יבמות קיח

יבמות קיח

אִשָּׁה אוֹמֶרֶת: ״מֵת״, וְאִשָּׁה אוֹמֶרֶת: ״לֹא מֵת״ — הֲרֵי זוֹ לֹא תִּנָּשֵׂא.

or one woman says: He died, and another woman says: He did not die, this woman may not marry.

גְּמָ׳ טַעְמָא דְּאָמְרָה ״לֹא מֵת״, הָא אִישְׁתִּיקָא — תִּנָּשֵׂא? הָא אֵין צָרָה מְעִידָה לַחֲבֶרְתָּהּ!

GEMARA: The mishna taught that if one rival wife says their husband died, while the second maintains that he did not die, the one who says he did not die may not remarry. The Gemara infers: The reason is that the second rival wife said explicitly: He did not die, from which it may be inferred that if she was silent and said nothing, she is permitted to marry based on the testimony of the first. However, this conclusion is problematic, as there is a principle that one rival wife may not testify on behalf of another, and if so, how can she rely on the testimony of her rival wife?

״לֹא מֵת״ אִיצְטְרִיכָא לֵיהּ, סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: הָא מָיֵית, וְהָא דְּקָאָמְרָה ״לֹא מֵת״ — לְקַלְקוֹלַהּ לְצָרָה הִיא דְּקָמִיכַּוְּונָא, וְ״תָמוֹת נַפְשָׁהּ עִם פְּלִשְׁתִּים״ קָאָמְרָה, קָמַשְׁמַע לַן.

The Gemara answers that this inference is incorrect, as it was necessary for the mishna to state: He did not die, as it might enter your mind to say that this man did in fact die, and with regard to that which she says: He did not die, she intends to ruin her rival wife. And as for herself she says: Let her die with the Philistines. This is a paraphrase of the verse: “Let me die with the Philistines” (Judges 16:30), which is a shorthand expression for one’s desire to hurt his enemies even if he suffers the same fate himself. In this case it means that she is prepared to testify falsely that their husband did not die, so as to ruin her rival wife. Therefore the mishna teaches us that this is not the case, and she is not permitted to marry based on the testimony of her rival wife.

אַחַת אוֹמֶרֶת מֵת כּוּ׳. וְלִיפְלוֹג רַבִּי מֵאִיר בְּרֵישָׁא! אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: בְּמַחְלוֹקֶת שְׁנוּיָה, וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הִיא. וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבִּי מֵאִיר, בְּהָא אֲפִילּוּ רַבִּי מֵאִיר מוֹדֶה דְּכֹל ״לֹא מֵת״ בְּעֵדוּת אִשָּׁה לָאו הַכְחָשָׁה הִיא.

§ The mishna taught that if one wife says: He died, and one says: He was killed, Rabbi Meir says that as they contradict one another, they may not remarry. The Gemara asks: And let Rabbi Meir also disagree in the first clause, when one witness says the husband died and the other claims he did not die. Rabbi Elazar said: This is taught as a tannaitic dispute. In other words, Rabbi Meir also disagreed with the first clause, and the unattributed opinion in the mishna is that of Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: You can even say that the first clause is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, as in this case even Rabbi Meir concedes that any claim of: He did not die, with regard to testimony enabling a woman to remarry, is not considered contradictory.

תְּנַן: עֵד אוֹמֵר ״מֵת״, וְעֵד אוֹמֵר ״לֹא מֵת״, אִשָּׁה אוֹמֶרֶת ״מֵת״ וְאִשָּׁה אוֹמֶרֶת ״לֹא מֵת״ — הֲרֵי זוֹ לֹא תִּנָּשֵׂא. בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר — סְתָמָא כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר, אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן קַשְׁיָא! קַשְׁיָא.

The Gemara raises a difficulty with regard to this answer. We learned in the mishna: If one witness says: He died, and one witness says: He did not die, or if one woman says: He died, and another woman says: He did not die, she may not marry. Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, the unattributed statement in this mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, that when a rebuttal contradicts the original testimony, one cannot rely upon the testimony that the husband died. However, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, this is difficult. The Gemara answers: Yes, this is difficult.

