בבא בתרא קכט

בבא בתרא קכט

אִי לְאַפּוֹקֵי מִדְּרָבָא – מוֹסִיף הוּא! אִי דְּמָר בַּר רַב אָשֵׁי – לֵית הִלְכְתָא כְּמָר בַּר רַב אָשֵׁי! אִי לְאַפּוֹקֵי מִדִּשְׁמוּאֵל וְרַב שֵׁשֶׁת וְרַב פָּפָּא – הָא אִיתּוֹתְבוּ!

If his statement is said to exclude the statement of Rava that the testimony of members of the third generation concerning members of the first generation is valid, this is difficult, as Rava’s statement is not in conflict with Rabbi Abba’s statement that the testimony of members of the third generation with regard to members of the second generation is valid; it merely adds to it. If it is said to exclude the opinion of Mar bar Rav Ashi that a grandfather can testify concerning his grandchild, this is also difficult, as it has already been established that the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Mar bar Rav Ashi. If it is said to exclude the rulings of Shmuel and Rav Sheshet and Rav Pappa, that a person who became blind can testify about what he saw beforehand, this too is difficult, as their rulings were refuted based on a baraita.

אֶלָּא לְאַפּוֹקֵי מִדְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, וּמֵאַתְקָפְתָּא דְּמָר בַּר רַב אָשֵׁי.

The Gemara explains: Rather, Mar Zutra’s statement is said to exclude the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan that one cannot testify that a specific one of his sons is his firstborn, and to exclude the strong objection of Mar bar Rav Ashi to the statement of Rabbi Abba with regard to a case where a debtor admitted to part of a claim and witnesses testified that he repaid the entire debt. Despite Mar bar Rav Ashi’s objection, the halakha is that the debtor is not liable to take an oath.

הַמְחַלֵּק נְכָסָיו עַל פִּיו, רִיבָּה לְאֶחָד וּמִיעֵט לְאֶחָד כּוּ׳. הֵיכִי דָּמֵי מַתָּנָה בַּתְּחִלָּה, הֵיכִי דָּמֵי בָּאֶמְצַע, הֵיכִי דָּמֵי בַּסּוֹף?

§ The mishna teaches: With regard to one on his deathbed who apportions his property orally, granting it to his sons as a gift, and he increased the portion given to one of his sons and reduced the portion given to one other son, or equated the portion of the firstborn to the portions of the other sons, his statement stands. But if he said that they will receive the property not as a gift but as an inheritance, he has said nothing. If he wrote in his will, whether at the beginning, or in the middle, or at the end, that he is granting them the property as a gift, his statement stands. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances where it is phrased as a gift at the beginning? What are the circumstances where it is phrased as a gift in the middle? What are the circumstances where it is phrased as a gift at the end?

כִּי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: ״תִּנָּתֵן שָׂדֶה פְּלוֹנִית לִפְלוֹנִי, וְיִירָשֶׁהָ״ – זוֹ הִיא מַתָּנָה בַּתְּחִלָּה. ״וְיִירָשֶׁהָ וְתִנָּתֵן לוֹ״ – זוֹ הִיא מַתָּנָה בַּסּוֹף. ״יִירָשֶׁהָ וְתִנָּתֵן לוֹ וְיִירָשֶׁהָ״ – זוֹ הִיא מַתָּנָה בָּאֶמְצַע.

When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan says that where one on his deathbed instructed: Such and such a field will be given to so-and-so and he will inherit it, this is a case where it is phrased as a gift at the beginning. Where he instructed: And he will inherit it and it will be given to him, this is a case where it is phrased as a gift at the end. Where he instructed: He will inherit it and it will be given to him and he will inherit it, this is a case where it is phrased as a gift in the middle.

וְדַוְקָא בְּאָדָם אֶחָד וְשָׂדֶה אַחַת; אֲבָל בְּאָדָם אֶחָד וּשְׁתֵּי שָׂדוֹת, שָׂדֶה אַחַת וּשְׁנֵי בְּנֵי אָדָם – לֹא.

And the halakha that his statement is valid pertains specifically to a case where the two terms, giving and inheritance, are employed with regard to one person and one field. But if they are employed with regard to one person and two fields, e.g., if he says: Reuven will inherit this field and will be given that field, or one field and two people, e.g., Reuven will inherit half of this field and Shimon will be given the other half, the part that was phrased as inheritance does not take effect. Only the part that is phrased as a gift takes effect.

רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר: אֲפִילּוּ אָדָם אֶחָד וּשְׁתֵּי שָׂדוֹת, שָׂדֶה אַחַת וּשְׁנֵי בְּנֵי אָדָם; אֲבָל בִּשְׁתֵּי שָׂדוֹת וּשְׁנֵי בְּנֵי אָדָם – לֹא.

Rabbi Elazar says: Even in a case where the two terms are employed with regard to one person and two fields, or one field and two people, his instruction takes effect, as both terms were employed with regard to the same person or the same field. But with regard to two fields and two people, it does not take effect, as the two instructions are not connected to one another.

כִּי אֲתָא רָבִין, אָמַר: ״תִּנָּתֵן שָׂדֶה פְּלוֹנִית לִפְלוֹנִי, וְיִירַשׁ פְּלוֹנִי שָׂדֶה פְּלוֹנִית״ – רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אוֹמֵר: קָנָה, רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר: לֹא קָנָה.

When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that if one on his deathbed said: Such and such a field will be given to so-and-so, and so-and-so, i.e., another person, will inherit such and such a field, i.e., another field, Rabbi Yoḥanan says that even the latter person, who was designated to inherit his field, has acquired it. Rabbi Elazar says: He has not acquired it.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי לְרָבִין: אַנְחֵתְתְּ לַן חֲדָא, וְאַתְקֵפְתְּ לַן חֲדָא! בִּשְׁלָמָא דְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אַדְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר לָא קַשְׁיָא – כָּאן בְּאָדָם אֶחָד וּשְׁתֵּי שָׂדוֹת, כָּאן בִּשְׁנֵי בְּנֵי אָדָם וּשְׁתֵּי שָׂדוֹת;

Abaye said to Ravin: You have lightened our burden with one statement that you cited, but you have made it difficult for us with the other one. Granted, the contradiction between this statement of Rabbi Elazar that you cited and the previously cited statement of Rabbi Elazar is not difficult. There, in the previously cited statement, Rabbi Elazar said that the directive takes effect with regard to a case of one person and two fields, and here he said that the directive does not take effect with regard to a case of two people and two fields.

אֶלָּא דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אַדְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן – קַשְׁיָא!

But the apparent contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan and the other statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan is difficult, as Rav Dimi cited in Rabbi Yoḥanan’s name that his directive takes effect only in a case of one person and one field, and according to your citation in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan it takes effect even in a case of two people and two fields.

אָמוֹרָאֵי נִינְהוּ וְאַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן.

Ravin answered him: Rav Dimi and I are amora’im, and we each have a different tradition with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan.

וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר, לֹא קָנָה עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר: ״פְּלוֹנִי וּפְלוֹנִי יִירְשׁוּ שָׂדֶה פְּלוֹנִית וּפְלוֹנִית שֶׁנְּתַתִּים לָהֶם בְּמַתָּנָה, וְיִירָשׁוּם״.

Ravin continued: And Reish Lakish says that one has not acquired the field in the case of two people and two fields unless the giver says: So-and-so and so-and-so will inherit such and such a field and such and such a field that I have given them as a gift, and they will inherit it.

בִּפְלוּגְתָּא – אָמַר רַב הַמְנוּנָא: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא אָדָם אֶחָד וְשָׂדֶה אַחַת; אֲבָל אָדָם אֶחָד וּשְׁתֵּי שָׂדוֹת, שָׂדֶה אַחַת וּשְׁנֵי בְּנֵי אָדָם – לֹא. וְרַב נַחְמָן אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ אָדָם אֶחָד וּשְׁתֵּי שָׂדוֹת, שָׂדֶה אַחַת וּשְׁנֵי בְּנֵי אָדָם; אֲבָל שְׁתֵּי שָׂדוֹת וּשְׁנֵי בְּנֵי אָדָם – לֹא. וְרַב שֵׁשֶׁת אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ שְׁתֵּי שָׂדוֹת וּשְׁנֵי בְּנֵי אָדָם.

