בבא בתרא קל

בבא בתרא קל

וְקִדּוּשִׁין.

and betrothal, as if a man betroths a woman and retracts the betrothal within the time required for speaking, his retraction is not effective.

מַתְנִי׳ הָאוֹמֵר ״אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי יִירָשֵׁנִי״ בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁיֵּשׁ בַּת; ״בִּתִּי תִּירָשֵׁנִי״ בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁיֵּשׁ בֵּן – לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם, שֶׁהִתְנָה עַל מַה שֶּׁכָּתוּב בַּתּוֹרָה. רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן בְּרוֹקָה אוֹמֵר: אִם אָמַר עַל מִי שֶׁרָאוּי לְיוֹרְשׁוֹ – דְּבָרָיו קַיָּימִין; וְעַל מִי שֶׁאֵין רָאוּי לוֹ לְיוֹרְשׁוֹ – אֵין דְּבָרָיו קַיָּימִין.

MISHNA: In a case of one who says: So-and-so will inherit from me, in a case where there is a daughter, or: My daughter will inherit from me, in a case where there is a son, he has said nothing, as he has stipulated counter to that which is written in the Torah concerning the order of inheritance. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka says: If he said this about one fit to inherit from him, his statement stands, but if it was about one for whom it was not fit to inherit from him, his statement does not stand.

גְּמָ׳ טַעְמָא דְּאַחֵר בִּמְקוֹם בַּת, וּבַת בִּמְקוֹם בֵּן; הָא בֵּן בֵּין הַבָּנִים, וּבַת בֵּין הַבָּנוֹת – דְּבָרָיו קַיָּימִין. אֵימָא סֵיפָא, רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן בְּרוֹקָה אוֹמֵר: אִם אָמַר עַל מִי שֶׁרָאוּי לְיוֹרְשׁוֹ – דְּבָרָיו קַיָּימִין. הַיְינוּ תַּנָּא קַמָּא!

GEMARA: The Gemara infers from the mishna that the reason the first tanna rules that his bequeathal is invalid is that he bequeathed his estate to another in a case where he had a daughter, or to his daughter where he had a son, but if he bequeathed his entire estate to one son among his other sons, or to one daughter among his other daughters, his statement stands. The Gemara questions this inference: Say the latter clause of the mishna: Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka says that if he said this about one fit to inherit from him, his statement stands. This is identical to the opinion of the first tanna. What information does this statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka add? With regard to what case do they disagree?

וְכִי תֵּימָא רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן בְּרוֹקָה – אֲפִילּוּ אַחֵר בִּמְקוֹם בַּת וּבַת בִּמְקוֹם בֵּן קָאָמַר; וְהָתַנְיָא, רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל בְּנוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן בְּרוֹקָה אוֹמֵר: לֹא נֶחְלְקוּ אַבָּא וַחֲכָמִים עַל אַחֵר בִּמְקוֹם בַּת וּבַת בִּמְקוֹם בֵּן, שֶׁלֹּא אָמַר כְּלוּם;

The Gemara continues: And if you would say that Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka is saying that one’s statement stands even in a case where he bequeathed his estate to another where he had a daughter or to a daughter where he had a son, as although he bequeathed it to one who is not currently his heir, the beneficiary would be fit to inherit from him if the current heirs die, and this would be contrary to the opinion of the first tanna, this is difficult. And isn’t it taught in a baraita (Tosefta 7:18) that Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, says: My father and the Rabbis did not disagree about a case where one bequeathed his estate to another where he had a daughter or to a daughter where he had a son; in a case such as this, my father concedes that he has said nothing.

עַל מָה נֶחְלְקוּ – עַל בֵּן בֵּין הַבָּנִים, וּבַת בֵּין הַבָּנוֹת; שֶׁאַבָּא אוֹמֵר: יִירַשׁ, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: לֹא יִירַשׁ!

Rabbi Yishmael continues: With regard to what case do they disagree? They disagree with regard to a case where he bequeathed his entire estate to one son among his other sons, or to one daughter among his other daughters, as my father says that the son or daughter inherits the entire estate, and the Rabbis say that he does not inherit it.

אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: מִדְּקָאָמַר ״לֹא נֶחְלְקוּ״ – מִכְּלָל דְּתַנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר: נֶחְלְקוּ.

The Gemara explains: If you wish, say that from the fact that Rabbi Yishmael is saying that they did not disagree about a case where one bequeathed his estate to another where he had a daughter or to a daughter where he had a son, by inference, the first tanna of that baraita, to whom he was responding, holds that they did disagree in this case.

אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: כּוּלֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן בְּרוֹקָה הִיא, וְחַסּוֹרֵי מְחַסְּרָא וְהָכִי קָתָנֵי: הָאוֹמֵר ״אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי יִירָשֵׁנִי״ בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁיֵּשׁ בַּת; ״בִּתִּי תִּירָשֵׁנִי״ בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁיֵּשׁ בֵּן – לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם. הָא בַּת בֵּין הַבָּנוֹת וּבֵן בֵּין הַבָּנִים – אִם אָמַר ״יִירַשׁ כׇּל נְכָסָיו״, דְּבָרָיו קַיָּימִין; שֶׁרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אוֹמֵר: אִם אָמַר עַל מִי שֶׁרָאוּי לְיוֹרְשׁוֹ – דְּבָרָיו קַיָּימִין.

And if you wish, say instead that the entire mishna is stating the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, and the mishna is incomplete, and this is what it is teaching: With regard to one who says: So-and-so will inherit from me, in a case where there is a daughter, or: My daughter will inherit from me, in a case where there is a son, he has said nothing, but if he bequeathed his property to one son among his other sons, or one daughter among his other daughters, then if he said that the son or daughter will inherit all his property, his statement stands, as Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka says: If he said this about one fit to inherit him, that he should inherit all of his property, his statement stands.

אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן בְּרוֹקָה. וְכֵן אָמַר רָבָא: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן בְּרוֹקָה.

§ As for the halakhic ruling, Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka. And Rava says as well that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka.

אָמַר רָבָא: מַאי טַעְמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן בְּרוֹקָה? אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְהָיָה בְּיוֹם הַנְחִילוֹ אֶת בָּנָיו״ – הַתּוֹרָה נָתְנָה רְשׁוּת לָאָב לְהַנְחִיל לְכׇל מִי שֶׁיִּרְצֶה.

Rava said: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka? The verse states: “Then it shall be, in the day that he causes his sons to inherit” (Deuteronomy 21:16), which is interpreted to mean that the Torah gave the father permission to bequeath his estate to whomever he wishes among his sons.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: הָא – מִ״לֹּא יוּכַל לְבַכֵּר״ נָפְקָא!

Abaye said to him: Isn’t this halakha derived from the continuation of the verse: “He may not make the son of the beloved the firstborn, before the son of the hated, who is the firstborn”? From the prohibition against depriving the firstborn of his double portion it can be inferred that one can change the apportionment of the inheritance of his other sons.

הַהוּא מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְתַנְיָא, אַבָּא חָנָן אָמַר מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר:

The Gemara answers: That clause in the verse is necessary for that which is taught in a baraita: Abba Ḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Eliezer:

מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״לֹא יוּכַל לְבַכֵּר״?

Why must the verse state: “He may not make the son of the beloved the firstborn” (Deuteronomy 21:16)?

לְפִי שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְהָיָה בְּיוֹם הַנְחִילוֹ אֶת בָּנָיו״. שֶׁיָּכוֹל וַהֲלֹא דִין הוּא – וּמָה פָּשׁוּט, שֶׁיִּפָּה כֹּחוֹ, שֶׁנּוֹטֵל בָּרָאוּי כִּבְמוּחְזָק – הַתּוֹרָה נָתְנָה רְשׁוּת לָאָב לְהַנְחִיל לְכׇל מִי שֶׁיִּרְצֶה; בְּכוֹר, שֶׁהוֹרַע כֹּחוֹ, שֶׁאֵינוֹ נוֹטֵל בָּרָאוּי כִּבְמוּחְזָק – לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״לֹא יוּכַל לְבַכֵּר״.