מַתְנִי׳ הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁהָלְכָה הִיא וּבַעְלָהּ לִמְדִינַת הַיָּם, וּבָאָה וְאָמְרָה ״מֵת בַּעְלִי״ — תִּנָּשֵׂא וְתִטּוֹל כְּתוּבָּתָהּ, וְצָרָתָהּ אֲסוּרָה. הָיְתָה בַּת יִשְׂרָאֵל לְכֹהֵן — תֹּאכַל בִּתְרוּמָה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן.

MISHNA: In the case of a woman who went, she and her husband, overseas, and she comes and says: My husband died, she may marry, and she takes her marriage contract based on her own testimony. And it remains prohibited for her rival wife to remarry, as a woman cannot testify on behalf of her rival wife. If the rival wife was an Israelite woman married to a priest, she may continue to partake of teruma, as she is not permitted to remarry, and therefore the presumption that the husband is still alive is maintained in relation to her. This is the statement of Rabbi Tarfon.

רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: אֵין זוֹ דֶּרֶךְ מוֹצִיאָתוֹ מִידֵי עֲבֵירָה, עַד שֶׁתְּהֵא אֲסוּרָה לִינָּשֵׂא, וַאֲסוּרָה מִלֶּאֱכוֹל בִּתְרוּמָה.

Rabbi Akiva says: This is not the way to spare someone from transgression. According to the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon, there is a concern that she might be eating teruma unlawfully. There is no remedy for this situation unless it is prohibited for the rival wife to marry, as she cannot rely on the testimony of her rival wife, and it is also prohibited for her to partake of teruma, lest the other woman was speaking the truth. In other words, the halakha is stringent on both counts.

אָמְרָה: ״מֵת (לִי) בַּעְלִי, וְאַחַר כָּךְ מֵת חָמִי״ — תִּנָּשֵׂא וְתִטּוֹל כְּתוּבָּתָהּ, וַחֲמוֹתָהּ אֲסוּרָה. הָיְתָה בַּת יִשְׂרָאֵל לְכֹהֵן — תֹּאכַל בִּתְרוּמָה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: אֵין זוֹ דֶּרֶךְ מוֹצִיאָ[תָ]הּ מִידֵי עֲבֵירָה, עַד שֶׁתְּהֵא אֲסוּרָה לִינָּשֵׂא וַאֲסוּרָה מִלֶּאֱכוֹל בִּתְרוּמָה.

The mishna discusses a similar case. If a woman said: My husband died and afterward my father-in-law died, she may marry and take her marriage contract, and it is prohibited for her mother-in-law to remarry, as a woman may not testify on behalf of her mother-in-law. If the mother-in-law was the daughter of an Israelite married to a priest, she may partake of teruma; this is the statement of Rabbi Tarfon. Rabbi Akiva says: This is not the way to spare her from transgression; there is no remedy unless it is prohibited for the mother-in-law to marry and also prohibited for her to partake of teruma.

גְּמָ׳ וּצְרִיכָא, דְּאִי אִיתְּמַר הָךְ קַמַּיְיתָא — בְּהָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן, מִשּׁוּם דְּצַעְרָא דְּגוּפַהּ. אֲבָל חֲמוֹת, דְּצַעְרָא מִילֵּי דְּעָלְמָא — אֵימָא מוֹדֵי לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא.

GEMARA: The mishna states the dispute between Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva with regard to two apparently identical cases. The Gemara explains: And it is necessary to state both of these examples. As, had the mishna stated the dispute only in this first case, I would have said: It is in this case that Rabbi Tarfon said the wife is suspected of lying, because the suffering is physical, i.e., she is jealous of her rival wife, with whom she shares her husband. However, with regard to her mother-in-law, where the suffering is merely verbal and not physical, one might say that he concedes to Rabbi Akiva, i.e., that she is not considered a liar, and therefore it should be prohibited for her mother-in-law to partake in teruma.

