סנהדרין לב

סנהדרין לב

מַתְנִי׳ אֶחָד דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת וְאֶחָד דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת בִּדְרִישָׁה וּבַחֲקִירָה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״מִשְׁפַּט אֶחָד יִהְיֶה לָכֶם״.

MISHNA: Both cases of monetary law and cases of capital law are equal with regard to the requirement for inquiry and interrogation of the witnesses, as it is stated: “You shall have one manner of law” (Leviticus 24:22), meaning that all legal procedures must be uniform.

מָה בֵּין דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת לְדִינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת? דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת – בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה, וְדִינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת – בְּעֶשְׂרִים וּשְׁלֹשָׁה. דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת – פּוֹתְחִין בֵּין לִזְכוּת בֵּין לְחוֹבָה, וְדִינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת – פּוֹתְחִין לִזְכוּת וְאֵין פּוֹתְחִין לְחוֹבָה.

Having stated the essential similarity between the two, the mishna enumerates the differences between them. What are the differences between cases of monetary law and cases of capital law? Cases of monetary law are judged by a court of three judges, and cases of capital law are judged by a court of twenty-three judges. In cases of monetary law, the court opens the deliberations either with a claim to exempt the accused, or with a claim to find him liable. And in cases of capital law, the court opens the deliberations with a claim to acquit the accused, but it does not open the deliberations with a claim to find him liable.

דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת – מַטִּין עַל פִּי אֶחָד, בֵּין לִזְכוּת בֵּין לְחוֹבָה, וְדִינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת – מַטִּין עַל פִּי אֶחָד לִזְכוּת, וְעַל פִּי שְׁנַיִם לְחוֹבָה.

In cases of monetary law, the court directs, i.e., issues, the ruling based on a majority of one judge, either to exempt, or to find liable. But in cases of capital law, the court directs the judgment based on a majority of one judge to acquit and based on a majority of two judges to find liable.

דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת – מַחְזִירִין בֵּין לִזְכוּת בֵּין לְחוֹבָה, דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת – מַחְזִירִין לִזְכוּת וְאֵין מַחְזִירִין לְחוֹבָה.

In cases of monetary law, the court brings the accused back to be judged again if new evidence arises, either with a claim to exempt the accused, or with a claim to find him liable. In cases of capital law, the court brings the accused back to be judged again with a claim to acquit him, but the court does not bring him back to be judged with a claim to find him liable.

דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת – הַכֹּל מְלַמְּדִין זְכוּת וְחוֹבָה, דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת – הַכֹּל מְלַמְּדִין זְכוּת, וְאֵין הַכֹּל מְלַמְּדִין חוֹבָה.

In cases of monetary law, all those present at the trial may teach a reason to exempt a litigant or to find him liable. In cases of capital law, all those present at the trial may teach a reason to acquit the accused, but not all present may teach a reason to find him liable. Only the judges can teach a reason to find him liable.

דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת – הַמְלַמֵּד חוֹבָה מְלַמֵּד זְכוּת, וְהַמְלַמֵּד זְכוּת מְלַמֵּד חוֹבָה. דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת – הַמְלַמֵּד חוֹבָה מְלַמֵּד זְכוּת, אֲבָל הַמְלַמֵּד זְכוּת אֵין יָכוֹל לַחְזוֹר וּלְלַמֵּד חוֹבָה.

In cases of monetary law, one who initially teaches a reason to find the accused liable may then teach a reason to exempt him, and one who initially teaches a reason to exempt him may then teach a reason to find him liable. In cases of capital law, one who initially teaches a reason to find him liable may then teach a reason to acquit, but one who initially teaches a reason to acquit may not return and teach a reason to find him liable.

דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת – דָּנִין בַּיּוֹם, וְגוֹמְרִין בַּלַּיְלָה. דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת – דָּנִין בַּיּוֹם, וְגוֹמְרִין בַּיּוֹם.

In cases of monetary law, the court judges during the daytime, and may conclude the deliberations and issue the ruling even at night. In cases of capital law, the court judges during the daytime, and concludes the deliberations and issues the ruling only in the daytime.

דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת – גּוֹמְרִין בּוֹ בַּיּוֹם, בֵּין לִזְכוּת בֵּין לְחוֹבָה. דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת – גּוֹמְרִין בּוֹ בַּיּוֹם לִזְכוּת, וּבַיּוֹם שֶׁלְּאַחֲרָיו לְחוֹבָה. לְפִיכָךְ, אֵין דָּנִין לֹא בְּעֶרֶב שַׁבָּת וְלֹא בְּעֶרֶב יוֹם טוֹב.

