שבת צז

שבת צז

וְאֶלָּא הָא גָּמַר גְּזֵירָה שָׁוָה! גְּזֵירָה שָׁוָה לָא גָּמַר. אֶלָּא מֵהֵיכָא הֲוָה? מִ״וַּיַּעְפִּילוּ״ הֲוָה.

The Gemara asks: However, didn’t Rabbi Akiva derive this by means of a verbal analogy? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira did not learn a verbal analogy. Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira had no tradition of this verbal analogy from his teachers, and therefore he disagreed with Rabbi Akiva’s conclusion. The Gemara asks: However, according to Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira, from where was Zelophehad’s liability derived? Why was he executed? The Gemara answers: Zelophehad was among those who “presumed to ascend to the top of the mountain” (Numbers 14:44) in the wake of the sin of the spies.

כַּיּוֹצֵא בַּדָּבָר, אַתָּה אוֹמֵר: ״וַיִּחַר אַף ה׳ בָּם וַיֵּלַךְ״ — מְלַמֵּד שֶׁאַף אַהֲרֹן נִצְטָרַע, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא. אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן בְּתִירָא: עֲקִיבָא, בֵּין כָּךְ וּבֵין כָּךְ אַתָּה עָתִיד לִיתֵּן אֶת הַדִּין. אִם כִּדְבָרֶיךָ — הַתּוֹרָה כִּסַּתּוּ וְאַתָּה מְגַלֶּה אוֹתוֹ?! וְאִם לָאו — אַתָּה מוֹצִיא לַעַז עַל אוֹתוֹ צַדִּיק.

On a similar note, Rabbi Akiva revealed an additional matter not explicitly articulated in the Torah. You say that when Aaron and Miriam spoke against Moses, both Aaron and Miriam were struck with leprosy, as it written: “And God became angry at them and He left, and the cloud departed from above the tent, and behold, Miriam was leprous like snow. And Aaron turned toward Miriam, and behold, she was leprous” (Numbers 12:9–10). The verse’s statement that God became angry at both of them teaches that Aaron, too, became leprous; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira said to him: Akiva, in either case you will be judged in the future for this teaching. If the truth is in accordance with your statement, the Torah concealed Aaron’s punishment and you reveal it. And if the truth is not in accordance with your statement, you are unjustly slandering that righteous man.

וְאֶלָּא הָכְתִיב ״בָּם״! הַהוּא בִּנְזִיפָה בְּעָלְמָא. תַּנְיָא כְּמַאן דְּאָמַר אַף אַהֲרֹן נִצְטָרַע, דִּכְתִיב: ״וַיִּפֶן אַהֲרֹן אֶל מִרְיָם וְהִנֵּה מְצֹרָעַת״, תָּנָא: שֶׁפָּנָה מִצָּרַעְתּוֹ.

The Gemara asks: However, didn’t Rabbi Akiva derive this from the plural pronoun them, meaning that God was angry with both of them? The Gemara answers: God’s anger in that verse was manifest in a mere rebuke, not in leprosy. A baraita was taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who said that Aaron also became leprous, as it is written: “And Aaron turned toward Miriam, and behold, she was leprous” (Numbers 12:10), and it was taught: This teaches that he turned, i.e., he was healed, from his leprosy, as he too had been afflicted.

אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: הַחוֹשֵׁד בִּכְשֵׁרִים — לוֹקֶה בְּגוּפוֹ, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְהֵן לֹא יַאֲמִינוּ לִי וְגוֹ׳״, וְגַלְיָא קַמֵּי קוּדְשָׁא בְּרִיךְ הוּא דִּמְהֵימְנִי יִשְׂרָאֵל. אָמַר לוֹ: הֵן מַאֲמִינִים בְּנֵי מַאֲמִינִים, וְאַתָּה אֵין סוֹפְךָ לְהַאֲמִין.

On the topic of Miriam’s leprosy, the Gemara cites that which Reish Lakish said: One who suspects the innocent of indiscretion is afflicted in his body, as it is written: “And Moses answered and said: But they will not believe me and will not hearken to my voice, for they will say, God did not appear to you” (Exodus 4:1), and it is revealed before the Holy One, Blessed be He, that the Jewish people would believe. The Holy One, Blessed be He, said to Moses: They are believers, the children of believers; and ultimately, you will not believe.

