סנהדרין פד

סנהדרין פד

וְעֶרֶל בָּשָׂר לֹא יָבוֹא אֶל מִקְדָּשִׁי (לְשָׁרְתֵנִי)״.

or uncircumcised in flesh may enter My Temple” (Ezekiel 44:9).

אוֹנֵן מְנָלַן? דִּכְתִיב: ״וּמִן הַמִּקְדָּשׁ לֹא יֵצֵא וְלֹא יְחַלֵּל אֵת מִקְדַּשׁ אֱלֹהָיו״. הָא אַחֵר שֶׁלֹּא יָצָא, חִילֵּל.

The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that it is prohibited for an acute mourner priest to perform the Temple service? It is derived from a verse, as it is written with regard to a High Priest whose mother or father died: “And from the Temple he shall not emerge and he shall not desecrate the Temple of his God” (Leviticus 21:12), from which it may be inferred that another, who is not a High Priest but an ordinary priest, who did not emerge from the Temple and who continued to perform the service, has desecrated the service.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַדָּא לְרָבָא: וְנֵילַף ״חִילּוּל״ ״חִילּוּל״ מִתְּרוּמָה, מָה לְהַלָּן בְּמִיתָה – אַף כָּאן בְּמִיתָה.

Rav Adda said to Rava: And let us derive it by means of a verbal analogy: Derive the meaning of the term of desecration written with regard to an acute mourner who performs the Temple service from the term of desecration written with regard to an impure priest who partakes of teruma. Just as there, with regard to teruma, he is punished with death at the hand of Heaven, so too here, with regard to an acute mourner who performs the Temple service, he is punished with death at the hand of Heaven.

מִי כְּתִיב בֵּיהּ בְּגוּפֵיהּ? מִכְּלָלָא קָאָתֵי. הָוֵי דָּבָר הַבָּא מִן הַכְּלָל, וְכׇל דָּבָר הַבָּא מִן הַכְּלָל אֵין דָּנִין אוֹתוֹ בִּגְזֵרָה שָׁוָה.

Rava answers: Is desecration written with regard to the matter of a priest who performs the Temple service as an acute mourner itself? It is derived from that which is written with regard to the High Priest, by inference. Therefore, it is a matter that emerges from an inference, and the principle is: Any matter that emerges from an inference cannot be derived by means of a verbal analogy. A verbal analogy can be derived only when the matter is written explicitly.

יוֹשֵׁב מְנָלַן? אָמַר רָבָא אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: אָמַר קְרָא ״כִּי בוֹ בָּחַר ה׳ אֱלֹהֶיךָ מִכׇּל שְׁבָטֶיךָ לַעֲמֹד לְשָׁרֵת״. לַעֲמִידָה בְּחַרְתִּיו, וְלֹא לִישִׁיבָה.

The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that it is prohibited for a priest who is seated to perform the Temple service? Rava says that Rav Naḥman says: The verse states: “For him has the Lord chosen from among all your tribes, to stand and minister in the name of the Lord” (Deuteronomy 18:5). God states in the verse that I chose him for service while he is standing, but not for service while seated.

בַּעַל מוּם: רַבִּי אוֹמֵר בְּמִיתָה, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים בָּאַזְהָרָה. מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי? דִּכְתִיב: ״אַךְ אֶל הַפָּרֹכֶת לֹא יָבֹא וְגוֹ׳״, וְיָלֵיף חִילּוּל חִילּוּל מִתְּרוּמָה. מָה לְהַלָּן בְּמִיתָה, אַף כָּאן בְּמִיתָה.

§ The baraita continues: With regard to a blemished priest who performs the Temple service, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: He is punished with death at the hand of Heaven, and the Rabbis say: He is liable only for violating a prohibition. The Gemara elaborates: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi? It is as it is written: “But he shall not come into the curtain and he shall not approach the altar as he has a blemish, that he desecrate not My sacred places” (Leviticus 21:23). And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi derives the punishment by means of a verbal analogy: The meaning of the term of desecration written with regard to a blemished priest who performs the Temple service is derived from the term of desecration written with regard to an impure priest who partakes of teruma. Just as there, with regard to teruma, he is punished with death at the hand of Heaven, so too here, with regard to a blemished priest who performs the Temple service, he is punished with death at the hand of Heaven.

וְנֵילַף ״חִילּוּל״ ״חִילּוּל״ מִנּוֹתָר: מָה לְהַלָּן בְּכָרֵת, אַף כָּאן בְּכָרֵת?

