זבחים לא

זבחים לא

הַשְׁתָּא ״כְּזַיִת״ ״וּכְזַיִת״ כְּלָלָא, ״כְּזַיִת לְמָחָר בַּחוּץ״ מִיבַּעְיָא?!

Now that Rabbi Yehuda concedes that even: An olive-bulk and an olive-bulk, is one general term, is it necessary to inquire with regard to: An olive-bulk the next day outside?

לִישָּׁנָא אַחֲרִינָא: ״כְּזַיִת לְמָחָר בַּחוּץ״ פְּרָטָא, ״כְּזַיִת״ ״כְּזַיִת״ מִיבַּעְיָא?!

The Gemara presents another version of this discussion: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi might say that if Rabbi Yehuda maintains that even when one says: An olive-bulk the next day outside, each term is considered separate, is it necessary to inquire with regard to: An olive-bulk, an olive-bulk?

אִיתְּמַר: חֲצִי זַיִת חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ, חֲצִי זַיִת חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ, וַחֲצִי זַיִת חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ – אָמַר רָבָא: ״וַיִּקַץ כְּיָשֵׁן״ הַפִּיגּוּל. וְרַב הַמְנוּנָא אָמַר: עֵירוּב מַחְשָׁבוֹת הָוֵי.

§ It was stated: If one had intent to eat half an olive-bulk beyond its designated time, half an olive-bulk outside its designated area, and another half an olive-bulk beyond its designated time, Rava says: In such a case, the piggul: “Awaked as one asleep” (Psalms 78:65), i.e., since one had intent to consume two halves of an olive-bulk beyond their designated time, these intentions are joined together. The middle thought is disregarded, since it constitutes only half the requisite measure, and the offering is rendered piggul. And Rav Hamnuna says: It constitutes a combination of improper intentions. The middle thought, although itself insufficient to disqualify the offering, is sufficient to interfere with the intention to consume it beyond its time, and the offering is not rendered piggul.

אָמַר רָבָא: מְנָא אָמֵינָא לַהּ? דִּתְנַן: כְּבֵיצָה אוֹכֶל רִאשׁוֹן וּכְבֵיצָה אוֹכֶל שֵׁנִי שֶׁבְּלָלָן זֶה בָּזֶה – רִאשׁוֹן. חִלְּקָן – זֶה שֵׁנִי וְזֶה שֵׁנִי. הָא חָזַר וְעֵירְבָן – רִאשׁוֹן הָוֵי.

Rava said: From where, i.e., based on what, do I state my ruling? As we learned in a mishna (Teharot 1:5): An egg-bulk of food with first-degree impurity and an egg-bulk of food with second-degree impurity that one mixed together are collectively considered to have first-degree impurity. If one separated them into two portions, each containing a homogenous mixture, this portion is considered to have second-degree impurity and that portion is considered to have second-degree impurity. Since neither of them contains the requisite amount of food with first-degree impurity, each mixture settles to the lower level of impurity between the two foods. Rava reasoned: But if one mixed them again, they revert to be of first-degree impurity.

מִמַּאי? מִדְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: נָפֵל זֶה בְּעַצְמוֹ וְזֶה בְּעַצְמוֹ עַל כִּכָּר שֶׁל תְּרוּמָה – פְּסָלוּהָ. נָפְלוּ שְׁנֵיהֶן כְּאַחַת – עֲשָׂאוּהָ שְׁנִיָּה.

From where do I know this? From the fact that the latter clause of that mishna teaches: If this portion fell by itself and that portion fell by itself onto a loaf of teruma, it disqualifies it, as would any food with second-degree impurity. But it does not render it impure, since only foods with first-degree impurity impart impurity to other foods. But if they both fell simultaneously onto the loaf, they render it a food with second-degree impurity. Evidently, although the first-degree impurity lay dormant for lack of a requisite measure, it resurfaces when the rest of the measure is added, despite the fact that each portion was previously considered to have second-degree impurity. The halakha would be the same in the case of intent to consume the offering beyond its designated time, i.e., the intent to consume half an olive-bulk outside its area does not interfere with the intent of piggul.

וְרַב הַמְנוּנָא אָמַר: הָתָם אִיכָּא שִׁיעוּרָא, הָכָא לֵיכָּא שִׁיעוּרָא.

And Rav Hamnuna says: The cases are different. There, in the case of ritual impurity, there is a requisite measure present at the outset, which is divided and then recombined. Here, in the case of the offering, there is no requisite measure present at the outset to render it piggul.