הֵן מַאֲמִינִים, דִּכְתִיב: ״וַיַּאֲמֵן הָעָם״. בְּנֵי מַאֲמִינִים — ״וְהֶאֱמִין בַּייָ״. אַתָּה אֵין סוֹפְךָ לְהַאֲמִין, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״יַעַן לֹא הֶאֱמַנְתֶּם בִּי וְגוֹ׳״. מִמַּאי דִּלְקָה, דִּכְתִיב: ״וַיֹּאמֶר ה׳ לוֹ עוֹד הָבֵא נָא יָדְךָ בְּחֵיקֶךָ וְגוֹ׳״.

They are believers, as it is written: “And the people believed once they heard that God had remembered the children of Israel, and that He saw their affliction, and they bowed and they prostrated” (Exodus 4:31). The children of believers, as it says with regard to Abraham our Patriarch: “And he believed in God, and He counted it for him as righteousness” (Genesis 15:6). Ultimately, you will not believe, as it is stated: “And God said to Moses and to Aaron: Because you did not believe in Me to sanctify Me in the eyes of the children of Israel” (Numbers 20:12). From where do we know that Moses was afflicted in his body? As it is written: “And God said to him further: Bring your hand to your bosom, and he brought his hand to his bosom and he took it out and behold, his hand was leprous like snow” (Exodus 4:6).

אָמַר רָבָא, וְאִיתֵּימָא רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא: מִדָּה טוֹבָה מְמַהֶרֶת לָבֹא מִמִּדַּת פּוּרְעָנוּת. דְּאִילּוּ בְּמִדַּת פּוּרְעָנוּת כְּתִיב: ״וַיּוֹצִיאָהּ וְהִנֵּה יָדוֹ מְצֹרַעַת כַּשָּׁלֶג״, וְאִילּוּ בְּמִדָּה טוֹבָה כְּתִיב: ״וַיּוֹצִיאָהּ מֵחֵיקוֹ וְהִנֵּה שָׁבָה כִּבְשָׂרוֹ״ — מֵחֵיקוֹ הוּא דְּשָׁבָה כִּבְשָׂרוֹ.

On this topic, Rava said, and some say that it was Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, who said: The divine attribute of beneficence takes effect more quickly than the divine attribute of punishment. From where is this derived? While, with regard to the divine attribute of punishment, it is written, “And he took it out and behold, his hand was leprous like snow” (Exodus 4:6), with regard to the divine attribute of beneficence it is written: “And He said: Return your hand to your bosom, and he returned his hand to his bosom and he took it out from his bosom and behold, it had returned to be like his original flesh” (Exodus 4:7). The Gemara analyzes this as follows: It was already from his bosom that it returned to be like his original flesh. Moses’ hand was healed even before he took his hand out.

״וַיִּבְלַע מַטֵּה אַהֲרֹן אֶת מַטֹּתָם״, אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: נֵס בְּתוֹךְ נֵס.

The Gemara proceeds to discuss another miracle that transpired at that time. With regard to the verse, “And each man threw down his staff and they became serpents, and Aaron’s staff swallowed their staffs” (Exodus 7:12), Rabbi Elazar said: This was a miracle within a miracle. It was Aaron’s staff, not his serpent, that swallowed the other staffs.

מֵרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד לִרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד.

We learned in the mishna that there is a dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis in a case where one threw an object from the private domain to the other private domain through the public domain between the two. Rabbi Akiva deems him liable, as one who threw an object from the private domain to the public domain, and the Rabbis deem him exempt.

בָּעֵי רַבָּה: לְמַטָּה מֵעֲשָׂרָה פְּלִיגִי, וּבְהָא פְּלִיגִי — דְּמָר סָבַר אָמְרִינַן קְלוּטָה כְּמָה שֶׁהוּנְּחָה, וּמָר סָבַר לָא אָמְרִינַן קְלוּטָה כְּמָה שֶׁהוּנְּחָה. אֲבָל לְמַעְלָה מֵעֲשָׂרָה — דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל פָּטוּר, וְלָא יָלְפִינַן זוֹרֵק מִמּוֹשִׁיט.