וְאִי אִיתְּמַר בְּהָא — בְּהָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, אֲבָל בְּהָךְ — אֵימָא מוֹדֶה לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי טַרְפוֹן, צְרִיכָא.

And vice-versa: Had the mishna stated the dispute only in this second case, I would have said: It is in this case that Rabbi Akiva said that the mother-in-law must refrain from eating teruma in case the daughter-in-law is not lying, but in this other case of the rival wife, you might say that he concedes to Rabbi Tarfon that she may eat teruma, as a rival wife is certainly not telling the truth. Therefore, it is necessary for the mishna to state the dispute in both two cases.

אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי טַרְפוֹן. אָמַר אַבָּיֵי, אַף אֲנַן נָמֵי תְּנֵינָא: ״נִיתַּן לִי בֵּן בִּמְדִינַת הַיָּם. מֵת בְּנִי, וְאַחַר כָּךְ בַּעְלִי״ — נֶאֱמֶנֶת. ״בַּעְלִי, וְאַחַר כָּךְ בְּנִי״ — אֵינָהּ נֶאֱמֶנֶת.

§ Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon. The testimony of a woman who is suspected of harboring ill will toward another is entirely rejected with regard to that other person, and no credence is given to her account at all. Abaye said: Likewise, we, too, learn in a mishna (118b): If a woman came and said: A son was born to me overseas, and my son died and afterward my husband died, she is deemed credible in all regards, and she enters into levirate marriage. If she said: My husband died and afterward my son died, which means she is exempt from levirate marriage, she is not deemed credible.

וְחוֹשְׁשִׁין לִדְבָרֶיהָ, וְחוֹלֶצֶת וְלֹא מִתְיַיבֶּמֶת. לִדְבָרֶיהָ הוּא דְּחוֹשְׁשִׁין, הָא לְדִבְרֵי צָרָה — אֵין חוֹשְׁשִׁין. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.

That mishna adds: But in any case, the court is concerned about her statement, and she must perform ḥalitza and she does not enter into levirate marriage. In other words, the court takes into consideration the possibility that she is speaking the truth, and if her son did die after her husband it is prohibited for her to enter into levirate marriage. Abaye infers from the language of the mishna on 118b: It is with regard to her own statement that the court is concerned. This indicates that the court is not concerned at all about the statement of her rival wife who testified with regard to her. The Gemara concludes: Learn from here that this is the case.

מַתְנִי׳ קִידֵּשׁ אַחַת מֵחָמֵשׁ נָשִׁים, וְאֵין יוֹדֵעַ אֵי זוֹ קִידֵּשׁ, כׇּל אַחַת אוֹמֶרֶת: ״אוֹתִי קִידֵּשׁ״ — נוֹתֵן גֵּט לְכׇל אַחַת וְאַחַת, וּמַנִּיחַ כְּתוּבָּה בֵּינֵיהֶן, וּמִסְתַּלֵּק, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן.

MISHNA: In relation to the dispute between Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva in the previous mishna, in which Rabbi Akiva states that one must avoid a possible transgression, the mishna cites two similar cases involving other topics. With regard to one who betrothed one of five women, and he does not know which of them he betrothed, and each one of them says: He betrothed me, if he does not want to marry any of them he gives a bill of divorce to each and every one of them so none will have the status of a woman with regard to whom there is uncertainty whether she is divorced. And he leaves the marriage contract among them and departs. The marriage contract remains in dispute between the women until they clarify which of them is entitled to the money. This is the statement of Rabbi Tarfon.

רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: אֵין זוֹ דֶּרֶךְ מוֹצִיא מִידֵי עֲבֵירָה, עַד שֶׁיִּתֵּן גֵּט וּכְתוּבָּה לְכׇל אַחַת וְאַחַת. גָּזַל אֶחָד מֵחֲמִשָּׁה וְאֵין יוֹדֵעַ מֵאֵיזֶה גָּזַל, כׇּל אֶחָד אוֹמֵר ״אוֹתִי גָּזַל״ — מַנִּיחַ גְּזֵילָה בֵּינֵיהֶן וּמִסְתַּלֵּק, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: אֵין זוֹ דֶּרֶךְ מוֹצִיא מִידֵי עֲבֵירָה, עַד שֶׁיְּשַׁלֵּם לְכׇל אֶחָד וְאֶחָד.

