שבת סט

שבת סט

״וְכִי תִשְׁגּוּ וְלֹא תַעֲשׂוּ אֵת כׇּל הַמִּצְוֹת הָאֵלֶּה״, וּכְתִיב: ״וְהַנֶּפֶשׁ אֲשֶׁר תַּעֲשֶׂה בְּיָד רָמָה״. הוּקְשׁוּ כּוּלָּם לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה: מָה לְהַלָּן דָּבָר שֶׁחַיָּיבִים עַל זְדוֹנוֹ כָּרֵת וְשִׁגְגָתוֹ חַטָּאת, אַף כׇּל דָּבָר שֶׁחַיָּיבִין עַל זְדוֹנוֹ כָּרֵת וְעַל שִׁגְגָתוֹ חַטָּאת.

“And if you err, and do not perform all these commandments that God spoke to Moses” (Numbers 15:22). The Sages understood this verse as referring specifically to the laws of idolatry. And it is written: “And the person who acts with a high hand, he blasphemes God and that soul shall be cut off from the midst of his people” (Numbers 15:30), from which we learn that all the mitzvot are derived from this juxtaposition to idolatry. Just as there, with regard to idolatry, the reference is to a matter which, for its intentional violation, one is liable to be punished with karet, as it is stated: “And that soul shall be cut off,” and for its unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering; so too, any matter that for its intentional violation one is liable to be punished with karet, for its unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering.

וְאֶלָּא מוֹנְבַּז, שְׁגָגָה בְּמַאי? כְּגוֹן שֶׁשָּׁגַג בְּקׇרְבָּן. וְרַבָּנַן: שִׁגְגַת קׇרְבָּן לֹא שְׁמָהּ שְׁגָגָה.

The Gemara asks: However, according to Munbaz, who holds that included in the category of an unwitting sinner is one who at the time of action was aware that it was prohibited; if he were fully aware, in what sense was his action unwitting? The Gemara answers: It is referring to a case where he was unwitting with regard to the sacrifice. He was aware that he was committing a transgression for which one is liable to be punished with karet when performed intentionally; however, he was unaware that he would be liable to bring a sin-offering if he performed the transgression unwittingly. Since he was not aware of all punishments and forms of atonement associated with that transgression, he is considered an unwitting sinner and is liable to bring a sin-offering. The Gemara asks: And what do the Rabbis who disagree with Munbaz hold? They hold: Unwitting with regard to a sacrifice is not considered unwitting.

וְרַבָּנַן, שְׁגָגָה בְּמַאי? רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: כֵּיוָן שֶׁשָּׁגַג בְּכָרֵת, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהֵזִיד בְּלָאו. וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר עַד שֶׁיִּשְׁגּוֹג בְּלָאו וְכָרֵת. אָמַר רָבָא: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ — אָמַר קְרָא: ״אֲשֶׁר לֹא תֵעָשֶׂינָה בִּשְׁגָגָה וְאָשֵׁם״ — עַד שֶׁיִּשְׁגּוֹג בְּלָאו וְכָרֵת שֶׁבָּהּ.

The Gemara asks: And in the opinion of the Rabbis, lack of awareness with regard to what aspects of the prohibition renders the action unwitting? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is an unwitting transgression since he was unwitting with regard to the fact that the punishment for his transgression is karet, even though he was aware that his action was in violation of a Torah prohibition, and he performed the transgression intentionally. And Reish Lakish said that according to the Rabbis it is not considered unwitting until he was unwitting with regard to both the prohibition and karet, i.e., he was unaware that his action was prohibited by Torah law. Rava said: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish? The verse said: “And if one soul shall sin by mistake from the common people, by performing one of God’s commandments that may not be done, and he becomes guilty” (Leviticus 4:27), indicating that it is not considered unwitting until he was unwitting with regard to the prohibition and its concomitant karet. The verse indicates that the individual was unaware that he violated “one of the commandments that may not be done,” i.e., that there is a Torah prohibition with regard to that action.

וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, הַאי קְרָא דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ מַאי עָבֵיד לֵיהּ? מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְתַנְיָא: ״מֵעַם הָאָרֶץ״ — פְּרָט לִמְשׁוּמָּד. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: ״אֲשֶׁר לֹא תֵעָשֶׂינָה בִּשְׁגָגָה וְאָשֵׁם״. הַשָּׁב מִידִיעָתוֹ — מֵבִיא קׇרְבָּן עַל שִׁגְגָתוֹ, לֹא שָׁב מִידִיעָתוֹ — אֵינוֹ מֵבִיא קׇרְבָּן עַל שִׁגְגָתוֹ.

