְּעֶשְׂרִים וּשְׁלֹשָׁה, אַף נִשְׁכָּב – הוּא וּבְהֶמְתּוֹ בְּעֶשְׂרִים וּשְׁלֹשָׁה.

The Gemara answers: As it is written: “Whoever lies with an animal shall be put to death” (Exodus 22:18). If this verse is not needed for the matter of the one who actively lies with the animal, i.e., a male who sexually penetrates the animal, apply it to the matter of the one who causes the animal to lie with him, by being penetrated by the animal. There is another verse (Leviticus 20:15) that explicitly addresses a man penetrating the animal sexually; this verse from Exodus is therefore understood to be referring to the case where he causes the animal to penetrate him. And the Merciful One brought this forth using the active term “lies,” to compare one who causes the animal to lie with him to one who actively lies with the animal, in order to teach that just as in a case of one who lies with an animal, he and his animal are to be judged by twenty-three judges, so too, in the case of one who causes an animal to lie with him, he and his animal are to be judged by twenty-three judges.

שׁוֹר הַנִּסְקָל בְּעֶשְׂרִים וּשְׁלֹשָׁה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״הַשּׁוֹר יִסָּקֵל וְגַם בְּעָלָיו יוּמָת״. כְּמִיתַת הַבְּעָלִים כָּךְ מִיתַת הַשּׁוֹר. אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי לְרָבָא: מִמַּאי דְּהַאי ״וְגַם בְּעָלָיו יוּמָת״ לִכְמִיתַת בְּעָלִים כָּךְ מִיתַת הַשּׁוֹר הוּא דַּאֲתָא?

§ The mishna teaches that an ox that is to be stoned is judged by twenty-three judges, as it is stated: “The ox shall be stoned and also its owner shall be put to death” (Exodus 21:29). From this verse it is derived that just as the manner of the death of the owner, so is the manner of the death of the ox. Consequently, it follows that twenty-three judges are necessary to adjudicate the case of the ox that is to be stoned. Abaye said to Rava: From where do we know that this phrase: “And also its owner shall be put to death,” comes to teach that just as the manner of the death of the owner, so is the manner of the death of the ox?

אֵימָא לִקְטָלָא הוּא דַּאֲתָא! אִם כֵּן, לִיכְתּוֹב ״וְגַם בְּעָלָיו״, וְלִישְׁתּוֹק!

Why not say instead that it comes to teach that the owner of the ox is liable to receive the death penalty? Rava responded: If so, let it write in the same verse only: “The ox shall be stoned and also its owner,” and let it be silent and not add more. It would be clear that the owner is also to be put to death. Since the verse added the explicit term: “Shall be put to death,” it is clear that the intention is to teach that just as the manner of the death of the owner, so is the manner of the death of the ox.

אִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא הָכִי, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא בִּסְקִילָה. בִּסְקִילָה סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ? קְטַל אִיהוּ – בְּסַיִיף, מָמוֹנוֹ – בִּסְקִילָה?

Abaye said: Had the Merciful One written the verse in this manner, I would say that the owner is executed by stoning. The Gemara rejects this: Would it enter your mind to say he should be executed by stoning? If he killed the person himself he would be executed by the sword, which is deemed a lighter punishment; if his property killed the victim, could he be given the more severe execution by stoning?

וְדִילְמָא הַאי דִּכְתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״יוּמָת״ לְאַקּוֹלֵי עִילָּוֵיהּ, לְאַפּוֹקֵי מִסַּיִיף לְחֶנֶק? הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר חֶנֶק חָמוּר, אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר חֶנֶק קִיל, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?

The Gemara asks: But perhaps this term that the Merciful One wrote: “Shall be put to death,” is to be lenient with him, to remove his sentence from the category of execution by the sword and instead to sentence him to death by strangulation. This works out well according to the one who says that strangulation is more severe than the sword. According to that opinion there is no place for such a claim, as the punishment is certainly not more severe than that of an actual murderer. But according to the one who says that strangulation is a lighter punishment, what is there to say?

לָא סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ, דִּכְתִיב: ״אִם כֹּפֶר יוּשַׁת עָלָיו״. וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ בַּר קְטָלָא הוּא, וְהָכְתִיב: ״לֹא תִקְחוּ כֹפֶר לְנֶפֶשׁ רֹצֵחַ״!

The Gemara responds: It would not enter your mind to think this, as it is written: “If a ransom be placed upon him, then he shall give for the redemption of his life whatever is placed upon him” (Exodus 21:30), and if it enters your mind to say that he is liable to receive the death penalty, that verse would not be understood, for the following reason: But isn’t it written: “You shall take no ransom for the life of a murderer who was convicted to die, for he shall be put to death” (Numbers 35:31)? Since in this case there is a ransom payment, it is clear that there is no actual death penalty involved.

