סנהדרין ה

סנהדרין ה

וְאִם הָיָה מוּמְחֶה לְרַבִּים, דָּן אֲפִילּוּ יְחִידִי. אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: כְּגוֹן אֲנָא דָּן דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת בִּיחִידִי. וְכֵן אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא: כְּגוֹן אֲנָא דָּן דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת בִּיחִידִי.

But if one was a judge accepted as an expert for the public, then he may judge cases even as the lone judge. Rav Naḥman said: One such as I may judge cases of monetary law as the lone judge. And similarly, Rabbi Ḥiyya said: One such as I may judge cases of monetary law as the lone judge.

אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: כְּגוֹן אֲנָא דִּגְמִירְנָא וּסְבִירְנָא וּנְקִיטְנָא רְשׁוּתָא, אֲבָל לָא נְקִיט רְשׁוּתָא – דִּינֵיהּ לָא דִּינָא? אוֹ דִילְמָא: אַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא נָקֵיט רְשׁוּתָא – דִּינֵיהּ דִּינָא?

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the meaning of: Such as I, in the statements of these Rabbis? Did they intend to say: Such as I, in that I have studied and have the skills to extrapolate and derive new rulings on the basis of earlier decisions, and have also received permission to judge as the lone judge? But accordingly, if one has not received permission to judge as the lone judge, his judgment is not a valid judgment? Or perhaps this is not the correct reading of the statements, and the halakha is that even though he did not receive permission to judge as the lone judge, his judgment is nevertheless a valid judgment?

תָּא שְׁמַע: דְּמָר זוּטְרָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן דָּן דִּינָא וּטְעָה, אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב יוֹסֵף. אָמַר לוֹ: אִם קִיבְּלוּךְ עֲלַיְיהוּ – לָא תְּשַׁלֵּם, וְאִי לָא – זִיל שַׁלֵּים. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: כִּי לָא נָקֵיט רְשׁוּתָא – דִּינֵיהּ דִּינָא. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a solution to this dilemma from the following case: Mar Zutra, son of Rav Naḥman, once adjudicated a certain case and erred in his ruling. Upon recognizing his error, he came before Rav Yosef to ask what he should do. Rav Yosef said to him: If the litigants accepted you upon themselves as the lone judge, and both had agreed that they would accept your ruling, you are not liable to pay restitution to the party who lost the case due to your erroneous ruling. But if they did not accept you on themselves, but were rather compelled to be judged before you, you must go and pay restitution. And learn from it that even in a case where one did not receive permission to judge as the lone judge, his ruling is a valid judgment. The Gemara affirms: Learn from it that this is the case.

אָמַר רַב: הַאי מַאן דְּבָעֵי לְמֵידַן דִּינָא, וְאִי טְעָה מִיבְעֵי לְמִיפְּטַר – לִישְׁקוֹל רְשׁוּתָא מִבֵּי רֵישׁ גָּלוּתָא. וְכֵן אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: לִשְׁקוֹל רְשׁוּתָא מִבֵּי רֵישׁ גָּלוּתָא.

§ Rav says: One who wants to adjudicate a case and wants to be exempt from payment of restitution if he errs in his judgment must receive permission from the Exilarch to judge cases. And similarly, Shmuel says: In such a case he must receive permission from the Exilarch. Once he receives permission, even an erroneous decision carries halakhic force and therefore it is as if he did not err.

פְּשִׁיטָא: מֵהָכָא לְהָכָא, וּמֵהָתָם לְהָתָם – מַהֲנֵי. וּמֵהָכָא לְהָתָם נָמֵי מַהֲנֵי, דְּהָכָא שֵׁבֶט וְהָתָם מְחוֹקֵק.

Since the Gemara mentioned the importance of a judge receiving authorization from the Exilarch, it now discusses the scope of this authority. It is obvious that from here to here, meaning relying on permission granted by the Exilarch in Babylonia in order to adjudicate cases within Babylonia, and from there to there, relying on permission granted by the Nasi in Eretz Yisrael in order to adjudicate cases within Eretz Yisrael, the authorization is effective. And it is also obvious that from here to there, relying on permission granted by the Exilarch to adjudicate cases within Eretz Yisrael, it is also effective, as the authority of the Exilarch is greater than that of the Nasi. This is so since the Exilarch here in Babylonia may be termed a scepter, i.e., a ruler with actual power of governance, and the Nasi there in Eretz Yisrael is only a staff, i.e., a legislator with limited power.

