תמורה כז

תמורה כז

״וְאִם תַּחְתֶּיהָ תַּעֲמוֹד הַבַּהֶרֶת״.

“But if the white leprous spot stays in its place [taḥteha]” (Leviticus 13:23). In this verse, the word “taḥteha” indicates that the white leprous spot remains in its place. This usage of the word is fitting for substitution, since when sanctity is transferred by substitution from a consecrated animal to a non-sacred animal, the sanctity of the consecrated animal remains in place, despite the fact that the non-sacred animal is also consecrated.

דְּאַחוֹלֵי, דִּכְתִיב: ״תַּחַת הַנְּחוֹשֶׁת אָבִיא זָהָב״, וְהִלְכָּךְ, גַּבֵּי קׇדְשֵׁי מִזְבֵּחַ דְּעָבְדִין תְּמוּרָה — לִישָּׁנָא דְּאַתְפּוֹסֵי הוּא, גַּבֵּי קׇדְשֵׁי בֶּדֶק הַבַּיִת דְּלָא עָבְדִין תְּמוּרָה — לִישָּׁנָא דְּאַחוֹלֵי הוּא.

Yet taḥat is also a term that indicates desacralization, as it is written: “In place of [taḥat] brass I will bring gold, and in place of iron I will bring silver, and in place of wood brass, and in place of stones iron” (Isaiah 60:17). In this verse, taḥat means replacement, which is what occurs in desacralization, where one item is replaced by another. And therefore, the term should be understood in accordance with the context: With regard to animals consecrated for sacrifice upon the altar, which render a non-sacred animal for which they are exchanged a substitute, taḥat is a term that indicates the associating of one sanctity with another. With regard to animals consecrated for Temple maintenance, which do not render a non-sacred animal for which they are exchanged a substitute, taḥat is a term that indicates desacralization.

אָמַר רָבָא: אֲפִילּוּ בְּקׇדְשֵׁי מִזְבֵּחַ מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ לִישָּׁנָא דְּאַחוֹלֵי הוּא, כְּגוֹן שֶׁהָיָה הֶקְדֵּשׁ בַּעַל מוּם.

Rava said: Even with regard to animals consecrated for sacrifice upon the altar, which render a non-sacred animal for which they are exchanged a substitute, you can find that taḥat is a term that indicates desacralization. For example, in a case where a consecrated animal was blemished and can be desacralized because it is unfit to be sacrificed, and one placed that consecrated animal next to a non-sacred animal and said: This animal is in place of [taḥat] that animal. Although the blemished sacred animal can render a non-sacred animal for which it is exchanged consecrated as a substitute, in this context the term taḥat means desacralization.

אָמַר רַבִּי אָשֵׁי: אֲפִילּוּ בְּבַעַל מוּם נָמֵי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ לִישָּׁנָא דְּאַחוֹלֵי, וּמַשְׁכַּחַת לִישָּׁנָא דְּאַתְפּוֹסֵי. יָדוֹ אַקּוֹדֶשׁ — חוֹל הָוֵי, יָדוֹ אַחוֹל — קוֹדֶשׁ הָוֵי.

Rabbi Ashi said: Even in the case of a blemished animal, mentioned by Rava, sometimes you find that taḥat is a term that indicates desacralization and sometimes you find that taḥat is a term that indicates the associating of one sanctity with another. If the owner’s hand is resting on the consecrated animal and he says: This animal is in place of [taḥat] that animal, it is a term of desacralization, as the placement of his hand indicates that his intention is to desacralize the consecrated animal, with its sanctity transferred to that non-sacred animal. If the owner’s hand is resting on the non-sacred animal when he says: This animal is in place of that animal, then taḥat is a term of substitution, as the placement of his hand indicates that his intention is for the non-sacred animal to be consecrated with the same sanctity as the consecrated animal.

בָּעֵי אַבָּיֵי: הָיוּ לְפָנָיו שְׁתֵּי בְּהֵמוֹת שֶׁל קֹדֶשׁ בַּעֲלוֹת מוּם, וּשְׁתֵּי בְּהֵמוֹת שֶׁל חוּלִּין תְּמִימוֹת, וְאָמַר ״הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ תַּחַת אֵלּוּ״, מַהוּ?

