שבועות ל״ב

שבועות ל״ב

עַד שֶׁיִּשְׁמְעוּ מִפִּי הַתּוֹבֵעַ!

until they hear a demand to testify directly from the mouth of the plaintiff.

רָץ אַחֲרֵיהֶן אִיצְטְרִיכָא לֵיהּ; סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: כֵּיוָן דְּרָץ אַחֲרֵיהֶן – כְּמַאן דְּאָמַר לְהוּ דָּמֵי; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

The Gemara answers: Mentioning the case of the plaintiff pursuing them was necessary for Shmuel, as otherwise it could enter your mind to say: Since the plaintiff is pursuing them, it is like the case of one who says to them directly to testify. Therefore, Shmuel teaches us that although the intent of the plaintiff is for them to testify, the witnesses are liable only if he tells them so explicitly.

וְהָא נָמֵי תְּנֵינָא: שְׁבוּעַת הָעֵדוּת כֵּיצַד? אָמַר לְעֵדִים ״בּוֹאוּ וְהַעִידוּנִי״, ״שְׁבוּעָה״ כּוּ׳ – אָמַר אִין, לָא אָמַר לָא!

The Gemara asks: But this too, we learn in the mishna: Liability to bring a sliding-scale offering for taking a false oath of testimony, how so? In a case where the plaintiff said to two witnesses: Come and testify on my behalf, and they replied: On our oath, etc., from which it can be inferred that if the plaintiff said this to the witnesses, yes, they are liable, and if he did not say this to the witnesses, no, they are not liable.

״אָמַר״ לָאו דַּוְקָא.

The Gemara rejects this: No proof may be cited from the mishna, as perhaps when the tanna states: In a case where the plaintiff said, he did not mean that this is the halakha only in a case where he specifically verbalized his demand that they testify; rather, the same would be true even if he conveyed his intent in a non-verbal manner.

דְּאִי לָא תֵּימָא הָכִי, גַּבֵּי פִּקָּדוֹן דְּקָתָנֵי: שְׁבוּעַת הַפִּקָּדוֹן כֵּיצַד? אָמַר לוֹ: ״תֵּן לִי פִּקָּדוֹן שֶׁיֵּשׁ לִי בְּיָדְךָ״ ; הָכָא נָמֵי – אָמַר אִין, לָא אָמַר לָא?! הָא ״וְכִחֶשׁ בַּעֲמִיתוֹ״ כֹּל דְּהוּ!

As, if you do not say so and assert that the language of the mishna is precise and one is liable only if the oath was in response to a verbal demand, then as for the mishna (36b), which teaches with regard to a deposit: Liability to bring a guilt-offering for taking a false oath on a deposit, how so? In a case where the owner said to the bailee: Give me the deposit that belongs to me and is in your possession, would you say there, also, that if the owner said this to the bailee, yes, he is liable, and if he did not say this to the bailee, no, he is not liable? But doesn’t the verse “And deals falsely with his colleague in a matter of deposit” (Leviticus 5:21) indicate that the bailee is liable for any denial of the deposit at all, unrelated to the nature of the claim raised by the owner of the item?

אֶלָּא ״אָמַר״ לָאו דַּוְקָא; הָכָא נָמֵי לָאו דַּוְקָא.

Rather, it must be that when the tanna says with regard to the oath on a deposit: In a case where the owner said to the bailee, he did not mean that this is the halakha only in a case where he specifically verbalized his demand. Here too, with regard to the oath of testimony, the tanna did not mean that this is the halakha only in a case where the plaintiff specifically verbalized his demand.

הַאי מַאי? אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא ״אָמַר״ דְּהָכָא דַּוְקָא – תְּנָא הָתָם אַטּוּ הָכָא. אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ לָא ״אָמַר״ דְּהָתָם דַּוְקָא וְלָא ״אָמַר״ דְּהָכָא דַּוְקָא – ״אָמַר״ ״אָמַר״ לְמָה לִי לְמִיתְנְיַיהּ?

The Gemara asks: What is this comparison? Granted, if you say that here, when the tanna says in the mishna with regard to the oath of testimony: In a case where the plaintiff said to two individuals, it is specifically in a case where the plaintiff verbalized his demand, one could explain that the tanna taught there, with regard to the oath on a deposit: In a case where the owner said, due to the fact that he employed that formulation here in the mishna. Tanna’im frequently employ uniform language in different cases, even though there are halakhic differences between them. But if you say that neither there with regard to the oath on a deposit is it specifically in a case where the owner verbally said, nor here with regard to the oath of testimony is it specifically in a case where the plaintiff verbally said, why do I need to teach: Said, said, in both instances?