The Gemara asks: And what does Rabbi Yoḥanan do with that verse cited as proof by Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish? The Gemara answers: He needs it for that which was taught in a baraita: The phrase: “From the common people” (Leviticus 4:27) teaches that only some sinners, not all, bring sacrifices for their unwitting sins. It comes to exclude an apostate. When an apostate sins unwittingly, he is under no obligation to bring a sin-offering even after he repents. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: This halakha is derived from the phrase in that verse: “That may not be done, and he becomes guilty.” One who repents due to his awareness, i.e., one who repents as soon as he becomes aware that he performed a transgression, brings a sacrifice for his unwitting transgression. However, one who does not repent due to his awareness that he sinned, e.g., an apostate who continues to sin even after he becomes aware that he committed a transgression, does not bring an offering for his unwitting action. Rabbi Yoḥanan understood the verse in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar.

תְּנַן: אֲבוֹת מְלָאכוֹת אַרְבָּעִים חָסֵר אַחַת. וְהָוֵינַן בַּהּ: מִנְיָנָא לְמָה לִי? וְאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: שֶׁאִם עֲשָׂאָן כּוּלָּן בְּהֶעְלֵם אֶחָד — חַיָּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת. הֵיכִי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ — בִּזְדוֹן שַׁבָּת וְשִׁגְגַת מְלָאכוֹת.

The Gemara cites proof from what we learned in a mishna: The number of primary categories of prohibited labors on Shabbat is forty-less-one, which the mishna proceeds to list. And we discussed this mishna: Why do I need this tally of forty-less-one? Isn’t merely listing the prohibited labors sufficient? And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The tally was included to teach that if he performed all of the prohibited labors in the course of one lapse of awareness during which he was unaware of the prohibition involved, he is liable for each and every one. Therefore, the mishna indicated that one could conceivably be liable to bring thirty-nine sin-offerings. Under what circumstances can you find a case where one would be liable for unwittingly violating all thirty-nine labors? It must be in a case where with regard to Shabbat his actions were intentional, as he was aware that it was Shabbat; and with regard to the prohibited labors his actions were unwitting, as he was unaware that these labors are prohibited on Shabbat.

בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, דְּאָמַר כֵּיוָן שֶׁשָּׁגַג בְּכָרֵת אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהֵזִיד בְּלָאו — מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ כְּגוֹן דְּיָדַע לֵהּ לְשַׁבָּת בְּלָאו. אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ, דְּאָמַר עַד שֶׁיִּשְׁגּוֹג בְּלָאו וּבְכָרֵת — דְּיָדַע לֵיהּ לְשַׁבָּת בְּמַאי? דְּיָדְעֵהּ בִּתְחוּמִין, וְאַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא.

Granted, according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said: Once he was unwitting with regard to the fact that the punishment for his transgression is karet, even though he was aware that his action was in violation of a Torah prohibition, and he performed the transgression intentionally, he is considered to have sinned unwittingly, you find that possibility in a case where he was aware that performing labor on Shabbat involves violation of a Torah prohibition, but he was unaware that the punishment for violating that prohibition is karet. However, according to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, who said: It is not considered unwitting until he was unwitting with regard to both the prohibition and karet, the result is that he is completely unaware of all the prohibited labors of Shabbat. If so, when Rabbi Yoḥanan said that the case where one would be liable to bring thirty-nine sin-offerings is one where with regard to Shabbat, his actions were intentional as he was aware that it was Shabbat, the question arises: With regard to what aspect of Shabbat was he aware? If he was completely unaware of all the labors prohibited on Shabbat, in what sense were his actions intentional with regard to Shabbat? The Gemara answers: He was aware of the halakhot of the prohibition of Shabbat boundaries, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. According to Rabbi Akiva, the prohibition to go beyond a certain distance outside the city limits on Shabbat is by Torah law and not merely a rabbinic decree.