The Gemara challenges: And let us derive the punishment by means of a different verbal analogy: Derive the meaning of the term of desecration written with regard to a blemished priest who performs the Temple service from the term of desecration written with regard to notar. Just as there, with regard to notar, he is punished with karet, so too here, with regard to a blemished priest who performs the Temple service, he is punished with karet.

מִסְתַּבְּרָא מִתְּרוּמָה הֲוָה לֵיהּ לְמֵילַף, שֶׁכֵּן פְּסוּל הַגּוּף מִפְּסוּל הַגּוּף. אַדְּרַבָּה, מִנּוֹתָר הֲוָה לֵיהּ לְמֵילַף, שֶׁכֵּן קוֹדֶשׁ, פְּנִים, פִּיגּוּל וְנוֹתָר.

The Gemara explains: It is reasonable to say that he should have derived the punishment for a blemished priest who performs the Temple service from teruma, as the tanna derives the bodily disqualification of a blemished priest from the bodily disqualification of the impure priest. The Gemara challenges: On the contrary, he should have derived the punishment for a blemished priest who performs the Temple service from notar, as there are elements common to notar and a blemished priest who performs the Temple service. Unlike teruma, both are cases involving sacrificial matters; both involve matters performed inside the Temple; and in both cases, the disqualification of piggul and the disqualification of notar are applicable.

אֶלָּא, מִטָּמֵא שֶׁשִּׁימֵּשׁ גָּמַר. פְּסוּל הַגּוּף מִפְּסוּל הַגּוּף, קוֹדֶשׁ פְּנִים פִּיגּוּל וְנוֹתָר מִקּוֹדֶשׁ פְּנִים פִּיגּוּל וְנוֹתָר.

Rather, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi derives the halakha of a blemished priest who performed the Temple service from the halakha of an impure priest who performed the Temple service, due to the elements common to both. He derives the bodily disqualification of a blemished priest from the bodily disqualification of an impure priest who performs the Temple service, and he derives the case of a blemished priest, whose case involves sacrificial matters, matters performed inside the Temple, and the relevance of both piggul and notar, from the case of an impure priest, whose case involves sacrificial matters, matters performed inside the Temple, and the relevance of both piggul and notar.

וְרַבָּנַן, אָמַר קְרָא: ״בּוֹ״, וְלֹא בְּבַעַל מוּם.

The Gemara asks: And the Rabbis, what is the reason that they hold that he is liable only for violating a prohibition? It is as the verse states: “And die because of it if they desecrate it; I am the Lord Who sanctifies them” (Leviticus 22:9), from which it is derived: “Because of it” they receive death at the hand of Heaven, but not in the case of a blemished priest.

הֵזִיד בִּמְעִילָה: רַבִּי אוֹמֵר בְּמִיתָה, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים בָּאַזְהָרָה. מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי? אָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ: גָּמַר חֵטְא חֵטְא מִתְּרוּמָה. מָה לְהַלָּן בְּמִיתָה – אַף כָּאן בְּמִיתָה.

The baraita continues: With regard to one who intentionally performed an action of misuse of consecrated property. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: He is punished with death at the hand of Heaven, and the Rabbis say: He is liable only for violating a prohibition. The Gemara elaborates: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi? Rabbi Abbahu says: He derives a verbal analogy: The meaning of the term of sin written with regard to one who intentionally misuses consecrated property (see Leviticus 5:15) is derived from the term of sin written with regard to an impure priest who partakes of teruma (see Leviticus 22:9). Just as there, with regard to teruma, the priest is punished with death at the hand of Heaven, so too here, one who intentionally misuses consecrated property is punished with death at the hand of Heaven.

וְרַבָּנַן אָמְרִי: אָמַר קְרָא ״בּוֹ״, ״בּוֹ״ וְלֹא בִּמְעִילָה.

The Gemara explains: And the Rabbis say that the verse states with regard to teruma: “Because of it” they receive death at the hand of Heaven, but not in the case of the intentional misuse of consecrated property.

זָר שֶׁשִּׁימֵּשׁ בְּמִקְדָּשׁ: תַּנְיָא, רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל אוֹמֵר: נֶאֱמַר כָּאן ״וְהַזָּר הַקָּרֵב יוּמָת״, וְנֶאֱמַר לְהַלָּן ״כֹּל הַקָּרֵב הַקָּרֵב אֶל מִשְׁכָּן ה׳ יָמוּת״. מָה לְהַלָּן בִּידֵי שָׁמַיִם, אַף כָּאן בִּידֵי שָׁמַיִם.