כִּדְתַנְיָא: ״לֹא יָסוּר שֵׁבֶט מִיהוּדָה״ – אֵלּוּ רָאשֵׁי גָלִיּוֹת שֶׁבְּבָבֶל, שֶׁרוֹדִין אֶת יִשְׂרָאֵל בְּשֵׁבֶט. ״וּמְחֹקֵק מִבֵּין רַגְלָיו״ – אֵלּוּ בְּנֵי בָּנָיו שֶׁל הִלֵּל, שֶׁמְּלַמְּדִין תּוֹרָה בָּרַבִּים.

This is as it is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “The scepter shall not depart from Judah nor the ruler’s staff from between his feet until Shiloh comes” (Genesis 49:10). The term “Shiloh” is understood as a reference to the Messiah, and therefore the verse is interpreted as delineating the authority of Jewish rulers during the exile, before the Messiah comes. “The scepter shall not depart from Judah”; these are the Exilarchs in Babylonia, who are empowered by the government and consequently subjugate the Jewish people as with a scepter. “Nor the ruler’s staff from between his feet”; These are the grandchildren of Hillel the Elder who hold the position of Nasi and teach Torah in public, but do not have authority to actually enforce their judgments.

מֵהָתָם לְהָכָא מַאי? תָּא שְׁמַע: דְּרַבָּה בַּר חָנָה דָּן דִּינָא וּטְעָה. אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי חִיָּיא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִי קִיבְּלוּךְ עֲלַיְיהוּ – לָא תְּשַׁלֵּם, וְאִי לָא – זִיל שַׁלֵּים. וְהָא רַבָּה בַּר חָנָה רְשׁוּתָא הֲוָה נְקִיט! שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: מֵהָתָם לְהָכָא לָא מַהֲנֵי. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.

If one has permission from there, from the Nasi, and wants to adjudicate cases here in Babylonia, what is the halakha? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear an incident that occurred: Rabba bar Ḥana adjudicated a case in Babylonia and erred. He came before Rabbi Ḥiyya to ask what he should do. Rabbi Ḥiyya said to him: If the litigants accepted you upon themselves, you are not liable to pay restitution to the party who unjustly lost the case, but if not, go and pay. But Rabba bar Ḥana received permission from the Nasi in Eretz Yisrael; therefore, learn from this incident that permission from there to adjudicate cases here is not effective. The Gemara affirms: Learn from it that this is the case.

וְלָא מַהֲנֵי? וְהָא רַבָּה בַּר רַב הוּנָא, כִּי הֲוָה מִינְּצֵי בַּהֲדֵי דְּבֵי רֵישׁ גָּלוּתָא, אָמַר: לָאו מִינַּיְיכוּ נְקִיטְנָא רְשׁוּתָא, נְקִיטְנָא רְשׁוּתָא מֵאַבָּא מָרִי, וְאַבָּא מָרִי מֵרַב, וְרַב מֵרַבִּי חִיָּיא, וְרַבִּי חִיָּיא מֵרַבִּי! בְּמִילְּתָא דְעָלְמָא הוּא דְּאוֹקֵים לְהוּ.

The Gemara asks: And is this permission not effective? But when Rabba bar Rav Huna was involved in a dispute with the members of the house of the Exilarch he said: It is not from you that I received permission to judge cases. I received permission from my father, my master, i.e., Rav Huna, and my father, my master, received permission from Rav, and Rav from Rabbi Ḥiyya, and Rabbi Ḥiyya from Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi in Eretz Yisrael. Therefore, it seems that permission received in Eretz Yisrael is in fact effective in Babylonia. The Gemara rejects this proof: He was merely standing up to them with words alone, but there was no halakhic validity to his statement.

וְכִי מֵאַחַר דְּלָא מַהֲנֵי, רַבָּה בַּר חָנָה רְשׁוּתָא דִּנְקַט לְמָה לִי? לָעֲיָירוֹת הָעוֹמְדִים עַל הַגְּבוּלִין.

The Gemara asks: But since permission to judge received in Eretz Yisrael is not effective in Babylonia, why did Rabba bar Ḥana need to receive permission when he left for Babylonia? What was the value of that permission? The Gemara answers: The permission is effective for the cities that stand on the borders of Babylonia, which are not entirely in the jurisdiction of Babylonia, so permission from Eretz Yisrael is effective there.