Rabba raised a dilemma with regard to their dispute: Are they disagreeing with regard to a case where the object traveled below ten handbreadths from the ground? And, if so, it is with regard to this point that they disagree: As this Master, Rabbi Akiva holds: We say that an object in airspace is considered at rest. The object is considered as if it was actually placed in the public domain after being lifted from the private domain. And this Master, i.e., the Rabbis, holds: We do not say that an object in airspace is considered at rest. However, with regard to a case where the object traveled above ten handbreadths from the ground, everyone agrees that one is exempt, and we do not derive the legal status of throwing from the legal status of passing. Although everyone agrees that one who passes an object from a private domain to another private domain via a public domain is liable, even if it was passed above ten handbreadths, as that was the service of the Levites, one who throws an object in that manner is exempt.

אוֹ דִילְמָא: לְמַעְלָה מֵעֲשָׂרָה פְּלִיגִי, וּבְהָא פְּלִיגִי — דְּמָר סָבַר יָלְפִינַן זוֹרֵק מִמּוֹשִׁיט, וּמָר סָבַר לָא יָלְפִינַן זוֹרֵק מִמּוֹשִׁיט. אֲבָל לְמַטָּה מֵעֲשָׂרָה — דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל חַיָּיב, מַאי טַעְמָא? — קְלוּטָה כְּמָה שֶׁהוּנְּחָה דָּמְיָא.

Or perhaps, they are disagreeing with regard to a case where the object traveled above ten handbreadths from the ground, and it is with regard to this that they disagree: As this Master, Rabbi Akiva, holds: We derive the legal status of throwing from the legal status of passing. Therefore, one who throws an object that passes through the airspace of a public domain higher than ten handbreadths from the ground is liable. And this Master, i.e., the Rabbis, holds: We do not derive throwing from passing. However, with regard to a case where the object traveled beneath the ten handbreadth airspace of the public domain, everyone agrees that he is liable. What is the reason for that? An object in airspace is considered at rest.

אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: הָא מִילְּתָא אִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ לְרַב חִסְדָּא, וּפַשְׁטַהּ נִיהֲלֵיהּ רַב הַמְנוּנָא מֵהָא: מֵרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד לִרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד וְעוֹבֵר בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים עַצְמָהּ — רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא מְחַיֵּיב, וַחֲכָמִים פּוֹטְרִים. מִדְּקָאָמַר ״בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים עַצְמָהּ״, פְּשִׁיטָא לְמַטָּה מֵעֲשָׂרָה פְּלִיגִי.

Rav Yosef said: Rav Ḥisda had a dilemma with regard to this matter, and Rav Hamnuna resolved it for him from this baraita: With regard to an object that travels from the private domain to the other private domain, and it passes through the public domain itself, Rabbi Akiva deems one liable and the Rabbis deem one exempt. From the fact that it says in the baraita: Through the public domain itself, it is obvious that it is with regard to a case where the object traveled below ten handbreadths from the ground that they disagree.

וּבְמַאי? אִילֵימָא בְּמַעֲבִיר, לְמַטָּה מֵעֲשָׂרָה — הוּא דִּמְחַיֵּיב, לְמַעְלָה מֵעֲשָׂרָה — לָא מְחַיֵּיב? וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: הַמּוֹצִיא מַשּׂוֹי לְמַעְלָה מֵעֲשָׂרָה — חַיָּיב, שֶׁכֵּן מַשָּׂא בְּנֵי קְהָת. אֶלָּא לָאו בְּזוֹרֵק, וּלְמַטָּה מֵעֲשָׂרָה הוּא דִּמְחַיֵּיב, לְמַעְלָה מֵעֲשָׂרָה — לָא מְחַיֵּיב, שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ בִּקְלוּטָה כְּמָה שֶׁהוּנְּחָה פְּלִיגִי. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.

And with regard to what form of transfer is the baraita dealing? If you say it refers to passing an object in his hand, is it only when he passes it below ten handbreadths that he is liable? When he passes it above ten handbreadths is he not liable? Didn’t Rabbi Elazar say: One who carries out a load from a private domain to a public domain above ten handbreadths from the ground is liable, as that was the manner in which the descendants of Kehat, from whom we derived the laws of carrying, carried their burden in the Tabernacle? Rather, isn’t this baraita referring to a case of throwing, and it is in a case where the object travels below ten handbreadths from the ground that one is liable, and above ten handbreadths from the ground one is not liable? Learn from it that it is with regard to whether or not an object in airspace is considered at rest that they disagree. The Gemara summarizes: Indeed, learn from it that this is the crux of their dispute.