Rabbi Akiva says: This is not the way to spare someone from transgression, as perhaps the woman he actually betrothed will not receive the money to which she is entitled. There is no remedy unless he gives a bill of divorce and a marriage contract payment to each and every one. And likewise, in the case of one who stole money from one of five people and does not know from which of them he stole, and each one says: He stole from me, he leaves the stolen money among them and departs, and they will decide among themselves how to distribute the money; this is the statement of Rabbi Tarfon. Rabbi Akiva says: This is not the way to spare him from transgression; there is no remedy unless he pays each and every one of them.

גְּמָ׳ ״קִידֵּשׁ״ — קָתָנֵי, ״בָּעַל״ — לָא קָתָנֵי. ״גָּזַל״ — קָתָנֵי, ״לָקַח״ — לָא קָתָנֵי. מַנִּי מַתְנִיתִין? לָא תַּנָּא קַמָּא וְלָא רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר!

GEMARA: The Gemara infers: It is taught in the mishna that he betrothed one of five women, whereas it is not taught that he had sexual intercourse with one of five women, as a different ruling applies in this case. Similarly, with regard to the second case, it is taught that he stole from one of five people, and it is not taught that he purchased an item from one of five people. If so, whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? It is not in accordance with the opinion of the first tanna and it is also not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar.

דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר: לֹא נֶחְלְקוּ רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא עַל שֶׁקִּידֵּשׁ אַחַת מֵחָמֵשׁ נָשִׁים וְאֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ אֵיזוֹ קִידֵּשׁ, שֶׁמַּנִּיחַ כְּתוּבָּה בֵּינֵיהֶן וּמִסְתַּלֵּק. עַל מָה נֶחְלְקוּ — עַל שֶׁבָּעַל. רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן אוֹמֵר: מַנִּיחַ כְּתוּבָּה בֵּינֵיהֶן וּמִסְתַּלֵּק, רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: עַד שֶׁיְּשַׁלֵּם לְכׇל אַחַת וְאַחַת.

The Gemara elaborates. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva did not dispute the case of a man who betrothed one of five women and he does not know which of them he betrothed, as everyone agrees in this case that he leaves the money of the marriage contract among them and departs. With regard to what did they disagree? With regard to the case of one who had sexual intercourse with one of them for the purpose of betrothal. Rabbi Tarfon says: He leaves the money among them and departs, while Rabbi Akiva says: He does not fulfill his obligation unless he pays each and every one of them. Since he married in an inappropriate manner, the Sages penalized him by compelling him to pay all the women.

לֹא נֶחְלְקוּ רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא עַל שֶׁלָּקַח מִקָּח מֵחֲמִשָּׁה בְּנֵי אָדָם וְאֵין יוֹדֵעַ מֵאֵיזֶה מֵהֶן לָקַח — שֶׁמַּנִּיחַ דְּמֵי מִקָּח בֵּינֵיהֶן וּמִסְתַּלֵּק. לֹא נֶחְלְקוּ אֶלָּא שֶׁגָּזַל מֵחֲמִשָּׁה, שֶׁאָמַר רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן: מַנִּיחַ גְּזֵילָה בֵּינֵיהֶם וּמִסְתַּלֵּק, וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: עַד שֶׁיְּשַׁלֵּם גְּזֵילָה לְכׇל אֶחָד וְאֶחָד.

Likewise, Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva did not dispute the case of one who purchased an item from one of five people and he does not know from which of them he purchased it. Everyone agrees in this case that he leaves the price of the purchase among them and departs. They disagree only with regard to one who stole from five people, as Rabbi Tarfon says: He leaves the stolen money among them and departs, and Rabbi Akiva says: He does not fulfill his obligation unless he pays the stolen money to each and every one of them. In this case, as he committed a transgression, he must ensure that the stolen money is restored to its proper owner.

מִדְּקָאָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר בְּ״קִידֵּשׁ״ וְ״לָקַח״ לָא פְּלִיגִי, מִכְּלָל דְּתַנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר פְּלִיגִי. מַנִּי?

The Gemara states: From the fact that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar said that Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva do not disagree with regard to the cases of one who betrothed and one who purchased, one may learn by inference that the first tanna, with whom he disagrees, holds that they do disagree about the cases of betrothed and purchased, whereas with regard to one who had sexual intercourse and one who stole an item Rabbi Tarfon agrees with Rabbi Akiva. With this in mind, who is the author of the mishna?

אִי תַּנָּא קַמָּא — לִיתְנֵי ״קִידֵּשׁ״ וְ״לָקַח״. אִי רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר — לִיתְנֵי ״בָּעַל״ וְ״גָזַל״.

The Gemara elaborates: If the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the first tanna, let it teach the cases of betrothed and also purchased, but not that of one who stole or one who had intercourse, as the first tanna maintains that Rabbi Tarfon agrees with Rabbi Akiva in those cases. If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, let it teach the cases of one who had sexual relations and that of one who stole. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar holds that Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva disagree in the case of one who had sexual relations, not in the case of a man who betrothed one of five women. Likewise, he maintains that they disagree in the case of one who stole from five people, not one who purchased an item from five people.

לְעוֹלָם רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר, וּמַאי ״קִידֵּשׁ״ — קִידֵּשׁ בְּבִיאָה. תְּנָא ״קִידֵּשׁ״, לְהוֹדִיעֲךָ כֹּחוֹ דְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא,

The Gemara answers: Actually, the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, and what is the meaning of the term: Betrothed? It means that he betrothed one of the women by means of sexual intercourse. And the mishna taught the term betrothed to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the stringent opinion of Rabbi Akiva.

דְּאַף עַל גַּב דְּאִיסּוּרָא דְּרַבָּנַן עֲבַד, קָנֵיס! תְּנָא ״גָּזַל״, לְהוֹדִיעֲךָ כֹּחוֹ דְּרַבִּי טַרְפוֹן, דְּאַף עַל גַּב דְּאִיסּוּרָא דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא עֲבַד, לָא קָנֵיס.

The Gemara explains: As, although this man performed an act that violated a prohibition that applies by rabbinic law, i.e., he did not have licentious sexual relations with her but rather engaged in intercourse for the purpose of betrothal, which is in violation of a rabbinic prohibition that one may not betroth a woman by sexual intercourse ab initio, even so Rabbi Akiva penalizes him. And the mishna taught the case of one who stole so as to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the lenient opinion of Rabbi Tarfon, as although he performed an act that violated a prohibition that applies by Torah law, nevertheless he does not penalize him even in this case.

מַתְנִי׳ הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁהָלְכָה הִיא וּבַעְלָהּ לִמְדִינַת הַיָּם וּבְנָהּ עִמָּהֶם, וּבָאת וְאָמְרָה: ״מֵת בַּעְלִי וְאַחַר כָּךְ מֵת בְּנִי״ — נֶאֱמֶנֶת. מֵת בְּנִי וְאַחַר כָּךְ מֵת בַּעְלִי״ — אֵינָהּ נֶאֱמֶנֶת. וְחוֹשְׁשִׁין לִדְבָרֶיהָ, וְחוֹלֶצֶת וְלֹא מִתְיַיבֶּמֶת.

MISHNA: In the case of a woman who went, she and her husband, overseas, and her son was with them, and later she came back and said: My husband died and afterward my son died, she is deemed credible. It is permitted for her to remarry, and she is exempt from levirate marriage. The reason is that she had children when she left, and therefore she retains her presumptive status of one who is exempt from levirate marriage. However, if she said: My son died and afterward my husband died, she is not deemed credible, i.e., she may not enter into levirate marriage. And yet we are concerned and give some credence to her statement, in case she was actually widowed by a childless husband, and therefore she performs ḥalitza to exempt her from the levirate bond with her yavam, and she does not enter into levirate marriage.

