שבועות י״ט

שבועות י״ט

דְּבָעֵי לְמִיכְתַּב בְּהֵמָה וְחַיָּה לְכִדְרַבִּי, כָּתֵיב נָמֵי שֶׁרֶץ. כִּדְתָנָא דְּבֵי רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל: כָּל פָּרָשָׁה שֶׁנֶּאֶמְרָה וְנִשְׁנֵית, לֹא נִשְׁנֵית אֶלָּא בִּשְׁבִיל דָּבָר שֶׁנִּתְחַדֵּשׁ בָּהּ.

the Torah needs to write both “domesticated animal” and “undomesticated animal” in the verse “or the carcass of a non-kosher undomesticated animal, or the carcass of a non-kosher domesticated animal” to teach that halakha that the school of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi taught (see 7a), “creeping animal” is also written, even though there is no novel element taught by the addition of that term. This is in accordance with what was taught in the school of Rabbi Yishmael: Every passage in the Torah that was stated and repeated was repeated only for the novel element introduced therein. It is the style of the Torah to repeat an entire passage to teach even one additional halakha, in this case, that which was taught by Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.

וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, הַאי ״בָּהּ״ מַאי עָבֵיד לֵיהּ? פְּרָט לַמִּתְעַסֵּק.

The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Eliezer, who maintains that in general it is not necessary that the unwitting transgressor know precisely which prohibition he violated, what does he do with the words “in which he sinned,” the words from which Rabbi Yehoshua learned that there is no liability to bring an offering unless he knows precisely which sin he committed? The Gemara answers: According to Rabbi Eliezer, these words emphasize the fact that one is liable only when he intends to do the prohibited act, to the exclusion of one who acts unawares and has no intention to perform the action. That is to say, if one was preoccupied with another matter and, acting unawares, he transgressed a prohibition, he is not liable to bring a sin-offering.

וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: מַשְׁמָעוּת דּוֹרְשִׁין אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ. וְכֵן אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת מַשְׁמָעוּת דּוֹרְשִׁין אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ – דְּרַב שֵׁשֶׁת מַחְלֵיף דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר לְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא וּדְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא לְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר.

Until now the Gemara has discussed Ḥizkiyya’s understanding of the practical difference between the opinions of Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva in the mishna. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: There is no halakhic difference between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva, as they both agree that one must know the exact source of his ritual impurity. The difference between them is limited to the interpretation of the meaning of the verses, i.e., they disagree about the source in the Torah for this halakha. And similarly, it can be reasoned that Rav Sheshet says: The difference between them is limited to the interpretation of the meaning of the verses, as Rav Sheshet would switch the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer for that of Rabbi Akiva and that of Rabbi Akiva for that of Rabbi Eliezer. He was not meticulous in his attributions of the respective opinions, as he held that there is no halakhic difference between them.

בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רָבָא מֵרַב נַחְמָן: הֶעְלֵם זֶה וְזֶה בְּיָדוֹ, מַהוּ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הֲרֵי הֶעְלֵם טוּמְאָה בְּיָדוֹ, וְחַיָּיב. אַדְּרַבָּה – הֲרֵי הֶעְלֵם מִקְדָּשׁ בְּיָדוֹ, וּפָטוּר!

Rava asked Rav Naḥman: According to both Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva, if one had a lapse of awareness of both this and that, his having contracted ritual impurity and his having entered the Temple, what is the halakha? Rav Naḥman said to him: He has a lapse of awareness about his impurity, and therefore he is liable. The Gemara disputes this: On the contrary, he has a lapse of awareness about the Temple, and he should therefore be exempt.

אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: חָזֵינַן; אִי מִטּוּמְאָה קָא פָרֵישׁ – הֲרֵי הֶעְלֵם טוּמְאָה בְּיָדוֹ, וְחַיָּיב. אִי מִמִּקְדָּשׁ קָא פָרֵישׁ – הֲרֵי הֶעְלֵם מִקְדָּשׁ בְּיָדוֹ, וּפָטוּר. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: כְּלוּם פֵּרֵישׁ מִמִּקְדָּשׁ – אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם טוּמְאָה; כְּלוּם פֵּרֵישׁ מִטּוּמְאָה – אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם מִקְדָּשׁ! אֶלָּא לָא שְׁנָא.

