סנהדרין לג

סנהדרין לג

מִיכָּן שֶׁפּוֹתְחִין בְּדִינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת תְּחִלָּה לִזְכוּת.

From here it is derived that in cases of capital law, the court opens the deliberations by first raising a claim to acquit the accused. This baraita corresponds to the explanation of Abaya and Rava that the court notifies the accused that he has nothing to fear if he is innocent.

דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת מַחֲזִירִין כּוּ׳. וּרְמִינְהוּ: דָּן אֶת הַדִּין, זִיכָּה אֶת הַחַיָּיב, חִיֵּיב אֶת הַזַּכַּאי, טִימֵּא אֶת הַטָּהוֹר, טִיהֵר אֶת הַטָּמֵא – מַה שֶּׁעָשָׂה עָשׂוּי, וִישַׁלֵּם מִבֵּיתוֹ.

§ The mishna teaches that in cases of monetary law, the court brings the accused back to be judged again if new evidence arises, whether with a claim to exempt him or with a claim to find him liable. In cases of capital law, the court brings the accused back to be judged again with a claim to acquit him, but does not bring him back to be judged with a claim to find him liable. And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a mishna (Bekhorot 28b): If a judge issued a judgment and erred, so that he exempts a liable party or finds an innocent party liable, or if he ruled that a pure item is impure or ruled that an impure item is pure, and by doing so he caused a litigant a monetary loss; what he did is done, i.e., the judgment stands, and the judge must pay damages from his home, i.e., from his personal funds. This indicates that the court does not bring the accused back to be judged again if new evidence arises.

אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: לָא קַשְׁיָא, כָּאן בְּמוּמְחֶה, כָּאן בְּשֶׁאֵינוֹ מוּמְחֶה. וּבְמוּמְחֶה מַחְזִירִין? וְהָקָתָנֵי: אִם הָיָה מוּמְחֶה לְבֵית דִּין – פָּטוּר מִלְּשַׁלֵּם!

Rav Yosef says: This is not difficult. The mishna here, which teaches that the court does bring the accused back to be judged again if new evidence arises, is stated with regard to a judge who was an expert, whereas the mishna there in tractate Bekhorot, which teaches that what he did is done, is stated with regard to a judge who was not an expert. The Gemara asks: And does one bring the accused back in the case of a judge who was an expert? But that mishna in tractate Bekhorot teaches: If he was an expert accepted by the court he is exempt from liability to pay. This indicates that the court does not bring the accused back to be judged again if new evidence arises, even if the judge is an expert; otherwise there would be no need to state that the judge is exempt from liability to pay.

אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: כָּאן שֶׁיֵּשׁ גָּדוֹל הֵימֶנּוּ בְּחָכְמָה וּבְמִנְיָן, כָּאן שֶׁאֵין גָּדוֹל הֵימֶנּוּ בְּחָכְמָה וּבְמִנְיָן.

Rav Naḥman says a different explanation: The mishna here, which teaches that the court does bring the accused back to be judged again if new evidence arises, is stated with regard to a case where there is a court greater than this one in wisdom and number of students that can judge the case again. The mishna there, which teaches that what he did is done, is stated with regard to a case where there is no court greater than his in wisdom and number of students that can judge the case again. If this judge erred, the error will not be corrected.

רַב שֵׁשֶׁת אָמַר: כָּאן שֶׁטָּעָה בִּדְבַר מִשְׁנָה, כָּאן שֶׁטָּעָה בְּשִׁיקּוּל הַדַּעַת. דְּאָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת אָמַר רַב אַסִּי: טָעָה בִּדְבַר מִשְׁנָה – חוֹזֵר, טָעָה בְּשִׁיקּוּל הַדַּעַת – אֵינוֹ חוֹזֵר.