Abaye raises a dilemma: If there were standing before him two sacrificial animals that were blemished and two non-sacred animals that were unblemished,and, without placing his hands on any animal, he says: These animals are hereby in place of [taḥat] those animals, what is the halakha?

מִי אָמַר לְאַתְפּוֹסֵי וְלָקֵי, אוֹ דִלְמָא: כֹּל הֵיכָא דְּאִיכָּא הֶיתֵּרָא — לָא שָׁבֵיק אִינִישׁ הֶיתֵּרָא וְעָבֵיד אִיסּוּרָא?

The Gemara explains the dilemma: Did he intend to say taḥat as association, i.e., to consecrate the two non-sacred animals as substitutes, and therefore he is flogged two sets of lashes for the two violations of the prohibition against consecrating an animal as a substitute? Or perhaps, does one say that since anywhere that there exists both a permitted and a prohibited manner to perform an action, a person does not cast aside the permitted manner and perform the prohibition? If so, here too his intention was to desacralize the two blemished animals, and therefore he is not flogged.

וְאִם תִּמְצֵי לוֹמַר, כֹּל הֵיכָא דְּאִיכָּא הֶיתֵּרָא לָא שָׁבֵיק אִינִישׁ וְעָבֵיד אִיסּוּרָא, הָיוּ לְפָנָיו שְׁתֵּי בְּהֵמוֹת שֶׁל קוֹדֶשׁ, וְאַחַת מֵהֶן בַּעֲלַת מוּם, וּשְׁתֵּי בְּהֵמוֹת שֶׁל חוּלִּין, וְאַחַת מֵהֶן בַּעֲלַת מוּם, וְאָמַר ״הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ תַּחַת אֵלּוּ״, מַהוּ?

And if you say that anywhere that there exists both a permitted and a prohibited manner to perform an action, a person does not cast aside the permitted manner and perform the prohibition, in a case where there were standing before him two sacrificial animals, one of which was blemished and one of which was unblemished, and two non-sacred animals, one of which was blemished and one of which was unblemished, and he said: These animals are hereby in place of [taḥat] those animals, what is the halakha? Although he certainly intended to transfer the sanctity of the unblemished sacrificial animal to a non-sacred animal by substitution, it is unclear which of the two non-sacred animals he intended to consecrate as a substitute.

מִי אָמַר: תְּמִימָה תַּחַת תְּמִימָה — לְאַתְפּוֹסֵי, בַּעֲלַת מוּם תַּחַת בַּעֲלַת מוּם — לְאַחוֹלֵי.

Once again, the Gemara explains the dilemma: Did he intend to say that the unblemished non-sacred animal should be consecrated as a substitute in place of the unblemished consecrated animal, and with regard to this pairing he intended to associate the sanctity by substitution, while the blemished non-sacred animal should be consecrated in place of the blemished consecrated animal, and for this pairing he intended to desacralize the consecrated animal. If so, he is flogged only for the first pairing and not for the second pairing.

אוֹ דִלְמָא, תְּמִימָה דְּחוּלִּין תַּחַת בַּעֲלַת מוּם דְּהֶקְדֵּשׁ, בַּעֲלַת מוּם דְּחוּלִּין תַּחַת תְּמִימָה דְּהֶקְדֵּשׁ, וְתַרְוַיְיהוּ לָקֵי?

Or perhaps, he intended that the unblemished non-sacred animal should be consecrated as a substitute in place of the blemished consecrated animal, and the blemished non-sacred animal should be consecrated as a substitute in place of the unblemished consecrated animal, and since he intended to perform substitution in both cases he is flogged for both pairings.

וְאִם תִּמְצֵי לוֹמַר, כֹּל הֵיכָא דְּאִיכָּא הֶיתֵּירָא — לָא עָבֵיד אִיסּוּרָא, וּלְאַחוֹלֵי הוּא, וְלָא לָקֵי. הָיוּ לְפָנָיו שָׁלֹשׁ בְּהֵמוֹת שֶׁל קֹדֶשׁ, וְאַחַת מֵהֶן בַּעֲלַת מוּם, וְשָׁלֹשׁ בְּהֵמוֹת שֶׁל חוּלִּין תְּמִימוֹת, וְאָמַר: ״הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ תַּחַת אֵלּוּ״.

