סוכה לא

סוכה לא

הוֹשַׁעְנָא! מֵעִיקָּרָא, נָמֵי לְאַסָּא ״הוֹשַׁעְנָא״ קָרוּ לֵיהּ.

it is called hoshana, which is a term used to describe the four species. The Gemara answers: This is not a full-fledged change of name, as occasionally it also happens that they initially refer to a myrtle branch as a hoshana while it is attached to the tree.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: סוּכָּה גְּזוּלָה, וְהַמְסַכֵּךְ בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים — רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר פּוֹסֵל, וַחֲכָמִים מַכְשִׁירִין.

§ The Sages taught: With regard to a stolen sukka and with regard to one who roofs a sukka in the public domain, which is tantamount to robbing land from the public, Rabbi Eliezer deems these sukkot unfit for use in fulfillment of the mitzva, and the Rabbis deem them fit.

אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: מַחְלוֹקֶת בְּשֶׁתּוֹקֵף אֶת חֲבֵירוֹ וְהוֹצִיאוֹ מִסּוּכָּתוֹ. וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר לְטַעְמֵיהּ דְּאָמַר: אֵין אָדָם יוֹצֵא יְדֵי חוֹבָתוֹ בְּסוּכָּתוֹ שֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ. אִי קַרְקַע נִגְזֶלֶת — סוּכָּה גְּזוּלָה הִיא. וְאִי נָמֵי קַרְקַע אֵינָהּ נִגְזֶלֶת — סוּכָּה שְׁאוּלָה הִיא.

Rav Naḥman said: This dispute is limited to a case where one assaults another and forcibly evicts him from his sukka, and takes his place in the sukka. In that case, Rabbi Eliezer deems the sukka unfit. And Rabbi Eliezer conforms to his own reasoning, as he said: A person does not fulfill his obligation with the sukka of another. Therefore, in any event, he does not fulfill his obligation with it. If land can be stolen and acquired by the robber, the sukka from which he evicted the owner is a stolen sukka. And if indeed land cannot be stolen, nevertheless, the robber does not fulfill his obligation according to Rabbi Eliezer, as it is a borrowed sukka.

וְרַבָּנַן לְטַעְמַיְיהוּ, דְּאָמְרִי: אָדָם יוֹצֵא יְדֵי חוֹבָתוֹ בְּסוּכָּתוֹ שֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ, וְקַרְקַע אֵינָהּ נִגְזֶלֶת, וְסוּכָּה שְׁאוּלָה הִיא.

And the Rabbis conform to their reasoning, as they said: A person fulfills his obligation with the sukka of another. And since land cannot be stolen and the sukka is merely a borrowed sukka and not a stolen one, the robber fulfills his obligation, despite the fact that he committed a reprehensible act.

אֲבָל גָּזַל עֵצִים וְסִיכֵּךְ בָּהֶן — דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל אֵין לוֹ אֶלָּא דְּמֵי עֵצִים.

However, if one stole wood and roofed a sukka with it, everyone agrees, as Rabbi Eliezer concedes, that the original owner of the wood has rights only to the monetary value of the wood. The wood itself belongs to the robber, so it is not a stolen sukka.

מִמַּאי?

The Gemara asks: From where does Rav Naḥman draw the conclusion that the dispute is with regard to a stolen sukka and not with regard to a sukka established with stolen building materials?

מִדְּקָתָנֵי: דּוּמְיָא דִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים. מָה רְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים — קַרְקַע לָאו דִּידֵיהּ הוּא, סוּכָּה נָמֵי — לָאו קַרְקַע דִּידֵיהּ הוּא.

The Gemara answers: From the fact that the halakha of a stolen sukka is juxtaposed in the baraita to the halakha of a sukka established in the public domain, the baraita teaches that the legal status of the stolen sukka is similar to the legal status of a sukka established in the public domain. Just as one does not fulfill his obligation with a sukka in the public domain because the land is not his, with regard to the stolen sukka too, one does not fulfill his obligation because the land is not his, not because the building materials were stolen.