Rav Ashi said: We observe his behavior. If he leaves the Temple because of the impurity, i.e., when he is told that he is impure, it is clear that the lapse of awareness that he had is about the impurity, and he is liable. And if he leaves because of the Temple, i.e., when he is told that he is in the Temple, then the lapse of awareness that he had is about the Temple, and he is exempt. Ravina said to Rav Ashi: There is no indication from here; didn’t he leave because he became aware of the Temple only because he became aware also of the impurity? Otherwise, why would he leave the Temple? And didn’t he leave because he became aware of the impurity only because he became aware also of the Temple? Otherwise, why would he leave the Temple? Rather, there is no difference, so there is no indication from here.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: שְׁנֵי שְׁבִילִין, אֶחָד טָמֵא וְאֶחָד טָהוֹר; וְהָלַךְ בָּרִאשׁוֹן וְלֹא נִכְנַס, בַּשֵּׁנִי וְנִכְנַס – חַיָּיב.

§ The Gemara begins a discussion about another topic related to awareness of impurity. The Sages taught in a baraita: If there were two paths in a certain place, one of them impure, as a corpse was buried there, and the other one pure, but it was not clear which of the two paths was impure, and someone walked on the first path and did not then enter the Temple, and then afterward he walked on the second path, forgot that he was ritually impure, and entered the Temple, he is liable to bring a sin-offering, since he certainly contracted impurity on one of the paths and entered the Temple in a state of impurity.

הָלַךְ בָּרִאשׁוֹן וְנִכְנַס, הִזָּה וְשָׁנָה וְטָבַל, וְאַחַר כָּךְ הָלַךְ בַּשֵּׁנִי וְנִכְנַס – חַיָּיב. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן פּוֹטֵר. וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן יְהוּדָה פּוֹטֵר בְּכוּלָּן מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן.

If he walked on the first path and entered the Temple, and on the third day he was sprinkled with waters of purification to purify him from the uncertain impurity imparted by a corpse, and on the seventh day he was sprinkled upon again, and he immersed himself in a ritual bath, thereby completing his purification, and then afterward he walked on the second path and entered the Temple, he is liable to bring a sin-offering, since one of the paths was certainly impure and he entered the Temple after having walked on it. Rabbi Shimon deems him exempt in this latter case, because neither time that he entered the Temple was it certain that he was impure, the first time because he might not yet have become impure, and the second time because he might already have purified himself. And Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda, in the name of Rabbi Shimon, deems him exempt in all of these cases.

בְּכוּלָּן –

The Gemara asks: Does Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda really exempt him in all of these cases,

וַאֲפִילּוּ בְּקַמַּיְיתָא?! מִמָּה נַפְשָׁךְ טָמֵא הוּא! אָמַר רָבָא: הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן – כְּגוֹן שֶׁהָלַךְ בָּרִאשׁוֹן, וּבְשָׁעָה שֶׁהָלַךְ בַּשֵּׁנִי שָׁכַח שֶׁהָלַךְ בָּרִאשׁוֹן; דְּהָוְיָא לֵיהּ מִקְצָת יְדִיעָה.

even in the first case, where he walked on both of the paths and did not purify himself in between? This is difficult, as whichever way you look at it, he is impure, since he certainly contracted impurity on one of the two paths. Rava said: What are we dealing with here? We are dealing with a case where he walked on the first path, and then afterward when he was walking on the second path he forgot that he had already walked on the first path, so that his lapse of awareness when he entered the Temple was only a lapse of partial awareness. That is, when he entered the Temple he forgot only that he had walked on the first path, and for this lapse of knowledge by itself he is not liable to bring a sin-offering, as it is not certain that he contracted impurity there.

וּבְהָא קָא מִיפַּלְגִי – תַּנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר: אָמְרִינַן מִקְצָת יְדִיעָה כְּכׇל יְדִיעָה; וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן סָבַר: לָא אָמְרִינַן מִקְצָת יְדִיעָה כְּכׇל יְדִיעָה.