The Gemara cites a dispute between the Sages with regard to the punishment of a non-priest who performed the Temple service. It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yishmael says: It is stated here: “You and your sons with you shall keep your priesthood in everything that pertains to the altar…and any non-priest who approaches shall be put to death [yumat]” (Numbers 18:7), and it is stated there: “Anyone who approaches the Tabernacle of the Lord shall die [yamut]” (Numbers 17:28). Just as there, the reference is to death at the hand of Heaven; so too here, in the case of a non-priest who performs the Temple service, the reference is to death at the hand of Heaven.

רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: נֶאֱמַר כָּאן ״וְהַזָּר הַקָּרֵב יוּמָת״, וְנֶאֱמַר לְהַלָּן ״וְהַנָּבִיא הַהוּא אוֹ חֹלֵם הַחֲלוֹם הַהוּא יוּמָת״. מָה לְהַלָּן בִּסְקִילָה, אַף כָּאן בִּסְקִילָה. רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן נוּרִי אוֹמֵר: מָה לְהַלָּן בְּחֶנֶק, אַף כָּאן בְּחֶנֶק.

Rabbi Akiva says that it is stated here: “And any non-priest who approaches shall be put to death [yumat]” and it is stated there: “And that prophet or that dreamer of a dream shall be put to death [yumat]” (Deuteronomy 13:6). Just as there, with regard to the prophet, he is executed by stoning, so too here, a non-priest who performs the Temple service is executed by stoning. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri says: Just as there, with regard to the prophet, he is executed by strangulation, so too here, a non-priest who performs the Temple service is executed by strangulation.

בְּמַאי קָמִיפַּלְגִי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא? רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא סָבַר: דָּנִין ״יוּמָת״ מִ״יּוּמָת״, וְאֵין דָּנִין ״יוּמָת״ מִ״יָּמוּת״. וְרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל סָבַר: דָּנִין הֶדְיוֹט מֵהֶדְיוֹט, וְאֵין דָּנִין הֶדְיוֹט מִנָּבִיא. וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא: כֵּיוָן שֶׁהִדִּיחַ – אֵין לְךָ הֶדְיוֹט גָּדוֹל מִזֶּה.

The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva disagree? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Akiva holds: In the verbal analogy, one derives yumat from yumat and one does not derive yumat from yamut. And Rabbi Yishmael holds: Although the terms are not identical, one derives by means of a verbal analogy the halakha of an ordinary person from the halakha of an ordinary person and one does not derive the halakha of an ordinary person from the halakha of a prophet. The Gemara asks: And what does Rabbi Akiva hold? Once the prophet incited others to idol worship, you have no greater example of an ordinary person than that, i.e., he no longer has the status of a prophet.

בְּמַאי קָמִיפַּלְגִי רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן נוּרִי? בִּפְלוּגְתָּא דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן וְרַבָּנַן, דְּתַנְיָא: נָבִיא שֶׁהִדִּיחַ – בִּסְקִילָה. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: בְּחֶנֶק. הָא אֲנַן תְּנַן: רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: בְּחֶנֶק.

The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri disagree? The Gemara answers: They disagree with regard to the issue that is the subject of the dispute of Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis, as it is taught in a baraita: A prophet who incited others to idol worship is executed by stoning. Rabbi Shimon says: He is executed by strangulation. The Gemara asks: Didn’t we learn in a mishna with regard to a prophet who incites others to idol worship that Rabbi Akiva says: He is executed by strangulation, contrary to Rabbi Akiva’s opinion cited in the baraita?

תְּרֵי תַּנָּאֵי וְאַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא. מַתְנִיתִין – רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן וְאַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא. בָּרַיְיתָא – רַבָּנַן וְאַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא.

The Gemara answers: These are two tanna’im and they disagree with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. The mishna, which cites the opinion that Rabbi Akiva holds that a prophet who incited others to idol worship is executed by strangulation, is citing the opinion of Rabbi Shimon in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Shimon was his preeminent disciple. The baraita, which cites the opinion that Rabbi Akiva holds that a prophet who incited others to idol worship is executed by stoning, is citing the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Shimon, and they too hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva.

הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ אֵלּוּ הֵן הַנִּשְׂרָפִין.

MISHNA: These are the transgressors who are strangled in the implementation of the court-imposed death penalty: One who strikes his father or his mother, and one who abducts a Jewish person, and a rebellious elder according to the court, and a false prophet, and one who prophesies in the name of idol worship, and one who engages in intercourse with a married woman, and conspiring witnesses who testify that the daughter of a priest committed adultery, even though were she guilty, she would be executed by burning. And her paramour is also executed via strangulation as in any case where a man engages in intercourse with a married woman.

מַתְנִי׳ אֵלּוּ הֵן הַנֶּחְנָקִין – הַמַּכֶּה אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ, וְגוֹנֵב נֶפֶשׁ מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל, וְזָקֵן מַמְרֵא עַל פִּי בֵּית דִּין, וּנְבִיא הַשֶּׁקֶר, וְהַמִּתְנַבֵּא בְּשֵׁם עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, וְהַבָּא עַל אֵשֶׁת אִישׁ, וְזוֹמְמֵי בַּת כֹּהֵן וּבוֹעֲלָהּ.

GEMARA: The mishna teaches: One who strikes his father or his mother is executed by strangulation. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this halakha? The Gemara answers: It is derived from a verse, as it is written: “One who strikes his father or his mother shall be put to death” (Exodus 21:15), and every death stated in the Torah without specification is referring to nothing other than strangulation.

גְּמָ׳ מַכֵּה אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ מְנָלַן? דִּכְתִיב: ״וּמַכֵּה אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ מוֹת יוּמָת״, וְכׇל מִיתָה הָאֲמוּרָה בַּתּוֹרָה סְתָם – אֵינָהּ אֶלָּא חֶנֶק.

The Gemara suggests: Say that one is not executed for striking his father or mother unless he kills him or her. The Gemara explains: Does it enter your mind to say that if one kills one other person, he is executed by beheading with a sword, but if he kills his father or mother he is executed by strangulation? That is not reasonable.

אֵימָא: עַד דְּקָטֵיל לֵיהּ מִיקְטָל! סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ? קְטַל חַד בְּסַיִיף, וְאָבִיו בְּחֶנֶק?

The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who said that strangulation is a more lenient form of execution than decapitation. But according to the one who said that strangulation is a more severe form of execution than decapitation, what is there to say? Perhaps one is liable to receive the death penalty for striking his father or mother only if he kills the parent, and the added severity for killing a parent is in terms of the specific form of death penalty.

הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר חֶנֶק קַל, אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר חֶנֶק חָמוּר, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?

The Gemara answers: Rather, prove that one is executed by strangulation for striking his father or mother even if he does not kill them from the fact that it is written: “One who strikes a man and he dies shall be put to death” (Exodus 21:12), and it is written: “Or if in enmity he struck him with his hand and he died he shall be put to death” (Numbers 35:21). Learn from these verses in which it states: Strikes and he dies, that anywhere that there is mention of striking without specifying a resultant death, it is not referring to a case where the blow caused one’s death.

אֶלָּא, מִדִּכְתִיב: ״מַכֵּה אִישׁ וָמֵת מוֹת יוּמָת״, וּכְתִיב: ״אוֹ בְאֵיבָה הִכָּהוּ בְיָדוֹ וַיָּמֹת״, שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: כֹּל הֵיכָא דְּאִיכָּא הַכָּאָה סְתָם – לָאו מִיתָה הוּא.

The Gemara notes: And it was necessary for the Torah to write: “One who strikes a man,” and it was necessary for the Torah to write: “Anyone who kills a soul, the murderer shall be slain on the basis of witnesses” (Numbers 35:30), since if the Merciful One wrote only: “One who strikes a man and he dies,” I would say that one who strikes a man, i.e., an adult, who is obligated in the fulfillment of mitzvot, yes, he is executed, but one who kills a minor, no, he is not executed. Therefore, the Merciful One writes: “Anyone who kills a soul.” And if the Merciful One wrote only: “Anyone who kills a soul,” I would say that one is executed even if he killed a non-viable newborn, or even if he killed a child born after a gestation period of eight months, who, in talmudic times, was also considered non-viable. Consequently, both verses are necessary.