הָהִיא סָבְתָּא דַּאֲתַאי לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן, אֲמַרָה לֵיהּ: רֵישׁ גָּלוּתָא וְכוּלְּהוּ רַבָּנַן דְּבֵי רֵישׁ גָּלוּתָא בְּסוּכָּה גְּזוּלָה הֲווֹ יָתְבִי. צָוְוחָה וְלָא אַשְׁגַּח בָּהּ רַב נַחְמָן. אֲמַרָה לֵיהּ: אִיתְּתָא דַּהֲוָה לֵיהּ לַאֲבוּהָא תְּלָת מְאָה וְתַמְנֵי סְרֵי עַבְדֵי צָוְוחָא קַמַּיְיכוּ וְלָא אַשְׁגְּחִיתוּ בַּהּ?! אֲמַר לְהוּ רַב נַחְמָן: פָּעִיתָא הִיא דָּא, וְאֵין לָהּ אֶלָּא דְּמֵי עֵצִים בִּלְבַד.

The Gemara relates: There was a certain old woman who came before Rav Naḥman. She said to him: The Exilarch and all the Sages in his house have been sitting in a stolen sukka. She claimed that the Exilarch’s servants stole her wood and used it to build the sukka. She screamed, but Rav Naḥman did not pay attention to her. She said to him: A woman whose father, Abraham, our forefather, had three hundred and eighteen slaves screams before you, and you do not pay attention to her? She claimed that she should be treated with deference due to her lineage as a Jew. Rav Naḥman said to the Sages: This woman is a screamer, and she has rights only to the monetary value of the wood. However, the sukka itself was already acquired by the Exilarch.

אָמַר רָבִינָא: הַאי כְּשׁוּרָא דִמְטַלַּלְתָּא דִּגְזוּלָה, עָבְדִי לַיהּ רַבָּנַן תַּקַּנְתָּא, מִשּׁוּם תַּקָּנַת מָרִישׁ.

Ravina said: With regard to the stolen large beam of a sukka, the Sages instituted an ordinance that the robber need not return it intact, due to the general ordinance of a beam. By the letter of the law, one who stole a beam and incorporated it in the construction of a new house is required to dismantle the house and return the beam. The Sages instituted an ordinance requiring the robber to repay the monetary value of the beam instead. They instituted this ordinance to facilitate the repentance of the robber, who would be less likely to repent if doing so entailed destruction of the house.

פְּשִׁיטָא, מַאי שְׁנָא מֵעֵצִים? מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא עֵצִים שְׁכִיחִי, אֲבָל הַאי לָא שְׁכִיחָא — אֵימָא לָא, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

The Gemara asks: This is obvious. In what way is the beam different from other wood used in establishing the sukka? The Gemara answers: Lest you say: Wood is common, and therefore the owners are more likely to despair of recovering the wood and will suffice with receiving monetary restitution and replacing the wood, but, with regard to this large beam, which is not common, say that there is no despair, and the robber is required to return the actual beam, therefore, Ravina teaches us that the ordinance applies even to this beam, and the robber is required to return only its monetary value.

הָנֵי מִילֵּי בְּגוֹ שִׁבְעָה, אֲבָל לְבָתַר שִׁבְעָה — הָדַר בְּעֵינֵיהּ. וְאִי חִבְּרוֹ בְּטִינָא, וַאֲפִילּוּ לְאַחַר שִׁבְעָה נָמֵי יָהֵיב לֵיהּ דְּמֵי.

The Gemara notes: This halakha that the robber need not dismantle the sukka and return the beam applies only within the seven days of the Festival. However, after the seven days, the beam returns to the owner intact. And if the robber attached it with mortar and it is affixed permanently to the sukka, then even after the seven days of the Festival, the ordinance remains in effect, and the robber gives the original owner the monetary value of the beam.

תָּנָא: יָבֵשׁ — פָּסוּל, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה מַכְשִׁיר. אָמַר רָבָא: מַחֲלוֹקֶת בְּלוּלָב, דְּרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: מַקְּשִׁינַן לוּלָב לְאֶתְרוֹג, מָה אֶתְרוֹג בָּעֵי ״הָדָר״ — אַף לוּלָב בָּעֵי ״הָדָר״. וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה סָבַר: לָא מַקְּשִׁינַן לוּלָב לְאֶתְרוֹג. אֲבָל בְּאֶתְרוֹג — דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל הָדָר בָּעֵינַן.

§ It was taught in the Tosefta: A dry lulav is unfit. Rabbi Yehuda deems it fit. Rava said: The dispute is specifically with regard to a lulav, as the Rabbis hold: We liken the lulav to the etrog, based on their juxtaposition in the verse. Just as the etrog requires beauty, so too, the lulav requires beauty. And Rabbi Yehuda holds: We do not liken the lulav to the etrog. However, with regard to an etrog, everyone agrees that we require beauty [hadar] as the verse states: “Fruit of a beautiful tree” (Leviticus 23:40) and a dry etrog does not meet that criterion.