דִּלְמָא אוֹרְחָא דְּמִילְּתָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

The Gemara answers: Perhaps the tanna is teaching us the matter in the manner in which it typically occurs, as both a plaintiff and the owner of a deposit typically articulate their claims verbally. It may still be that if the demand was conveyed non-verbally, the witness is liable. Since there is no proof from the mishna, the statement of Shmuel is necessary to teach that if the demand is not articulated verbally, the witness is not liable for taking a false oath.

תַּנְיָא כְּוָותֵיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל: רָאוּהוּ שֶׁבָּא אַחֲרֵיהֶן, אָמְרוּ לוֹ: ״מָה אַתָּה בָּא אַחֲרֵינוּ? שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֵין אָנוּ יוֹדְעִין לָךְ עֵדוּת״ – פְּטוּרִין. וְאִם בְּפִקָּדוֹן – חַיָּיבִים.

The Gemara notes that it is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel: In a case where the witnesses saw that the plaintiff was pursuing them, and they said to him: For what reason are you pursuing us; on our oath we do not know testimony on your behalf, they are exempt. And if it is with regard to an oath on a deposit, in a case where the owner is pursuing the bailee and he denies that the deposit is in his possession, the bailees are liable, as they are liable for any denial of the deposit at all, irrespective of the nature of the claim raised by the owner of the item.

הִשְׁבִּיעַ עֲלֵיהֶן חֲמִשָּׁה פְּעָמִים כּוּ׳.

§ The mishna teaches: If he administered an oath to them five times and they came to court and admitted that they had knowledge of the incident and testified, they are exempt. But if they denied knowledge of the incident in court as well, they are liable for each and every one of the oaths administered to them outside the court.

מְנָלַן דְּאַכְּפִירָה בְּבֵית דִּין הוּא דִּמְחַיְּיבִי, אַחוּץ לְבֵית דִּין לָא מִחַיְּיבִי?

The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that it is specifically for denial in court that they are liable, and they are not liable for denial outside court?

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי, אָמַר קְרָא: ״אִם לוֹא יַגִּיד וְנָשָׂא עֲוֹנוֹ״ – לֹא אָמַרְתִּי לְךָ אֶלָּא בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁאִילּוּ מַגִּיד זֶה, מִתְחַיֵּיב זֶה מָמוֹן.

Abaye said: It is derived as the verse states with regard to the oath of testimony: “If he does not utter it, he shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 5:1), from which it is derived: I said this halakha to you only in a place where, were this witness to utter his testimony, that other individual becomes liable to make a monetary payment, i.e., in court. He is not liable for denial in a place where his testimony would not render one liable to pay.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב פָּפָּא לְאַבָּיֵי: אִי הָכִי, אֵימָא שְׁבוּעָה גּוּפַאּ – בְּבֵית דִּין אֵין, וְשֶׁלֹּא בְּבֵית דִּין לָא!

Rav Pappa said to Abaye: If so, say that it is not the denial but the oath itself; if it is taken in court, yes, he is liable, and if it is that which is not taken in court, no, he is not liable.

לָא סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ, דְּתַנְיָא: ״לְאַחַת״ – לְחַיֵּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת. וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ בְּבֵית דִּין, מִי מְחַיֵּיב עַל כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת?! וְהָתְנַן: הִשְׁבִּיעַ עֲלֵיהֶן חֲמִשָּׁה פְּעָמִים בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין וְכָפְרוּ – אֵין חַיָּיבִין אֶלָּא אַחַת. אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: מָה טַעַם? הוֹאִיל וְאֵינָם יְכוֹלִין לַחְזוֹר וּלְהוֹדוֹת. אֶלָּא לָאו שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: שְׁבוּעָה – חוּץ לְבֵית דִּין, כְּפִירָה – בְּבֵית דִּין?