Abba Ḥanan explains: It is necessary because it is stated previously in the verse: “Then it shall be, in the day that he causes his sons to inherit,” as one might have thought: Could this not be derived through an a fortiori inference, as follows: And if with regard to an ordinary son, one who is not a firstborn, whose power is enhanced in that he takes in inheritance the property due the deceased as he does the property the deceased possessed at the time he died, nevertheless, the Torah gave the father permission to bequeath his estate to whichever of his sons he wishes, depriving his other sons of their portions, then with regard to a firstborn, whose power is diminished in that he does not take a double portion of the property due his father as he takes of the property the deceased possessed at the time of his death, is it not clear all the more so that his father can deprive him of the double portion he receives as a firstborn? Therefore, the verse states: “He may not make the son of the beloved the firstborn.”

וְיֹאמַר ״לֹא יוּכַל לְבַכֵּר״; מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְהָיָה בְּיוֹם הַנְחִילוֹ אֶת בָּנָיו״?

Abba Ḥanan continues: And let the verse state only the prohibition of: “He may not make the son of the beloved the firstborn.” Why must the verse state: “Then it shall be, in the day that he causes his sons to inherit”?

שֶׁיָּכוֹל וַהֲלֹא דִּין הוּא – וּמָה בְּכוֹר, שֶׁהוֹרַע כֹּחוֹ, שֶׁאֵינוֹ נוֹטֵל בָּרָאוּי כִּבְמוּחְזָק – אָמְרָה תּוֹרָה: ״לֹא יוּכַל לְבַכֵּר״; פָּשׁוּט, שֶׁיִּפָּה כֹּחוֹ, שֶׁנּוֹטֵל בָּרָאוּי כִּבְמוּחְזָק – לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן?!

It is necessary because one might have thought: Could this not be derived through an a fortiori inference, as follows: And if with regard to a firstborn, whose power is diminished in that he does not take a double portion of the property due his father as he takes of the property the deceased possessed, nevertheless the Torah states: “He may not make the son of the beloved the firstborn,” i.e., the firstborn may not be deprived of his double portion, then with regard to an ordinary son, whose power is enhanced in that he takes in inheritance the property due the deceased as he does the property the deceased possessed, is it not clear all the more so that his father cannot deprive him of his portion of the inheritance?

תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְהָיָה בְּיוֹם הַנְחִילוֹ אֶת בָּנָיו״ – הַתּוֹרָה נָתְנָה רְשׁוּת לָאָב לְהַנְחִיל לְכׇל מִי שֶׁיִּרְצֶה.

Therefore, the verse states: “Then it shall be, in the day that he causes his sons to inherit,” indicating that the Torah gave the father permission to bequeath his estate to whichever of his sons he wishes. Consequently, the prohibition “he may not make the son of the beloved the firstborn” is not available to prove that one may bequeath his estate to whichever of his sons he wishes.

אָמַר רַבִּי זְרִיקָא אָמַר רַבִּי אַמֵּי אָמַר רַבִּי חֲנִינָא אָמַר רַבִּי: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן בְּרוֹקָה. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי אַבָּא: ״הוֹרָה״ אִיתְּמַר.

§ The Gemara resumes discussion of the halakhic ruling: Rabbi Zerika says that Rabbi Ami says that Rabbi Ḥanina says that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka. Rabbi Abba said to Rabbi Zerika: It was stated that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi ruled in an actual case in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka.

בְּמַאי קָמִיפַּלְגִי? מָר סָבַר: הֲלָכָה עֲדִיפָא, וּמָר סָבַר: מַעֲשֶׂה רַב.

The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do they disagree? Since both Rabbi Zerika and Rabbi Abba agree that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, why did Rabbi Abba state that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi ruled as much in an actual case? The Gemara answers: One Sage, Rabbi Zerika, holds that a ruling in principle is a preferable source for a halakha, rather than a ruling from an incident; and one Sage, Rabbi Abba, holds that a specific incident ruled upon by a Sage is a preferable source.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: אֵין לְמֵדִין הֲלָכָה לֹא מִפִּי תַלְמוּד, וְלֹא מִפִּי מַעֲשֶׂה, עַד שֶׁיֹּאמְרוּ לוֹ הֲלָכָה לְמַעֲשֶׂה. שָׁאַל וְאָמְרוּ לוֹ הֲלָכָה לְמַעֲשֶׂה – יֵלֵךְ וְיַעֲשֶׂה מַעֲשֶׂה, וּבִלְבַד שֶׁלֹּא יְדַמֶּה.

