זבחים קיד

זבחים קיד

בִּשְׁלָמָא רוֹבֵעַ וְנִרְבָּע – מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לֵיהּ דְּאַקְדְּשִׁינְהוּ מֵעִיקָּרָא, וַהֲדַר (רבעו) [אִירְבַעוּ].

Granted, with regard to an animal that actively copulated with a person or an animal that was the object of bestiality, you find circumstances in which the exemption for one who slaughters it outside the Temple courtyard cannot be based on the fact that it is not fit to be brought to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, e.g., a case where one initially consecrated it, at which point it was fit to be brought to the Temple courtyard, and then engaged in bestiality with it. Since it was initially fit to be brought to the Temple courtyard, another verse is needed to exclude it.

אֶלָּא מוּקְצֶה וְנֶעֱבָד – אֵין אָדָם אוֹסֵר דָּבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ שֶׁלּוֹ! בְּקָדָשִׁים קַלִּים, וְאַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי – דְּאָמַר: קָדָשִׁים קַלִּים מָמוֹן בְּעָלִים הוּא.

But with regard to an animal that was set aside for idol worship or one that was worshipped, this explanation is not tenable, since an animal that was already consecrated would not become disqualified because a person does not render forbidden an item that is not his. The Gemara responds that it is possible to disqualify a consecrated item in the case of offerings of lesser sanctity, such as a peace offering, and in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who says: An offering of lesser sanctity is the property of the owner.

דְּתַנְיָא: ״וּמָעֲלָה מַעַל בַּה׳״ – לְרַבּוֹת קֳדָשִׁים קַלִּים, שֶׁהֵן מָמוֹנוֹ. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי.

This is as it is taught in a baraita that the verse states with regard to the obligation to bring a guilt offering for robbery for taking a false oath concerning unlawful possession of the property of another: “If anyone sin, and commit a trespass against the Lord, and deal falsely with his neighbor in a matter of deposit, or of pledge, or of robbery, or have oppressed his neighbor” (Leviticus 5:21). The term “against the Lord” serves to include one who takes an oath with regard to another’s offerings of lesser sanctity, since they are the property of their owner. This is the statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili.

הִלְכָּךְ, רוֹבֵעַ וְנִרְבָּע – דְּבַר עֶרְוָה. מוּקְצֶה וְנֶעֱבָד – עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, בְּקָדָשִׁים קַלִּים.

The Gemara summarizes: Therefore, all of the cases listed in the mishna are cases in which the animal was initially fit to be brought to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting but was subsequently disqualified as an offering. An animal that actively copulated with a person and an animal that was the object of bestiality are disqualified after having been consecrated, due to a matter of forbidden sexual intercourse. An animal that was set aside for idol worship or one that was worshipped as an object of idol worship becomes forbidden after it was consecrated in the case of an offering of lesser sanctity, which according to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili is the property of its owner.

אֶתְנַן, וּמְחִיר, כִּלְאַיִם, יוֹצֵא דּוֹפֶן – בִּוְלָדוֹת קָדָשִׁים.

In the case of an animal that was given as payment to a prostitute or as the price of a dog, or an animal born of a mixture of diverse kinds, or an animal born by caesarean section, none of which could have occured at a time that the animal was fit to be sacrificed, the mishna is referring to the offspring of sacrificial animals that were given as payment to a prostitute or as the price of a dog while in utero. These animals were fit to be brought as a sacrifice while they were still part of a consecrated animal, and only following birth are they considered to be unfit for sacrifice.

קָסָבַר: וַלְדֵי קָדָשִׁים – בַּהֲוָיָיתָן הֵן קְדוֹשִׁים.

Although these offspring are still part of a consecrated animal while in utero, and as such one might say that the status of payment to a prostitute or the price of a dog should not take effect with regard to them, the tanna of the mishna holds that with regard to the offspring of sacrificial animals, they are sanctified only as they are from the time of birth, but not in utero. Therefore, they can be disqualified by serving as payment to a prostitute or as the price of a dog.

בַּעֲלֵי מוּמִין וְכוּ׳, אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ וְכוּ׳.

§ The mishna cites a disagreement between the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon with regard to temporarily blemished animals: Rabbi Shimon holds that one who sacrifices them outside the Temple courtyard violates a prohibition, as they will be fit for sacrifice after the passage of time, whereas the Rabbis hold that one is exempt. The mishna cites two similar disagreements: With regard to doves whose time of fitness has not yet arrived that are slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, and with regard to one who slaughters an animal itself and its offspring on one day, where the latter, which is not fit for being sacrificed until the next day, is slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard.