And if you say that anywhere that there exists both a permitted and a prohibited manner to perform an action, one does not perform the prohibition, this would resolve the previous dilemma, as his intention must have been to desacralize the blemished consecrated animal, and therefore he is not flogged two sets of lashes, one can raise the following dilemma: In a case where there were three sacrificial animals before him, one of which was blemished while the other two were unblemished, and three non-sacred animals, all of which were unblemished, and he said: These animals are hereby in place of [taḥat] those animals, what is the halakha?

מִי אָמְרִינַן, מִדִּתְמִימוֹת תַּחַת תְּמִימוֹת לְאַתְפּוֹסֵי, תְּמִימוֹת נָמֵי תַּחַת בַּעֲלַת מוּם לְאַתְפּוֹסֵי? אוֹ דִלְמָא, הָכָא נָמֵי, כֹּל הֵיכָא דְּאִיכָּא הֶיתֵּירָא לָא עָבֵיד אִיסּוּרָא, וְהַהִיא בָּתְרָיְיתָא לְאַחוֹלֵי הָוֵי.

The Gemara explains the dilemma: Do we say that since he intended for the unblemished non-sacred animals to be consecrated as substitutes in place of the unblemished consecrated animals, i.e., to associate their sanctity, so too he intended to consecrate the unblemished non-sacred animal as a substitute in place of the blemished consecrated animal, i.e., to associate its sanctity, and he therefore is flogged three sets of lashes? Or perhaps, here too one applies the principle that anywhere that there exists both a permitted and a prohibited manner to perform an action, a person does not perform the prohibition. If so, his intention with regard to this latter blemished consecrated animal was to desacralize it, and therefore he is not flogged for transferring its sanctity to a substitute.

וְאִם תִּימְצֵי לוֹמַר, הָכָא נָמֵי, כֵּיוָן דְּאַכַּתִּי גַּבְרָא לָא אִיתַּחְזַק בְּאִיסּוּרֵי, לָא שָׁבֵיק הֶתֵּירָא וְעָבֵיד אִיסּוּרָא. בָּעֵי רַב אָשֵׁי: הָיוּ לְפָנָיו אַרְבַּע בְּהֵמוֹת שֶׁל קֹדֶשׁ וְאַחַת מֵהֶן בַּעֲלַת מוּם, וְאַרְבַּע בְּהֵמוֹת שֶׁל חוּלִּין, וְאָמַר ״הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ תַּחַת אֵלּוּ״, מַהוּ?

And if you say that here too, since this man has not yet been established as one who regularly transgresses a prohibition, until he has done so three times, therefore it is assumed that he does not cast aside the permitted manner and perform the prohibition, Rav Ashi therefore raises the following dilemma: If there were four sacrificial animals standing before him, one of which was blemished and the other three were unblemished, and four non-sacred animals, all of which were unblemished, and he said: These animals are hereby in place of [taḥat] those animals, what is the halakha?

הָכָא וַדַּאי, כֵּיוָן דְּאִיתַּחְזַק גַּבְרָא בְּאִיסּוּרֵי (בְּכוּלָּן), לָקֵי בְּאַרְבַּע מַלְקִיּוֹת.

Again, the Gemara clarifies the dilemma: Here, since it is certain that he intended for three unblemished non-sacred animals to be consecrated as substitutes in place of the three unblemished consecrated animals, this man has been established as one who regularly transgresses a prohibition. Therefore, it is assumed that he also intended for one of the unblemished non-sacred animals to be consecrated as a substitute in place of the blemished consecrated animal, which means he is liable to be flogged four sets of lashes for the four substitutions.

אוֹ דִלְמָא, אַף עַל גַּב דְּאִיתַּחְזַק בְּאִיסּוּרָא, לָא שָׁבֵיק אִינִישׁ הֶיתֵּירָא וְעָבֵיד אִיסּוּרָא, וְהָוֵי בָּתְרָיְיתָא לְאַחוֹלֵי הָוֵי? תֵּיקוּ.