וּפְלִיגָא דְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר. דְּאָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: מְחַיֵּיב הָיָה רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אֲפִילּוּ לְמַעְלָה מֵעֲשָׂרָה, וְהַאי דְּקָתָנֵי ״רְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים עַצְמָהּ״ — לְהוֹדִיעֲךָ כֹּחָן דְּרַבָּנַן.

And this conclusion disagrees with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, as Rabbi Elazar said: Rabbi Akiva deems one liable even if the object travels above ten handbreadths. And that term that was taught in the baraita, the public domain itself, is to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the opinion of the Rabbis, who deem one exempt even if the object traveled in the public domain itself, and all the more so if it traveled above ten handbreadths, which is no longer within the bounds of the public domain.

וּפְלִיגָא דְּרַב חִלְקִיָּה בַּר טוֹבִי, דַּאֲמַר רַב חִלְקִיָּה בַּר טוֹבִי: תּוֹךְ שְׁלֹשָׁה — דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל חַיָּיב. לְמַעְלָה מֵעֲשָׂרָה — דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל פָּטוּר. מִשְּׁלֹשָׁה וְעַד עֲשָׂרָה — בָּאנוּ לְמַחְלוֹקֶת רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא וְרַבָּנַן.

This opinion of Rabbi Elazar disagrees with the opinion of Rav Ḥilkiya bar Tovi, as Rav Ḥilkiya bar Tovi said: If the thrown object traveled within three handbreadths from the ground, everyone agrees that one is liable because the Sages established the principle of lavud. Lavud means that any object within three handbreadths of another object is considered to be attached to it. Therefore, an object that traveled within three handbreadths of the ground is considered to have come to a complete rest. If the thrown object traveled above ten handbreadths from the ground, everyone agrees that one is exempt. If the thrown object traveled between three handbreadths and ten handbreadths from the ground, we have come to the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis.

תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי: בְּתוֹךְ שְׁלֹשָׁה — דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל חַיָּיב, לְמַעְלָה מֵעֲשָׂרָה — אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם שְׁבוּת. וְאִם הָיוּ רְשׁוּיוֹת שֶׁלּוֹ — מוּתָּר. מִשְּׁלֹשָׁה וְעַד עֲשָׂרָה — רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא מְחַיֵּיב וַחֲכָמִים פּוֹטְרִין.

That was also taught in a baraita: Within three handbreadths of the ground, everyone agrees that one is liable; above ten handbreadths from the ground, everyone agrees that one is exempt by Torah law, and it is only prohibited due to rabbinic decree. The Sages prohibited throwing or passing an object from the private domain of one person set to the private domain of another person unless a joining of the courtyards is set. And if both of the private domains were his it is permitted. If the thrown object traveled between three handbreadths and ten handbreadths from the ground, Rabbi Akiva deems one liable and the Sages deem him exempt.

אָמַר מָר: אִם הָיוּ רְשׁוּיוֹת שֶׁלּוֹ — מוּתָּר. לֵימָא תִּהְוֵי תְּיוּבְתֵּיהּ דְּרַב, דְּאִיתְּמַר: שְׁנֵי בָתִּים בִּשְׁנֵי צִדֵּי רְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים, רַבָּה בַּר רַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַב: אָסוּר לִזְרוֹק מִזֶּה לָזֶה. וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: מוּתָּר לִזְרוֹק מִזֶּה לָזֶה. וְלָאו מִי אוֹקֵימְנָא לְהַהִיא כְּגוֹן דְּמִידְּלֵי חַד וּמִתַּתֵּי חַד — דְּזִימְנִין נָפֵל, וְאָתֵי לְאֵתוּיֵי.