This dispute between the amora’im of Eretz Yisrael is also the subject of a dispute between the amora’im of Babylonia. Rav Hamnuna says: The mishna taught that when both giving and inheritance are mentioned one can increase the portion of one of his sons only with regard to a case of one person and one field, but with regard to one person and two fields, or one field and two people, it is not effective. And Rav Naḥman says: Even in a case of one person and two fields, or one field and two people, it is effective, but in a case of two fields and two people, it is not. And Rav Sheshet says: Even in a case of two fields and two people, it is effective.

אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: מְנָא אָמֵינָא לַהּ? דְּתַנְיָא, הָאוֹמֵר: ״תְּנוּ שֶׁקֶל לְבָנַי בְּשַׁבָּת״, וּרְאוּיִן לִיתֵּן סֶלַע – נוֹתֵן לָהֶן סֶלַע. וְאִם אָמַר: ״אַל תִּתְּנוּ לָהֶן אֶלָּא שֶׁקֶל״ – אֵין נוֹתְנִין לָהֶן אֶלָּא שֶׁקֶל. וְאִם אָמַר: ״אִם מֵתוּ,

Rav Sheshet said: From where do I say this? As it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Ketubot 6:10): If a person on his deathbed, or one who is going overseas, says to his children’s steward: Give a shekel to my children every week for their needs, and this is a situation where, based on their needs, they are fit for the steward to give them a sela, i.e., double the amount, he gives them a sela. When the father mentioned a shekel, he presumably meant that the children should be given a sum in accordance with their actual requirements, not that specific amount. But if he said: Give them only a shekel, the steward gives them only a shekel, and no more. And if he said: If my children die,

יִירְשׁוּ אֲחֵרִים תַּחְתֵּיהֶם״ – בֵּין שֶׁאָמַר ״תְּנוּ״ בֵּין שֶׁאָמַר ״אַל תִּתְּנוּ״ – אֵין נוֹתְנִין לָהֶן אֶלָּא שֶׁקֶל.

others will inherit their portion in their stead, then regardless of whether he said: Give them a shekel, or whether he said: Do not give them more than a shekel, the court gives his children only a shekel per week, so as not to reduce the share of the others, as their father clearly stated that he wishes to give his children only a specific stipend, and that he intends to leave the bulk of his property to others.

וְהָא הָכָא, דְּכִשְׁתֵּי שָׂדוֹת וְכִשְׁנֵי בְנֵי אָדָם דָּמֵי, וְקָתָנֵי דְּקָנֵי!

Rav Sheshet concludes: And isn’t the case here like a case of two fields and two people, as the father gave part of his property to his sons as a gift, and the rest to others as an inheritance? But it is taught that the others acquire the property, although he employed only the terminology of inheritance concerning them.

הוּא מוֹתֵיב לַהּ וְהוּא מְפָרֵק לַהּ – בְּרָאוּי לְיוֹרְשׁוֹ, וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן בְּרוֹקָה הִיא.

Rav Sheshet raised the objection and he resolved it: The term others is referring to those who are fit to inherit from him; and the ruling of the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, who holds that one can bequeath his property to anyone who is fit to inherit from him. Therefore it is unnecessary for the bequest to be phrased as a gift.

אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי, תָּא שְׁמַע: ״נְכָסַי לְךָ, וְאַחֲרֶיךָ יִירַשׁ פְּלוֹנִי, וְאַחֲרֵי אַחֲרֶיךָ יִירַשׁ פְּלוֹנִי״ – מֵת רִאשׁוֹן, קָנָה שֵׁנִי; מֵת שֵׁנִי, קָנָה שְׁלִישִׁי. וְאִם מֵת שֵׁנִי בְּחַיֵּי רִאשׁוֹן – יַחְזְרוּ נְכָסִים לְיוֹרְשֵׁי רִאשׁוֹן.

Rav Ashi said: Come and hear a proof for the opinion of Rav Sheshet from a baraita (Tosefta 8:4): If one states: My property will go to you after my death for your use during your lifetime, and after you die, so-and-so will inherit the property, and after the one who inherits after you dies, so-and-so will inherit the property, then in this case, when the first recipient dies, the second acquires it, and when the second dies, the third acquires it. And if the second dies during the lifetime of the first, the property returns after his death to the heirs of the first, and does not go to the third designated recipient, as his right was to inherit it from the second one, who never received it.