The Gemara examines which source is preferable. The Sages taught in a baraita: One may derive the halakha neither from a statement nor from an incident where one saw a ruling issued in a certain manner, unless the Sages explicitly tell him that it is the practical halakha. If he asked the Sages and they told him the practical halakha, he may go and act upon the ruling in those circumstances, provided that he does not compare between cases and apply the ruling to other circumstances.

מַאי ״וּבִלְבַד שֶׁלֹּא יְדַמֶּה״? וְהָא כׇּל הַתּוֹרָה כּוּלָּהּ דַּמּוֹיֵי מְדַמֵּינַן לַהּ!

The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the statement: Provided that he does not compare? But don’t we compare cases throughout the entire Torah? The main method of halakhic derivation is through comparing cases where the halakha was already established to cases where the halakha is unclear.

אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי, הָכִי קָאָמַר: וּבִלְבַד שֶׁלֹּא יְדַמֶּה בִּטְרֵפוֹת.

Rav Ashi said that this is what the baraita is saying: Provided that he does not compare between various cases of animals with wounds that will cause them to die within twelve months [tereifot], which are forbidden for consumption. In general, one may compare cases, but with regard to the definition of a tereifa, one may not compare.

דְּתַנְיָא: אֵין אוֹמְרִים בִּטְרֵפוֹת זוֹ דּוֹמָה לָזוֹ. וְאַל תִּתְמַהּ, שֶׁהֲרֵי חוֹתְכָהּ מִכָּאן וּמֵתָה, חוֹתְכָהּ מִכָּאן וְחָיְתָה.

This is as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to tereifot, one does not say: This wound is similar to that wound. Every type of wound has its own halakhot. And do not wonder about this principle, as there are organs with regard to which one cuts it from here, i.e., one side, and the animal dies within twelve months, but one cuts it from there, i.e., another side, and it lives.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי אַסִּי לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: כִּי אָמַר לַן מָר ״הֲלָכָה הָכִי״, נַעֲבֵיד מַעֲשֶׂה? אָמַר: לָא תַּעְבְּידוּ עַד דְּאָמֵינָא הֲלָכָה לְמַעֲשֶׂה.

Rabbi Asi said to Rabbi Yoḥanan: When the Master, i.e., Rabbi Yoḥanan, says to us: This is the halakha, should we act upon the ruling? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Do not act upon the ruling unless I say that it is a practical halakha.

אֲמַר לְהוּ רָבָא לְרַב פָּפָּא וּלְרַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: כִּי אָתֵי פִּסְקָא דְּדִינָא דִּידִי לְקַמַּיְיכוּ, וְחָזֵיתוּ בֵּיהּ פִּירְכָא – לָא תִּקְרְעוּהוּ עַד דְּאָתֵיתוּ לְקַמַּאי; אִי אִית לִי טַעְמָא – אָמֵינָא לְכוּ, וְאִי לָא – הָדַרְנָא בִּי. לְאַחַר מִיתָה, לָא מִיקְרָע תִּקְרְעוּהוּ, וּמִגְמָר נָמֵי לָא תִּגְמְרוּ מִינֵּיהּ. לָא מִיקְרָע תִּקְרְעוּנֵיהּ – דְּאִי הֲוַאי הָתָם דִּלְמָא הֲוָה אָמֵינָא לְכוּ טַעְמָא;

Rava said to Rav Pappa and to Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua: When a legal ruling of mine comes before you and you perceive a refutation of it, do not tear it up until you come before me to discuss it. If I have a valid explanation, I will tell you, and if not, I will retract my ruling. If a ruling of mine comes before you after my death, when you can no longer discuss it with me, do not tear it up, but do not learn from it either, i.e., do not rule in accordance with it. Do not tear it up, as had I been there, perhaps I would have told you a valid explanation that you would have accepted;