Rav Sheshet says a different explanation: The mishna here, which teaches that the court does bring the accused back to be judged again if new evidence arises, is stated with regard to a case where the judge erred in a matter that appears in the Mishna, i.e., he forgot an explicit mishnaic ruling, in which case the verdict is void. The mishna there, which teaches that what he did is done, is stated with regard to a case where the judge erred in his deliberation. As Rav Sheshet says that Rav Asi says: In the case of a judge who erred in a matter that appears in the Mishna, the decision is revoked, but in the case of a judge who erred in his deliberation, the decision is not revoked.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: אֲפִילּוּ טָעָה בְּרַבִּי חִיָּיא וְרַבִּי אוֹשַׁעְיָא? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִין. אֲפִילּוּ בִּדְרַב וּשְׁמוּאֵל? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִין. אֲפִילּוּ בְּדִידִי וְדִידָךְ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אַטּוּ אֲנַן קָטְלֵי קְנֵי בְּאַגְמָא אֲנַן?

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Does the category of: Erred in a matter that appears in the Mishna, include even one who erred concerning a statement of Rabbi Ḥiyya and Rabbi Oshaya, who were among the last of the tanna’im? Rav Ashi said to him: Yes. Ravina asked him: Does it include even one who erred concerning a statement of the first-generation amora’im Rav and Shmuel? Rav Ashi said to him: Yes. Ravina asked him: Does it include even one who erred concerning statements of mine and yours, as we are of the final generation of amora’im? Rav Ashi said to him: Is that to say that we are reed cutters in the pond? That is, our statements are in this category as well.

הֵיכִי דָּמֵי שִׁיקּוּל הַדַּעַת? אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: כְּגוֹן תְּרֵי תַּנָּאֵי אוֹ תְּרֵי אָמוֹרָאֵי דִּפְלִיגִי אַהֲדָדֵי, וְלָא אִיתְּמַר הִלְכְתָא לָא כְּמָר וְלָא כְּמָר, וְאִיקְּרִי וַעֲבַד כְּחַד מִינַּיְיהוּ, וְסוּגְיָא דִּשְׁמַעְתָּא אָזְלִי כְּאִידַּךְ – הַיְינוּ שִׁיקּוּל הַדַּעַת.

The Gemara clarifies: What is considered an error in a deliberation? Rav Pappa says: For example, two tanna’im or two amora’im who disagree with each other, and the halakha was not stated in accordance with this Sage or in accordance with that Sage, and it occurred that the judge acted in accordance with one of them, and the discussion of the halakha goes in accordance with the other opinion, i.e., most judges rule in accordance with the opposing opinion; this is an error in a deliberation.

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַב הַמְנוּנָא לְרַב שֵׁשֶׁת: מַעֲשֶׂה בְּפָרָה שֶׁל בֵּית מְנַחֵם שֶׁנִּיטְּלָה הָאֵם שֶׁלָּהּ, וְהֶאֱכִילָהּ רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן לִכְלָבִים.

Rav Hamnuna raised an objection to Rav Sheshet from the continuation of the mishna cited earlier (Bekhorot 28b): There was an incident involving a cow of the household of Menaḥem whose womb was removed, and when Rabbi Tarfon was consulted he ruled that it is an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months [tereifa], which is forbidden for consumption. And based on the ruling of Rabbi Tarfon, the questioner fed it to the dogs.

וּבָא מַעֲשֶׂה לִפְנֵי חֲכָמִים בְּיַבְנֶה, וְהִתִּירוּהָ. שֶׁאָמַר תּוֹדוֹס הָרוֹפֵא: אֵין פָּרָה וַחֲזִירָה יוֹצֵאת מֵאֲלֶכְּסַנְדְּרִיָּא שֶׁל מִצְרַיִם אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן חוֹתְכִין הָאֵם שֶׁלָּהּ, כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא תֵּלֵד. אָמַר רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן: הָלְכָה חֲמוֹרְךָ, טַרְפוֹן! אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא: פָּטוּר אַתָּה, שֶׁכׇּל הַמּוּמְחֶה לָרַבִּים פָּטוּר מִלְּשַׁלֵּם.