״נִיתַּן לִי בֵּן בִּמְדִינַת הַיָּם״, וְאָמְרָה: ״מֵת בְּנִי, וְאַחַר כָּךְ מֵת בַּעְלִי״ — נֶאֱמֶנֶת. ״מֵת בַּעְלִי, וְאַחַר כָּךְ מֵת בְּנִי״ — אֵינָהּ נֶאֱמֶנֶת. וְחוֹשְׁשִׁין לִדְבָרֶיהָ, וְחוֹלֶצֶת וְלֹא מִתְיַיבֶּמֶת.

If she went with her childless husband and returned alone and testified: A son was born to me overseas, and she further said: My son died and afterward my husband died, she is deemed credible and may even enter into levirate marriage, as she was presumed to be childless when she left and consequently she retains that presumptive status. However, if she said: My husband died and afterward my son died, she is not deemed credible for the purpose of exempting her from levirate marriage, but the court is concerned about her statement. And therefore she must perform ḥalitza and she does not enter into levirate marriage.

״נִיתַּן לִי יָבָם בִּמְדִינַת הַיָּם״, אָמְרָה: ״מֵת בַּעְלִי וְאַחַר כָּךְ מֵת יְבָמִי״, ״יְבָמִי וְאַחַר כָּךְ בַּעְלִי״ — נֶאֱמֶנֶת.

If she said: A yavam was born for me overseas, i.e., when the family left the country her husband did not have a brother, and she claims that in the meantime a brother was born to her husband, and she also said: My husband died and afterward my yavam died, or: My yavam died and afterward my husband died, in either case she is deemed credible. This is because when she left she was not presumed to require levirate marriage, and the suggestion that her husband now has a brother is based solely on her testimony.

הָלְכָה הִיא וּבַעְלָהּ וִיבָמָהּ לִמְדִינַת הַיָּם, אָמְרָה: ״מֵת בַּעְלִי, וְאַחַר כָּךְ יְבָמִי״, ״יְבָמִי, וְאַחַר כָּךְ בַּעְלִי״ — אֵינָהּ נֶאֱמֶנֶת, שֶׁאֵין הָאִשָּׁה נֶאֱמֶנֶת לוֹמַר ״מֵת יְבָמִי״ שֶׁתִּנָּשֵׂא, וְלֹא ״מֵתָה אֲחוֹתָהּ״ שֶׁתִּכָּנֵס לְבֵיתוֹ, וְאֵין הָאִישׁ נֶאֱמָן לוֹמַר ״מֵת אָחִי״ שֶׁיְּיַבֵּם אִשְׁתּוֹ, וְלֹא ״מֵתָה אִשְׁתּוֹ״, שֶׁיִּשָּׂא אֲחוֹתָהּ.

However, if she went, she and her husband and her yavam, overseas, and upon her return she said: My husband died and afterward my yavam died, or: My yavam died and afterward my husband died, she is not deemed credible, as a woman is not deemed credible if she says: My yavam died, in order that she may marry another man. And she is not deemed credible if she says that her sister died, in order that she may enter the house of her sister’s husband. And a man is not deemed credible if he says: My brother died, so that he may enter into levirate marriage with his brother’s wife, and he is not deemed credible when he says that his wife died, in order that he may marry his wife’s sister. The Sages accepted impaired testimony of this kind only when there was a concern about creating a situation of a deserted wife.

גְּמָ׳ בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רָבָא מֵרַב נַחְמָן: הַמְזַכֶּה גֵּט לְאִשְׁתּוֹ בִּמְקוֹם יָבָם, מַהוּ? כֵּיוָן דְּסָנְיָא לֵיהּ — זְכוּת הוּא לָהּ, וְזָכִין לְאָדָם שֶׁלֹּא בְּפָנָיו. אוֹ דִלְמָא: כֵּיוָן דְּזִימְנִין דְּרָחֲמָא לֵיהּ, חוֹב הוּא לָהּ, וְאֵין חָבִין לָאָדָם שֶׁלֹּא בְּפָנָיו.