וּצְרִיכִי; דְּאִי תְּנָא בַּעֲלֵי מוּמִין – מִשּׁוּם דִּמְאִיסִי; אֲבָל תּוֹרִין, דְּלָא מְאִיסִי – אֵימָא לָא, דְּמוֹדוּ לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן;

The Gemara comments: And all of these cases are necessary. As, if the mishna had taught the disagreement only in the case of temporarily blemished animals, one would think that the Rabbis deem exempt one who sacrifices outside the Temple courtyard only in that case, because they are repulsive; but with regard to doves whose time of fitness has not yet arrived, which are not repulsive and which will be fit when their time arrives, I will say that this is not the halakha, and that the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Shimon that one does violate a prohibition.

וְאִי תְּנָא תּוֹרִין – מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא (חזו) [אִיחֲזוֹ] וְאִידְּחוֹ; אֲבָל בַּעֲלֵי מוּמִין, דְּאִיחֲזוֹ וְאִידְּחוֹ – אֵימָא לָא, דְּמוֹדֵה לְהוּ רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן לְרַבָּנַן;

And if the mishna had taught the disagreement only in the case of doves whose time of fitness has not yet arrived, one could say that it is only in this case that Rabbi Shimon holds that one who sacrifices them outside violates a prohibition, because they are not defined as: Fit for sacrifice and rejected; their time of fitness simply has not arrived. But with regard to temporarily blemished animals, which were fit for sacrifice and then disqualified, I will say that this is not the halakha, as Rabbi Shimon concedes to the Rabbis that one who sacrifices them outside the Temple courtyard does not violate a prohibition, since they are not fit to be sacrificed as offerings.

וְאִי תְּנָא הָנֵי תַּרְתֵּי – מִשּׁוּם דִּפְסוּלָא דְּגוּפַיְיהוּ; אֲבָל אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ, דִּפְסוּלָא מֵעָלְמָא קָאָתֵי לַהּ – אֵימָא מוֹדוּ לֵיהּ רַבָּנַן לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן; צְרִיכָא.

And if the mishna had taught only these two cases, i.e., temporarily blemished animals and doves whose time of fitness has not yet arrived, I would say that the Rabbis hold that one who slaughters them outside the Temple courtyard is not liable because their disqualification is inherent. But in the case of the animal itself and its offspring, where the disqualification comes to the offspring from an external factor, i.e., that its parent was slaughtered that day, I will say that the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Shimon that one who slaughters an animal and its offspring outside the Temple courtyard does violate the prohibition. Therefore, it is necessary for the mishna to teach the disagreement in each case.

שֶׁהָיָה רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן?

§ The mishna teaches that Rabbi Shimon says: In the case of any sacrificial animal that is fit to be sacrificed after the passage of time, if one sacrificed it outside the courtyard, he is in violation of a prohibition but there is no liability for karet. Rabbi Shimon did not specify what prohibition is violated. The Gemara therefore asks: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Shimon?

אָמַר רַבִּי אִילְעָא אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״לֹא תַעֲשׂוּן כְּכֹל אֲשֶׁר אֲנַחְנוּ עוֹשִׂים פֹּה הַיּוֹם״ – אֲמַר לְהוּ מֹשֶׁה לְיִשְׂרָאֵל: כִּי עָיְילִיתוּ לָאָרֶץ – יְשָׁרוֹת תַּקְרִיבוּ, חוֹבוֹת לֹא תַּקְרִיבוּ.

Rabbi Ile’a says that Reish Lakish says that the verse states: “You shall not do all that we do here this day, every man whatsoever is right in his own eyes. For you have not as yet come to the rest and to the inheritance, which the Lord your God gives you” (Deuteronomy 12:8–9). Moses said the following to the Jewish people: When you enter Eretz Yisrael, upright offerings, i.e., offerings that one believes are proper to bring due to one’s own generosity, such as vow offerings and gift offerings, you may sacrifice, but obligatory offerings you may not sacrifice, even in the Tabernacle in Gilgal, until you arrive at “the rest,” i.e., Shiloh, at which point you may sacrifice them.

וְגִלְגָּל לְגַבֵּי שִׁילֹה מְחוּסַּר זְמַן הוּא, וְקָאָמַר לְהוּ מֹשֶׁה: ״לֹא תַעֲשׂוּן״.

And since obligatory offerings during the period of Gilgal, in relation to the period of Shiloh, are considered offerings whose time has not yet arrived, and Moses said to the Jewish people concerning them: “You shall not do,” during that period, it follows that one who sacrifices an offering whose time has not yet arrived is in violation of the prohibition: “You shall not do.”