Or perhaps, even though in this case he has been established as one who transgresses the prohibition, nevertheless even such a person does not cast aside the permitted manner and perform the prohibition. And if so, his intention with regard to this latter blemished animal was to desacralize it. The Gemara concludes that all of these dilemmas shall stand unresolved.

אִם הָיָה הֶקְדֵּשׁ בַּעַל מוּם יֹצֵא לְחוּלִּין כּוּ׳.

§ The mishna teaches: If the consecrated animal was blemished, and he said: This consecrated animal is desacralized, with its sanctity transferred to that non-sacred animal, the consecrated animal is desacralized. The owner is required to conduct an appraisal to ascertain the relative value of the two animals, and if the consecrated animal was worth more than the non-sacred animal, he must pay the difference to the Temple treasury.

אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: יֹצֵא לְחוּלִּין דְּבַר תּוֹרָה, וְצָרִיךְ לַעֲשׂוֹת דָּמִים מִדִּבְרֵיהֶם, וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: אַף צָרִיךְ לַעֲשׂוֹת דָּמִים דְּבַר תּוֹרָה.

Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The consecrated animal is desacralized by Torah law even if the consecrated animal was worth one hundred dinars and the non-sacred animal was worth only one peruta. But by rabbinic law, the owner is required to conduct an appraisal to ascertain the relative value of the two animals and to pay the difference to the Temple treasury, so that the Temple treasury not suffer a loss. And Reish Lakish says: Even the requirement to conduct an appraisal, to ascertain the relative value of the two animals and to pay the difference to the Temple treasury, applies by Torah law.

בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? אִי נֵימָא אַאוֹנָאָה, בְּהָא נֵימָא רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אַף צָרִיךְ לַעֲשׂוֹת דָּמִים דְּבַר תּוֹרָה?

What are we dealing with here, i.e., what is the case that is subject to the disagreement between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish? If we say that they disagree in a case where the difference in value between the two animals was exactly one-sixth, which is the difference in value that constitutes exploitation by Torah law, and the halakha is that such a transaction is valid but one must return the difference in value, would Reish Lakish say that even in such a case the requirement to conduct an appraisal to ascertain the relative value of the two animals applies by Torah law?

וְהָא תְנַן: אֵלּוּ דְּבָרִים שֶׁאֵין לָהֶם אוֹנָאָה: הָעֲבָדִים, וְהַשְּׁטָרוֹת, וְהַקַּרְקָעוֹת, וְהַהֶקְדֵּשׁוֹת!

But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Bava Metzia 56a): These are matters that, even if the disparity between the value and the payment is one-sixth, are not subject to the halakhot of exploitation: Slaves, documents, lands, and consecrated property.Since consecrated property is not subject to the halakhot of exploitation, why would Reish Lakish say that one must repay the difference in value between the two animals to the Temple treasury by Torah law?

אֶלָּא, אַבִּטּוּל מִקָּח בְּהָא נֵימָא רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן צָרִיךְ לַעֲשׂוֹת דָּמִים מִדִּבְרֵיהֶם?

Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish disagree with regard to a case of nullification of a transaction, i.e., where the difference in value between the two animals was greater than one-sixth. Would Rabbi Yoḥanan say in such a case that one is required to conduct an appraisal to ascertain the relative value of the two animals by rabbinic law?

וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה אַקַּרְקָעוֹת דְּחוּלִּין, וְרַבִּי יוֹנָה אָמַר אַהֶקְדֵּשׁוֹת, תַּרְוַויְיהוּ מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמְרִי: אוֹנָאָה אֵין לָהֶן, בִּיטּוּל מִקָּח יֵשׁ לָהֶם!

But didn’t Rabbi Yirmeya say this ruling with regard to non-sacred lands, and Rabbi Yona said it with regard to consecrated property, and both of them said it in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: They are not subject to the halakhot of exploitation, in the case of a disparity of one-sixth. But they are subject to nullification of a transaction, in the case of a greater disparity. If so, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yona, Rabbi Yoḥanan maintains that when the disparity between the value and the payment is greater than one-sixth, the transaction is nullified by Torah law. But in that case, why would Rabbi Yoḥanan rule here that only by rabbinic law is he required to calculate the difference and pay its value?