The mishna continues: And the incident came before the Sages of the court in Yavne, and they ruled that such an animal is permitted and is not a tereifa. As Theodosius [Todos] the doctor said: A cow or pig does not emerge from Alexandria of Egypt unless the residents sever its womb so that it will not give birth in the future. The breeds of cows and pigs in Alexandria were of exceptional quality and the people of Alexandria did not want them reproduced elsewhere. The fact that these animals lived long lives after their wombs were removed proves that the hysterectomy did not render them tereifot. Upon hearing this, Rabbi Tarfon said: Your donkey is gone, Tarfon, as he believed he was required to compensate the owner for the cow that he ruled to be a tereifa. Rabbi Akiva said to him: You are exempt, as any judge accepted as an expert for the public is exempt from liability to pay.

וְאִי אִיתָא, לֵימָא לֵיהּ: טוֹעֶה בִּדְבַר מִשְׁנָה אַתָּה, וְטוֹעֶה בִּדְבַר מִשְׁנָה חוֹזֵר.

Rav Hamnuna states his objection to Rav Sheshet: And if it is so that there is a distinction between the two types of judicial errors, let Rabbi Akiva say to Rabbi Tarfon: You err in a matter that appears in the Mishna, as the ruling that an animal whose womb has been removed is permitted is recorded in a mishna (see Ḥullin 54a), and in the case of one who errs in a matter that appears in the Mishna, the decision is revoked.

חֲדָא וְעוֹד קָאָמַר: חֲדָא, דְּטוֹעֶה בִּדְבַר מִשְׁנָה אַתָּה, וְטוֹעֶה בִּדְבַר מִשְׁנָה חוֹזֵר. וְעוֹד: אִי נָמֵי בְּשִׁיקּוּל הַדַּעַת טָעִיתָ – מוּמְחֶה לָרַבִּים אַתָּה, וְכׇל הַמּוּמְחֶה לָרַבִּים פָּטוּר מִלְּשַׁלֵּם.

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Akiva states one reason and adds another reason. One: As you err in a matter that appears in the Mishna, and in the case of one who errs in a matter that appears in the Mishna, the decision is revoked. Another: Even if you erred in a deliberation, you are a judge accepted as an expert for the public, and any judge accepted as an expert for the public is exempt from liability to pay.

אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק לְרָבָא: מַאי קָא מוֹתֵיב רַב הַמְנוּנָא לְרַב שֵׁשֶׁת מִפָּרָה? פָּרָה הֲרֵי הֶאֱכִילָהּ לִכְלָבִים, וְלֵיתָא דְּתֶהְדַּר.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said to Rava: What was the objection raised by Rav Hamnuna to Rav Sheshet from the incident of the cow? After all, the owner had already fed the cow to the dogs, and it is not possible to revoke the ruling and judge the case again.

הָכִי קָאָמַר לֵיהּ: אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא טָעָה בִּדְבַר מִשְׁנָה אֵינוֹ חוֹזֵר, אַלְמָא קָם דִּינָא – הַיְינוּ דְּקָא מְפַחֵיד רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן, וְקָאָמַר לֵיהּ אִיהוּ: מוּמְחֶה לְבֵית דִּין אַתָּה וְאַתָּה פָּטוּר מִלְּשַׁלֵּם. אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ טָעָה בִּדְבַר מִשְׁנָה חוֹזֵר, לֵימָא לֵיהּ: כֵּיוָן דְּאִילּוּ הֲוַאי פָּרָה, דִּינָךְ לָאו דִּינָא וְלָא כְּלוּם עֲבַדְתְּ, הַשְׁתָּא נָמֵי לָא כְּלוּם עֲבַדְתְּ.

Rava answered: This is what Rav Hamnuna was saying to Rav Sheshet: Granted, if you say that in the case of a judge who errs in a matter that appears in the Mishna, the decision is not revoked, which evidently indicates that the verdict stands as it is, that is why Rabbi Tarfon feared that he would have to pay, and Rabbi Akiva said to him: You are an expert accepted by the court, and are exempt from liability to pay. But if you say that in the case of a judge who erred in a matter that appears in the Mishna, the decision is revoked, let Rabbi Akiva say to Rabbi Tarfon: Since if the cow were to be here, your verdict is not a verdict and you did nothing, now as well, you did nothing and you are not liable to pay. It was the action of the owner that caused the loss, as he fed the cow to the dogs.