וְהָא הָכָא, דְּכִשְׁתֵּי שָׂדוֹת וּשְׁנֵי בְּנֵי אָדָם דָּמֵי, וְקָתָנֵי דְּקָנָה!

Rav Ashi states his proof: And here it is a case like that of two fields and two people, as the bequest to the first recipient was phrased as a gift, and to the second one it was phrased as inheritance; and yet the baraita teaches that the second recipient acquires the property after the death of the first.

וְכִי תֵּימָא: הָכָא נָמֵי בְּרָאוּי לְיוֹרְשׁוֹ, וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן בְּרוֹקָה הִיא; אִי הָכִי, מֵת שֵׁנִי קָנָה שְׁלִישִׁי?!

And if you would say that here, too, the baraita is referring to a case where the recipient is fit to inherit from him, and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, if so, why does it state that when the second dies, the third acquires it?

הָא שְׁלַח רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב עַוְיָא: לְדִבְרֵי רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן בְּרוֹקָה, ״נְכָסַי לְךָ, וְאַחֲרֶיךָ לִפְלוֹנִי״, וְרִאשׁוֹן רָאוּי לְיוֹרְשׁוֹ – אֵין לַשֵּׁנִי בִּמְקוֹם רִאשׁוֹן כְּלוּם, שֶׁאֵין זֶה לְשׁוֹן מַתָּנָה אֶלָּא לְשׁוֹן יְרוּשָּׁה, וִירוּשָּׁה אֵין לָהּ הֶפְסֵק!

Rav Ashi explains his previous comment: Didn’t Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Avya, send the following ruling in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka? If a person on his deathbed said: My property is given to you, and after you to so-and-so, and the first recipient was fit to inherit from him, the second gets nothing in place of the first, i.e., he does not receive the property after the first one dies, as this formulation employed by the owner was not one of a gift; rather, it was a formulation of inheritance, and inheritance has no end, i.e., it cannot be stopped. Therefore, since the first recipient acquired it as inheritance, his heirs inherit it from him, and it cannot be taken by the second one. Therefore, the baraita is irreconcilable with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka.

תְּיוּבְתָּא דְכוּלְּהוּ! תְּיוּבְתָּא.

The Gemara affirms: The refutation of the opinions of all the Sages who disagree with the opinion of Rav Sheshet that even if one uses the two terms with regard to two fields and two people his gift to both people is effective, is a conclusive refutation.

לֵימָא נָמֵי תֶּיהְוֵי תְּיוּבְתֵּיהּ דְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ? וְתִסְבְּרָא?! וְהָא אָמַר רָבָא: הִלְכְתָא כְּוָתֵיהּ דְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ בְּהָנֵי תְּלָת!

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that it is also a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Reish Lakish, who maintains that giving must be mentioned with regard to both recipients and both fields. The Gemara asks: And how can you understand this? But didn’t Rava say that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish with regard to these three issues: Acquisition of land for the rights to its produce, ḥalitza of a pregnant woman, and the matter of bequeathal phrased both as a gift and as inheritance?

לָא קַשְׁיָא; כָּאן בְּתוֹךְ כְּדֵי דִבּוּר, כָּאן לְאַחַר כְּדֵי דִבּוּר.

The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. Here, in the case where giving can be mentioned concerning one of the recipients and inheritance with regard to the other, it is a case where the two bequests were stated within the time required for speaking a short phrase, i.e., the time it takes to greet one’s teacher. According to the halakha, within this time a speaker can retract his statement. Therefore both bequests are considered to be part of one statement. There, in the case where Reish Lakish maintains that giving must be mentioned with regard to both people for it to take effect, it is a case where the final part of the statement, where he said: And they will inherit it, was after the time required for speaking a short phrase.

וְהִלְכְתָא: כׇּל תּוֹךְ כְּדֵי דִבּוּר כְּדִבּוּר דָּמֵי, לְבַר מֵעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה

And the halakha is that the legal status of any statement interrupted or retracted within the time required for speaking a short phrase is like that of continuous speech. This is the halakha in all cases, apart from idol worship, as one who accepts an idol as his god is liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment even if he retracts his statement within the time required for speaking a short phrase,