מַאי רְשׁוּתָא? כִּי הֲוָה נָחֵית רַבָּה בַּר חָנָה לְבָבֶל, אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי חִיָּיא לְרַבִּי: בֶּן אָחִי יוֹרֵד לְבָבֶל. ״יוֹרֶה?״ ״יוֹרֶה!״, ״יָדִין?״ ״יָדִין!״, ״יַתִּיר בְּכוֹרוֹת?״ ״יַתִּיר!״.

§ What is the specific nature of this permission? The Gemara relates: When Rabba bar Ḥana descended to Babylonia, his uncle Rabbi Ḥiyya said to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: My brother’s son is descending to Babylonia. May he teach people and issue rulings with regard to what is prohibited and what is permitted? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: He may teach. Rabbi Ḥiyya then asked: May he also adjudicate cases of monetary law, and be absolved from payment if he errs? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: He may adjudicate. Rabbi Ḥiyya continued: May he declare a firstborn animal permitted? The male firstborn of a kosher animal may not be eaten, as it is supposed to be offered in the Temple. But if it acquires a permanent blemish it is unfit for an offering, and it may be eaten. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: He may declare such an animal permitted.

כִּי הֲוָה נָחֵית רַב לְבָבֶל, אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי חִיָּיא לְרַבִּי: בֶּן אֲחוֹתִי יוֹרֵד לְבָבֶל. ״יוֹרֶה?״ ״יוֹרֶה!״, ״יָדִין?״ ״יָדִין!״, ״יַתִּיר בְּכוֹרוֹת?״ ״אַל יַתִּיר!״.

Similarly, when Rav, who was also Rabbi Ḥiyya’s nephew, descended to Babylonia, Rabbi Ḥiyya said to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: My sister’s son is descending to Babylonia. May he teach people and issue rulings with regard to what is prohibited and what is permitted? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: He may teach. Rabbi Ḥiyya then asked: May he also adjudicate cases of monetary law, and be absolved from payment if he errs? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi responded: He may adjudicate. Rabbi Ḥiyya continued: May he declare a firstborn animal permitted? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: He may not declare such an animal permitted.

מַאי שְׁנָא לְמָר דְּקָא קָרֵי ״בֶּן אָחִי״, וּמַאי שְׁנָא לְמָר דְּקָא קָרֵי ״בֶּן אֲחוֹתִי״? וְכִי תֵּימָא הָכִי הֲוָה מַעֲשֶׂה, וְהָאָמַר מָר: אַיְּבוּ וְחַנָּה וְשֵׁילָא וּמָרְתָא וְרַבִּי חִיָּיא כּוּלְּהוּ בְּנֵי אַבָּא בַּר אַחָא כַּרְסַלָּא מִכַּפְרִי הֲווֹ? רַב בַּר אֲחוּהּ דַּהֲוָה בַּר אֲחָתֵיהּ, רַבָּה בַּר חָנָה בַּר אֲחוּהּ דְּלָאו בַּר אֲחָתֵיהּ.

This incident raises several questions, which the Gemara asks in sequence. What is different concerning this Sage, Rabba bar Ḥana, that Rabbi Ḥiyya called him: My brother’s son, and what is different concerning that Sage, Rav, that Rabbi Ḥiyya called him: My sister’s son? And if you would say that this was the situation: Rabba bar Ḥana was his brother’s son and Rav was his sister’s son, but doesn’t the Master say: Aivu, Rav’s father, and Ḥana, the father of Rabba bar Ḥana, and Sheila, and Marta, and Rabbi Ḥiyya, were all sons of Abba bar Aḥa Karsala from Kafrei? Consequently, Rav would also be Rabbi Ḥiyya’s brother’s son. The Gemara answers: Rav was his brother’s son who was also his sister’s son, as Rabbi Ḥiyya’s half-brother married Rabbi Ḥiyya’s half-sister; while Rabba bar Ḥana was his brother’s son who was not his sister’s son. Therefore, he referred to Rav in a manner that emphasized the additional relationship.

וְאִי בָּעֵית אֵימָא:

And if you wish, say instead that he called him: My sister’s son, for a different reason:

עַל שֵׁם חׇכְמָתוֹ, דִּכְתִיב: ״אֱמֹר לַחׇכְמָה אֲחֹתִי אָתְּ״.

It was due to his extraordinary wisdom, as it is written: “Say to wisdom: You are my sister” (Proverbs 7:4). Therefore, calling him: My sister’s son, was an indication of his great wisdom.