וּבְלוּלָב לָא בָּעֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה ״הָדָר״? וְהָתְנַן, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: יַאַגְדֶנּוּ מִלְמַעְלָה. מַאי טַעְמָא — לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּבָעֵי ״הָדָר״?

The Gemara asks: And with regard to a lulav, does Rabbi Yehuda really not require beauty? But didn’t we learn in the mishna that Rabbi Yehuda says: With regard to a lulav whose leaves have spread out, one should bind the lulav from the top. What is the reason to do so? Is it not because he requires beauty in the case of lulav?

לָא, כִּדְקָתָנֵי טַעְמָא: רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן: ״כַּפּוֹת תְּמָרִים״ — כְּפוֹת, וְאִם הָיָה פָּרוּד יִכְפְּתֶנּוּ.

The Gemara rejects this: No, as the reason is taught: Rabbi Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Tarfon that the same verse states: “Branches [kappot] of a date palm.” The Sages interpret the term to mean bound [kafut], indicating that if the leaves of the lulav were spread, one should bind it.

וְלָא בָּעֵי ״הָדָר״? וְהָתְנַן: אֵין אוֹגְדִין אֶת הַלּוּלָב אֶלָּא בְּמִינוֹ, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה. מַאי טַעְמָא, לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּבָעֵי ״הָדָר״?

The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yehuda not require beauty with regard to the lulav? But didn’t we learn in a mishna: One binds the lulav only with its own species, this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda? What is the reason that Rabbi Yehuda requires the binding to be from its own species? Is it not due to the fact that he requires beauty with regard to the lulav?

לָא, דְּהָא אָמַר רָבָא: אֲפִילּוּ בְּסִיב, וַאֲפִילּוּ בְּעִיקָּרָא דְּדִיקְלָא. [וְאֶלָּא] מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה הָתָם? דְּקָא סָבַר לוּלָב צָרִיךְ אֶגֶד, וְאִי מַיְיתֵי מִינָא אַחֲרִינָא — הָוֵה לְהוּ חֲמִשָּׁה מִינִין.

The Gemara answers: No, that is not the reason, as Rava said: According to Rabbi Yehuda, one may bind the lulav even with fiber that grows around the trunk of the date palm and even with the root of the date palm, even though these do not meet the criterion of beauty. The Gemara asks: Rather, what is the rationale for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda there, that a lulav must be bound with its own species? The Gemara answers: It is because he holds that a lulav requires binding, and if one brought another species to bind it, they are five species instead of four, violating the prohibition against adding to the mitzvot of the Torah.

וּבְאֶתְרוֹג מִי בָּעֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הָדָר? וְהָתַנְיָא: אַרְבַּעַת מִינִין שֶׁבַּלּוּלָב, כְּשֵׁם שֶׁאֵין פּוֹחֲתִין מֵהֶן כָּךְ אֵין מוֹסִיפִין עֲלֵיהֶן. לֹא מָצָא אֶתְרוֹג — לֹא יָבִיא לֹא פָּרִישׁ וְלֹא רִמּוֹן וְלֹא דָּבָר אַחֵר. כְּמוּשִׁין — כְּשֵׁרִין, יְבֵשִׁין — פְּסוּלִין. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אַף יְבֵשִׁין.

The Gemara asks: And with regard to an etrog, does Rabbi Yehuda require beauty? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: With regard to the four species of the lulav, just as one may not diminish from their number, so too, one may not add to their number. If one did not find an etrog, he should not bring a quince, a pomegranate, or any other item instead. If the species are slightly dried, they are fit. If they are completely dry, they are unfit. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even dry etrogim are fit.

וְאָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה: מַעֲשֶׂה

And Rabbi Yehuda said: There was an incident

בִּבְנֵי כְרַכִּין, שֶׁהָיוּ מוֹרִישִׁין אֶת לוּלְבֵיהֶן לִבְנֵי בְנֵיהֶן! אָמְרוּ (לָהֶם): מִשָּׁם רְאָיָה? אֵין שְׁעַת הַדְּחָק רְאָיָה.

involving city dwellers who lived in an area distant from the region where the four species grow, who would bequeath their lulavim to their grandchildren, even though they were completely dry. The Sages said to him: Is there proof from there that species that are dry remain fit for use? Actions taken in exigent circumstances are not proof. In typical circumstances, it would be prohibited to use those species.

קָתָנֵי מִיהַת, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אַף יְבֵשִׁין כְּשֵׁרִין, מַאי לָאו, אַאֶתְרוֹג! לָא, אַלּוּלָב.