GEMARA: Rava raised a dilemma before Rav Naḥman: In the case of a man who confers possession of a bill of divorce to his wife, i.e., he appoints an agent to take the bill of divorce to his wife, when she has a potential yavam, what is the halakha if her husband dies before she is divorced? One might say that since she hates her yavam, receiving the bill of divorce is for her benefit, as this act renders her prohibited to him, and it is a principle that one may act in a person’s interest in his absence. If so, as soon as the husband gives the bill of divorce to the agent she is divorced. Or perhaps, since she sometimes loves her yavam, this bill of divorce is to her disadvantage, and one may not act against a person’s interest in his absence. Consequently, she is not divorced until the bill of divorce reaches her possession.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ, תְּנֵינָא: וְחוֹשְׁשִׁין לִדְבָרֶיהָ, וְחוֹלֶצֶת וְלֹא מִתְיַיבֶּמֶת.

Rav Naḥman said to Rava that we learned an answer to this dilemma in the mishna: And we are concerned about her statement, and she must perform ḥalitza and she does not enter into levirate marriage. The mishna states that the court gives her statement some credence in either case, both when her testimony would exempt her from levirate marriage and when it would allow her to marry her yavam. This indicates that levirate marriage is considered neither in her interest nor a disadvantage for her. Rather, its classification is uncertain.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרָבָא: הַמְזַכֶּה גֵּט לְאִשְׁתּוֹ בִּמְקוֹם קְטָטָה, מַהוּ? כֵּיוָן דְּאִית לַהּ קְטָטָה בַּהֲדֵיהּ — זְכוּת הוּא לָהּ. אוֹ דִּלְמָא, נְיָחָא דְּגוּפָא עֲדִיף לַהּ? תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּאָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: טָב לְמֵיתַב טַן דּוּ מִלְּמֵיתַב אַרְמְלוּ.

§ Ravina said to Rava: With regard to one who confers possession of a bill of divorce to his wife through an agent in a situation when there was a quarrel between them, what is the halakha? The Gemara explains both sides of the question: Since she has a quarrel with him, the bill of divorce might be considered for her benefit. Or perhaps, her physical comfort is preferable to her, as she prefers to remain married despite the quarrel between her and her husband. Come and hear a resolution, as Reish Lakish said: There is a popular idiom among women: It is better to sit as two [tan du] than to sit lonely as a widow, i.e., a woman prefers the companionship of any husband over being alone.

אַבָּיֵי אָמַר: דְּשׁוּמְשְׁמָנָא גַּבְרָא, כּוּרְסְיַהּ בֵּי חָרָתָא רָמוּ לַהּ. רַב פָּפָּא אָמַר: דְּנַפָּצָא גַּבְרָא, תִּיקְרֵי בְּסִיפֵּי בָבָא וְתִיתִּיב.

Abaye said a similar popular expression: One whose husband is small as an ant, she places her seat among the noblewomen, as she considers herself important merely by virtue of being married. Rav Pappa said a different maxim: One whose husband is a wool comber [naftza], a lowly occupation, she calls him to sit with her at the entrance to the house, to display herself as a married woman.

רַב אָשֵׁי אוֹמֵר: דְּקוֹלְסָא גַּבְרָא, לָא בָּעֲיָא טְלָפְחֵי לְקִידְרָא. תָּנָא: וְכוּלָּן מְזַנּוֹת וְתוֹלוֹת בְּבַעְלֵיהֶן.

Similarly, Rav Ashi says: One whose husband sells cabbage heads [kulsa] does not require lentils for her pot. She is so happy she is married that she does not mind even if he does not provide her with food. The Gemara comments: A Sage taught: And all of these women who appear so satisfied with their marriage, they all commit adultery and attribute the children to their husbands. This is another reason why they are so keen to be married. This shows that even when there are quarrels between a couple, the wife still prefers the status of a married woman, and therefore the bill of divorce is not considered in her interest.

הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ הָאִשָּׁה שָׁלוֹם