מַאן תְּנָא לְהָא דְּתָנוּ רַבָּנַן: שָׁגַג בָּזֶה וּבָזֶה — זֶהוּ שׁוֹגֵג הָאָמוּר בַּתּוֹרָה. הֵזִיד בָּזֶה וּבָזֶה — זֶהוּ מֵזִיד הָאָמוּר בַּתּוֹרָה. שָׁגַג בְּשַׁבָּת וְהֵזִיד בִּמְלָאכוֹת, אוֹ שֶׁשָּׁגַג בִּמְלָאכוֹת וְהֵזִיד בְּשַׁבָּת, אוֹ שֶׁאָמַר: יוֹדֵעַ אֲנִי שֶׁמְּלָאכָה זוֹ אֲסוּרָה, אֲבָל אֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁחַיָּיבִין עָלֶיהָ קׇרְבָּן אוֹ לֹא — חַיָּיב. כְּמַאן — כְּמוֹנְבַּז.

The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna who taught this baraita? As the Sages taught: If one acted unwittingly with regard to both this, the fact that it is Shabbat, and that, the specific prohibited labors, that is the case of unwitting transgression stated in the Torah. If one acted intentionally with regard to both this and that, that is the case of intentional transgression stated in the Torah. If one acted unwittingly with regard to Shabbat and intentionally with regard to the labors, i.e., he forgot that it was Shabbat, but he was aware that those labors are prohibited when it is Shabbat; or if one acted unwittingly with regard to the labors and intentionally with regard to Shabbat, i.e., he was unaware that these labors are prohibited, but he was aware that labor is prohibited on Shabbat, or, even if he said: I know that this labor is prohibited on Shabbat; however, I do not know whether or not one is liable to bring a sacrifice for its performance, he is liable to bring a sin-offering like anyone who sins unwittingly. In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Munbaz, who holds that one is considered an unwitting sinner even in a case where he was unwitting only with regard to the sacrifice.

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: הַכֹּל מוֹדִים בִּשְׁבוּעַת בִּיטּוּי, שֶׁאֵין חַיָּיבִין עָלֶיהָ קׇרְבָּן עַד שֶׁיִּשְׁגּוֹג בְּלָאו שֶׁבָּהּ. ״הַכֹּל מוֹדִים״, מַאן — רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן. פְּשִׁיטָא, כִּי קָאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, הֵיכָא דְּאִיכָּא כָּרֵת, אֲבָל הָכָא דְּלֵיכָּא כָּרֵת — לָא!

Abaye said: Everyone agrees with regard to an oath on a statement, a case where one swore to prohibit or to obligate himself to perform an action, that the halakha is as follows: If he violates his oath he is only liable to bring an offering if he was unwitting with regard to its prohibition, i.e., he was unaware that it is prohibited by Torah law to violate an oath. The Gemara asks: To whose opinion is Abaye referring in the phrase: Everyone agrees? Certainly, it is the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan with regard to the opinion of the Rabbis in their dispute with Munbaz. Even though Rabbi Yoḥanan generally holds that the fact that one is unwitting with regard to karet is sufficient to render his action unwitting, the case of an oath is different. The Gemara asks: In the case of an oath, it is obvious that he would agree. When Rabbi Yoḥanan says that one need not be unwitting with regard to the prohibition, it is in a case where there is a prohibition punishable by karet; however, here, where there is no punishment of karet, Rabbi Yoḥanan would not say so. Obviously, he agrees that one must be unwitting with regard to the prohibition. There appears to be nothing new in Abaye’s statement.

סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא, הוֹאִיל וְחַיָּיב קׇרְבָּן — חִידּוּשׁ הוּא, דִּבְכָל הַתּוֹרָה כּוּלָּהּ לָא אַשְׁכְּחַן לָאו דְּמַיְיתֵי עֲלֵיהּ קׇרְבָּן, וְהָכָא מַיְיתֵי — כִּי שָׁגַג בְּקׇרְבָּן נָמֵי לִיחַיַּיב,

The Gemara explains: It might enter your mind to say the following: Since the obligation to bring an offering in the case of the oath is a novel halakha, as throughout the whole Torah in its entirety we do not find a prohibition for whose unwitting violation one is liable to bring an offering and for whose intentional violation is not punishable by karet; and here, one is liable to bring an offering for its unwitting violation, I might have said that if he was unwitting, i.e., unaware that he would be obligated, with regard to the offering, let him be liable also according to the Rabbis, who disagree with Munbaz.

קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן. מֵיתִיבִי: אֵיזוֹהִי שִׁגְגַת שְׁבוּעַת בִּיטּוּי לְשֶׁעָבַר — שֶׁאִם אָמַר ״יוֹדֵעַ אֲנִי שֶׁשְּׁבוּעָה זוֹ אֲסוּרָה, אֲבָל אֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ אִם חַיָּיבִין עָלֶיהָ קׇרְבָּן אוֹ לֹא״ — חַיָּיב! הָא מַנִּי? — מוֹנְבַּז הִיא.