רַב חִסְדָּא אָמַר: כָּאן – שֶׁנָּטַל וְנָתַן בַּיָּד, כָּאן – שֶׁלֹּא נָטַל וְנָתַן בַּיָּד.

Rav Ḥisda says that the contradiction between the mishna here and the mishna in tractate Bekhorot as to whether or not the court brings the accused back to be judged again if new evidence arises can be answered as follows: The mishna there in tractate Bekhorot is stated with regard to a case where a judge took the item in question from one litigant and gave it to the other litigant with his hand. In this case, the judge is liable to pay. The mishna here is stated with regard to a case where a judge of the court did not take the item in question from one litigant and give it to the other litigant with his hand. The court merely issued a ruling, and the litigants executed the verdict on their own. Therefore, the court is not liable to pay, and the judges retry the case.

בִּשְׁלָמָא חִיֵּיב אֶת הַזַּכַּאי, כְּגוֹן שֶׁנָּטַל וְנָתַן בַּיָּד. אֶלָּא זִיכָּה אֶת הַחַיָּיב, הֵיכִי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ? דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ: ״פָּטוּר אַתָּה״, וְהָא לֹא נָטַל וְנָתַן בַּיָּד! כֵּיוָן דְּאָמַר ״פָּטוּר אַתָּה״, כְּמוֹ שֶׁנָּטַל וְנָתַן בַּיָּד דָּמֵי.

The Gemara asks: Granted, one can explain the clause from the mishna in tractate Bekhorot: He finds an innocent party liable, in a case where the judge took the item in question from the innocent party and gave it to the other litigant with his hand. But how can you find him giving the item from one to another with regard to the clause of: He exempts a liable party? As, the judge said to the litigant only: You are exempt from liability to pay, but the judge did not take the item in question from one litigant and give it to the other litigant with his hand. The Gemara explains: Once he says: You are exempt from liability to pay, it is considered as if he took the item in question from the innocent party and gave it to the other litigant with his hand, as there is no need for any further action.

אֶלָּא מַתְנִיתִין דְּקָתָנֵי: דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת מַחְזִירִין בֵּין לִזְכוּת בֵּין לְחוֹבָה, בִּשְׁלָמָא לִזְכוּת מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ, דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ מֵעִיקָּרָא: ״חַיָּיב אַתָּה״, וְלֹא נָטַל וְלֹא נָתַן בַּיָּד. אֶלָּא לְחוֹבָה הֵיכִי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ? דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ: ״פָּטוּר אַתָּה״? וְהָאָמְרַתְּ: כֵּיוָן דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ ״פָּטוּר אַתָּה״, כְּמוֹ שֶׁנָּטַל וְנָתַן בַּיָּד דָּמֵי!

The Gemara asks: But what of the mishna, which teaches: In cases of monetary law, the court brings the accused back to be judged again if new evidence arises, either with a claim to exempt the accused, or with a claim to find him liable? Granted, you can find the example of: To exempt, where the court says at the outset to one litigant: You are liable to pay, and a judge did not take the item in question from one litigant and give it to the other litigant with his hand, as Rav Ḥisda holds that the verdict is revoked and the court does not pay. But how can you find the example of judging the case again to find him liable? As once the court says to the litigant: You are exempt, the case cannot be judged again. But you said that once a judge says: You are exempt from liability to pay, it is considered as if he took the item in question from the innocent party and gave it to the other litigant with his hand. If so, the court must pay and the judgment will not be revoked.