יַתִּיר בְּכוֹרוֹת? אַל יַתִּיר. מַאי טַעְמָא? אִילֵּימָא מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא חַכִּים, הָא קָא אָמְרִינַן דְּחַכִּים טוּבָא! אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא בְּקִיעַ בְּמוּמֵי.

The Gemara had related that Rabbi Ḥiyya asked Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: May Rav declare a firstborn animal permitted, and that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi had responded: He may not declare such an animal permitted. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that he denied him this permission? If we say that it was because Rav was not sufficiently wise and learned, but that is difficult, as we already said that he was exceedingly wise. Rather, it must be that it was because, although he was quite knowledgeable about the halakha, he was not an expert with regard to blemishes, meaning that he lacked the practical expertise to apply the halakha to actual cases.

וְהָאָמַר רַב: שְׁמוֹנָה עָשָׂר חֳדָשִׁים גָּדַלְתִּי אֵצֶל רוֹעֵה בְהֵמָה, לֵידַע אֵיזֶה מוּם קָבוּעַ וְאֵיזֶה מוּם עוֹבֵר? אֶלָּא, לְחַלֵּק לוֹ כָּבוֹד לְרַבָּה בַּר חָנָה.

The Gemara rejects this answer. But didn’t Rav say: I apprenticed with a shepherd for eighteen months in order to be able to know which blemish is a permanent blemish, and which is a temporary blemish? Evidently, he had a high level of practical expertise in this matter. The Gemara explains: Rather, it was in order to bestow honor upon Rabba bar Ḥana. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi wanted to ensure that Rabba bar Ḥana would be treated with respect, so he made sure that there was an area of halakha with regard to which the people would not be able to consult with Rav and would need to consult with Rabba bar Ḥana instead.

וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: מִשּׁוּם הָא גּוּפֵיהּ, דְּרַב בְּקִיעַ בְּמוּמֵי טְפֵי, וְשָׁרֵי מוּמֵי דְּלָא יָדְעִי אִינָשֵׁי. וְאָמְרִי: ״כִּי הַאי גַוְונָא שְׁרָא רַב״, וְאָתוּ לְמִשְׁרֵי מוּם עוֹבֵר.

And if you wish, say instead: It is due to this fact itself: Since Rav was a great expert with regard to blemishes, he would permit blemishes that average people do not know about. And as a result, they would erroneously say with regard to a different blemish: In a case like this Rav declared the animal permitted, and in this way they would come to erroneously permit an animal with a temporary blemish, believing it to be identical to the blemish that Rav had declared permitted. Due to this concern, Rav was denied the authority to declare firstborn animals permitted on the basis of a blemish.

יוֹרֶה, יוֹרֶה. אִי גְּמִיר, רְשׁוּתָא לְמָה לִי לְמִישְׁקַל? מִשּׁוּם מַעֲשֶׂה שֶׁהָיָה.

With regard to the permission granted to Rabba bar Ḥana and Rav, the Gemara had related that Rabbi Ḥiyya asked Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: May he teach people and issue rulings concerning what is prohibited and what is permitted? And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi responded: He may teach. The Gemara asks: If he had studied and mastered the relevant halakhot, why do I need him to receive permission? The need for formal authority is understandable when it comes to serving on a court to judge cases of monetary law, but any knowledgeable person should be qualified to answer questions about ritual law. The Gemara explains: The need for such permission is due to an incident that took place.

דְּתַנְיָא: פַּעַם אַחַת הָלַךְ רַבִּי לְמָקוֹם אֶחָד, וְרָאָה בְּנֵי אָדָם שֶׁמְּגַבְּלִין עִיסּוֹתֵיהֶם בְּטוּמְאָה. אָמַר לָהֶם: מִפְּנֵי מָה אַתֶּם מְגַבְּלִין עִיסּוֹתֵיכֶם בְּטוּמְאָה? אָמְרוּ לוֹ: תַּלְמִיד אֶחָד בָּא לְכָאן וְהוֹרָה לָנוּ: מֵי בְצָעִים אֵין מַכְשִׁירִין. וְהוּא מֵי בֵיצִים דְּרַשׁ לְהוּ, וְאִינְהוּ סְבוּר מֵי בְצָעִים קָאָמַר.