Therefore, Abaye teaches us that this is not so. The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: What is an unwitting violation of an oath on a statement relating to the past? What is an example of one who unwittingly swore falsely with regard to an incident that occurred in the past? It cannot be a case where he forgot the incident, as in that case he is exempt from bringing an offering. It is a case where if he said: I know that taking this false oath is prohibited, but I do not know whether or not one is liable to bring an offering for swearing falsely, he is liable to bring an offering for an unwitting transgression. Apparently, with regard to an oath on a statement, unwitting with regard to the sacrifice renders the action unwitting. The Gemara rejects this: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is the opinion of Munbaz. In his opinion, one who commits a transgression while unaware whether or not one is liable to bring an offering if he performs that transgression unwittingly is considered to have performed the transgression unwittingly.

(לִישָּׁנָא אַחֲרִינָא: מַנִּי? אִילֵּימָא מוֹנְבַּז — פְּשִׁיטָא, הַשְׁתָּא בְּכׇל הַתּוֹרָה דְּלָאו חִידּוּשׁ הוּא אָמַר שִׁגְגַת קׇרְבָּן שְׁמָהּ שְׁגָגָה, הָכָא דְּחִידּוּשׁ הוּא — לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן?! אֶלָּא לָאו רַבָּנַן הִיא, וּתְיוּבְתָּא דְאַבָּיֵי! תְּיוּבְתָּא.)

There is another version of the discussion of Abaye’s statement where, after quoting the halakha with regard to an oath on a statement, the question was raised: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? If you say it is in accordance with the opinion of Munbaz, that is obvious: Now, if throughout the entire Torah where there is no novelty in the obligation to bring an offering, he said that unwitting with regard to an offering is considered unwitting; here, where there is a novelty and the offering in the case of an oath on a statement is more significant than other sin-offerings, certainly unwitting with regard to the offering should be considered unwitting. Rather, is it not the opinion of the Rabbis, and this is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Abaye? The Gemara concludes: Indeed, it is a conclusive refutation.

וְאָמַר אַבָּיֵי: הַכֹּל מוֹדִים בִּתְרוּמָה שֶׁאֵין חַיָּיבִין עָלֶיהָ חוֹמֶשׁ עַד שֶׁיִּשְׁגּוֹג בְּלָאו שֶׁבָּהּ. ״הַכֹּל מוֹדִים״ מַאן? — רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן. פְּשִׁיטָא! כִּי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן הֵיכָא דְּאִיכָּא כָּרֵת, הֵיכָא דְּלֵיכָּא כָּרֵת לָא! מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: מִיתָה בִּמְקוֹם כָּרֵת עוֹמֶדֶת, וְכִי שָׁגַג בְּמִיתָה נָמֵי לִיחַיַּיב — קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן. רָבָא אָמַר: מִיתָה בִּמְקוֹם כָּרֵת עוֹמֶדֶת וְחוֹמֶשׁ בִּמְקוֹם קׇרְבָּן קָאֵי.

And Abaye said: Everyone agrees with regard to teruma that one is only liable to add a payment of one-fifth the value of the teruma for eating it unwittingly if he is unwitting with regard to its prohibition. The Gemara asks: To whose opinion is Abaye referring in the phrase: Everyone agrees? Certainly, it is the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan. Even though, in general, he holds that unwitting with regard to karet is sufficient to render the action unwitting, the case of teruma is different. The Gemara asks: In the case of teruma, it is obvious that he would agree. When Rabbi Yoḥanan says that one need not be unwitting with regard to the prohibition, it is in a case where there is a prohibition punishable by karet; however, here, where there is no punishment of karet, Rabbi Yoḥanan would not say so. The Gemara answers that nonetheless Abaye introduced a novel element: Lest you say that since one who intentionally eats teruma is subject to death at the hand of Heaven, perhaps death stands in place of karet. And where he was unwitting with regard to the punishment of death for this sin, he should also be liable to pay the added fifth as one who performed the transgression unwittingly because his case is analogous to one who is considered unwitting due to lack of awareness of karet. Therefore, Abaye teaches us that it is not so. Rava said: Indeed, death stands in place of karet and the added one-fifth stands in place of a sacrifice. One who is unwitting with regard to death at the hand of Heaven and the added fifth has the same legal status as one who is unwitting with regard to karet and an offering.

אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: הָיָה מְהַלֵּךְ בַּדֶּרֶךְ אוֹ בַּמִּדְבָּר וְאֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ אֵימָתַי שַׁבָּת, מוֹנֶה שִׁשָּׁה יָמִים וּמְשַׁמֵּר יוֹם אֶחָד. חִיָּיא בַּר רַב אוֹמֵר: מְשַׁמֵּר יוֹם אֶחָד, וּמוֹנֶה שִׁשָּׁה. בְּמַאי קָמִיפַּלְגִי — מָר סָבַר כִּבְרִיָּיתוֹ שֶׁל עוֹלָם, וּמָר סָבַר כְּאָדָם הָרִאשׁוֹן. מֵיתִיבִי: הָיָה מְהַלֵּךְ בַּדֶּרֶךְ וְאֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ אֵימָתַי שַׁבָּת מְשַׁמֵּר יוֹם אֶחָד לְשִׁשָּׁה. מַאי לָאו, מוֹנֶה שִׁשָּׁה וּמְשַׁמֵּר יוֹם אֶחָד?! לָא, מְשַׁמֵּר יוֹם אֶחָד וּמוֹנֶה שִׁשָּׁה.

Rav Huna said: One who was walking along the way or in the desert, and he does not know when Shabbat occurs, he counts six days from the day that he realized that he lost track of Shabbat and then observes one day as Shabbat. Ḥiyya bar Rav says: He first observes one day as Shabbat and then he counts six weekdays. The Gemara explains: With regard to what do they disagree? One Sage, Rav Huna, held: It is like the creation of the world, weekdays followed by Shabbat. And one Sage, Ḥiyya bar Rav, held: It is like Adam, the first man, who was created on the sixth day. He observed Shabbat followed by the six days of the week. The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Ḥiyya bar Rav from a baraita: If a person was walking along the way and does not know when Shabbat occurs, he observes one day for every six. What, does this not mean that he counts six and then observes one day in accordance with the opinion of Rav Huna? The Gemara rejects this: No, it could also mean that he observes one day and then counts six.

אִי הָכִי ״מְשַׁמֵּר יוֹם אֶחָד לְשִׁשָּׁה״ — ״מְשַׁמֵּר יוֹם אֶחָד וּמוֹנֶה שִׁשָּׁה״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ. וְעוֹד, תַּנְיָא: הָיָה מְהַלֵּךְ בַּדֶּרֶךְ אוֹ בַּמִּדְבָּר וְאֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ אֵימָתַי שַׁבָּת, מוֹנֶה שִׁשָּׁה וּמְשַׁמֵּר יוֹם אֶחָד, תְּיוּבְתָּא דְּרַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר רַב! תְּיוּבְתָּא.

The Gemara asks: If so, if that is what the baraita meant, why employ the phrase: He observes one day for six? It should have stated: He observes one day and counts six. And furthermore, it was taught in a baraita: If one was walking along the way or was in the desert, and he does not know when Shabbat occurs, he counts six days and observes one day. That is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Rav. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, it is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Ḥiyya bar Rav.

אָמַר רָבָא: בְּכָל יוֹם וָיוֹם עוֹשֶׂה לוֹ כְּדֵי פַרְנָסָתוֹ [בַּר מֵהָהוּא יוֹמָא]. וְהָהוּא יוֹמָא לֵימוּת?! דְּעָבֵיד מֵאֶתְמוֹל שְׁתֵּי פַרְנָסוֹת. וְדִילְמָא מֵאֶתְמוֹל שַׁבָּת הֲוַאי! אֶלָּא כָּל יוֹם וָיוֹם עוֹשֶׂה לוֹ פַּרְנָסָתוֹ, אֲפִילּוּ הָהוּא יוֹמָא. וְהָהוּא יוֹמָא בְּמַאי מִינְּכַר לֵיהּ? בְּקִידּוּשָׁא וְאַבְדָּלְתָּא.

Rava said: The person who lost track of Shabbat and treats one day a week as Shabbat, each day he makes enough food to sustain himself, except for that day which he designated as Shabbat. The Gemara asks: And on that day let him die? Rather, it means that the day before he makes twice the amount of food that he prepared on the other days to sustain him for that day and the following day. The Gemara asks: And perhaps the day before was actually Shabbat? In that case, not only did he perform labor on Shabbat, but he also performed labor on Shabbat in preparation for a weekday. Rather, on each and every day he makes enough food to sustain himself for that day, including on that day that he designated as Shabbat. And if you ask: And how is that day which he designated as Shabbat distinguishable from the rest? It is distinguishable by means of the kiddush and the havdala that he recites on that day.