Abaye said to Rav Pappa: That should not enter your mind, as it is taught in a baraita that the verse: “And it will be when he is guilty of any one of these” (Leviticus 5:5), serves to render one liable to bring an offering for each and every instance when one repeatedly performs the transgressions for which one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering. And if it enters your mind that one is liable only for an oath taken in court, is one liable for each and every oath? But didn’t we learn in the mishna: If he administered an oath to them five times before the court, and they denied knowledge of any testimony relating to the incident, they are liable for taking only one false oath. Rabbi Shimon said: What is the reason for this ruling? Since once they denied that they had any knowledge of the matter they can no longer retract that denial and admit that they have knowledge of the matter. Abaye explains: Rather, must one not conclude from it that one is liable for each and every oath taken outside court; but one is liable only if the denial is in court?

כָּפְרוּ שְׁנֵיהֶן כְּאַחַת – חַיָּיבִין. הָא אִי אֶפְשָׁר לְצַמְצֵם?

§ The mishna teaches: If both of the witnesses denied knowledge of the incident together, both of them are liable. The Gemara asks: But isn’t it impossible for two events to coincide precisely? By necessity, one denial must have preceded the other.

אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: הָא מַנִּי – רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי הִיא, דְּאָמַר אֶפְשָׁר לְצַמְצֵם.

Rav Ḥisda said: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who says: It is possible for two events to coincide precisely.

רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבָּנַן, כְּגוֹן שֶׁכָּפְרוּ שְׁנֵיהֶן בְּתוֹךְ כְּדֵי דִיבּוּר – וְתוֹךְ כְּדֵי דִיבּוּר כְּדִיבּוּר דָּמֵי.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Even if you say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, the mishna can be interpreted in a case where both of them denied knowledge of relevant testimony within the time required for speaking a short phrase, and the halakhic status of a pause or retraction within the time required for speaking a short phrase is like that of continuous speech. Although the two statements did not coincide precisely, their halakhic status is as if they did.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא מִדִּיפְתִּי לְרָבִינָא: מִכְּדִי תּוֹךְ כְּדֵי דִיבּוּר כַּמָּה הָוֵי – כְּדֵי שְׁאֵילַת תַּלְמִיד לָרַב, אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי: כְּדֵי שְׁאֵילַת הָרַב לַתַּלְמִיד; עַד דְּאָמְרִי ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁאֵין אָנוּ יוֹדְעִין לָךְ עֵדוּת״, טוּבָא הָוֵי! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: כׇּל אֶחָד וְאֶחָד תּוֹךְ דִּיבּוּרוֹ שֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ.

Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: After all, how long is the duration of: Within the time required for speaking a short phrase? It is an interval equivalent to the duration of the three-word greeting of a student to his teacher: Shalom alekha rabbi. Some say that it is a briefer interval, equivalent to the duration of the two-word greeting of a teacher to his student: Shalom alekha. According to either opinion, in the time that elapses until the two of them say: On my oath we do not know any testimony for you, it is an interval greater than the time required to utter those words. How, then, can the mishna be interpreted as referring to a case where they stated their denials within the time required for speaking those words? Ravina said to Rav Aḥa of Difti: The case in the mishna is one where each and every potential witness will issue his denial within the time required for speaking, starting from the end of the statement of the other.

בְּזֶה אַחַר זֶה – הָרִאשׁוֹן חַיָּיב וְהַשֵּׁנִי פָּטוּר. מַתְנִיתִין דְּלָא כִּי הַאי תַּנָּא – דְּתַנְיָא: מַשְׁבִּיעַ עֵד אֶחָד – פָּטוּר, וְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן מְחַיֵּיב.

§ The mishna teaches: If they denied knowledge one after the other, the first one who denied knowledge is liable, and the second one is exempt, as once the first witness denies knowledge of the incident, the second is an individual witness, whose testimony is not decisive, and he is exempt from the oath of testimony. The Gemara notes: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of this tanna, as it is taught in a baraita: In the case of one who administers an oath to one witness, the witness is exempt from bringing an offering for taking a false oath of testimony; and Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, deems the witness liable to bring an offering. In his opinion, the second witness in the case in the mishna would be liable, not exempt.

לֵימָא בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי – דְּמָר סָבַר: עֵד אֶחָד כִּי אָתֵא – לִשְׁבוּעָה הוּא דְּקָא אָתֵא; וּמָר סָבַר: עֵד אֶחָד כִּי אֲתָא – לְמָמוֹנָא קָא אָתֵא?