וְאִיצְטְרִיךְ לְמִיכְתַּב ״מַכֵּה אִישׁ״, וְאִיצְטְרִיךְ לְמִכְתַּב ״כׇּל מַכֵּה נֶפֶשׁ״. דְּאִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״מַכֵּה אִישׁ וָמֵת״, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: אִישׁ דְּבַר מִצְוָה – אִין, קָטָן – לָא. כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״כׇּל מַכֵּה נֶפֶשׁ״. וְאִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״כׇּל מַכֵּה נֶפֶשׁ״, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: אֲפִילּוּ נְפָלִים, אֲפִילּוּ בֶּן שְׁמוֹנָה. צְרִיכִי.

The Gemara asks: But if that is the source for the halakha that one is liable for striking his father or mother, why not say that he is liable even though he did not wound him or her and draw blood? Why, then, did we learn in a mishna (85b): One who strikes his father and his mother is not liable unless he wounds them?

וְאֵימָא: אַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא עָבֵיד בֵּיהּ חַבּוּרָה? אַלְּמָה תְּנַן: הַמַּכֶּה אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב עַד שֶׁיַּעֲשֶׂה בָּהֶן חַבּוּרָה!

The Gemara answers that the verse states: “And one who strikes an animal shall pay for it; and one who strikes a person shall be put to death” (Leviticus 24:21), juxtaposing one who strikes an individual with one who strikes an animal. An earlier verse states: “One who strikes the soul of an animal shall pay for it” (Leviticus 24:18). Based on this it is derived: Just as one who strikes an animal is not liable unless he wounds it and draws blood, as “soul” is written concerning it, and it can be derived from the verse: “For the blood is the soul” (Deuteronomy 12:23), that the term “soul” is a reference to blood, so too, one who strikes a person is not liable unless he causes a wound and draws blood.

אָמַר קְרָא: ״מַכֵּה אָדָם וּמַכֵּה בְהֵמָה״. מָה מַכֵּה בְהֵמָה – עַד דְּעָבֵיד בַּהּ חַבּוּרָה, דִּכְתִיב בַּהּ ״נֶפֶשׁ״, אַף מַכֵּה אָדָם – עַד דְּעָבֵיד חַבּוּרָה.

Rav Yirmeya objects to this proof: If that is so, then in a case where one weakened the animal by placing a burden of stones upon it and thereby injured or killed it, would one say that so too in that case he is not liable because he did not draw blood? Clearly he is liable to pay for the damage that he caused. Rather, with regard to the term soul in the verse: “One who strikes the soul of an animal,” if it is not a matter that is relevant to the soul of an animal, as even in a case where one weakens the animal by placing a burden of stones upon it, he is liable, apply it to the matter of the soul of a person, and thereby derive that one who strikes his parent is liable to be executed only if he wounds his parent and draws blood.

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב יִרְמְיָה: אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, הִכְחִישָׁהּ בַּאֲבָנִים – הָכִי נָמֵי דְּלָא מִיחַיַּיב? אֶלָּא, אִם אֵינוֹ עִנְיָן לְנֶפֶשׁ בְּהֵמָה – דְּהָא אִי נָמֵי הִכְחִישָׁהּ בַּאֲבָנִים חַיָּיב – תְּנֵיהוּ עִנְיָן לְנֶפֶשׁ אָדָם.

The Gemara asks: But if the fact that one who strikes his parent is liable only if he draws blood is derived based on the principle: If it is not a matter, why do I need the juxtaposition between the striking of a man and the striking of an animal? The Gemara answers: The juxtaposition is necessary in order to derive the halakha for that which is taught in a baraita in the school of Ḥizkiyya: Just as in the case of one who strikes an animal there is no distinction between one who does so unwittingly and one who does so intentionally, and in both cases he is liable to pay damages, so too, in the case of one who strikes a person there is no distinction between one who does so intentionally and is executed, and one who does so unwittingly and is not executed. In both cases he is exempt from paying damages based on the principle that one receives only the greater punishment.

אֶלָּא, הֶקֵּישָׁא לְמָה לִי? לְכִדְתַנְיָא דְּבֵי חִזְקִיָּה.

The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who holds in accordance with the opinion of the tanna of the school of Ḥizkiyya, but according to the one who does not hold in accordance with the opinion of the tanna of the school of Ḥizkiyya, why do I need the juxtaposition between the striking of a man and the striking of an animal?

הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאִית לֵיהּ תַּנָּא דְּבֵי חִזְקִיָּה, אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּלֵית לֵיהּ תַּנָּא דְּבֵי חִזְקִיָּה, הֶיקֵּישָׁא לְמָה לִי?