As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi once went to a certain place, and he saw people there kneading dough while they were in a state of ritual impurity, and they believed that nevertheless, the dough remained ritually pure. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to them: For what reason are you kneading your dough in a state of ritual impurity? They said to him: A certain Torah scholar came here and taught us that water from swamps [mei betza’im] does not render food susceptible to contract ritual impurity. Therefore, they would take water from swamps and knead dough with it, in the mistaken belief that such dough would not be susceptible to ritual impurity. But in reality, what he taught them was that water of eggs [mei beitzim], i.e., the albumin of eggs, does not render food susceptible to impurity, as it is not considered water. But they thought he said: Water from swamps.

וְטָעוּ נָמֵי בְּהָא: מֵי קֵרַמְיוֹן וּמֵי פֵיגָה פְּסוּלִין, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהֵן מֵי בְצָעִים. וְאִינְהוּ סְבוּר: מִדִּלְגַבֵּי חַטָּאת פְּסִילִי – אַכְשׁוֹרֵי נָמֵי לָא מַכְשְׁרִי. וְלָא הִיא: הָתָם, לְעִנְיַן חַטָּאת, בָּעֵינַן מַיִם חַיִּים; הָכָא, אַכְשׁוֹרֵי כָּל דְּהוּ מַכְשְׁרִי.

And the residents of that same place erred also with regard to this: It was taught in a mishna (Para 8:10): The waters of the Keramiyyon River and the waters of the Piga River are not fit for mixing with ashes of the red heifer to use as water of purification, since they are water from swamps. And they erroneously thought: Since this water is not fit for use as water of purification, this means it is not considered water, and therefore it also does not render food susceptible to contracting impurity. But it is not so, as there, with regard to water of purification, we need: “Running water” (see Numbers 19:17), and water from swamps is not running water. But here, with regard to rendering food susceptible to impurity, any water renders food susceptible.

תָּנָא, בְּאוֹתָהּ שָׁעָה גָּזְרוּ: תַּלְמִיד אַל יוֹרֶה אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן נוֹטֵל רְשׁוּת מֵרַבּוֹ.

It was taught: At that time, when Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi discovered the consequences resulting from a Torah scholar who was not precise with his terminology, the Sages decreed: A Torah scholar may not teach halakha unless he receives permission from his teacher to do so. The teacher should not grant him this permission if he does not know how to express himself in a clear manner.

תַּנְחוּם בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי אַמֵּי אִיקְּלַע לְחֶתֶר. דְּרַשׁ לְהוּ: מוּתָּר לִלְתּוֹת חִיטִּין בַּפֶּסַח. אָמְרוּ לוֹ: לָאו רַבִּי מַנִּי דְּמִן צוּר אִיכָּא הָכָא? וְתַנְיָא: תַּלְמִיד אַל יוֹרֶה הֲלָכָה בִּמְקוֹם רַבּוֹ, אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן הָיָה רָחוֹק מִמֶּנּוּ שָׁלֹשׁ פַּרְסָאוֹת כְּנֶגֶד מַחֲנֵה יִשְׂרָאֵל. אָמַר לְהוּ: לָאו אַדַּעְתַּאי.

Concerning a similar matter, the Gemara relates: Tanḥum, son of Rabbi Ami, arrived at a place called Ḥatar, and he taught them: It is permitted to wash wheat in a small amount of water in order to make it easier to peel during the grinding process on Passover, and there is no concern that perhaps it will become leavened. They said to him: Isn’t Rabbi Mani from Tyre here i.e., near our location? And it is taught in a baraita: A Torah scholar may not teach halakha in the vicinity of his teacher, unless he is distant from the teacher by at least three parasangs [parsaot], corresponding to the size of the camp of Israel. In the encampment in the wilderness no one else judged cases, as all the Jewish people brought their cases to Moses (see Exodus 33:7). Tanḥum, son of Rabbi Ami, said to them: It did not enter my mind that Rabbi Mani was in the vicinity.

רַבִּי חִיָּיא חַזְיֵיהּ לְהָהוּא גַּבְרָא דַּהֲוָה קָאֵי בְּבֵית הַקְּבָרוֹת. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לָאו בֶּן אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי כֹּהֵן אַתָּה? אָמַר לֵיהּ: אִין. אֲבוּהּ דְּהָהוּא גַּבְרָא גְּבַהּ עֵינַיִם הֲוָה, נָתַן עֵינָיו בִּגְרוּשָׁה וְחִילְּלוֹ.