In cases of monetary law, the court may conclude the deliberations and issue the ruling even on that same day, whether to exempt the accused or to find him liable. In cases of capital law, the court may conclude the deliberations and issue the ruling even on that same day to acquit the accused, but must wait until the following day to find him liable. Therefore, since capital cases might continue for two days, the court does not judge cases of capital law on certain days, neither on the eve of Shabbat nor the eve of a Festival.

דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת, הַטְּמָאוֹת וְהַטְּהָרוֹת – מַתְחִילִין מִן הַגָּדוֹל. דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת – מַתְחִילִין מִן הַצַּד.

In cases of monetary law, and likewise in the cases of ritual impurity and purity, the judges commence expressing their opinions from the greatest of the judges. In cases of capital law, the judges commence issuing their opinions from the side, where the least significant judges sit.

הַכֹּל כְּשֵׁרִין לָדוּן דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת, וְאֵין הַכֹּל כְּשֵׁרִין לָדוּן דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת, אֶלָּא כֹּהֲנִים לְוִיִּם וְיִשְׂרְאֵלִים הַמַּשִּׂיאִין לַכְּהוּנָּה.

All are fit to judge cases of monetary law. But not all are fit to judge cases of capital law; only priests, Levites, and Israelites who are of sufficiently fit lineage to marry their daughters to members of the priesthood are fit to judge cases of capital law.

גְּמָ׳ דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת מִי בָּעֵינַן דְּרִישָׁה וַחֲקִירָה? וּרְמִינְהוּ: שְׁטָר שֶׁזְּמַנּוֹ כָּתוּב בְּאֶחָד בְּנִיסָן בַּשְּׁמִיטָּה, וּבָאוּ עֵדִים וְאָמְרוּ: ״הֵיאַךְ אַתֶּם מְעִידִין עַל שְׁטָר זֶה? וַהֲלֹא בְּיוֹם פְּלוֹנִי עִמָּנוּ הֱיִיתֶם בְּמָקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי!״ שְׁטָר כָּשֵׁר וְעֵדָיו כְּשֵׁרִין. חָיְישִׁינַן שֶׁמָּא אִיחֲרוּהוּ וּכְתָבוּהוּ.

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that cases of monetary law require inquiry and interrogation of the witnesses. The Gemara asks: Do we require inquiry and interrogation in cases of monetary law? And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a baraita (Tosefta, Makkot 1:2): With regard to a promissory note whose date is written on the first of Nisan of the Sabbatical Year, and witnesses came and said to the signatory witnesses: How is it that you are testifying concerning this promissory note? But is it not so that on such and such day on which the promissory note was written you were with us in such and such place? The promissory note is nevertheless valid, and its witnesses remain fit to bear witness. The reason they are not proven to have signed the promissory note falsely is that we are concerned that perhaps they delayed and wrote it, i.e., the loan was given on an earlier date, and the promissory note was postdated.

וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ בָּעֵינַן דְּרִישָׁה וַחֲקִירָה, הֵיכִי חָיְישִׁינַן שֶׁמָּא אִיחֲרוּהוּ וּכְתָבוּהוּ?

The Gemara explains the contradiction: And if it enters your mind to say that we require inquiry and interrogation in cases of monetary law, how are we concerned that perhaps they delayed and wrote it? The signatory witnesses would be asked on which day they signed the promissory note, and when that does not accord with what is written in the promissory note, their testimony would be disregarded.

וְלִיטַעְמָיךְ, תִּיקְשֵׁי לָךְ מַתְנִיתִין: שִׁטְרֵי חוֹב הַמּוּקְדָּמִין פְּסוּלִים, וְהַמְאוּחָרִים כְּשֵׁרִין. וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ בָּעֵינַן דְּרִישָׁה וַחֲקִירָה, מְאוּחָרִין אַמַּאי כְּשֵׁרִין?

The Gemara counters: And according to your reasoning that we do not require inquiry and interrogation in cases of monetary law, the mishna elsewhere should pose a difficulty for you as well. As mishnayot are more authoritative than baraitot, it is preferable to raise a contradiction between two mishnayot than to raise a contradiction from a baraita to a mishna. The mishna teaches (Shevi’it 10:5): Antedated promissory notes are not valid, but postdated promissory notes are valid. And if it enters your mind to say we require inquiry and interrogation in cases of monetary law and that if there is a contradiction the testimony is not accepted, why are postdated promissory notes valid? The witnesses’ testimony does not accord with what is written in the document.