The Master said in the baraita cited above: And if both of the private domains were his, i.e., they belonged to the same person, it is permitted. Let us say that this is a conclusive refutation of Rav’s opinion, as an amoraic dispute was stated with regard to the following case: Concerning two houses on two opposite sides of the public domain, even if they belong to the same person, Rabba bar Rav Huna said that Rav said: It is prohibited to throw an object from this private domain to that private domain. And Shmuel said: It is permitted to throw from this private domain to that private domain. The Gemara rejects this and states: Didn’t we already establish that Rav’s statement is referring to a case where one of the houses was elevated and one was low? Due to the disparity in height, the concern is that at times the object will fall into the public domain, and one will come to bring it in from there and thereby violate a Torah prohibition.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב חִסְדָּא לְרַב הַמְנוּנָא, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ רַב הַמְנוּנָא לְרַב חִסְדָּא: מְנַָא הָא מִילְּתָא דַאֲמוּר רַבָּנַן: כׇּל פָּחוֹת מִשְּׁלֹשָׁה — כְּלָבוּד דָּמֵי? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לְפִי שֶׁאִי אֶפְשָׁר לָהּ לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים שֶׁתִּילָּקֵט בְּמַלְקֵט וּבְרָהִיטָנֵי.

Rav Ḥisda said to Rav Hamnuna, and some say that Rav Hamnuna said to Rav Ḥisda: From where is this matter that the Sages stated: Any objects less than three handbreadths apart are considered to be lavud, attached? He said to him: Because it is impossible for the public domain to be made level with planes. Since the space cannot be completely smooth, even the minor differences in the ground level throughout the public domain must be taken into consideration.

אִי הָכִי, שְׁלֹשָׁה נָמֵי? וְתוּ, הָא דִּתְנַן: הַמְשַׁלְשֵׁל דְּפָנוֹת מִלְּמַעְלָה לְמַטָּה, אִם הֵן גְּבוֹהִין מִן הָאָרֶץ שְׁלֹשָׁה טְפָחִים — פְּסוּלָה. הָא פָּחוֹת מִשְּׁלֹשָׁה — כְּשֵׁרָה.

He asked him: If so, if that is the reason, objects within three handbreadths should also be considered lavud. Why is it that only objects within less than three handbreadths are considered attached? And furthermore, an inference can be made from that which we learned in the mishna with regard to the halakhot of sukka: If one lowers the walls of a sukka from the top to the bottom, if the bottom of the wall is above three handbreadths from the ground, the sukka is invalid because it is considered to be lacking walls. By inference, if one lowers the walls so that the bottom of the wall is below three handbreadths from the ground, it is valid. In this case, the rationale that it is impossible for the public domain to be made level does not apply.

הָתָם הַיְינוּ טַעְמָא, מִשּׁוּם דְּהָוְיָא לַהּ מְחִיצָה שֶׁהַגְּדָיִים בּוֹקְעִין בָּהּ. תִּינַח לְמַטָּה, לְמַעְלָה מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? אֶלָּא כׇּל פָּחוֹת מִשְּׁלֹשָׁה כְּלָבוּד דָּמֵי — הִלְכְתָא גְּמִירִי לַהּ.

He rejects this: There, the reason that a space larger than three handbreadths is not considered to be part of the wall is because it, i.e., the wall, is a partition that goats pass through. Therefore, it is a partition incapable of serving its function. Once a partition is below three handbreadths, it will obstruct the passage of the goats. Furthermore, according to this explanation, it works out well when the measure of three handbreadths is below, adjacent to the ground. If any more than three handbreadths of space are between the ground and the wall, it is not considered a wall. However, there are several halakhot in which lavud applies above and not near the ground, e.g., when the roofing of the sukka is not connected to the walls. What, then, can be said to explain that halakha? Rather, the conclusion is that the halakha which states that anything that is less than three is considered to be lavud is a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai, learned through tradition.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: מֵרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים וּרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד בָּאֶמְצַע — רַבִּי מְחַיֵּיב, וַחֲכָמִים פּוֹטְרִין. רַב וּשְׁמוּאֵל דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ: לֹא חִיֵּיב רַבִּי אֶלָּא בִּרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד מְקוֹרֶה, דְּאָמְרִינַן בֵּיתָא כְּמַאן דְּמַלְיָא דָּמֵי, אֲבָל שֶׁאֵינוֹ מְקוֹרֶה לָא. אָמַר רַב חָנָא אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: מְחַיֵּיב הָיָה רַבִּי שְׁתַּיִם — אַחַת מִשּׁוּם הוֹצָאָה, וְאַחַת מִשּׁוּם הַכְנָסָה.