The Gemara answers: He derives that just as one who strikes an animal for medical purposes is exempt from payment of restitution, so too, one who strikes a person for medical purposes is exempt, even if it results in the death of the one that he treated.

מָה מַכֵּה בְהֵמָה לִרְפוּאָה – פָּטוּר, אַף מַכֵּה אָדָם לִרְפוּאָה – פָּטוּר.

The Gemara explains: As a dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the halakha with regard to whether a son may let blood for his father? Is he liable for wounding his father? Rav Mattana says that it is written: “And you shall love your neighbor as yourself” (Leviticus 19:18); just as one would want others to heal him when the need arises, one must heal others when the need arises. It is prohibited for one to do to others only those actions that he would not want done to him. Therefore, it is permitted for one to heal his father even if the procedure entails wounding him. Rav Dimi bar Ḥinnana says: This is derived from the juxtaposition between one who strikes a person and one who strikes an animal. Just as one who strikes an animal for medical purposes is exempt from paying restitution, so too, one who strikes a person for medical purposes is exempt from liability.

דְּאִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: בֵּן מַהוּ שֶׁיַּקִּיז דָּם לְאָבִיו? רַב מַתְנָא אָמַר: ״וְאָהַבְתָּ לְרֵעֲךָ כָּמוֹךָ״. רַב דִּימִי בַּר חִינָּנָא אָמַר: מַכֵּה אָדָם וּמַכֵּה בְהֵמָה, מָה מַכֵּה בְהֵמָה לִרְפוּאָה – פָּטוּר, אַף מַכֵּה אָדָם לִרְפוּאָה – פָּטוּר.

The Gemara relates: Rav did not allow his son to extract a thorn from him, due to the concern that his son would unwittingly wound him. Mar, son of Ravina, did not allow his son to pierce his blister, lest he wound him, which would be an unwitting violation of a prohibition.

רַב לָא שָׁבֵיק לִבְרֵיהּ לְמִישְׁקַל לֵיהּ סִילְוָא. מָר בְּרֵיהּ דְּרָבִינָא לָא שָׁבֵיק לִבְרֵיהּ לְמִיפְתַּח לֵיהּ כְּוָותָא, דִּילְמָא חָבֵיל וְהָוְיָא לֵיהּ שִׁגְגַת אִיסּוּר.

The Gemara challenges this: If so, this should be a concern when another who is not his son treats him as well, as it is prohibited for one Jew to injure another. The Gemara explains: There is a distinction, as when another treats him, the concern is that the individual would be in unwitting violation of a prohibition. By contrast, when his son treats him, the concern is that he would be in unwitting violation of a prohibition punishable by strangulation.

אִי הָכִי, אַחֵר נָמֵי? אַחֵר – שִׁיגְגַת לָאו, בְּנוֹ – שִׁגְגַת חֶנֶק.

The Gemara asks: But with regard to that which we learned in a mishna (Shabbat 122b): It is permitted on Shabbat to move an ordinary hand needle used for sewing garments to extract a thorn with it, why is it permitted to extract a thorn on Shabbat? Let us be concerned lest he wound the individual in the process, which would be an unwitting violation of a prohibition punishable by stoning.

וְהָדִתְנַן: מַחַט שֶׁל יָד לִיטּוֹל בָּהּ אֶת הַקּוֹץ, לֵיחוּשׁ דִּילְמָא חָבֵיל וְהָוְיָא לַהּ שִׁגְגַת סְקִילָה?

The Gemara answers: There, even if one wounds the individual, he is unwittingly performing a labor for a destructive purpose, i.e., he is causing an injury, and one is liable to be executed only for the performance of a labor for a constructive purpose on Shabbat.

הָתָם מְקַלְקֵל הוּא.

The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who said that one who performs a labor on Shabbat for a destructive purpose is exempt. But according to the one who said that even when performing the labor for a destructive purpose, there are cases where one is liable if he benefits from the action, what is there to say?

הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר: מְקַלְקֵל פָּטוּר, אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר: חַיָּיב, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?

The Gemara answers: Whom did you hear that said that one who is destructive in causing a wound is liable to be executed if there is a constructive element to his action? It is Rabbi Shimon,

מַאן שָׁמְעַתְּ לֵיהּ דְּאָמַר: מְקַלְקֵל בְּחַבּוּרָה חַיָּיב? רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הִיא.