הָא לָא קַשְׁיָא, דַּעֲדִיפָא מִינַּהּ קָאָמְרִינַן. דַּאֲפִילּוּ אֶחָד בְּנִיסָן בִּשְׁמִיטָּה, דְּלָא שְׁכִיחִי אִינָשֵׁי דְּמוֹזְפִי, דְּלֵיכָּא לְמֵימַר שֶׁמָּא אִיחֲרוּהוּ וּכְתָבוּהוּ דְּלָא מַרַע לִשְׁטָרֵיהּ, אֲפִילּוּ הָכִי, כֵּיוָן דִּשְׁבִיעִית סוֹפָהּ מְשַׁמֶּטֶת – מַכְשְׁרִינַן.

The Gemara explains: This is not difficult. There is a reason why the contradiction was raised from the baraita, not from the mishna. We are saying a better, i.e., stronger, contradiction than the one from the mishna. As one sees in the baraita that even with regard to a promissory note written on the first of Nisan in the Sabbatical Year, when it is not common to find people to lend money, as all debts are canceled at the close of the Sabbatical Year, where it is not as reasonable to say that perhaps they delayed and wrote the promissory note, as one would not damage his promissory note by postdating it so close to the end of the Sabbatical Year; even so, since the Sabbatical Year cancels debts only at its close, we are concerned that the promissory note is postdated and we deem it valid. This is why the contradiction was raised from the baraita, not from the mishna.

מִכׇּל מָקוֹם, קַשְׁיָא. סִימָן: חרפ״ש.

The Gemara returns to its question: In any case, the contradiction between the mishna and the baraita is difficult. The Gemara presents a mnemonic device for the following discussion, with each letter representing the name of a Sage who suggests an answer: Ḥet, reish, peh, shin.

אָמַר רַבִּי חֲנִינָא: דְּבַר תּוֹרָה, אֶחָד דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת וְאֶחָד דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת בִּדְרִישָׁה וּבַחֲקִירָה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״מִשְׁפַּט אֶחָד יִהְיֶה לָכֶם״. וּמָה טַעַם אָמְרוּ דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת לָא בָּעֵינַן דְּרִישָׁה וַחֲקִירָה? כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא תִּנְעוֹל דֶּלֶת בִּפְנֵי לֹוִין.

The Gemara cites the first answer. Rabbi Ḥanina says: By Torah law, both cases of monetary law and cases of capital law are equal with regard to inquiry and interrogation of witnesses, as it is stated: “You shall have one manner of law” (Leviticus 24:22). And what is the reason the Sages said that in cases of monetary law we do not need inquiry and interrogation? It is an ordinance instituted by the Sages so as not to lock the door in the face of potential borrowers. The Sages were concerned that intensive examination of the witnesses would often result in contradictory testimony and render it difficult for lenders to collect their debts. This could lead to people refraining from lending money.

אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה

The Gemara asks: If that is so that the Sages removed the requirement for inquiry and interrogation in cases of monetary law,

טָעוּ – לֹא יְשַׁלְּמוּ? כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן שֶׁתִּנְעוֹל דֶּלֶת בִּפְנֵי לוֹוִין!

then if the judges erred they should not need to pay the party they wronged, as they can claim that they were prevented from examining the witnesses effectively. The Gemara answers: If that were to be the halakha, all the more so that this would lock the door in the face of potential borrowers. If people know that the courts are not responsible for an error in judgment, they will not be willing to lend money.

רָבָא אָמַר: מַתְנִיתִין דְּהָכָא בְּדִינֵי קְנָסוֹת, וְאִידַּךְ בְּהוֹדָאוֹת וְהַלְוָאוֹת.

Rava says: The ruling of the mishna here, that cases of monetary law require inquiry and interrogation, is stated with regard to laws of fines, not standard cases of monetary law. And the other sources, i.e., the mishna in tractate Shevi’it and the baraita, which do not require inquiry and interrogation, are stated with regard to cases of admissions and loans, in which there is cause to relax the procedures of deliberation, as explained.

רַב פָּפָּא אָמַר: אִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי בְּהוֹדָאָה וְהַלְוָאָה. כָּאן – בְּדִין מְרוּמֶּה, כָּאן – בְּדִין שֶׁאֵינוֹ מְרוּמֶּה.