אָמַר רַב הַמְנוּנָא: מְנָא אָמֵינָא לַהּ? דִּתְנַן: הָאוֹכֶל שֶׁנִּטְמָא בְּאַב הַטּוּמְאָה, וְשֶׁנִּטְמָא בִּוְלַד הַטּוּמְאָה – מִצְטָרְפִין זֶה עִם זֶה לְטַמֵּא בַּקַּל שֶׁבִּשְׁנֵיהֶם. מַאי, לָאו אַף עַל גַּב דַּהֲדַר מַלְּיֵיהּ?

Rav Hamnuna said: From where do I say my opinion? As we learned in another mishna (Me’ila 17b): The food that became ritually impure through contact with a primary source of ritual impurity, thereby assuming first-degree impurity, and the food that became ritually impure through contact with a derivative source of ritual impurity, thereby assuming second-degree impurity, join together to constitute the requisite measure of an egg-bulk to impart impurity in accordance with the more lenient of the two, i.e., as a food of second-degree impurity. What, is it not that they retain second-degree impurity even if one makes up the requisite measure again? If so, it can be inferred that the first-degree impurity is lost, and it does not lie dormant or resurface. Here as well, the latter intent of piggul cannot restore the initial intent of piggul, as the intent to consume half an olive-bulk outside its area interfered.

דִּלְמָא דְּלָא הֲדַר מַלְּיֵיהּ!

The Gemara responds: Perhaps the mishna is referring specifically to a case where one does not complete the requisite measure again.

כִּי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי אָמַר: חֲצִי זַיִת חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ, וַחֲצִי זַיִת חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ, וַחֲצִי זַיִת חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ – תָּנֵי בַּר קַפָּרָא: פִּיגּוּל; אֵין חֲצִי זַיִת מוֹעִיל בִּמְקוֹם כְּזַיִת.

The Gemara presents similar cases: When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael, he said: If one had intent to eat half an olive-bulk outside its designated area, and half an olive-bulk beyond its designated time, and then another half an olive-bulk beyond its designated time, bar Kappara teaches that the offering is rendered piggul, since the half an olive-bulk with regard to the area is not effective to interfere where the intent with regard to the time concerns a whole olive-bulk.

כִּי אֲתָא רָבִין אָמַר: חֲצִי זַיִת חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ, וַחֲצִי זַיִת חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ, וַחֲצִי זַיִת חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ – תָּנֵי בַּר קַפָּרָא: פִּיגּוּל; אֵין חֲצִי זַיִת מוֹעִיל בִּמְקוֹם כְּזַיִת.

When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael, he stated a different formulation: If one had intent to eat half an olive-bulk beyond its designated time, and then another half an olive-bulk beyond its designated time, and then half an olive-bulk outside its designated area, bar Kappara teaches that the offering is rendered piggul, since the half an olive-bulk is not effective to interfere where the intent of piggul concerns a whole olive-bulk.

רַב אָשֵׁי מַתְנֵי הָכִי: חֲצִי זַיִת חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ, וּכְזַיִת – חֶצְיוֹ חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ וְחֶצְיוֹ חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ; תָּנֵי בַּר קַפָּרָא: פִּיגּוּל; אֵין חֲצִי זַיִת מוֹעִיל בִּמְקוֹם כְּזַיִת.

Rav Ashi teaches the halakha in this manner: If one had intent to eat half an olive-bulk beyond its designated time, and then intended with regard to a whole olive-bulk to eat half of it outside its designated area and half of it beyond its designated time, bar Kappara teaches that the offering is rendered piggul, because the half an olive-bulk is not effective to interfere where the intent of piggul concerns a whole olive-bulk.

אָמַר רַבִּי יַנַּאי: חִישֵּׁב שֶׁיֹּאכְלוּהוּ כְּלָבִים לְמָחָר – פִּיגּוּל; דִּכְתִיב: ״וְאֶת אִיזֶבֶל יֹאכְלוּ הַכְּלָבִים בְּחֵלֶק יִזְרְעֶאל״.

§ Rabbi Yannai says: If one had intent that dogs would eat the offering the next day, it is rendered piggul, as it is written: “And the dogs shall eat Jezebel in the portion of Jezreel” (II Kings 9:10). The verse indicates that consumption by dogs is considered eating.

