בבא בתרא קלו

בבא בתרא קלו

כִּדְאָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: ״וּקְנֵינָא מִינֵּיהּ מוֹסִיף עַל מַתַּנְתָּא דָּא״; הָכָא נָמֵי – דְּאָמַר: ״אַף כְּתוֹבוּ וַחֲתוֹמוּ וְהַבוּ לֵיהּ״.

It is as Rav Ḥisda says that if it is written in the will: And we acquired it from him through an act of acquisition in addition to this gift, this formulation does not cancel the will’s power to take effect after the person’s death, as the intention of referring to it as a gift is merely to enhance the legal power of the recipient by confirming the transfer through an act of acquisition. Here too, in a case where he says: Write and sign a document as well, and give it to him, it is apparent that his request is to enhance the legal power of the recipient by writing a document in addition to transferring the gift itself.

אִיתְּמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל, הֲלָכָה: כּוֹתְבִין וְנוֹתְנִין. וְכֵן אָמַר רָבָא אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן, הֲלָכָה: כּוֹתְבִין וְנוֹתְנִין.

It was stated that Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says that the halakha is that one writes a document and gives the money in this case. And Rava says similarly that Rav Naḥman says that the halakha is that one writes a document and gives the money in this case.

מַתְנִי׳ הַכּוֹתֵב נְכָסָיו לְבָנָיו, צָרִיךְ שֶׁיִּכְתּוֹב ״מֵהַיּוֹם וּלְאַחַר מִיתָה״, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ.

MISHNA: A healthy person who writes a document granting his property to his sons in his lifetime, but wishes to continue to derive benefit from it until his death, must write: I give the property from today and after my death. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yosei says: He need not write: From today and after my death; it is sufficient for him to write that the transfer will take effect after he dies.

הַכּוֹתֵב נְכָסָיו לִבְנוֹ לְאַחַר מוֹתוֹ – הָאָב אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לִמְכּוֹר, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהֵן כְּתוּבִין לַבֵּן; וְהַבֵּן אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לִמְכּוֹר, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהֵן בִּרְשׁוּת הָאָב.

If one writes a document granting his property to his son from today and after his death, the father cannot sell the property because it is written as granted to the son, and the son cannot sell it because it is still in the possession of the father with regard to using the property and consuming its produce.

מָכַר הָאָב – מְכוּרִים עַד שֶׁיָּמוּת. מָכַר הַבֵּן – אֵין לַלּוֹקֵחַ בָּהֶן כְּלוּם עַד שֶׁיָּמוּת הָאָב.

If the father sold the property, it is sold to the purchaser inasmuch as he may use it and consume its produce until the father dies, at which point it belongs to the son. If the son sold it during his father’s lifetime, the purchaser has no right to use it until the father dies.

גְּמָ׳ וְכִי כָּתַב ״מֵהַיּוֹם וּלְאַחַר מִיתָה״, מַאי הָוֵי? הָא תְּנַן: ״מֵהַיּוֹם וּלְאַחַר מִיתָה״ – גֵּט וְאֵינוֹ גֵּט; וְאִם מֵת, חוֹלֶצֶת וְלֹא מִתְיַיבֶּמֶת!

GEMARA: And if he wrote: I give the property from today and after my death, what of it? Didn’t we learn in a mishna (Gittin 72a): If a husband said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce from today and after my death, it is a bill of divorce but not a complete bill of divorce, and therefore if he dies without children his wife performs the ritual through which a woman is freed of her levirate bonds [ḥalitza], as perhaps the bill of divorce is invalid and she is bound by the levirate bond and may not remarry without first performing ḥalitza. But she does not enter into levirate marriage, as perhaps the bill of divorce is valid, and it is forbidden for a divorcée to marry her former husband’s brother.

הָתָם – מְסַפְּקָא לַן אִי תְּנָאָה הָוֵי, אִי חֲזָרָה הָוֵי; אֲבָל הָכָא – הָכִי קָאָמַר לֵיהּ: גּוּפָא קְנִי מֵהַיּוֹם, פֵּירָא לְאַחַר מִיתָה.