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that they disagree about this: One Sage, the first tanna, holds: When one witness comes to testify, it is to render the one against whom he is testifying liable to take an oath, and that is the reason that he is coming, as one witness cannot render him liable to make a monetary payment. And one Sage, Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, holds: When one witness comes to testify, it is to render the one against whom he is testifying liable to make a monetary payment, and that is the reason that he is coming. The tanna’im disagree whether denial by one witness constitutes a denial with regard to monetary matters.

וְתִיסְבְּרָא?! הָאָמַר אַבָּיֵי: הַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּעֵד סוֹטָה, וְהַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּעֵדֵי סוֹטָה, וּמַחְלוֹקֶת בְּעֵדֵי סוֹטָה; הַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּעֵד אֶחָד, וְהַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּעֵד שֶׁכְּנֶגְדּוֹ חָשׁוּד עַל הַשְּׁבוּעָה.

The Gemara rejects this: And how can you understand their dispute in that way? Doesn’t Abaye say: All concede with regard to a witness in the case of a sota that he is liable for taking a false oath of testimony; and all concede with regard to witnesses in the case of a sota; and there is a dispute with regard to witnesses in the case of a sota. All concede with regard to one witness that he is not liable for taking a false oath of testimony because he cannot render another liable to make a monetary payment; and all concede with regard to a witness testifying on behalf of the claimant when his counterpart, the defendant, is suspect about the oath.

אֶלָּא דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא עֵד אֶחָד כִּי אָתֵי – לִשְׁבוּעָה קָא אָתֵי; וְהָכָא בְּהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי: מָר סָבַר דָּבָר הַגּוֹרֵם לְמָמוֹן – כְּמָמוֹן דָּמֵי, וּמָר סָבַר לָאו כְּמָמוֹן דָּמֵי.

The Gemara suggests: Rather, all concede that when one witness comes to testify, it is to render the one against whom he is testifying liable to take an oath, and that is the reason he is coming. And here they disagree about this: One Sage, Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, holds: A matter that causes financial loss is considered to have monetary value. Although the testimony of one witness does not render one liable for monetary payment, occasionally the party against whom he testified will prefer to pay rather than take the oath that the witness rendered him liable to take. In those cases, the testimony of one witness does in fact cause money to be paid. And one Sage, the first tanna, holds: A matter that causes financial loss is not considered to have monetary value.

גּוּפָא – אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: הַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּעֵד סוֹטָה, וְהַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּעֵדֵי סוֹטָה, וּמַחְלוֹקֶת בְּעֵדֵי סוֹטָה; הַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּעֵד אֶחָד, וְהַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּעֵד שֶׁכְּנֶגְדּוֹ חָשׁוּד עַל הַשְּׁבוּעָה.

§ With regard to the matter itself, Abaye says: All concede with regard to a witness in the case of a sota that he is liable for taking a false oath of testimony; and all concede with regard to witnesses in the case of a sota; and there is a dispute with regard to witnesses in the case of a sota. All concede with regard to one witness, and all concede with regard to a witness testifying on behalf of the claimant when his counterpart is suspect about the oath.

הַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּעֵד סוֹטָה – שֶׁחַיָּיב, בְּעֵד טוּמְאָה; דְּרַחֲמָנָא הֵימְנֵיהּ, דִּכְתִיב ״וְעֵד אֵין בָּהּ״ – כֹּל שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהּ.

The Gemara elaborates: All concede with regard to a witness in the case of a sota that he is liable for taking a false oath of testimony in the case of a witness of impurity. This is referring to a case where the husband issues a warning to his wife in the presence of two witnesses that she may not enter into seclusion with a certain man and witnesses testify that she entered into seclusion with him, and one witness testifies that she engaged in intercourse with that man, as in that case the Merciful One accorded credibility to the witness, as it is written with regard to a sota: “And there is no witness against her” (Numbers 5:13), that she engaged in intercourse. From that verse it is derived that any witness that there is against her is sufficient to render her forbidden to her husband and enable him to divorce her without paying the sum stipulated in the marriage contract. Therefore, the witness who testified that she engaged in intercourse with that man is for all intents and purposes a witness to a monetary matter.

וְהַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּעֵדֵי סוֹטָה – שֶׁפָּטוּר, בְּעֵדֵי קִינּוּי; דְּהָוֵה גּוֹרֵם דְּגוֹרֵם.