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַבִּי אַמֵּי: אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, חִישֵּׁב שֶׁתֹּאכְלֵהוּ אֵשׁ לְמָחָר, דִּכְתִיב: ״תְּאׇכְלֵהוּ אֵשׁ לֹא נֻפָּח״ – הָכִי נָמֵי דְּפִיגּוּל?! וְכִי תֵּימָא הָכִי נָמֵי; וְהָתְנַן: לֶאֱכוֹל כַּחֲצִי זַיִת וּלְהַקְטִיר חֲצִי כְּזַיִת – כָּשֵׁר, שֶׁאֵין אֲכִילָה וְהַקְטָרָה מִצְטָרְפִין!

Rabbi Ami objects to this: If that is so, then if one had intent that non-sacred fire would consume it the next day, as it is written: “A fire not blown shall consume him” (Job 20:26), this too should be piggul. And if you would say that this is indeed so, that is difficult: But didn’t we learn in the mishna: If his intent was to eat half an olive-bulk and to burn half an olive-bulk not at the appropriate time or in the appropriate area, the offering is fit because eating and burning do not join together?

אִי דְּאַפְּקַהּ בִּלְשׁוֹן אֲכִילָה – הָכִי נָמֵי; הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן – דְּאַפְּקַהּ בִּלְשׁוֹן הַקְטָרָה. דִּלְשׁוֹן אֲכִילָה לְחוֹד, וּלְשׁוֹן הַקְטָרָה לְחוּד.

The Gemara responds: If one expressed his intention to burn the offering in terms of consumption, it would indeed join together with intention to eat. But in the mishna here we are dealing with a case where he expressed it in terms of burning. The two intentions do not join together since terms of consumption and terms of burning are discrete entities.

בָּעֵי רַב אָשֵׁי: חִישֵּׁב לֶאֱכוֹל כְּזַיִת בִּשְׁנֵי בְּנֵי אָדָם, מַהוּ? בָּתַר מַחְשָׁבָה אָזְלִינַן – דְּאִיכָּא שִׁיעוּרָא, אוֹ בָתַר אוֹכְלִין אָזְלִינַן – וְלֵיכָּא שִׁיעוּרָא?

§ Rav Ashi raises a dilemma: If one had intent that two people would collectively eat an olive-bulk, what is the halakha? Do we follow the intent, in which case there is the requisite measure of an olive-bulk? Or do we follow those who eat, and neither eats the requisite measure?

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי, תָּא שְׁמַע: לֶאֱכוֹל כַּחֲצִי זַיִת וּלְהַקְטִיר כַּחֲצִי זַיִת – כָּשֵׁר, שֶׁאֵין אֲכִילָה וְהַקְטָרָה מִצְטָרְפִין.

Abaye said: Come and hear a proof from the mishna: If his intent was to eat half an olive-bulk and to burn half an olive-bulk beyond the designated time or outside the designated area, the offering is fit because eating and burning do not join together.

הָא לֶאֱכוֹל וְלֶאֱכוֹל דּוּמְיָא דְּלֶאֱכוֹל וּלְהַקְטִיר, וְהֵיכִי דָּמֵי – בִּשְׁנֵי בְּנֵי אָדָם; מִצְטָרֵף! שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.

It can be inferred that if one had intent to eat and to eat in a manner similar to a case of intent to eat half an olive-bulk and to burn half an olive-bulk; Abaye interjects: And what are the circumstances of such a case? It is a case with two people, i.e., where each one will consume half an olive-bulk. Abaye continues with the conclusion of his statement: Then the two halves join together. The Gemara concludes: Learn from it that this is so.

בָּעֵי רָבָא: חִישֵּׁב לֶאֱכוֹל כְּזַיִת בְּיָתֵר מִכְּדֵי אֲכִילַת פְּרָס, מַהוּ? לַאֲכִילַת גָּבוֹהַּ מְדַמֵּינַן לֵיהּ, אוֹ לַאֲכִילַת הֶדְיוֹט מְדַמֵּינַן לֵיהּ?

Rava raises a dilemma: If one had intent to eat an olive-bulk in more than the period of time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread, what is the halakha? Do we equate the consumption of offerings to the consumption of the Most High, i.e., the burning of offerings on the altar, for which there is no maximum allotted time? Or do we equate it to the consumption of an ordinary person, for whom consumption slower than this rate is not considered eating?