לְעוֹלָם אַבִּיטּוּל מִקָּח, וְאֵיפוֹךְ.

The Gemara answers: Actually, they disagree in a case of nullification of a transaction, i.e., more than one-sixth, and one should reverse attribution of the opinions; the opinion previously attributed to Rabbi Yoḥanan is actually that of Reish Lakish, and the opinion attributed to Reish Lakish is the ruling of Rabbi Yoḥanan.

וּמִי מָצֵית אָמְרַתְּ אֵיפוֹךְ? הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר אַהֶקְדֵּשׁוֹת, וְכׇל שֶׁכֵּן אַקַּרְקָעוֹת.

The Gemara asks: But how can you say that one should reverse the attribution of the opinions of Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish? This works out well according to the one who says that Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that consecrated property is not subject to the halakhot of exploitation if the disparity between the value and the payment is one-sixth, but it is subject to nullification of the transaction if the disparity between the value and the payment is greater than one-sixth. According to this opinion, that of Rabbi Yona, it is apparent all the more so that lands are subject to nullification if the disparity is greater than one-sixth.

אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר אַקַּרְקָעוֹת, אֲבָל הֶקְדֵּשׁוֹת אֵין לָהֶן בִּיטּוּל מִקָּח, הֵיכִי אֵיפוֹךְ לְהָא?

But according to the one who said that Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that only lands are subject to nullification if the disparity is greater than one-sixth, but with regard to consecrated property there is no nullification of a transaction, i.e., Rabbi Yirmeya, how can he reverse attribution of that opinion, and claim that Rabbi Yoḥanan maintains that he is required to pay the difference in value by Torah law?

אָמַר רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה: לָא תֵּיפוֹךְ.

Rabbi Yirmeya said: According to my opinion, do not reverse attribution of the opinions of Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish. In other words, Rabbi Yoḥanan maintains that he is required to pay the difference in value by rabbinic law. This is consistent with Rabbi Yirmeya’s ruling that Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that there is no nullification of a transaction in the case of consecrated property. Only Rabbi Yona would reverse attribution of the opinions of Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish in order for Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion to be consistent with his statement, as cited by Rabbi Yona, that there is nullification of a transaction in the case of consecrated property.

לֵימָא בְּדִשְׁמוּאֵל קָא מִיפַּלְגִי, דְּאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הֶקְדֵּשׁ שָׁוֶה מָנֶה שֶׁחִילְּלוֹ עַל שָׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה מְחוּלָּל. דְּרַבִּי יוֹנָה לֵית לֵיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל, וְרַבִּי יִרְמְיָה אִית לֵיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל.

It has been established that Rabbi Yona maintains that according to Rabbi Yoḥanan consecrated property is subject to nullification of a transaction, whereas Rabbi Yirmeya disputes that claim. The Gemara suggests: Shall we say that they disagree with regard to a statement of Shmuel, as Shmuel said: Consecrated property worth one hundred dinars [maneh] that one desacralized, with its sanctity transferred to a coin worth one peruta, is desacralized. Since consecrated property is not subject to nullification of a transaction, it is desacralized by coins worth any sum. The suggestion is that Rabbi Yona is not of the opinion that the halakha follows the ruling of Shmuel, and Rabbi Yirmeya is of the opinion that the halakha follows the ruling of Shmuel.

לָא, בֵּין דְּמָר וּבֵין דְּמָר — אִית לֵיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל, דְּרַבִּי יוֹנָה סָבַר: כִּי אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל — דִּיעֲבַד, אֲבָל לְכַתְּחִלָּה לָא אָמַר, וְרַבִּי יִרְמְיָה סָבַר: אֲפִילּוּ לְכַתְּחִלָּה.