אַדְּרַבָּה, מִשּׁוּם הִיא גּוּפַהּ: קְטַל אִיהוּ – לָא תִּיסְגֵּי לֵיהּ בְּמָמוֹנָא אֶלָּא בִּקְטָלָא. קְטַל שׁוֹרוֹ – לִיפְרוֹק נַפְשֵׁיהּ בְּמָמוֹנָא. אֶלָּא, אָמַר חִזְקִיָּה וְכֵן תָּנָא דְּבֵי חִזְקִיָּה: אָמַר קְרָא ״מוֹת יוּמַת הַמַּכֶּה רֹצֵחַ הוּא״ – עַל רְצִיחָתוֹ אַתָּה הוֹרְגוֹ, וְאִי אַתָּה הוֹרְגוֹ עַל רְצִיחַת שׁוֹרוֹ.

This line of reasoning is rejected: On the contrary, the additional phrase in the verse is necessary due to this argument itself. If one killed a person himself, it would not be enough for him to make a payment of money; he must be punished only with actual execution. But if his ox killed someone, I would say he should redeem himself with money, but that if he does not pay money, he would receive the death penalty. Rather, the matter cannot be decided on the basis of these verses, and it must be proven by what Ḥizkiyya says, and so the school of Ḥizkiyya taught this baraita: The verse states: “He that struck him shall be put to death; he is a murderer” (Numbers 35:21), from which it is inferred: You execute him for his act of murder, but you do not execute him for his ox’s act of murder.

אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: שׁוֹר סִינַי בְּכַמָּה? מִי גָּמַר שָׁעָה מִדּוֹרוֹת, אוֹ לָא? תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּתָנֵי רָמֵי בַּר יְחֶזְקֵאל: ״אִם בְּהֵמָה אִם אִישׁ לֹא יִחְיֶה״ – מָה אִישׁ בְּעֶשְׂרִים וּשְׁלֹשָׁה, אַף בְּהֵמָה בְּעֶשְׂרִים וּשְׁלֹשָׁה.

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: By how many judges would an ox at Mount Sinai have been judged? At the time of the giving of the Torah it was forbidden to ascend onto Mount Sinai, as it is written: “No hand shall touch him, but he shall be stoned or shot through; whether animal or man, it shall not live” (Exodus 19:13). If an ox did ascend the mountain, how many judges would be necessary to sentence it to execution by stoning? The Gemara explains the question: Do we derive a halakha that applies only to a specific time from a halakha that applies for all generations, and accordingly any animal that is to be stoned is judged by twenty-three judges; or not? The Gemara answers: Come and hear a solution from that which Rami bar Yeḥezkel taught: The verse states: “Whether animal or man it shall not live.” The comparison serves to teach that just as a person is judged by twenty-three judges, so too an animal is judged by twenty-three judges.

הָאֲרִי וְהַזְּאֵב כּוּ׳. אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: וְהוּא שֶׁהֵמִיתוּ, אֲבָל לֹא הֵמִיתוּ – לָא. אַלְמָא קָסָבַר: יֵשׁ לָהֶן תַּרְבּוּת וְיֵשׁ לָהֶן בְּעָלִים. רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא הֵמִיתוּ. אַלְמָא קָסָבַר: אֵין לָהֶם תַּרְבּוּת וְאֵין לָהֶם בְּעָלִים.

§ The mishna records a dispute with regard to the judgment of a lion or a wolf: Does this judgment require twenty-three judges? Reish Lakish says: And that dispute concerns a lion or wolf that has killed a person. But if they have not killed, then no, they may not be executed. Apparently, Reish Lakish holds that they have the capability of being tamed and domesticated, and consequently they might have owners, so it is not permitted to kill them without due cause. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The dispute applies even if they have not killed. Apparently, Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that they do not have the capability of being tamed, and therefore they do not have owners.

תְּנַן, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: כׇּל הַקּוֹדֵם לְהוֹרְגָן זָכָה. בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, לְמַאי זָכָה? זָכָה לְעוֹרָן. אֶלָּא לְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, לְמַאי זָכָה? כֵּיוָן שֶׁהֵמִיתוּ, שַׁוִּינְהוּ רַבָּנַן כְּמַאן דִּגְמַר דִּינַיְיהוּ, וְאִיסּוּרֵי הֲנָאָה נִינְהוּ.

We learned in the mishna: Rabbi Eliezer says: Anyone who kills them first merits. Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, what does he merit? It can be explained that he merits, i.e., acquires, their hides; since these animals are by definition ownerless, whoever kills them first may take the hide for himself. But according to the opinion of Reish Lakish, what does he merit? Since according to Reish Lakish the mishna is discussing a case where they have already killed, the Sages made their status equivalent to those whose verdicts have been issued in court, and oxen that are stoned are items from which deriving benefit is prohibited.