In any event, the Tosefta teaches that Rabbi Yehuda says: Even dry species are fit for use in fulfilling the mitzva. What, is it not referring to an etrog as well, indicating that in his opinion an etrog does not require beauty? No, he was stating only that a dry lulav is fit for use.

אָמַר מָר: כְּשֵׁם שֶׁאֵין פּוֹחֲתִין מֵהֶן, כָּךְ אֵין מוֹסִיפִין עֲלֵיהֶן. פְּשִׁיטָא? מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: הוֹאִיל וְאָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה לוּלָב צָרִיךְ אֶגֶד, וְאִי מַיְיתֵי מִינָא אַחֲרִינָא, הַאי לְחוֹדֵיהּ קָאֵי וְהַאי לְחוֹדֵיהּ קָאֵי, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

The Master stated in the baraita cited above: Just as one may not diminish from their number, so too, one may not add to their number. The Gemara asks: That is obvious. Why would it be permitted to add an additional species? The Gemara answers: Lest you say: Since Rabbi Yehuda said that a lulav requires a binding, and that requirement is a fundamental component of the mitzva, and if you bring another additional species, this species stands alone and that species stands alone, i.e., because the additional species is not bound with the others, its presence is insignificant, and causes no problem, therefore, Rabbi Yehuda teaches us that this is not the case. In fact, one may not bring an additional species.

אָמַר מָר: לֹא מָצָא אֶתְרוֹג — לֹא יָבִיא לֹא רִמּוֹן וְלֹא פָּרִישׁ וְלֹא דָּבָר אַחֵר. פְּשִׁיטָא! מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: לַיְיתֵי, כִּי הֵיכִי שֶׁלֹּא תִּשָּׁכַח תּוֹרַת אֶתְרוֹג, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן, זִימְנִין דְּנָפֵיק חוּרְבָּא מִינֵּיהּ, דְּאָתֵי לְמִסְרַךְ.

The Master stated in the baraita cited above: If one cannot find an etrog, he may not bring a pomegranate, a quince, or anything else instead. The Gemara wonders: This is obvious. The Gemara answers: Lest you say: He should bring these fruits so that the halakhic category of the etrog will not be forgotten, therefore, Rabbi Yehuda teaches us that it is in fact prohibited because on occasion, damage will result from this practice. Some may come to be drawn to this practice and use these species even when etrogim are available.

תָּא שְׁמַע: אֶתְרוֹג הַיָּשָׁן — פָּסוּל, וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה מַכְשִׁיר. תְּיוּבְתָּא דְרָבָא, תְּיוּבְתָּא.

The Gemara proposes: Come and hear another proof that, with regard to an etrog, Rabbi Yehuda does not require beauty: An old etrog is unfit. Rabbi Yehuda deems it fit. This is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rava, who holds that everyone agrees that an etrog requires beauty. The Gemara concludes: It is, indeed, a conclusive refutation of Rava’s opinion.

וְלָא בָּעֵי הָדָר? וְהָא אֲנַן תְּנַן: הַיָּרוֹק כְּכַרָּתֵי — רַבִּי מֵאִיר מַכְשִׁיר וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה פּוֹסֵל. לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּבָעֵי הָדָר? לָא, מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא גְּמַר פֵּירָא.

The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yehuda not require beauty in an etrog? But didn’t we learn in a mishna: With regard to an etrog that is leek green, Rabbi Meir deems it fit and Rabbi Yehuda deems it unfit? The Gemara asks: Is it not due to the fact that Rabbi Yehuda requires beauty in an etrog? The Gemara answers: No, it is due to the fact that in the case of a green etrog the fruit did not ripen, and it is inappropriate to fulfill the mitzva with an unripe fruit.

תָּא שְׁמַע: שִׁיעוּר אֶתְרוֹג קָטָן, רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: כֶּאֱגוֹז, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: כְּבֵיצָה. לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּבָעֵי הָדָר? לָא, מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא גְּמַר פֵּירָא.

The Gemara cites an additional proof. Come and hear: What is the minimum measure of a small etrog? Rabbi Meir says: It may be no smaller than a walnut-bulk. Rabbi Yehuda says: It may be no smaller than an egg-bulk. The Gemara asks: Is it not due to the fact that Rabbi Yehuda requires beauty in an etrog? The Gemara answers: No, it is due to the fact that in that case of an etrog smaller than an egg-bulk, the fruit did not ripen.