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No; both this Sage and that Sage are of the opinion that the halakha follows the ruling of Shmuel. The difference between them is that Rabbi Yona maintains that when Shmuel stated his halakha, he was referring to consecrated property that one desacralized after the fact, but he did not say that one may do so ab initio; and Rabbi Yirmeya maintains that Shmuel rules that it is permitted to desacralize consecrated property with coins worth any sum, even ab initio.

וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא, לְעוֹלָם לָא תֵּיפוֹךְ, וּדְקָא קַשְׁיָא לָךְ מַתְנִיתִין ״אֵלּוּ דְּבָרִים… הֶקְדֵּשׁוֹת״ — כִּדְרַב חִסְדָּא.

If you wish, say instead, with regard to the dispute between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yoḥanan: Actually, do not reverse the attribution of their respective opinions. In fact, they disagree with regard to a disparity of one-sixth, and Reish Lakish holds that one is required to pay the difference value by Torah law. And as for that which poses a difficulty for you with regard to the opinion of Reish Lakish, that it is taught in the mishna: These are matters that are not subject to the halakhot of exploitation: Slaves, documents, lands, and consecrated property, which indicates that one is required to pay the difference in value by rabbinic law, that mishna should be understood in accordance with the explanation of Rav Ḥisda.

דְּאָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: אֵין לָהֶן אוֹנָאָה — אֵינָן בְּתוֹרַת אוֹנָאָה, דַּאֲפִילּוּ פָּחוֹת מִכְּדֵי אוֹנָאָה חוֹזֵר.

As Rav Ḥisda said: What is the meaning of the phrase: Are not subject to the halakhot of exploitation? This means that they are not subject to the standard principles of exploitation at all; rather, more stringent halakhot apply in these cases. As, even if the disparity is less than the measure of exploitation, i.e., less than one-sixth, one may renege on the transaction, and in the case of consecrated property he is required to pay the value of the disparity.

אָמַר עוּלָּא: לָא אָמְרוּ אֶלָּא בְּשָׁמוּי בִּתְרֵי, אֲבָל בְּשָׁמוּי בִּתְלָתָא, וְאַף עַל גַּב דְּאָתֵי בְּמֵאָה — לָא הָדַר.

§ With regard to a case in which there was a disparity between the assessed value of property and its actual value, where one must pay the difference to the Temple treasury, Ulla said: The Sages said that one must pay the value of the disparity to the Temple treasury only if the value of the consecrated property was initially assessed by only two people and afterward three other people determined that the consecrated property was worth more. But in a case where the value of the consecrated property was initially assessed by three people, as required by halakha, and that amount was paid to the Temple treasury, even if afterward one hundred people came and assessed the value of the consecrated property at a higher value, one need not return the disparity of value to the Temple treasury.

אִינִי? וְהָאָמַר רַב סָפְרָא: הֵיכָא אָמְרִינַן מְאָה כִּתְרֵי וּתְרֵי כִּמְאָה? לְעִנְיַן עֵדוּת, אֲבָל לְעִנְיַן אוּמְדָּנָא — בָּתַר דֵּעוֹת אָזְלִינַן.

The Gemara asks: Is that so? But didn’t Rav Safra say: Where did one say the ruling that one hundred witnesses are like two witnesses, and two witnesses are like one hundred witnesses? That principle applies specifically to the matter of testimony. But with regard to the matter of assessments, we follow the majority of opinions. If so, in Ulla’s case, one should follow the assessment of the one hundred and pay the disparity to the Temple treasury.

וְתוּ תְּלָתָא וּתְלָתָא, לָא אָזְלִינַן בָּתַר בָּתְרָא? דְּיַד הֶקְדֵּשׁ עַל הָעֶלְיוֹנָה!

And furthermore, even in a case where three people initially assessed the value of the consecrated property, and afterward three other people assessed the consecrated property at a higher value, don’t we follow the latter assessment? Isn’t there is a principle that the Temple treasury of consecrated property always has the advantage?

קָסָבַר עוּלָּא: צָרִיךְ לַעֲשׂוֹת דָּמִים מִדִּבְרֵיהֶם, וְכֹל דְּרַבָּנַן אַקִּילוּ בֵּהּ רַבָּנַן.