And all concede with regard to witnesses in the case of a sota that each witness is exempt from liability due to a false oath of testimony. This is referring to the case of witnesses of warning, who testify that the jealous husband warned his wife not to enter into seclusion with a certain man, as each witness is the cause of a cause of financial loss, not a direct cause of that loss. In order to lose payment of her marriage contract, in addition to the witnesses of warning, witnesses of seclusion would also be required, after which either a witness would testify that she engaged in intercourse or she would be required to drink the bitter water of a sota, either of which would confirm that she engaged in an adulterous relationship.

וּמַחְלוֹקֶת בְּעֵדֵי סוֹטָה – בְּעֵדֵי סְתִירָה; מָר סָבַר: דָּבָר הַגּוֹרֵם לְמָמוֹן כְּמָמוֹן דָּמֵי – וְחַיָּיב, וּמָר סָבַר: לָאו כְּמָמוֹן דָּמֵי – וּפָטוּר.

And there is a dispute with regard to witnesses in the case of a sota; this is referring to witnesses of seclusion who testify that the woman who was warned by her husband in fact entered into seclusion with the man in question. One Sage, Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, holds that a matter that causes financial loss is considered to have monetary value, and each witness is liable for taking a false oath of testimony, as had they testified the woman would lose her marriage contract. And one Sage, the Rabbis, hold that a matter that causes financial loss is not considered to have monetary value, and he is exempt.

הַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּשֶׁכְּנֶגְדּוֹ חָשׁוּד עַל הַשְּׁבוּעָה, הַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּעֵד אֶחָד דְּרַבִּי אַבָּא.

§ It is stated above further: All concede with regard to a witness testifying on behalf of the claimant when his counterpart is suspect about the oath. All concede in the case of one witness, as in the incident with Rabbi Abba.

הַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּשֶׁכְּנֶגְדּוֹ חָשׁוּד עַל הַשְּׁבוּעָה – דַּחֲשִׁיד מַאן? אִילֵימָא דַּחֲשִׁיד לֹוֶה, דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ מַלְוֶה: אִי אֲתֵית אַסְהֵדְתְּ לִי, הֲוָה מִשְׁתְּבַעְנָא וְשָׁקֵילְנָא; וְלֵימָא לֵיהּ: מִי יֵימַר דְּמִשְׁתְּבַעְתְּ?

The Gemara elaborates: All concede with regard to a witness testifying on behalf of the claimant when his counterpart is suspect about the oath. The testimony of one witness renders the borrower liable to take an oath that he does not owe money. The Gemara asks: In a case where who is suspect? If we say that the borrower who is denying the debt is suspect, and it is a case where the lender says to the witness: If you came and testified on my behalf I would have taken an oath and taken the sum owed me from the borrower, since he is suspect with regard to oaths, why would the witness be liable for taking a false oath of testimony? Let the witness say to the lender: Who could say that you would have taken an oath? Since there is no certainty that he would have taken the oath, the witness is merely the cause of a cause of financial loss.

אֶלָּא כְּגוֹן שֶׁשְּׁנֵיהֶן חֲשׁוּדֵין, דְּאָמַר מָר: חָזְרָה שְׁבוּעָה לַמְחוּיָּב לָהּ, וּמִתּוֹךְ שֶׁאֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לִישָּׁבַע – מְשַׁלֵּם.

Rather, it is a case where both the borrower and the lender are suspect, as the Master says: Since both are suspect, the oath reverts to the one who is initially obligated to take it, i.e., the borrower, and since he is unable to take the oath because he is suspect, he pays the entire claim to the lender. One witness rendered the borrower liable to pay the debt.

הַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּעֵד אֶחָד דְּרַבִּי אַבָּא – דְּהָהוּא גַּבְרָא דַּחֲטַף נְסָכָא מֵחַבְרֵיהּ. אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי אַמֵּי, הֲוָה יָתֵיב רַבִּי אַבָּא קַמֵּיהּ; אֲזַל אַיְיתִי חַד סָהֲדָא דְּמִיחְטָף חַטְפַהּ מִינֵּיהּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: ״אִין, חֲטַפִי – וְדִידִי חֲטַפִי״.

Abaye said: All concede in the case of one witness, as in the incident with Rabbi Abba. What are the circumstances? As there was a certain man who snatched a silver ingot from another. The one from whom it was taken came before Rabbi Ami while Rabbi Abba was sitting before him, and he went and brought one witness who testified that the defendant indeed snatched it from him. The one who snatched it said to him: Yes, it is true that I snatched it, but I merely snatched that which was mine.