אָמַר רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה לְרַבִּי זֵירָא: אִי הָכִי,

Rabbi Yirmeya said to Rabbi Zeira: Therefore, it is prohibited to sacrifice offerings whose time has not yet arrived, even if they are sacrificed in the Tabernacle as was the case in Gilgal. If so, anyone who sacrifices an offering whose time has not yet arrived, even if he sacrifices it inside the Temple courtyard,

מִילְקֵי נָמֵי לִילְקֵי! אַלְּמָה אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא: הַכָּתוּב נִתְּקוֹ לַעֲשֵׂה?

should also receive lashes for sacrificing it, just as one would for violating other Torah prohibitions. Why did Rabbi Zeira say elsewhere that one who slaughters, inside the Temple courtyard, an offering whose time has not yet arrived does not receive lashes for having violated the prohibition of: “It shall not be accepted” (Leviticus 22:23), which is the general prohibition against sacrificing animals that are not fit to be sacrificed. Rabbi Zeira explains that he does not receive lashes because the verse has transmuted the negative precept into a prohibition that is stated as a positive mitzva, in the verse: “But from the eighth day forward it may be accepted” (Leviticus 22:27). There is no punishment of lashes for violating such a prohibition. Rabbi Yirmeya is asking that one should still receive lashes for having violated the prohibition of: “You shall not do.”

הָנֵי מִילֵּי לְרַבָּנַן, לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הָכִי נָמֵי.

The Gemara responds: That statement of Rabbi Zeira applies only according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Shimon in the mishna and hold that the verse that states: “You shall not do,” does not indicate that one who slaughters an animal whose time has not yet arrived is in violation of a prohibition. But according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, one would indeed receive lashes for slaughtering an animal whose time has not yet arrived inside the Temple.

רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק אָמַר: פְּנִים דְּגִלְגָּל לְגַבֵּי שִׁילֹה – כְּחוּץ דָּמֵי.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Rabbi Zeira’s statement is even in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who also holds that one would not receive lashes for slaughtering inside the Temple courtyard an offering whose time has not yet arrived. A prohibition cannot be derived from the prohibition stated with regard to the Tabernacle in Gilgal, since inside the Tabernacle in Gilgal, in relation to the Tabernacle in Shiloh, is considered like outside, and the prohibition: “You shall not do,” pertains only to sacrificing an offering whose time has not yet arrived outside the Temple courtyard.

רַבָּה אָמַר: טַעְמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן – כִּדְתַנְיָא, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: מִנַּיִן לַזּוֹבֵחַ פֶּסַח בְּבָמַת יָחִיד בִּשְׁעַת אִיסּוּר הַבָּמוֹת, שֶׁהוּא בְּלֹא תַעֲשֶׂה? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״לֹא תוּכַל לִזְבֹּחַ אֶת הַפָּסַח״.

Rabba said: The reason of Rabbi Shimon is not based upon: “You shall not do,” as Reish Lakish claims, but upon another verse. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon says: From where is it derived that one who slaughters his Paschal offering on a private altar at a time when it is prohibited to sacrifice offerings on private altars violates a prohibition? The verse states: “You may not sacrifice the Paschal offering within any of your gates; but at the place that the Lord your God shall choose to cause His name to dwell in, there you shall sacrifice the Paschal offering” (Deuteronomy 16:5–6).

יָכוֹל אַף בִּשְׁעַת הֶיתֵּר הַבָּמוֹת כֵּן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״בְּאַחַד שְׁעָרֶיךָ״ – לֹא אָמַרְתִּי לְךָ אֶלָּא בְּשָׁעָה שֶׁכׇּל יִשְׂרָאֵל נִכְנָסִין בְּשַׁעַר אֶחָד.

One might have thought that even at a time when it is permitted to sacrifice offerings on private altars this is so. Therefore, the verse states: “Within any [be’aḥad] of your gates,” which indicates that I said this prohibition to you only when all of the Jewish people enter the Temple through one [eḥad] gate in order to sacrifice their offerings. When there is no permanent communal altar, it is permitted to slaughter the Paschal offering on a private altar.

אֵימַת? אִי נֵימָא אַחַר חֲצוֹת – כָּרֵת נָמֵי מִחַיַּיב! אֶלָּא לָאו קוֹדֶם חֲצוֹת?

Rabba analyzes the baraita: When was this Paschal offering, for which one violates a prohibition for slaughtering it during a time when it is forbidden to sacrifice on private altars, slaughtered? If we say that it was after midday on the fourteenth of Nisan, which is the proper time for sacrificing the Paschal offering in the Temple, then one who sacrifices it then violates not only a prohibition, he should also be deemed liable to receive karet as well, as would anyone who slaughters a fit offering outside the Temple courtyard. Rather, is it not discussing one who slaughtered the Paschal offering on a private altar on the fourteenth of Nisan before midday, when its time had not yet arrived?

לְעוֹלָם לְאַחַר חֲצוֹת, וּבִשְׁעַת הֶיתֵּר הַבָּמוֹת קָאֵי.