חֲדָא קָתָנֵי: דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת מַחְזִירִין לִזְכוּת, שֶׁהִיא חוֹבָה. דִּכְוָותַהּ גַּבֵּי נְפָשׁוֹת: מַחְזִירִין לִזְכוּת,

The Gemara answers: The mishna teaches only that one statement, and it should be understood as follows: In cases of monetary law, the court brings the litigant back to be judged again to exempt that litigant, which is to the liability of the other litigant, while in the corresponding situation with regard to cases of capital law, the court brings the accused back to acquit him,

וְאֵין מַחְזִירִין לְחוֹבָה. מַחְזִירִין לִזְכוּת – זְכוּת גְּרֵידְתָּא, וְאֵין מַחְזִירִין לְחוֹבָה – לִזְכוּת שֶׁהִיא חוֹבָה.

but they do not bring him back to be judged with a claim to find him liable. When the mishna says: The court brings the accused back to acquit him, this is an acquittal alone and is not to anyone’s liability. When it says: But they do not bring him back to be judged with a claim to find him liable, this is an acquittal that is also a liability. The court does not bring the accused back to acquit him if this entails a liability to another.

חוֹבְתֵיהּ דְּמַאן? הָא לָא קַשְׁיָא, חוֹבְתֵיהּ דְּגוֹאֵל הַדָּם. מִשּׁוּם חוֹבְתֵיהּ דְּגוֹאֵל הַדָּם קָטְלִינַן לֵיהּ לְהַאי? וְעוֹד, מַאי ״בֵּין״ ״בֵּין״? קַשְׁיָא.

The Gemara clarifies: A liability for whom? There is no other litigant in cases of capital law. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, this is to the liability, i.e., the detriment, of the blood redeemer, as he desires that the murderer be killed, and he will no longer be allowed to kill him. The Gemara questions this explanation: Is it reasonable that due to the liability of the blood redeemer, we kill this one and do not reverse the verdict to acquit him even when there is a reason to do so? And further, what is the meaning of the term: Whether with a claim to exempt the accused, or whether with a claim to find him liable? It is clear that this is referring to two separate matters, not to two types of acquittal. The Gemara comments: This is difficult.

רָבִינָא אָמַר: כְּגוֹן שֶׁהָיָה לוֹ בְּיָדוֹ מַשְׁכּוֹן, וּנְטָלוֹ מִמֶּנּוּ.

The Gemara cites another explanation of how one can find a judge giving the item from one to another with regard to the clause of: He exempts a liable party. Ravina said: It is possible in a case where the one who lodged the claim had in his possession an item belonging to the other litigant that functioned as collateral for a debt, and when the judge issued a verdict in favor of the other he took the collateral from him, thereby physically transferring it to the wrong party.

טִימֵּא אֶת הַטָּהוֹר, דְּאַגַּע בֵּיהּ שֶׁרֶץ. טִיהֵר אֶת הַטָּמֵא, שֶׁעֵירְבָן בֵּין פֵּירוֹתָיו.

In the case from the mishna in tractate Bekhorot: He ruled that a pure item is impure, how could he cause a loss with his own hands? It is where he had the litigant’s ritually pure item touch a creeping animal to emphasize that he believes it was already impure, and he thereby imparted impurity to it. In that mishna’s case of: He ruled that an impure item is pure, how could he cause a loss with his own hands? It is where he mixed this impure produce of the litigant’s with the litigant’s ritually pure produce, and he thereby caused all of the produce to be considered impure.

דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת כּוּ׳. תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: מִנַּיִין לְיוֹצֵא מִבֵּית דִּין חַיָּיב, וְאָמַר אֶחָד ״יֵשׁ לִי לְלַמֵּד עָלָיו זְכוּת״, מִנַּיִין שֶׁמַּחְזִירִין אוֹתוֹ? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״נָקִי אַל תַּהֲרֹג״.

§ The mishna teaches that in cases of capital law, the court brings the accused back to be judged again with a claim to acquit him, but does not bring him back to be judged with a claim to find him liable. To explain the terms “innocent” and “righteous” in the verse: “And the innocent and the righteous you shall not slay” (Exodus 23:7), the Sages taught: From where is it derived that with regard to one who is leaving the court having been found liable, and someone said: I have the ability to teach a reason to acquit him, from where is it derived that the court brings the accused back to be judged again? The verse states: The innocent you shall not slay, and the accused may in fact be innocent.