אָמַר רַבִּי אַמֵּי: הֵיכִי (לִדַיְּינֵי) [לִידַיְּינוּהּ] דַּיָּינֵי לְהַאי דִּינָא? לִישַׁלֵּם – לֵיכָּא תְּרֵי סָהֲדִי! לִיפְטְרֵיהּ – הָא אִיכָּא חַד סָהֲדָא דְּמִחְטָף חֲטַף! לִישְׁתְּבַע – כֵּיוָן דְּאָמַר ״אֵין, חֲטַפִי – וְדִידִי חֲטַפִי״, הָוֵה לֵיהּ כְּגַזְלָן! אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי אַבָּא: הָוֵה לֵיהּ מְחוּיָּב שְׁבוּעָה וְאֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לִישָּׁבַע, וְכׇל הַמְחוּיָּב שְׁבוּעָה וְאֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לִישָּׁבַע – מְשַׁלֵּם.

Rabbi Ami said: How shall judges rule in this case? Let the judges require him to pay. But there are not two witnesses who witnessed the robbery. Let the judges rule to exempt him from payment. But there is one witness that he snatched the ingot. Based on the testimony of that witness, let the alleged robber take an oath that he did not snatch the ingot. But once he said: Yes, I snatched it, but I merely snatched that which was mine, his halakhic status is like that of a robber, who is disqualified from taking an oath. Rabbi Abba said to him: He is one who is obligated to take an oath but is unable to take an oath, and anyone who is obligated to take an oath but is unable to take an oath is liable to pay. In that case, were that witness to take a false oath and deny knowledge of the matter, he would be liable.

אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: הַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּעֵד מִיתָה שֶׁהוּא חַיָּיב, וְהַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּעֵד מִיתָה שֶׁהוּא פָּטוּר.

§ Rav Pappa says: All concede with regard to the witness of a death that he is liable for taking an oath of testimony if he took a false oath and denied knowledge of the incident, and all concede with regard to the witness of a death that he is exempt in that case.

הַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּעֵד מִיתָה שֶׁהוּא פָּטוּר – דַּאֲמַר לַהּ לְדִידַהּ וְלָא אֲמַר לְהוּ לְבֵית דִּין, דִּתְנַן: הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁאָמְרָה ״מֵת בַּעְלִי״ – תִּנָּשֵׂא, ״מֵת בַּעְלִי״ – תִּתְיַבֵּם.

The Gemara elaborates: All concede with regard to the witness of a death that he is exempt where he said to the wife herself that her husband is dead, but he did not tell it to the court, and now he denies his earlier statement, as we learned in a mishna (Eduyyot 1:12): The woman who said: My husband died, shall remarry on the basis of her own testimony. Likewise, if she says: My husband died, she shall enter into levirate marriage with her brother-in-law on the basis of her own testimony. The fact that the witness subsequently denied knowledge of the matter does not cause her to lose her marriage contract, since she can come to the court and testify based on the statement of the witness and collect her marriage contract.

הַכֹּל מוֹדִים בְּעֵד מִיתָה שֶׁהוּא חַיָּיב – דְּלָא אָמַר לְדִידַהּ וְלָא אֲמַר לְהוּ לְבֵית דִּין.

All concede with regard to the witness of a death that he is liable in a case where he did not say that the husband is dead to the wife herself nor did he say it to the court. In that case, his denial of knowledge of the matter causes the wife to lose payment of her marriage contract.

שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: מַשְׁבִּיעַ עֵדֵי קַרְקַע חַיָּיב? דִּלְמָא דִּתְפִישָׂא מִטַּלְטְלֵי.

The Gemara asks: Shall we conclude from here that according to Rav Pappa, in the case of one who administers an oath to witnesses with regard to land, the witnesses are liable for taking a false oath of testimony, given that the marriage contract here is collected from land belonging to the husband? This matter is subject to a dispute between the Sages (37b). The Gemara answers: No proof may be cited from here, as perhaps Rav Pappa is referring to a case where she seizes her husband’s movable property as payment for her marriage contract. Therefore, this is not considered testimony with regard to land.