Rav Pappa says: This and that, i.e., both the mishna here and the other sources, are stated with regard to cases of an admission and a loan. The distinction between them is that the mishna here, which rules that cases of monetary law require inquiry and interrogation, is stated with regard to a possibly fraudulent trial, where the court suspects that one party is attempting to defraud the other party and have witnesses offer false testimony on his own behalf. There, in the baraita and in the mishna in tractate Shevi’it, which do not require inquiry and interrogation, the ruling is stated with regard to a trial that does not appear fraudulent.

כִּדְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, דְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ רָמֵי: כְּתִיב ״בְּצֶדֶק תִּשְׁפֹּט עֲמִיתֶךָ״, וּכְתִיב ״צֶדֶק צֶדֶק תִּרְדֹּף״. הָא כֵּיצַד? כָּאן – בְּדִין מְרוּמֶּה, כָּאן – בְּדִין שֶׁאֵין מְרוּמֶּה.

This distinction is in accordance with the statement of Reish Lakish, as Reish Lakish raises a contradiction between two verses: It is written in one verse: “In justice shall you judge your neighbor” (Leviticus 19:15), and it is written in another verse: “Justice, justice, shall you follow” (Deuteronomy 16:20), with the repetition indicating that it is not enough to merely judge with justice. He continues: How can these texts be reconciled? Here, this latter verse is stated with regard to a possibly fraudulent trial, where the court must take extra care to judge with justice; and there, that former verse is stated with regard to a trial that does not appear fraudulent.

רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: מַתְנִיתִין כִּדְשַׁנִּין, קְרָאֵי אֶחָד לְדִין וְאֶחָד לִפְשָׁרָה.

Rav Ashi says: The ruling of the mishna here, that cases of monetary law require inquiry and interrogation, is as we answered, i.e., in accordance with any one of the answers offered by the other amora’im. And those verses were not stated with regard to fraudulent trials; rather, one is stated with regard to judgment, in which the court must pursue justice extensively, and one is stated with regard to compromise.

כִּדְתַנְיָא: ״צֶדֶק צֶדֶק תִּרְדֹּף״ – אֶחָד לְדִין וְאֶחָד לִפְשָׁרָה. כֵּיצַד? שְׁתֵּי סְפִינוֹת עוֹבְרוֹת בַּנָּהָר וּפָגְעוּ זֶה בָּזֶה, אִם עוֹבְרוֹת שְׁתֵּיהֶן – שְׁתֵּיהֶן טוֹבְעוֹת, בְּזֶה אַחַר זֶה – שְׁתֵּיהֶן עוֹבְרוֹת. וְכֵן שְׁנֵי גְּמַלִּים שֶׁהָיוּ עוֹלִים בְּמַעֲלוֹת בֵּית חוֹרוֹן וּפָגְעוּ זֶה בָּזֶה, אִם עָלוּ שְׁנֵיהֶן – שְׁנֵיהֶן נוֹפְלִין, בְּזֶה אַחַר זֶה – שְׁנֵיהֶן עוֹלִין.

As it is taught in a baraita: When the verse states: “Justice, justice, shall you follow,” one mention of “justice” is stated with regard to judgment and one is stated with regard to compromise. How so? Where there are two boats traveling on the river and they encounter each other, if both of them attempt to pass, both of them sink, as the river is not wide enough for both to pass. If they pass one after the other, both of them pass. And similarly, where there are two camels who were ascending the ascent of Beit Ḥoron, where there is a narrow steep path, and they encounter each other, if both of them attempt to ascend, both of them fall. If they ascend one after the other, both of them ascend.

הָא כֵּיצַד? טְעוּנָה וְשֶׁאֵינָהּ טְעוּנָה – תִּידָּחֶה שֶׁאֵינָהּ טְעוּנָה מִפְּנֵי טְעוּנָה. קְרוֹבָה וְשֶׁאֵינָהּ קְרוֹבָה – תִּידָּחֶה קְרוֹבָה מִפְּנֵי שֶׁאֵינָהּ קְרוֹבָה. הָיוּ שְׁתֵּיהֶן קְרוֹבוֹת, שְׁתֵּיהֶן רְחוֹקוֹת – הָטֵל פְּשָׁרָה בֵּינֵיהֶן, וּמֵעֲלוֹת שָׂכָר זוֹ לָזוֹ.