The Sages taught a case in a baraita similar to the one discussed in the mishna: One who throws an object from the public domain to the other public domain and the object passes through the private domain between the two, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi deems him liable for carrying into the private domain, and the Rabbis deem him exempt. With regard to this, Rav and Shmuel both said: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds him liable only if the private domain between the two public areas is covered with a roof. In that case, we say that the house is considered full and an object that passes through it is considered as if it landed upon an actual object. However, if the private domain is not covered, he is not liable even according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. On this topic, Rav Ḥana said that Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi would deem him liable to bring two sin-offerings in this case, one for carrying out from the private domain into the second public domain, and one for carrying in, when the object initially entered the private domain.

יָתֵיב רַב חָנָא וְקָא קַשְׁיָא לֵיהּ:

The Gemara relates that Rav Ḥana was sitting, and the following point was difficult for him:

לְמֵימְרָא דִּמְחַיֵּיב רַבִּי אַתּוֹלָדָה בִּמְקוֹם אָב?

Is that to say that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi deems one liable for a subcategory of prohibited labor when performed with a primary category of prohibited labor? After all, carrying out and carrying in constitute a primary category of prohibited labor and its subcategory.

וְהָתַנְיָא, רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: ״דְּבָרִים״ ״הַדְּבָרִים״ ״אֵלֶּה הַדְּבָרִים״ — אֵלּוּ שְׁלֹשִׁים וָתֵשַׁע מְלָאכוֹת שֶׁנֶּאֶמְרוּ לְמֹשֶׁה בְּסִינַי!

Wasn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says that Shabbat is mentioned in the verse: “These are the things [eleh hadevarim] that God has commanded to perform them” (Exodus 35:1)? Several points are derived from the superfluous emphases in this verse. The Torah could simply have stated: This is a thing [davar]. When it states things [devarim] in the plural, it teaches at least two points. The addition of the definite article the in the term the things [hadevarim] adds at least a third point. The numerological value of letters of the word eleh, which are alef, one; lamed, thirty; and heh, five, is thirty-six. The phrase: These are the things, alludes to three plus thirty-six derivation, i.e., the thirty-nine prohibited labors that were stated to Moses at Sinai. Since Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi maintains that there are a fixed number of primary categories of labor, he would certainly hold a person liable for the primary categories but not for the subcategories.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב יוֹסֵף: מָר אַהָא מַתְנֵי לַהּ, וְקַשְׁיָא לֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי אַדְּרַבִּי. אֲנַן אַדְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה מַתְנִינַן — וְלָא קַשְׁיָא לַן.

Rav Yosef said to him: The Master taught Rav Yehuda’s statement with regard to this, and consequently, he encounters a difficulty. One statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi contradicts another statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. We learn the statement of Rav Yehuda with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and therefore there is no difficulty for us.

דְּתַנְיָא: מֵרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים וְעָבַר אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים — רַבִּי יְהוּדָה מְחַיֵּיב וַחֲכָמִים פּוֹטְרִין.

As it was taught in a baraita: With regard to one who threw an object from the private domain to the public domain, and it traveled four cubits in the public domain, Rabbi Yehuda deems him liable and the Rabbis deem him exempt.

אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: מְחַיֵּיב הָיָה רַבִּי יְהוּדָה שְׁתַּיִם — אַחַת מִשּׁוּם הוֹצָאָה וְאַחַת מִשּׁוּם הַעֲבָרָה. דְּאִי סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ חֲדָא הוּא דִּמְחַיֵּיב, מִכְּלָל דְּרַבָּנַן פָּטְרִי לִגְמָרֵי? הָא אַפֵּיק לַהּ מֵרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים. מִמַּאי? דִּילְמָא לְעוֹלָם אֵימָא לָךְ רַבִּי יְהוּדָה חֲדָא הוּא דִּמְחַיֵּיב, וְרַבָּנַן פָּטְרִי לִגְמָרֵי, וְהֵיכִי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ? כְּגוֹן דְּאָמַר עַד דְּנָפְקָא לֵיהּ לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים תְּנוּח.