כָּפַר אֶחָד וְהוֹדָה אֶחָד כּוּ׳. הַשְׁתָּא בְּזֶה אַחַר זֶה, דְּתַרְוַיְיהוּ קָא כָפְרִי – אָמְרַתְּ הָרִאשׁוֹן חַיָּיב וְהַשֵּׁנִי פָּטוּר; כָּפַר אֶחָד וְהוֹדָה אֶחָד מִיבַּעְיָא?!

§ The mishna teaches: If one of the two witnesses denied knowledge of the incident, and the other one admitted that he had knowledge and proceeded to testify, the one who denies knowledge of the incident is liable. The Gemara asks: Why was it necessary to teach this halakha in the mishna? Now that in the previous case, where the potential witnesses both denied knowledge of the matter one after the other, you said: The first is liable and the second is exempt, in a case where one denied knowledge and one admitted that he had knowledge and proceeded to testify, is it necessary to mention that the one who denied knowledge is liable?

לָא צְרִיכָא, כְּגוֹן שֶׁכָּפְרוּ שְׁנֵיהֶן, וְחָזַר אֶחָד מֵהֶן וְהוֹדָה בְּתוֹךְ כְּדֵי דִיבּוּר; וְהָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן – דְּתוֹךְ כְּדֵי דִיבּוּר כְּדִיבּוּר דָּמֵי.

The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to state this halakha in a case where both of them denied knowledge of the matter, and one of them retracted his denial and admitted to knowledge of the matter within the time required for speaking a short phrase. And this teaches us that the halakhic status of a pause or retraction within the time required for speaking a short phrase is like that of continuous speech.

בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַב חִסְדָּא, דְּמוֹקֵי לַהּ לְהָהוּא כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי – רֵישָׁא אֶפְשָׁר לְצַמְצֵם, וְסֵיפָא אִיצְטְרִיךְ לְאַשְׁמוֹעִינַן דְּתוֹךְ כְּדֵי דִיבּוּר כְּדִיבּוּר דָּמֵי. אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן – רֵישָׁא תּוֹךְ כְּדֵי דִיבּוּר, סֵיפָא תּוֹךְ כְּדֵי דִיבּוּר! תַּרְתֵּי לְמָה לִי?

The Gemara asks: Granted, according to Rav Ḥisda, who interprets the previous case in the mishna in which the two witnesses denied knowledge of the incident as one, and they are liable in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, a different halakha may be learned from each clause in the mishna. It is learned from the first clause that it is possible for two events to coincide precisely, and the latter clause was necessary to teach us that the halakhic status of a pause or retraction within the time required for speaking a short phrase is like that of continuous speech. But according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, the halakha of: Within the time required for speaking a short phrase, is learned from the first clause, and the halakha of: Within the time required for speaking a short phrase, is learned from the latter clause. Why do I need two clauses to teach the same halakha?

מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: הָנֵי מִילֵּי כְּפִירָה וּכְפִירָה, אֲבָל כְּפִירָה וְהוֹדָאָה – אֵימָא לָא; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

The Gemara answers: Even according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, both clauses are necessary. Lest you say that this statement: The halakhic status of a pause or retraction within the time required for speaking a short phrase is like that of continuous speech, applies only in a case where the first statement is a denial and the second statement is a denial; but in a case where the first statement is a denial and the second statement is an admission, say that no, its halakhic status is not like that of continuous speech and one cannot admit knowledge after having denied it. Therefore, the tanna teaches us that even in a case where he retracts the denial and admits his knowledge, its halakhic status is not like that of continuous speech.

הָיוּ שְׁתֵּי כִּיתֵּי עֵדִים, כָּפְרָה הָרִאשׁוֹנָה וְאַחַר כָּךְ כָּפְרָה הַשְּׁנִיָּה. בִּשְׁלָמָא שְׁנִיָּה תִּתְחַיֵּיב – דְּכָפְרָה לַהּ רִאשׁוֹנָה; אֶלָּא רִאשׁוֹנָה אַמַּאי?

§ The mishna teaches: If there were two sets of witnesses that took the oath of testimony, and the first set denied knowledge of the matter and thereafter, the second set denied knowledge of the matter, both sets of witnesses are liable. The Gemara asks: Granted, the second set will be held liable, as since the first set denied knowledge of the matter, the ability of the plaintiff to collect his monetary claim is dependent exclusively on the second set, and their denial caused his loss. But why is the first set liable?