מַאי ״זָכָה״? זָכָה לַשָּׁמַיִם. תַּנְיָא כְּוָותֵיהּ דְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: אֶחָד שׁוֹר שֶׁהֵמִית וְאֶחָד בְּהֵמָה וְחַיָּה שֶׁהֵמִיתוּ – בְּעֶשְׂרִים וּשְׁלֹשָׁה. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: שׁוֹר שֶׁהֵמִית – בְּעֶשְׂרִים וּשְׁלֹשָׁה, וּשְׁאָר בְּהֵמָה וְחַיָּה שֶׁהֵמִיתוּ – כׇּל הַקּוֹדֵם לְהוֹרְגָן זָכָה בָּהֶן לַשָּׁמַיִם.

The Gemara answers: What is the meaning of: Merits, according to Reish Lakish? It means that he merits according to Heaven, meaning that he has performed a mitzva by destroying a harmful animal. The Gemara relates: It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish (Tosefta 3:1): Both an ox that killed and a different domesticated animal or undomesticated animal that killed are sentenced by twenty-three judges. Rabbi Eliezer says: An ox that killed is sentenced by twenty-three judges, but with regard to other domesticated animals and undomesticated animals that killed, anyone who kills them first merits, with that act, according to Heaven. It is therefore apparent that the disagreement concerns only animals that have killed, and that, as Reish Lakish explained, the term: Merits, indicates only a moral achievement but not a financial acquisition.

רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר וְכוּ׳. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא הַיְינוּ תַּנָּא קַמָּא? אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ נָחָשׁ.

§ The mishna states that with regard to these dangerous animals, Rabbi Akiva says: Their death is decreed by twenty-three judges. The Gemara asks: The opinion of Rabbi Akiva is identical to the opinion of the first tanna; what is the novelty of his statement? The Gemara answers: The difference between them relates to the halakha concerning a snake. According to the first tanna, a snake is also sentenced by twenty-three judges, whereas Rabbi Akiva holds that all domesticated and undomesticated animals other than snakes are included in this requirement.

אֵין דָּנִין כּוּ׳. הַאי שֵׁבֶט דַּחֲטָא בְּמַאי? אִילֵימָא שֵׁבֶט שֶׁחִלֵּל אֶת הַשַּׁבָּת, אֵימַר דְּפַלֵּיג רַחֲמָנָא בֵּין יְחִידִים לִמְרוּבִּין לְעִנְיַן עֲבוֹדַת כּוֹכָבִים, בִּשְׁאָר מִצְוֹת מִי פְּלִיג? אֶלָּא בְּשֵׁבֶט שֶׁהוּדַּח.

§ The mishna teaches that the court judges cases involving an entire tribe that sinned only in the Great Sanhedrin, consisting of seventy-one judges. The Gemara asks: With regard to this tribe that sinned, in what way did it sin? If we say that it was a tribe that transgressed most prohibitions, e.g., they desecrated Shabbat, this is difficult. There is a source to say that the Merciful One distinguishes between individuals and multitudes with regard to idol worship, as there is a special halakha with regard to an idolatrous city. But with regard to other mitzvot, does He distinguish between individuals and multitudes? Rather, it must be that the mishna is discussing a tribe that was subverted and which engaged in idol worship.

לְמֵימְרָא דִּבְדִינָא דְּרַבִּים דָּיְינִינַן לֵיהּ? כְּמַאן: לָא כְּרַבִּי יֹאשִׁיָּה וְלָא כְּרַבִּי יוֹנָתָן! דְּתַנְיָא: עַד כַּמָּה עוֹשִׂין עִיר הַנִּדַּחַת? מֵעֲשָׂרָה וְעַד מֵאָה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יֹאשִׁיָּה. רַבִּי יוֹנָתָן אוֹמֵר: מִמֵּאָה וְעַד רוּבּוֹ שֶׁל שֵׁבֶט.

The Gemara asks: Is this to say that we judge such a tribe with the halakha of a multitude, meaning that an entire idolatrous tribe is subject to the same treatment as an idolatrous city? If so, in accordance with whose opinion is the mishna? It is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoshiya, and not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yonatan. As it is taught in a baraita: How many people in a city must engage in idol worship for it to be designated as an idolatrous city? From ten until one hundred people; this is the statement of Rabbi Yoshiya. Rabbi Yonatan says: From one hundred people until a majority of a tribe.

וַאֲפִילּוּ רַבִּי יוֹנָתָן לָא קָאָמַר אֶלָּא רוּבּוֹ, אֲבָל כּוּלּוֹ לָא. אָמַר רַב מַתְנָה: הָכָא

And it is therefore apparent that even Rabbi Yonatan, who allows a larger community to be declared an idolatrous city, said this only with regard to a majority of the tribe at most, but if it was all of the tribe that was idolatrous, then the halakha of an idolatrous city does not apply. Rav Mattana said: Here, in the mishna,