Rava continues: And the tanna’im disagree with regard to this issue: The first tanna, who teaches that Rabbi Shimon deems the person exempt only where there was purification between the two entries, but not in the first case, maintains that we say that partial awareness of definite impurity is counted as complete awareness. And Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda, who teaches that Rabbi Shimon deems the person exempt even in the first case, where there was no purification between the two entries, maintains that we do not say that partial awareness of definite impurity is counted as complete awareness.

הָלַךְ בָּרִאשׁוֹן וְנִכְנַס, הִזָּה וְשָׁנָה וְטָבַל, חָזַר וְהָלַךְ בַּשֵּׁנִי וְנִכְנַס – חַיָּיב, וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן פּוֹטֵר. וְאַמַּאי חַיָּיב? סְפֵק יְדִיעָה הוּא!

§ The baraita teaches: If he walked on the first path and entered the Temple, and on the third day he was sprinkled with waters of purification, and on the seventh day he was sprinkled upon again, and he immersed himself in a ritual bath, and then he walked on the second path and entered the Temple, he is liable to bring a sin-offering; and Rabbi Shimon deems him exempt from bringing an offering. The Gemara asks: But why is he liable according to the first tanna? Each time he entered the Temple it was only with a lapse of awareness of uncertain impurity, the first time because he might not yet have become impure, and the second time because he might already have purified himself.

אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: כָּאן עָשׂוּ סְפֵק יְדִיעָה כִּידִיעָה. וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: הָא מַנִּי – רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל הִיא, דְּאָמַר: לָא בָּעֵינַן יְדִיעָה בַּתְּחִלָּה.

Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Here, since he certainly contracted impurity on one of the paths and entered the Temple in a state of impurity, they made awareness of uncertain impurity like awareness of definite impurity. And Reish Lakish says: In accordance with whose opinion is this? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, who says: We do not require any awareness of impurity whatsoever at the beginning, before he enters the Temple, and it suffices if it becomes known to him at the end that he had been impure at the time of his entry.

וּרְמִי דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אַדְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, וּרְמִי דְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אַדְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ. דְּתַנְיָא: אָכַל סְפֵק חֵלֶב וְנוֹדַע, סְפֵק חֵלֶב וְנוֹדַע – רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: כְּשֵׁם שֶׁמֵּבִיא חַטָּאת עַל כׇּל אֶחָד וְאֶחָד, כָּךְ מֵבִיא אָשָׁם תָּלוּי עַל כׇּל אֶחָד וְאֶחָד.

And the Gemara raises a contradiction between this statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan and another statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan; and the Gemara raises a contradiction between this statement of Reish Lakish and another statement of Reish Lakish. As it is taught in a baraita: If one ate an item concerning which there was uncertainty as to whether or not it was forbidden fat, and he later became aware of it, and then he ate some other item concerning which there was uncertainty as to whether or not it was forbidden fat, and he later became aware of it, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Just as he would bring a sin-offering for each and every one of his instances of consumption were he to learn that what he ate was actually forbidden fat, so too, he brings a provisional guilt-offering, brought by one who is uncertain as to whether he committed a transgression that requires a sin-offering, for each and every one of his instances of consumption if after each instance he became aware that he might have eaten forbidden fat.

רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן יְהוּדָה וְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אָמְרוּ מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: אֵינוֹ מֵבִיא אֶלָּא אָשָׁם תָּלוּי אֶחָד, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״עַל שִׁגְגָתוֹ אֲשֶׁר שָׁגָג״ – הַתּוֹרָה רִיבְּתָה שְׁגָגוֹת הַרְבֵּה וְאָשָׁם תָּלוּי אֶחָד.

Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda and Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, said in the name of Rabbi Shimon: He brings only one provisional guilt-offering, as it is stated with regard to a provisional guilt-offering: “He shall bring an unblemished ram…for a guilt-offering…to the priest; and the priest shall make atonement for him concerning his unwitting transgression wherein he unwittingly transgressed and knew it not” (Leviticus 5:18). This wording teaches that the Torah included many instances of unwitting transgressions in one provisional guilt-offering. One brings one provisional guilt-offering even if he had committed many unwitting transgressions.

וְאָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: כָּאן שָׁנָה רַבִּי, יְדִיעוֹת סְפֵיקוֹת מִתְחַלְּקוֹת לְחַטָּאוֹת.

Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yoḥanan disagree about how to understand the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: With regard to which case did he say that one brings a separate sin-offering for each and every one of his instances of consumption? And Reish Lakish says: Here Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi taught that awareness of the uncertain status separates the acts with regard to sin-offerings. If it later became known with certainty that he had actually eaten forbidden fat both times, he would be liable to bring two sin-offerings for the two instances of consumption, despite the fact that the two actions were separated only by awareness of the uncertain status, because such awareness is sufficient to separate the two acts.

וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: כְּשֵׁם שֶׁיְּדִיעוֹת וַדַּאי בְּעָלְמָא מִתְחַלְּקוֹת לְחַטָּאוֹת, כָּךְ יְדִיעוֹת סָפֵק מִתְחַלְּקוֹת לַאֲשָׁמוֹת.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi does not mean to say that awareness of the uncertain status separates the acts with regard to sin-offerings. He merely established the principle: Just as definite awareness in general separates the acts with regard to sin-offerings, e.g., where one ate forbidden fat and then became aware that it was definitely forbidden fat that he had eaten, and then he forgot and once again ate forbidden fat, so too, awareness of the uncertain status separates the acts with regard to provisional guilt-offerings. But awareness of the uncertain status does not separate the acts with regard to sin-offerings. If the awareness between the acts was only awareness of the uncertain status, he does not bring a sin-offering for each act when he later learns with certainty that it was forbidden fat that he had eaten. Evidently, Rabbi Yoḥanan maintains that awareness of the uncertain status is not like definite awareness, and Reish Lakish maintains that it is like definite awareness. This contradicts what they said above.

בִּשְׁלָמָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אַדְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן לָא קַשְׁיָא – כָּאן עָשׂוּ, וְלֹא בְּכׇל הַתּוֹרָה כּוּלָּהּ עָשׂוּ. הָכָא הוּא דְּלָא כְּתִיבָא יְדִיעָה בְּהֶדְיָא, מִ״וְּנֶעְלַם״ הוּא דְּקָא אָתֵי; וְלֹא בְּכׇל הַתּוֹרָה כּוּלָּהּ עָשׂוּ, דִּכְתִיב: ״אוֹ הוֹדַע אֵלָיו״ – יְדִיעָה מְעַלַּיְיתָא בָּעֵינַן.

The Gemara comments: Granted, the apparent contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan and the other statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan is not difficult, as one can explain that Rabbi Yoḥanan is precise in his wording, as he says: Here, with regard to impurity in the Temple, they made awareness of the uncertain status like definite awareness; but they did not do so everywhere in the entire Torah. There is a basis for this distinction, as here, with regard to impurity in the Temple, awareness at the beginning is not written explicitly in the Torah, but rather it is derived from: “And it is hidden from him” (Leviticus 5:2), which indicates that there must be some awareness that became hidden from him, and for this, awareness of the uncertain status suffices. But by contrast, they did not make awareness of the uncertain status like definite awareness everywhere in the entire Torah, as it is written: “Or if his sin, which he has sinned, becomes known to him” (Leviticus 4:28), which indicates that in general we require full-fledged awareness at the beginning.

אֶלָּא לְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ – אַדְּמוֹקֵים לֵיהּ כְּרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל, נוֹקְמַהּ כְּרַבִּי! הָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן – דְּרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל לָא בָּעֵי יְדִיעָה בַּתְּחִלָּה.

But as for Reish Lakish, rather than interpreting this baraita concerning the two paths in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, who does not require any awareness whatsoever at the beginning, let him interpret it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who holds that awareness of the uncertain status is like definite awareness. The Gemara explains: Reish Lakish teaches us this: That with regard to impurity in the Temple, Rabbi Yishmael does not require any awareness at the beginning.