אָמַר רָבָא: אִם הָיָה מַכִּיר מִקְצָת הַיּוֹם שֶׁיָּצָא בּוֹ, עוֹשֶׂה מְלָאכָה כׇּל הַיּוֹם כּוּלּוֹ. פְּשִׁיטָא! מַהוּ דְתֵימָא: כֵּיוָן דְּשַׁבָּת לָא נָפֵיק, בְּמַעֲלֵי שַׁבְּתָא [נָמֵי] לָא נָפֵיק. וְהַאי, אִי נָמֵי בְּחַמְשָׁה בְּשַׁבְּתָא נָפֵיק — לִישְׁתְּרֵי לֵיהּ לְמֶיעְבַּד מְלָאכָה תְּרֵי יוֹמֵי — קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן זִימְנִין דְּמַשְׁכַּח שְׁיָּירְתָּא וּמִקְּרֵי וְנָפֵיק.

Rava said: If he had partial knowledge of the day on which he left, i.e., he does not recall what day of the week it was but he does recall the number of days that passed since he left, every week he can perform labor throughout the day of his departure, since he certainly did not leave his house on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: That is obvious, and what novel element was introduced here? The Gemara answers: Lest you say, since he did not leave on Shabbat, he also did not leave on Friday, and this person, even if he left on Thursday, should be permitted to perform labor for two days, the eighth day and the ninth day from his departure, the same day of the week that he left and the following day. Therefore, Rava teaches us that at times one finds a convoy and happens to leave on a journey even on Friday. Therefore, he is not permitted to perform labor on the day of the week following the day of his departure.

הַיּוֹדֵעַ עִיקַּר שַׁבָּת: מְנָהָנֵי מִילֵּי? אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ: תְּרֵי קְרָאֵי כְּתִיבִי: ״וְשָׁמְרוּ בְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל אֶת הַשַּׁבָּת״, וּכְתִיב: ״וְאֶת שַׁבְּתֹתַי תִּשְׁמֹרוּ״. הָא כֵּיצַד? ״וְשָׁמְרוּ בְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל אֶת הַשַּׁבָּת״ — שְׁמִירָה אַחַת לְשַׁבָּתוֹת הַרְבֵּה. ״וְאֶת שַׁבְּתֹתַי תִּשְׁמֹרוּ״ — שְׁמִירָה אַחַת לְכׇל שַׁבָּת וְשַׁבָּת.

We learned in the mishna that there is a difference in halakha between one who knows the essence of Shabbat and one who does not know it. The Gemara asks: From where in the Torah are these matters derived? Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: Two verses are written. One states: “And the children of Israel observed the Shabbat, to perform the Shabbat through their generations, an everlasting covenant” (Exodus 31:16). And it is written: “And you shall observe My Shabbatot and you shall revere My Sanctuary, I am God” (Leviticus 26:2). How is it that Shabbat is in the singular in one verse, while in the other it is in the plural [Shabbatot]? It should be understood as follows: “And the children of Israel observed the Shabbat”: One observance for multiple Shabbatot. If one commits several transgressions, in certain cases he is only liable to bring one sacrifice. “And you shall observe My Shabbatot”: One observance for each and every Shabbat. In certain cases, one is liable to bring a sin-offering for each time that he unwittingly desecrated Shabbat.

מַתְקִיף לַהּ רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: אַדְּרַבָּה, אִיפְּכָא מִסְתַּבְּרָא: ״וְשָׁמְרוּ בְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל אֶת הַשַּׁבָּת״ — שְׁמִירָה אַחַת לְכׇל שַׁבָּת וְשַׁבָּת. ״וְאֶת שַׁבְּתֹתַי תִּשְׁמֹרוּ״ — שְׁמִירָה אַחַת לְשַׁבָּתוֹת הַרְבֵּה.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak strongly objects: On the contrary, the opposite is reasonable. “And the children of Israel observed the Shabbat”: One observance for each and every Shabbat. “And you shall observe My Shabbatot”: One observance for multiple Shabbatot. In any case, Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak also holds that the halakha of our mishna is derived from comparing and contrasting these two verses.

הַיּוֹדֵעַ שֶׁהוּא שַׁבָּת.

We learned in the mishna that there is a difference between one who is aware that the day is Shabbat and performs labor and one who forgets the essence of Shabbat and performs prohibited labors.