The Gemara rejects Rabba’s explanation: Actually, the Paschal offering may have been sacrificed on a private altar after midday of the fourteenth of Nisan, and it is referring to a time when it is permitted to sacrifice on private altars, i.e., the periods of Gilgal, Nov, and Gibeon. The verse teaches that although it was permitted to sacrifice voluntary vow offerings and gift offerings on a private altar, the Paschal offering may be sacrificed only on a great public altar.

וְהָא בִּשְׁעַת אִיסּוּר הַבָּמוֹת קָאָמַר! אִיסּוּר בָּמָה לוֹ, הֶיתֵּר בָּמָה לַחֲבֵירוֹ.

The Gemara asks: But doesn’t the baraita state: At a time when it is prohibited to sacrifice offerings on private altars? The Gemara responds: The baraita means that it is prohibited for one to sacrifice the Paschal offering on a private altar, but it is permitted to use a private altar for another offering, i.e., a voluntary vow offering or gift offering.

מְחוּסַּר זְמַן כּוּ׳. וְהָנֵי בְּנֵי אֲשָׁמוֹת נִינְהוּ?! אָמַר זְעֵירִי: תְּנִי מְצוֹרָע בַּהֲדַיְיהוּ.

§ The mishna teaches that with regard to an offering whose time has not yet arrived because it is premature for its owner, one who sacrifices it outside the Temple courtyard is exempt. This category includes a zav, a zava, and a woman after childbirth, any of whom sacrificed a sin offering or guilt offering outside the Temple courtyard during the days that they are counting toward purification. The Gemara asks: And are these individuals subject to the obligation to bring guilt offerings? Ze’eiri said: The text of the mishna should teach: Leper, together with the zav, zava, and woman after childbirth. A leper brings a guilt offering as part of his purification process.

עוֹלוֹתֵיהֶן וְשַׁלְמֵיהֶן. וְהָנֵי בְּנֵי שְׁלָמִים נִינְהוּ?! אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: תְּנִי נָזִיר. דִּזְעֵירִי קַבְעוּהָ תַּנָּאֵי, דְּרַב שֵׁשֶׁת לָא קַבְעוּהָ תַּנָּאֵי.

The mishna also teaches that if those whose time has not yet arrived sacrifice their burnt offerings or their peace offerings outside the Temple courtyard, they are liable. The Gemara asks: And are these individuals subject to the obligation to bring peace offerings? Rav Sheshet said: Teach the case of a Nazirite as part of the list in the mishna. A nazirite brings a peace offering at the conclusion of his term of naziriteship. The Gemara notes that the addition of Ze’eiri to the text of the mishna, i.e., the case of a leper, was fixed by the tanna’im in the version of the mishna that they would teach, while the addition of Rav Sheshet, i.e., the case of a nazirite, was not fixed by the tanna’im in the mishna that they would teach.

אָמַר רַבִּי חִלְקִיָּה (דְּבֵי) רַב טוֹבִי: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא לִשְׁמוֹ; אֲבָל שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ – חַיָּיב, הוֹאִיל וְרָאוּי לְשֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ בִּפְנִים.

§ The mishna teaches that if one whose days of purification are not complete, e.g., a leper, slaughters his guilt offering outside the courtyard, he is exempt, since the offering is not fit for sacrifice at that time. With regard to this, Rabbi Ḥilkiya, a Sage from the school of Rav Tovi, says: They taught this only with regard to one who slaughters a guilt offering outside the Temple courtyard for its own sake. But if he slaughtered it outside the Temple courtyard not for its own sake but for the sake of a different offering, he is liable for having sacrificed outside the courtyard. This is because it was fit to be sacrificed not for its own sake inside the Temple courtyard, as a guilt offering that was slaughtered not for its own sake is fit for sacrifice (see 2a).

אִי הָכִי, לִשְׁמוֹ נָמֵי נִיחַיַּיב – הוֹאִיל וְרָאוּי לְשֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ בִּפְנִים! בָּעֵי עֲקִירָה.

The Gemara asks: If so, one who slaughtered the guilt offering for its own sake should also be liable for having slaughtered it outside the Temple courtyard, since it was fit to be slaughtered not for its sake inside the Temple courtyard. The Gemara answers: In order for a guilt offering that was slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard to be considered fit to be sacrificed inside it, it first requires uprooting of its status, i.e., the one who slaughters it should intend explicitly that it be a different sacrifice. If its status as a guilt offering has not been uprooted, it is not considered fit to be sacrificed inside.

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב הוּנָא: וְכִי יֵשׁ לְךָ דָּבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ כָּשֵׁר לִשְׁמוֹ, וְכָשֵׁר שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ?! וְלֹא?! וַהֲרֵי

Rav Huna objects to Rabbi Ḥilkiya’s statement that a guilt offering whose time has not yet arrived is fit to be sacrificed inside if it is slaughtered not for its own sake: And is there anything that is not fit if its action is performed for its own sake, but is fit if its action is performed not for its sake? The Gemara replies: And is there not? But there is