וּמִנַּיִין לְיוֹצֵא מִבֵּית דִּין זַכַּאי, וְאָמַר אֶחָד: ״יֵשׁ לִי לְלַמֵּד עָלָיו חוֹבָה״, מִנַּיִין שֶׁאֵין מַחְזִירִין אוֹתוֹ? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״צַדִּיק אַל תַּהֲרֹג״.

And from where is it derived that with regard to one who is leaving the court, having been acquitted, and someone says: I have the ability to teach a reason to find him liable, from where is it derived that the court does not bring the accused back to be judged again? The verse states: “The righteous you shall not slay,” and the accused was found righteous in his trial.

אָמַר רַב שִׁימִי בַּר אָשֵׁי: וְחִילּוּפָא לְמֵסִית, דִּכְתִיב ״לֹא תַחְמֹל וְלֹא תְכַסֶּה עָלָיו״. רַב כָּהֲנָא מַתְנֵי מִ״כִּי הָרֹג תַּהַרְגֶנּוּ״.

Rav Shimi bar Ashi says: And the opposite of this is the halakha with regard to one who entices others to engage in idol worship, as it is written concerning him: “Neither shall you spare, neither shall you conceal him” (Deuteronomy 13:9). He is brought back to court to find him liable, but not to acquit him. Rav Kahana teaches this last halakha citing a different verse concerning the enticer: “But you shall kill him [harog tahargennu]” (Deuteronomy 13:10). The repetition of the verb indicates that he is killed even in circumstances where transgressors of other prohibitions would not be.

בְּעָא מִנֵּיהּ רַבִּי זֵירָא מֵרַב שֵׁשֶׁת: חַיָּיבֵי גָּלִיּוֹת מִנַּיִין? אָתְיָא ״רֹצֵחַ״ ״רֹצֵחַ״.

Rabbi Zeira asked Rav Sheshet: From where is it derived that the halakha concerning those liable to be exiled to a city of refuge for killing unintentionally is the same with regard to retrying a court case as the halakha concerning one who killed intentionally, who is found liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment? Rav Sheshet answered: It is derived from a verbal analogy employing the term “murderer” stated with regard to one who kills intentionally (see Numbers 35:16) and the term “murderer” stated with regard to one who kills unintentionally (see Numbers 35:19).

חַיָּיבֵי מַלְקִיּוֹת מִנַּיִין? אָתְיָא ״רָשָׁע״ ״רָשָׁע״.

Rabbi Zeira asked Rav Sheshet: From where is it derived that the halakha concerning those liable to receive forty lashes is the same with regard to retrying a court case as the halakha concerning one who killed intentionally, who is found liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment? Rav Sheshet answered: It is derived from a verbal analogy employing the term “wicked” stated with regard to one who kills intentionally (see Numbers 35:31) and the term “wicked” stated with regard to those liable to receive lashes (see Deuteronomy 25:2).

תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי: חַיָּיבֵי גָּלִיּוֹת מִנַּיִין? אַתְיָא ״רֹצֵחַ״ ״רֹצֵחַ״. חַיָּיבֵי מַלְקוֹת מִנַּיִין? אָתְיָא ״רָשָׁע״ ״רָשָׁע״.

The Gemara comments: This is also taught in a baraita (Tosefta 7:3): From where is it derived that the halakha concerning those liable to be exiled for killing unintentionally is the same with regard to retrying a court case as the halakha concerning one who killed intentionally, who is found liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment? It is derived from a verbal analogy employing the term “murderer” stated with regard to one who kills intentionally and the term “murderer” stated with regard to one who kills unintentionally. From where is it derived that the halakha concerning those liable to receive forty lashes is the same with regard to retrying a court case as the halakha concerning one who killed intentionally, who is found liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment? It is derived from a verbal analogy employing the term “wicked” stated with regard to one who kills intentionally and the term “wicked” stated with regard to those liable to receive lashes.