How does one decide which of them should go first? If there is one boat that is laden and one boat that is not laden, the needs of the one that is not laden should be overridden due to the needs of the one that is laden. If there is one boat that is close to its destination and one boat that is not close to its destination, the needs of the one that is close should be overridden due to the needs of the one that is not close. If both of them were close to their destinations, or both of them were far from their destinations, impose a compromise between them to decide which goes first, and the owners of the boats pay a fee to one other, i.e., the owners of the first boat compensate the owner of the boat that waits, for any loss incurred.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״צֶדֶק צֶדֶק תִּרְדֹּף״ – הַלֵּךְ אַחַר בֵּית דִּין יָפֶה, אַחַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר לְלוֹד, אַחַר רַבָּן יוֹחָנָן בֶּן זַכַּאי לִבְרוּר חַיִל.

§ The Sages taught: The verse states: “Justice, justice, shall you follow.” This teaches that one should follow the best, most prestigious, court of the generation. For example, follow after Rabbi Eliezer to Lod, after Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai to Beror Ḥayil.

תָּנָא: קוֹל רֵיחַיִם בְּבוּרְנִי – שְׁבוּעַ הַבֵּן, שְׁבוּעַ הַבֵּן. אוֹר הַנֵּר בִּבְרוּר חַיִל – מִשְׁתֶּה שָׁם, מִשְׁתֶּה שָׁם.

The Sages taught: When the gentile authorities issued decrees outlawing observance of the mitzvot, members of Jewish communities devised clandestine ways of indicating observance of mitzvot to each other. For example: If one produces the sound of a millstone in the city called Burni, this is tantamount to announcing: Week of the son, week of the son, i.e., there will be a circumcision. If one displays the light of a lamp in the city called Beror Ḥayil, this is tantamount to announcing: There is a wedding feast there, there is a wedding feast there.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״צֶדֶק צֶדֶק תִּרְדֹּף״ – הַלֵּךְ אַחַר חֲכָמִים לִישִׁיבָה. אַחַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר לְלוֹד, אַחַר רַבָּן יוֹחָנָן בֶּן זַכַּאי לִבְרוּר חַיִל, אַחַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ לִפְקִיעִין, אַחַר רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל לְיַבְנֶה, אַחַר רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא לִבְנֵי בְרָק, אַחַר רַבִּי מַתְיָא לְרוֹמִי, אַחַר רַבִּי חֲנַנְיָה בֶּן תְּרַדְיוֹן לְסִיכְנִי, אַחַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי לְצִיפּוֹרִי, אַחַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן בְּתִירָה לִנְצִיבִין, אַחַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ לַגּוֹלָה, אַחַר רַבִּי לְבֵית שְׁעָרִים, אַחַר חֲכָמִים לְלִשְׁכַּת הַגָּזִית.

The Sages taught: The verse states: “Justice, justice, shall you follow.” This teaches that one should follow the Sages to the academy where they are found. For example, follow after Rabbi Eliezer to Lod, after Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai to Beror Ḥayil, after Rabbi Yehoshua to Peki’in, after Rabban Gamliel to Yavne, after Rabbi Akiva to Bnei Brak, after Rabbi Matya to Rome [Romi], after Rabbi Ḥananya ben Teradyon to Sikhnei, after Rabbi Yosei to Tzippori, after Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira to Netzivin, after Rabbi Yehoshua to the exile [gola], i.e., Babylonia, after Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi to Beit She’arim, and after the Sages in the time of the Temple to the Chamber of Hewn Stone.

דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת פּוֹתְחִין כּוּ׳. הֵיכִי אָמְרִינַן? אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה: הָכִי אָמְרִינַן לְהוּ: מִי יֵימַר כִּדְקָאָמְרִיתוּ?

§ The mishna teaches that in cases of monetary law, the court opens the deliberations either with a claim to exempt the accused, or with a claim to find him liable. In cases of capital law, the court opens the deliberations with a claim to acquit the accused, but does not open the deliberations with a claim to find him liable. The Gemara asks: How do we say this opening stage of the deliberations? In other words, with what claim does the court begin deliberating? Rav Yehuda said: We say this to the witnesses: Who says that the event occurred as you said? Perhaps you erred?

אֲמַר לֵיהּ עוּלָּא: וְהָא חָסְמִינַן לְהוּ? וְלִיחַסְמוּ! מִי לָא תַּנְיָא: רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר, מַסִּיעִין אֶת הָעֵדִים מִמָּקוֹם לְמָקוֹם כְּדֵי שֶׁתִּיטָּרֵף דַּעְתָּן וְיַחְזְרוּ בָּהֶן?