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: Rabbi Yehuda would deem him liable to bring two sin-offerings in this case, one for carrying out from the private domain into the public domain and one for carrying the object four cubits through the public domain. The Rabbis deem him exempt for carrying four cubits in the public domain. And it must be interpreted that way because if it would enter your mind to say that Rabbi Yehuda deems him liable to bring only one sin-offering, by inference, the Rabbis deem him completely exempt. How is that possible? Didn’t he carry an object out from the private domain into the public domain? This proof is rejected: And from where do you draw that conclusion? Perhaps I could actually say to you that Rabbi Yehuda deems him liable to bring one sin-offering and the Rabbis deem him completely exempt, and how do you find that circumstance? In a case where he said: My intention is that as soon it, the object, goes out into the public domain it will immediately come to rest.

וּבְהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי, דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה סָבַר: אָמְרִינַן קְלוּטָה כְּמָה שֶׁהוּנְּחָה, וְאִיתְעֲבִידָא לֵיהּ מַחְשַׁבְתּוֹ. וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: לָא אָמְרִינַן קְלוּטָה כְּמָה שֶׁהוּנְּחָה, וְלָא אִיתְעֲבִידָא לֵיהּ מַחְשַׁבְתּוֹ! אֲבָל אַתּוֹלָדָה בִּמְקוֹם אָב לָא מְחַיֵּיב רַבִּי יְהוּדָה.

And they disagree with regard to this: Rabbi Yehuda maintains that we say: An object in airspace is considered at rest, and therefore his intention was fulfilled. As soon as the object enters the airspace of the public domain it is considered to have come to rest. And the Rabbis maintain that we do not say: An object in airspace is considered at rest, and therefore his intention was not fulfilled and he is exempt. However, Rabbi Yehuda does not hold one liable for a subcategory of labor performed together with a primary category of labor.

לָא סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ, דְּתַנְיָא: רַבִּי יְהוּדָה מוֹסִיף אַף הַשּׁוֹבֵט וְהַמְדַקְדֵּק. אָמְרוּ לוֹ: שׁוֹבֵט הֲרֵי הוּא בִּכְלַל מֵיסֵךְ, מְדַקְדֵּק הֲרֵי הוּא בִּכְלַל אוֹרֵג. מַאי לָאו דְּעַבְדִינְהוּ לְתַרְוַויְיהוּ בַּהֲדֵי הֲדָדֵי, וּשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ מְחַיֵּיב הָיָה רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אַתּוֹלָדָה בִּמְקוֹם אָב!

The Gemara rejects this explanation: It could not enter your mind to say so, as it was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda adds even lining up the threads of the warp and beating the threads of the woof to the list of primary categories of labor. The Rabbis said to him: Lining up is a subcategory subsumed under the primary category of stretching the threads of the warp within the loom, and beating is subsumed under the primary category of weaving. Is this not referring to a case where one performed both lining up and beating together, and learn from it that Rabbi Yehuda deems one liable for both a subcategory and a primary category of labor when they are performed together?

מִמַּאי? דִּילְמָא לְעוֹלָם דְּעַבְדַּהּ לְהָא לְחוּדַּהּ וְהָא לְחוּדַּהּ, וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אַתּוֹלָדָה בִּמְקוֹם אָב לָא מְחַיֵּיב, וּבְהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי: דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה סָבַר הָנֵי אָבוֹת נִינְהוּ, וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי הָנֵי תּוֹלְדוֹת נִינְהוּ.

The Gemara rejects this proof: And from where do you draw that conclusion? Perhaps it is actually referring to a case where one performed this action alone and this action alone, and Rabbi Yehuda does not deem one liable for a subcategory of labor performed together with a primary category of labor. And Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis disagree with regard to this. Rabbi Yehuda maintains as follows: These actions of lining up and beating are additional primary categories of labor, and the Rabbis maintain as follows: These are subcategories.

תֵּדַע, דְּקָתָנֵי ״רַבִּי יְהוּדָה מוֹסִיף״. אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא אָבוֹת, מַאי מוֹסִיף — מוֹסִיף אָבוֹת. אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ תּוֹלָדוֹת, מַאי מוֹסִיף? אִיתְּמַר נָמֵי, רַבָּה וְרַב יוֹסֵף דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ: לֹא חִיֵּיב רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אֶלָּא אַחַת.