וְאֵין מַחְזִירִין לְחוֹבָה. אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: וְהוּא שֶׁטָּעָה בְּדָבָר שֶׁאֵין הַצַּדּוּקִין מוֹדִין בּוֹ, אֲבָל טָעָה בִּדְבַר שֶׁהַצַּדּוּקִין מוֹדִין בּוֹ – זִיל קְרִי בֵּי רַב הוּא.

§ The mishna teaches concerning cases of capital law: But the court does not bring him back to be judged with a claim to find him liable. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: And this is the halakha only in a case where the judge erred with regard to a matter for which the Sadducees do not admit to its validity, i.e., he erred in a matter learned from tradition or established by the Sages. But if the judge erred in a matter for which the Sadducees admit to its validity, i.e., a matter that is written explicitly in the Torah, it is a topic that you could go learn in a children’s school, and such an error negates the verdict and is reversed.

בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא מֵרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: טָעָה בְּנוֹאֵף וְנוֹאֶפֶת מַהוּ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אַדְּמוֹקְדָךְ יְקִיד, זִיל קוּץ קָרָךְ וּצְלִי. אִיתְּמַר נָמֵי, אָמַר רַבִּי אַמֵּי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: טָעָה בְּנוֹאֵף – חוֹזֵר.

Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba asked of Rabbi Yoḥanan: What is the halakha in the case of a judge who erred with regard to the judgment of an adulterer and adulteress, by ruling that only the man is liable but not the woman? Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: While your fire is burning, cut your squash and roast it, i.e., seize the opportunity to add this case to the principle I taught you earlier. It was also stated: Rabbi Ami says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Concerning a judge who erred with regard to an adulterer, the court revokes the verdict.

אֶלָּא הֵיכִי דָּמֵי אֵין חוֹזְרִין? אָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: כְּגוֹן שֶׁטָּעָה שֶׁלֹּא כְּדַרְכָּהּ.

The Gemara asks: Rather, what are the circumstances where the court does not revoke the acquittal? Rabbi Abbahu says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: In a case where he erred and acquitted the adulterer who engaged in sexual intercourse in an atypical manner, i.e., anal intercourse. The halakha that this is considered sexual intercourse is not explicit in a verse. Therefore, if a court acquits one so accused, the verdict is not revoked.

דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת הַכֹּל כּוּ׳. הַכֹּל, וַאֲפִילּוּ עֵדִים? נֵימָא מַתְנִיתִין רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה הִיא, וְלָא רַבָּנַן?

§ The mishna teaches that in cases of monetary law, all those present at the trial may teach a reason to exempt a litigant or to find him liable. In cases of capital law, all those present at the trial may teach a reason to acquit the accused, but not all present may teach a reason to find him liable. The Gemara asks: In capital cases, may all those present teach a reason to acquit, and even witnesses? The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, and not in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis.

דְּתַנְיָא: ״וְעֵד אֶחָד לֹא יַעֲנֶה בְנֶפֶשׁ״ – בֵּין לִזְכוּת בֵּין לְחוֹבָה. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: עוֹנֶה לִזְכוּת, וְאֵין עוֹנֶה לְחוֹבָה.

The Gemara explains: As it is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “But one witness shall not testify against any person that he die” (Numbers 35:30). A witness cannot state anything other than his testimony, whether to provide a reason to acquit the accused or to provide a reason to find him liable; this is the opinion of the Rabbis. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: A witness may answer to provide a reason to acquit, but a witness may not answer to provide a reason to find the accused liable. The mishna here seems to be in accordance with the minority opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda.

אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: בְּאֶחָד מִן הַתַּלְמִידִים, וְדִבְרֵי הַכֹּל.

Rav Pappa says: When the mishna refers to all those present at the trial, it is not referring to the witnesses but to one of the students sitting before the court, and therefore all agree with the ruling of the mishna.