Ulla said to him: But by confronting the witnesses in this manner, we silence them. The witnesses will think that the court suspects them of lying, and they will not testify. Rav Yehuda said to him: And let them be silenced. Isn’t it taught in a baraita (Tosefta 9:1): Rabbi Shimon ben Eliezer says: In cases of capital law, the court brings the witnesses from one place to another place in order to confuse them so that they will retract their testimony if they are lying.

מִי דָּמֵי? הָתָם מִמֵּילָא קָא מִידְּחוּ, הָכָא קָא דָחֵינַן לְהוּ בְּיָדַיִם.

The Gemara rejects this argument: Are the halakhot comparable? There, where Rabbi Shimon ben Eliezer says to bring the witnesses from place to place, the witnesses are repressed by themselves, whereas here, we repress them by direct action, and that the court should not do.

אֶלָּא אָמַר עוּלָּא: הָכִי אָמְרִינַן, ״יֵשׁ לְךָ עֵדִים לַהֲזִימָּם?״ אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבָּה: וְכִי פּוֹתְחִין בִּזְכוּתוֹ שֶׁל זֶה שֶׁהִיא חוֹבָתוֹ שֶׁל זֶה?

Rather, Ulla says: We say this to the accused: Do you have witnesses to determine that the witnesses who testified against you are conspiring witnesses? Rabba said to him: But do we open the deliberations with a claim to acquit the accused that is to the liability of this one, i.e., the witnesses? This claim can lead to the witnesses incurring liability for their testimony.

וּמִי הָוְיָא חוֹבָתוֹ? וְהָתְנַן: אֵין עֵדִים זוֹמְמִין נֶהֱרָגִין עַד שֶׁיִּגָּמֵר הַדִּין.

The Gemara questions Rabba’s assumption: But is this to the liability of the witnesses? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Makkot 5b): Conspiring witnesses are not killed for their testimony until the verdict of the one concerning whom they testified is issued? Therefore, if they will be shown to be conspiring witnesses at this early stage of the proceedings, they will not be liable.

הָכִי אָמֵינָא: אִילּוּ שָׁתֵיק הַאי עַד דְּמִיגְמָר דִּינֵיהּ, וּמַיְיתִי עֵדִים וּמַזֵּים לְהוּ, הָוְיָא לֵיהּ חוֹבָתוֹ שֶׁל זֶה. אֶלָּא אָמַר רַבָּה: אָמְרִינַן לֵיהּ, ״יֵשׁ לְךָ עֵדִים לְהַכְחִישָׁן?״

The Gemara restates Rabba’s objection: This is what I say: If the accused would be silent until his verdict is issued and then brings witnesses and the court determines them to be conspiring witnesses, it will be found that the statement of the court is to the liability of this one, i.e., the witnesses. Rather, Rabba says: We say to the accused: Do you have witnesses to contradict them? If the first witnesses are contradicted as to the facts of the case, no one is liable.

רַב כָּהֲנָא אָמַר: ״מִדִּבְרֵיכֶם נִזְדַּכָּה פְּלוֹנִי״. אַבָּיֵי וְרָבָא דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ: אָמְרִינַן לֵיהּ, ״אִי לָא קְטַלְתְּ לָא תִּדְחַל״. רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: ״כׇּל מִי שֶׁיּוֹדֵעַ לוֹ זְכוּת יָבֹא וִילַמֵּד עָלָיו״.

Rav Kahana said: We say to the witnesses: Based on your statements, so-and-so is acquitted. The court issues a pro forma declaration that it is possible to find a reason to acquit based on the testimony of the witnesses, and then they begin the deliberations. Abaye and Rava both say: We say to the accused: For example, if you did not kill anyone, do not fear the consequences of these proceedings, as you will be acquitted. Rav Ashi says: The court announces: Whoever knows of a reason to acquit the accused should come and teach this reason concerning him.

תַּנְיָא כְּוָותֵיהּ דְּאַבָּיֵי וְרָבָא. רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: ״אִם לֹא שָׁכַב אִישׁ אוֹתָךְ וְאִם לֹא שָׂטִית וְגוֹ׳״ –

The Gemara comments: It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the explanation of Abaye and Rava. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The priest administering the sota rite to the sota says to her: “If no man has lain with you and if you have not gone astray to impurity while under your husband, you shall be free from this water of bitterness that causes the curse. But if you have gone astray while under your husband…” (Numbers 5:19–20). The priest first states the scenario in which the woman is innocent of adultery.