תָּא שְׁמַע: וּבְגָדוֹל כְּדֵי שֶׁיֶּאֱחוֹז שְׁנַיִם בְּיָדוֹ אַחַת, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: אֲפִילּוּ אֶחָד בִּשְׁתֵּי יָדָיו. מַאי טַעְמָא, לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּבָעֵי הָדָר? לָא, כֵּיוָן דְּאָמַר רַבָּה: לוּלָב בְּיָמִין וְאֶתְרוֹג בִּשְׂמֹאל, זִימְנִין דְּמִחַלְּפִי לֵיהּ וְאָתֵי לְאַפּוּכִינְהוּ וְאָתֵי לְאִיפְּסוֹלֵי.

Come and hear an additional proof: And in a large etrog, the maximum measure is so that one could hold two in his one hand; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yosei says: It is fit even if it is so large that he can hold only one in his two hands. The Gemara asks: What is the rationale for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? Is it not due to the fact that Rabbi Yehuda requires beauty in an etrog? The Gemara answers: No, the rationale is as Rabba said: One holds the lulav in the right hand and the etrog in the left. Sometimes, when one is handed the four species, they will exchange them for him, placing the three species in his left hand and the etrog in his right, and then he will come to switch them and place each in the appropriate hand. However, if the etrog is too large, he will be unable to hold the etrog and the lulav together, and he will come to render the etrog unfit, as it is apt to fall.

וְאֶלָּא לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, הָא כְּתִיב ״הָדָר״?

The Gemara asks: However, even according to Rabbi Yehuda, isn’t it written: The fruit of a beautiful [hadar] tree? How, then, can he rule that an etrog does not require beauty?

הַהוּא הַדָּר בְּאִילָנוֹ מִשָּׁנָה לְשָׁנָה.

The Gemara answers that Rabbi Yehuda holds: That verse means that one should take a fruit that dwells [hadar] in its tree from year to year. It remains on the tree and does not wither and fall at the end of the season as do most fruits. That is characteristic of the etrog.

שֶׁל אֲשֵׁרָה וְשֶׁל עִיר הַנִּדַּחַת. וְשֶׁל אֲשֵׁרָה — פָּסוּל? וְהָאָמַר רָבָא: לוּלָב שֶׁל עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה — לֹא יִטּוֹל, וְאִם נָטַל — כָּשֵׁר.

§ The mishna continues: The lulav of a tree worshipped as idolatry [asheira] and a lulav from a city whose residents were incited to idolatry, which must be burned along with all the city’s property, are unfit. And is a lulav of an asheira unfit? But didn’t Rava say with regard to a lulav of idolatry: One should not take it to fulfill the mitzva ab initio; however, if he took it, it is fit and he fulfills his obligation after the fact? Apparently, a lulav from an asheira is fit.

הָכָא בַּאֲשֵׁרָה דְמֹשֶׁה עָסְקִינַן, דְּכַתּוֹתֵי מְיכַתַּת שִׁיעוּרֵיהּ.

The Gemara explains: Here, in the mishna, we are dealing with the asheira of Moses, depicted in the Torah. The mishna is not referring to a tree planted in deference to idolatry, but rather to a tree that was itself worshipped as an idol. There is an obligation to burn idolatry and destroy it. Therefore, legally, the latter tree is considered as if it were already burned. The requisite measure of the lulav was crushed, and it is therefore unfit for use in fulfilling the mitzva. Rava’s ruling does not apply to an asheira of that kind.

דַּיְקָא נָמֵי, דְּקָתָנֵי: דּוּמְיָא דְּעִיר הַנִּדַּחַת. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.

The Gemara notes: The formulation of the mishna is also precise and indicates that the reference is to an asheira of Moses, as the juxtaposition of the halakha of an asheira to the halakha of a city whose residents were incited to idolatry teaches that the legal status of the asheira is similar to that of a city whose residents were incited to idolatry, in which all the property must be burned. In both cases, the lulav is considered already burned and lacking the requisite measure. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, learn from here that this is the reason that the lulav is unfit.

נִקְטַם רֹאשׁוֹ. אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא נִקְטַם, אֲבָל נִסְדַּק — כָּשֵׁר.

The mishna continues: If the top of the lulav was severed it is unfit. Rav Huna said: They taught that it is unfit only when it was completely severed; however, if the top merely split, the lulav is fit.

וְנִסְדַּק כָּשֵׁר? וְהָתַנְיָא: לוּלָב כָּפוּף,

The Gemara asks: And is a split lulav fit? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: A lulav that is bent at the top,