פְּשִׁיטָא דְּלָא בָּעֵי – מִדְּלָא מְיַיתְּרִי לֵיהּ קְרָאֵי; ״וְנֶעְלַם״ – דְּמִיחַיַּיב עַל הֶעְלֵם מִקְדָּשׁ! מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: כִּי לֵית לֵיהּ – מִקְּרָאֵי, אֲבָל מִגְּמָרָא אִית לֵיהּ; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

The Gemara challenges: It is obvious that Rabbi Yishmael does not require awareness at the beginning, since he has no superfluous verses from which to derive such a requirement. Rabbi Akiva learns from the superfluous phrase: “And it is hidden from him” (Leviticus 5:4), that awareness at the beginning is necessary, but Rabbi Yishmael says the verse serves to teach another halakha, that one is liable to bring an offering for a lapse of awareness that he was entering the Temple. The Gemara rejects this challenge: Lest you say: When Rabbi Yishmael does not accept this halakha requiring awareness at the beginning, it means that he does not derive it from a verse, but he accepts it as a tradition; to counter this, Reish Lakish teaches us that according to Rabbi Yishmael there is no requirement whatsoever for awareness at the beginning.

הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ יְדִיעוֹת הַטּוּמְאָה

מַתְנִי׳ שְׁבוּעוֹת שְׁתַּיִם שֶׁהֵן אַרְבַּע: ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאוֹכַל״ וְ״שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל״, ״שֶׁאָכַלְתִּי״ וְ״שֶׁלֹּא אָכַלְתִּי״.

MISHNA: With regard to oaths attesting to the truth about an utterance, which, when violated, render one liable to bring a sliding-scale offering, there are two types that are actually four types. The initial two oaths, which relate to utterances about the future and are explicitly prohibited in the Torah, are: On my oath I will eat, or: On my oath I will not eat. These are expanded to four, to include oaths concerning utterances about the past: On my oath I ate, or: On my oath I did not eat.

״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל״, וְאָכַל כׇּל שֶׁהוּא – חַיָּיב. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא. אָמְרוּ לוֹ לְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא: הֵיכָן מָצִינוּ בְּאוֹכֵל כָּל שֶׁהוּא שֶׁהוּא חַיָּיב – שֶׁזֶּה חַיָּיב? אָמַר לָהֶם רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא: וְכִי הֵיכָן מָצִינוּ בִּמְדַבֵּר וּמֵבִיא קׇרְבָּן – שֶׁזֶּה מְדַבֵּר וּמֵבִיא קׇרְבָּן?

If one says: On my oath I will not eat, and he then ate any amount, even less than an olive-bulk, he is liable; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Akiva: Where do we find that one who eats any amount is liable, leading you to say that this person is liable? Rabbi Akiva said to them: And where do we find one who speaks and is liable to bring an offering for it, as this oath taker merely speaks, i.e., takes an oath, and brings an offering for it?

גְּמָ׳ לְמֵימְרָא דְּ״שֶׁאוֹכַל״ – דְּאָכֵילְנָא מַשְׁמַע?! וּרְמִינְהִי: ״שְׁבוּעָה לֹא אוֹכַל לָךְ״, ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאוֹכַל לָךְ״, ״לֹא שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל לָךְ״ – אָסוּר.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Is this to say that phrasing an oath as: On my oath I will eat, always means that I take an oath that I will eat? The Gemara raises a contradiction from a mishna (Nedarim 16a): If one says: On my oath I will not eat of yours, or: On my oath I will eat of yours, or: Not on my oath I will not eat of yours, the food of the other person is forbidden.

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: לְעוֹלָם דְּאָכֵילְנָא מַשְׁמַע; לָא קַשְׁיָא, כָּאן בִּמְסָרְבִין בּוֹ לֶאֱכוֹל, כָּאן בְּשֶׁאֵין

Abaye said: Actually, saying: On my oath I will eat, means that I take an oath that I will eat. It is not difficult, because there is a difference between the contexts of the mishnayot: Here, it is referring to an oath taken in a context where others are importuning him to eat, so when he says: On my oath I will eat of yours, his intention is to indicate his refusal to eat. There, it is a context where others are not