The Gemara answers: Ulla holds that the halakha that the owner is required to conduct an appraisal, to ascertain the relative value of the two animals and to pay the difference to the Temple treasury, applies by rabbinic law, not by Torah law, and the Sages were lenient with regard to all rabbinic laws. Therefore, even if one hundred people assessed the value of the consecrated property at a higher value than the earlier assessment, one is not required to pay the disparity in value to the Temple treasury.

מַתְנִי׳ ״הֲרֵי זוֹ תַּחַת עוֹלָה״, ״תַּחַת חַטָּאת״ — לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם. ״תַּחַת חַטָּאת זוֹ״, וְ״תַחַת עוֹלָה זוֹ״, ״תַּחַת חַטָּאת וְתַחַת עוֹלָה שֶׁיֵּשׁ לִי בַּבַּיִת״ — הָיָה לוֹ, דְּבָרָיו קַיָּימִים.

MISHNA: If one said: This non-sacred animal is hereby in place of a burnt offering, or: It is in place of a sin offering, he has said nothing, as he did not say that it was in place of a specific offering. If he said: It is in place of this sin offering, or: It is in place of this burnt offering, or if he said: It is in place of a sin offering that I have in the house, or: It is in place of a burnt offering that I have in the house, and he had that offering in his house, his statement stands, i.e., is effective.

אָמַר עַל הַבְּהֵמָה טְמֵאָה וְעַל בַּעֲלַת מוּם ״הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ עוֹלָה״ — לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם. ״הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ לְעוֹלָה״ — יִמָּכְרוּ, וְיָבִיא בִּדְמֵיהֶם עוֹלָה.

If he said with regard to a non-kosher animal and with regard to a blemished animal: These animals are hereby designated as a burnt offering, he has said nothing. If he said: These animals are hereby designated for a burnt offering, the animals should be sold, and he brings a burnt offering purchased with the money received from their sale.

גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: מַתְנִיתִין דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר, דְּאִי כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר — הָא אֵין אָדָם מוֹצִיא דְּבָרָיו לְבַטָּלָה.

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that if one said: This non-sacred animal is hereby in place of a burnt offering, he has said nothing. Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, as, if it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, didn’t Rabbi Meir say: A person does not utter a statement for naught. In other words, if one issues a statement that cannot be fulfilled as stated, it is interpreted in a manner that renders it relevant. Consequently, when he said: This non-sacred animal is in place of a burnt offering, he must have been referring to a burnt offering that he had in his house.

״הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ לְעוֹלָה״ — יִמָּכְרוּ וְיָבִיא בִּדְמֵיהֶן עוֹלָה. טַעְמָא דִּבְהֵמָה טְמֵאָה וּבַעֲלַת מוּם, דְּלָא חַזְיָין — לָא בָּעֲיָין מוּמָא, אֲבָל מַפְרִישׁ נְקֵבָה לְאָשָׁם אוֹ לְעוֹלָה — בָּעֲיָין מוּמָא.

§ The mishna teaches: If he said with regard to a non-kosher animal and with regard to a blemished animal: These animals are hereby designated for a burnt offering, the animals should be sold, and he brings a burnt offering purchased with the money received from their sale. The Gemara infers: The reason that these animals are sold is that they are non-kosher and blemished animals, which are not fit to be sacrificed, and therefore they do not require the development of a blemish for them to be sold. But in the case of one who separates a female animal for a guilt offering or for a burnt offering, which may be brought only from males, since a female animal is fit to be sacrificed as a different type of offering, the animal does require the development of a blemish for it to be sold.

אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה, אָמַר רַב: מַתְנִיתִין דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, דִּתְנַן, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: תִּימָּכֵר שֶׁלֹּא בְּמוּם.

Consequently, Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, as we learned in a mishna (19b) that Rabbi Shimon says: In the case of one who designates a female animal for a guilt offering, since a female is unfit to be sacrificed as that offering, its halakhic status is like that of a blemished animal in the sense that it does not become inherently sacred; rather, only its value is sacred. Therefore, it may be sold without it having developed a blemish, and a guilt offering is purchased with the money received from its sale.

הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ כֵּיצַד מַעֲרִימִין.