The Gemara relates: Rabbi Ḥiyya saw a certain man standing in a cemetery. He said to him: Are you not the son of so-and-so the priest? As it is prohibited for priests to come into contact with the dead (see Leviticus 21:1–4), Rabbi Ḥiyya was surprised to see a priest standing in a cemetery. The man said to him: Yes, but that man’s, meaning his own, father was a man with raised eyes who would desire things that he saw, even if they were forbidden. He set his eyes upon a divorcée and married her despite the Torah prohibition against such a union (see Leviticus 21:7), and thereby disqualified the offspring of that union from the sanctity of priesthood. As the son of a priest and a divorcée, the man had the status of a ḥalal and was therefore not obligated to abide by the restrictions specific to priests.

פְּשִׁיטָא, לְפַלְגָא – הָא קָאָמַר דְּמַהֲנֵי. עַל תְּנַאי מַאי? תָּא שְׁמַע, דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן לְרַב שֶׁמֶן: הֲרֵי אַתָּה בִּרְשׁוּתֵנוּ עַד שֶׁתָּבֹא אֶצְלֵנוּ.

Continuing the discussion about receiving permission to teach halakha, the Gemara discusses the extent of this authority. It is obvious that one’s teacher can grant partial permission, meaning permission to rule on certain types of cases but not others, as it has been said above that doing so is effective. But what is the halakha with regard to granting such permission conditionally? Is it possible to grant permission limited to a certain period of time, or limited to a certain location? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear the solution to this matter from what Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Rav Shemen: You have our permission to instruct and to adjudicate until you return to us. This statement proves that it is possible to grant permission limited to a specific period of time.

גּוּפָא, אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: שְׁנַיִם שֶׁדָּנוּ – דִּינֵיהֶם דִּין, אֶלָּא שֶׁנִּקְרָא בֵּית דִּין חָצוּף. יָתֵיב רַב נַחְמָן וְקָאָמַר לְהָא שְׁמַעְתָּא. אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רָבָא לְרַב נַחְמָן: אֲפִילּוּ שְׁנַיִם מְזַכִּין אוֹ שְׁנַיִם מְחַיְּיבִין וְאֶחָד אוֹמֵר אֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ – יוֹסִיפוּ הַדַּיָּינִין. וְאִי אִיתָא, לִהְווֹ כִּשְׁנַיִם שֶׁדָּנוּ!

§ Earlier, the Gemara discussed the possibility of a court consisting of only two judges adjudicating a case. Concerning the matter itself, Shmuel says: With regard to two judges who adjudicated a case, their judgment is a valid judgment, but they are called an impudent court. Rav Naḥman sat and said this halakha. Rava raised an objection to Rav Naḥman from a mishna (29a): In a case where three judges are adjudicating a case, even if two judges deem the defendant exempt from payment or two judges deem him liable to pay, and one says: I do not know, the judges must add another judge, since the one who abstained has removed himself from the court, and there are not enough judges. And if it is so as Shmuel says, they should be viewed as two judges who adjudicated the case, and there would be no need to add another judge, as a judgment passed by two judges is valid.

שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּמֵעִיקָּרָא אַדַּעְתָּא דִּתְלָתָא יְתִיבִי. הָכָא, לָאו אַדַּעְתָּא דִּתְלָתָא יְתֵיבִי.

Rav Naḥman answered him: It is different there, as they convened from the outset with the knowledge that they are three and intended to judge the case with three judges. Therefore, if one abstains, they must add another to complete the quorum. But here they did not convene with the knowledge that they are three, but rather intended to adjudicate the case as a court of two judges.

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ, רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: הַדִּין בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה, וּפְשָׁרָה בִּשְׁנַיִם. וְיָפֶה כֹּחַ פְּשָׁרָה מִכֹּחַ הַדִּין, שֶׁשְּׁנַיִם שֶׁדָּנוּ – בַּעֲלֵי דִינִין יְכוֹלִין לַחֲזוֹר בָּהֶן, וּשְׁנַיִם שֶׁעָשׂוּ פְּשָׁרָה – אֵין בַּעֲלֵי דִינִין יְכוֹלִין לַחֲזוֹר בָּהֶן.

Rava raised an objection to Rav Naḥman from a baraita: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Cases of monetary law are adjudicated by three judges, and mediation leading to compromise can be performed by two mediators. And the power of compromise is greater than the power of adjudication, as if two judges adjudicated a case, the litigants are able to withdraw from the case and demand a court with a complete quorum. But if two mediated a compromise, the litigants may not withdraw.