Know that this is so, as the baraita teaches: Rabbi Yehuda adds. The Gemara explains this quote from the baraita: Granted, if you say that Rabbi Yehuda meant that these are primary categories of labor, what is the meaning of: He adds? It means he adds primary categories of labor. However, if you say that he meant that these are subcategories, what is the meaning of: He adds? It was also stated that it was Rabba and Rav Yosef who both said: Rabbi Yehuda deemed him liable to bring only one sin-offering.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: וּלְמַאי דִּסְלֵיק אַדַּעְתִּין מֵעִיקָּרָא דִּמְחַיֵּיב הָיָה רַבִּי יְהוּדָה שְׁתַּיִם? אִי לְהָכָא קָבָעֵי לַהּ — לְהָכָא לָא קָבָעֵי לַהּ. אִי לְהָכָא קָבָעֵי לַהּ — לְהָכָא לָא קָבָעֵי לַהּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: בְּאוֹמֵר ״כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁתִּרְצֶה — תָּנוּחַ״.

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: And according to what originally entered our mind that Rabbi Yehuda deemed him liable to bring two sin-offerings, how could he be liable for both carrying out from the private domain and for carrying four cubits in the public domain? If one only wanted the object to land here at the beginning of the public domain, he did not want it to land here, four cubits into the public domain. Conversely, if one only wanted the object to land here, four cubits into the public domain, he did not want it to land here, at the beginning of the public domain. Rav Ashi said to Ravina: It is possible in a case where one says: Any place that it wants to come to rest, let it come to rest. One indicated that his intention would be fulfilled wherever the thrown object lands.

פְּשִׁיטָא נִתְכַּוֵּון לִזְרוֹק שְׁמֹנֶה וְזָרַק אַרְבַּע — הֲרֵי כָּתַב ״שֵׁם״ מִשִּׁמְעוֹן. נִתְכַּוֵּון לִזְרוֹק אַרְבַּע וְזָרַק שְׁמֹנֶה — מַהוּ? מִי אָמְרִינַן: הָא אַפֵּיק לֵיהּ, אוֹ דִילְמָא: הֵיכָא דְּבָעֵי, הָא לָא נָח. וְלָאו הַיְינוּ דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי, וַאֲמַר לֵיהּ: בְּאוֹמֵר ״כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁתִּרְצֶה תָּנוּחַ״.

Concerning throwing an object on Shabbat from one domain to another and within a single domain, the Gemara raises several issues with regard to intention when throwing. It is obvious that one who intended to throw an object eight cubits in a public domain and actually threw it only four cubits is liable because that case is similar to a case where one wrote the word shem, the first two letters of the name Shimon. In the case of writing shem, the individual performed the prohibited labor of writing a two-letter word, even though he did not complete the word that he originally intended to write. The question is as follows: What is the halakha if one intended to throw an object four cubits and threw it eight? Do we say he did indeed carry the object, or perhaps we say that ultimately the object did not land where he wanted it to land? But is that not precisely what Ravina said to Rav Ashi, as mentioned above? And Rav Ashi said in response that it is referring to a case where one says: Any place that it wants to come to rest, let it come to rest. In such a scenario one is liable, because he expressed the fact that he is contented with any labor that will be performed with the object.

וּדְקָאָמְרַתְּ הֲרֵי כָּתַב ״שֵׁם״ מִשִּׁמְעוֹן, מִי דָּמֵי? הָתָם כַּמָּה דְּלָא כְּתִיב ״שֵׁם״ לָא מִכְּתִיב לֵיהּ ״שִׁמְעוֹן״, הָכָא כַּמָּה דְּלָא זָרֵיק אַרְבַּע — לָא מִיזְדַּרְקִי לֵיהּ תַּמְנֵי?!

Furthermore, the first case, which seems obvious, also requires clarification. And that which you said, that this is similar to a case where one wrote the word shem, the first two letters of the name Shimon, is it in fact similar? There, as long as the letters of shem, shin and mem, are not written, the name Shimon cannot be written. Here, where one intended to throw the object eight cubits and he threw it only four, is it true that as long as it was not thrown four cubits it cannot be thrown eight? An object can be thrown eight cubits without first landing after four cubits. The question remains unresolved.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הַזּוֹרֵק מֵרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים וּרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד בָּאֶמְצַע, אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת — חַיָּיב,

The Sages taught: With regard to one who throws an object on Shabbat from the public domain to the other public domain through the private domain, he is liable if he throws an object a total of four cubits in both parts of the public domain.