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי, תָּא שְׁמַע: לֶאֱכוֹל כַּחֲצִי זַיִת וּלְהַקְטִיר כַּחֲצִי זַיִת – כָּשֵׁר, שֶׁאֵין אֲכִילָה וְהַקְטָרָה מִצְטָרְפִין. טַעְמָא דְּלֶאֱכוֹל וּלְהַקְטִיר, הָא לֶאֱכוֹל וְלֶאֱכוֹל – מִצְטָרֵף; וְהָא הַקְטָרָה בְּיוֹתֵר מִכְּדֵי אֲכִילַת פְּרָס הוּא!

Abaye said: Come and hear a proof from the mishna: If his intent was to eat half an olive-bulk and to burn half an olive-bulk not at the appropriate time or in the appropriate area, the offering is fit because eating and burning do not join together. One may infer that the reason the offering is fit is that he had intent to eat and to burn the offering. But if he had intent to eat half an olive-bulk at the normal rate and to eat half an olive-bulk in the time it takes to burn half an olive-bulk, the two would join together. But the burning of an olive-bulk of an offering can take more than the time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread. It therefore seems that there is no upper limit on the time in which one is considered to have consumed an offering.

דִּלְמָא בְּהֶיסֵּק גָּדוֹל.

The Gemara rejects the proof: Perhaps the mishna is referring to intent to burn half an olive-bulk in a large fire, which can consume it in the time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread. Accordingly, one may draw the inference only with regard to a case where his intent was to consume the halves of an olive-bulk within this time.

לֶאֱכוֹל כַּחֲצִי זַיִת וּלְהַקְטִיר כַּחֲצִי זַיִת – כָּשֵׁר. טַעְמָא דְּלֶאֱכוֹל וּלְהַקְטִיר, הָא לֶאֱכוֹל וְלֶאֱכוֹל דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין דַּרְכּוֹ לֶאֱכוֹל – מִצְטָרֵף;

§ The mishna teaches: If one slaughtered the animal with intent to eat half an olive-bulk and to burn half an olive-bulk not at the appropriate time or in the appropriate area, the offering is fit. The Gemara infers: The reason that the two halves of an olive-bulk do not join together is because his intent was to eat half an olive-bulk and to burn half an olive-bulk. But if his intent was to eat half an olive-bulk of the meat and to eat half an olive-bulk of an item whose typical manner is such that one does not partake of it, then the halves do join together and disqualify the offering, as both intentions concern eating.

הָא קָתָנֵי רֵישָׁא: לֶאֱכוֹל אֶת שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לֶאֱכוֹל – מִצְטָרֵף; אֶת שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לֶאֱכוֹל אִין, שֶׁאֵין דַּרְכּוֹ לָא!

The Gemara notes an apparent contradiction: But the first clause of the mishna teaches: If one’s intent was to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one partakes of it, beyond its designated time, his intent joins together to disqualify the offering. One can infer that only if his intent was to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one partakes of it, does his intent join together, but if his intent was to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one does not to partake of it, then it does not join together.

אָמַר רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה: הָא מַנִּי – רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר הִיא, דְּאָמַר: מְחַשְּׁבִין מֵאֲכִילַת אָדָם לַאֲכִילַת מִזְבֵּחַ, וּמֵאֲכִילַת מִזְבֵּחַ לַאֲכִילַת אָדָם. דִּתְנַן: הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַזֶּבַח לֶאֱכוֹל דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין דַּרְכּוֹ לֶאֱכוֹל, וּלְהַקְטִיר דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין דַּרְכּוֹ לְהַקְטִיר – כָּשֵׁר. וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר פּוֹסֵל.

Rabbi Yirmeya says: In accordance with whose opinion is this latter clause? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who says: One can have intent to shift an item’s consumption from consumption by a person to consumption by the altar, or from consumption by the altar to consumption by a person. As we learned in another mishna (35a): In the case of one who slaughters the offering with intent to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one does not to partake of it, or to burn an item whose typical manner is such that one does not burn it on the altar, beyond its designated time or outside its designated area, the offering is fit, and Rabbi Eliezer deems it unfit.

אַבָּיֵי אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבָּנַן – וְלָא תֵּימָא: הָא לֶאֱכוֹל וְלֶאֱכוֹל דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין דַּרְכּוֹ לֶאֱכוֹל, אֶלָּא אֵימָא: הָא לֶאֱכוֹל וְלֶאֱכוֹל דָּבָר שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לֶאֱכוֹל.

Abaye says: You may even say that the latter clause is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. And do not say that one should infer from the mishna that if his intent was to eat half an olive-bulk of an item normally consumed and to eat half an olive-bulk of an item whose typical manner is such that one does not partake of it, then the offering is disqualified. Rather, say that one infers that if his intent was to eat half an olive-bulk and to eat another half an olive-bulk, both halves from an item whose typical manner is such that one partakes of it, then the halves join together to disqualify the offering.

מַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן? אִי דָּבָר שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לֶאֱכוֹל קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן – מֵרֵישָׁא שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: כַּחֲצִי זַיִת בַּחוּץ כַּחֲצִי זַיִת לְמָחָר – פָּסוּל; הָא כַּחֲצִי זַיִת לְמָחָר – פִּיגּוּל!

The Gemara asks: If so, what is this latter clause teaching us? If it teaches us that two half olive-bulks from an item whose typical manner is such that one partakes of it, join together, one can already learn this from the first clause of the mishna: If one has intent to consume half an olive-bulk outside its designated area and half an olive-bulk the next day, the offering is disqualified. One can infer that if his intent was to eat the first half an olive-bulk the next day, the offering would be rendered piggul.

אֶלָּא אִי לֶאֱכוֹל וּלְהַקְטִיר – מִדּוּקְיָא דְּרֵישָׁא שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: לֶאֱכוֹל דָּבָר שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לֶאֱכוֹל – אִין, שֶׁאֵין דַּרְכּוֹ לֶאֱכוֹל – לֹא;

But if one will say that this term teaches its literal meaning, that intentions to eat and to burn two halves of an olive-bulk do not join together, one can already learn this from the inference drawn above from the first clause of the mishna, namely that intent to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one partakes of it does disqualify the offering, but intent to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one does not partake of it does not. By extension, intent to consume half an olive-bulk of such an item does not join to disqualify the offering.

הַשְׁתָּא וּמָה לֶאֱכוֹל וְלֶאֱכוֹל דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין דַּרְכּוֹ לֶאֱכוֹל – לָא מִצְטָרֵף, לֶאֱכוֹל וּלְהַקְטִיר מִיבְּעֵי?!

Now, consider the following: And just as if when one has intent to partake of an item normally eaten and to partake of an item whose typical manner is such that one does not partake of it, his intentions do not join together, even though both intentions concern consumption, is it necessary for the mishna to teach that intentions to consume and to burn do not join together? The last clause therefore seems unnecessary.

לֶאֱכוֹל וּלְהַקְטִיר אִיצְטְרִיךְ; סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: הָתָם הוּא דְּלָאו כִּי אוֹרְחֵיהּ קָא מְחַשֵּׁב; אֲבָל הָכָא, דִּבְהַאי כִּי אוֹרְחֵיהּ וּבְהַאי כִּי אוֹרְחֵיהּ – אֵימָא לִיצְטָרֵף; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

The Gemara responds: It was necessary for the mishna to explicitly address the case where one had intent to eat and to burn, as it might enter your mind to say that it is only there, where one’s intentions are referring solely to consumption, that they do not join together, since he has intent to act in a way that is not consistent with its typical manner and consume an item not normally consumed. But here, where his intent is to both eat and burn the offering, such that with regard to this half he intends to act in a way consistent with its typical manner, and with regard to that half he intends to act in a way consistent with its typical manner, one might say that they should join together. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that intentions to eat and to burn do not join together.

הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ כׇּל הַזְּבָחִים שֶׁקִּבְּלוּ דָּמָן

מַתְנִי׳ כׇּל הַפְּסוּלִין שֶׁשָּׁחֲטוּ – שְׁחִיטָתָן כְּשֵׁרָה, שֶׁהַשְּׁחִיטָה כְּשֵׁרָה בְּזָרִים וּבְנָשִׁים וּבַעֲבָדִים וּבִטְמֵאִים. וַאֲפִילּוּ בְּקׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים, וּבִלְבַד שֶׁלֹּא יִהְיוּ טְמֵאִים נוֹגְעִין בַּבָּשָׂר. לְפִיכָךְ הֵן פּוֹסְלִין בְּמַחְשָׁבָה.

MISHNA: With regard to all those who are unfit for Temple service who slaughtered an offering, their slaughter is valid, as the slaughter of an offering is valid ab initio when performed even by non-priests, by women, by Canaanite slaves, and by ritually impure individuals. And this is the halakha even with regard to offerings of the most sacred order, provided that the ritually impure will not touch the flesh of the slaughtered animal, thereby rendering it impure. Therefore, these unfit individuals can disqualify the offering with prohibited intent, e.g., if one of them intended to partake of the offering beyond its designated time or outside its designated area.