The Gemara answers: There, we are uncertain if the expression: And after my death, is meant as a condition, i.e., if I die you will be divorced retroactively from today, or if it is a retraction of the statement: From today, meaning that the divorce would take effect only after his death, which would render it invalid. But here, in the case of a deed of gift, there is no contradiction in the statement, as this is what the father is presumably saying to him: Acquire the property itself today, and the produce after my death.

רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ. רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ חֲלַשׁ, עָל לְגַבֵּיהּ רַב הוּנָא וְרַב נַחְמָן. אָמַר לֵיהּ רַב הוּנָא לְרַב נַחְמָן, בְּעִי מִינֵּיהּ: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי, אוֹ אֵין הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי? אָמַר לֵיהּ: טַעְמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי לָא יָדַעְנָא, הֲלָכָה אֶיבְעֵי מִינֵּיהּ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אַתְּ בְּעִי מִינֵּיהּ אִי הֲלָכָה אִי לָא, וְטַעְמֵיהּ אֲנָא אָמֵינָא לָךְ.

§ The mishna teaches: Rabbi Yosei says that he need not write: From today and after my death. The Gemara relates: Rabba bar Avuh was sick, and Rav Huna and Rav Naḥman entered to visit him. Rav Huna said to Rav Naḥman: Ask him whether the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei or the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. Rav Naḥman said to Rav Huna: I do not know Rabbi Yosei’s reasoning; can I ask him about the halakha? Rav Huna said to Rav Naḥman: You ask him if the halakha is in accordance with his opinion or not, and I will tell you his reasoning afterward.

בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ, הָכִי אָמַר רַב: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי. בָּתַר דִּנְפַקוּ, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הַיְינוּ טַעְמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי, דְּאָמַר: זְמַנּוֹ שֶׁל שְׁטָר מוֹכִיחַ עָלָיו. תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי, רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁזְּמַנּוֹ שֶׁל שְׁטָר מוֹכִיחַ עָלָיו.

Rav Naḥman asked Rabba bar Avuh. Rabba bar Avuh said to him that this is what Rav says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. After they left, Rav Huna said to Rav Naḥman that this is Rabbi Yosei’s reasoning: He says that writing: From today and after my death, is unnecessary because the date written in a document proves when it takes effect. The Gemara adds: That is also taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Ketubot 8:4): Rabbi Yosei says that he need not write: From today and after my death, because the date written in a document proves when it takes effect.

בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רָבָא מֵרַב נַחְמָן: בְּהַקְנָאָה, מַהוּ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: בְּהַקְנָאָה – אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ.

§ Rava asked Rav Naḥman: In a case where the father performed an act of transfer, transferring his property to his son after his death, what is the halakha? Is it still necessary to write: From today and after my death? Rav Naḥman said to him: In a case where he performed an act of transfer, he need not write: From today and after my death.

רַב פַּפֵּי אָמַר: אִיכָּא אַקְנְיָתָא דִּצְרִיךְ, וְאִיכָּא אַקְנְיָתָא דְּלָא צְרִיךְ. ״אַקְנְיֵיהּ וּקְנֵינָא מִינֵּיהּ״ – לָא צָרִיךְ. ״קְנֵינָא מִינֵּיהּ וְאַקְנְיֵיהּ״ – צְרִיךְ.

Rav Pappi said: There is a case of transfer where he needs to write: From today and after my death, and there is a case of transfer where he does not need to do so. If it is written in the deed that he transferred it to him and we, the witnesses, acquired it from him, he does not need to write: From today and after my death. But if the statement is written in the opposite order: We acquired it from him and he transferred it to him, he still needs to write: From today and after my death.

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב חֲנִינָא מִסּוּרָא: מִי אִיכָּא מִידֵּי דַּאֲנַן לָא יָדְעִינַן, וְסָפְרֵי יָדְעִי? שְׁאֵלוּנְהוּ לְסָפְרֵי דְאַבָּיֵי – וְיָדְעִי, וּלְסָפְרֵי דְרָבָא – וְיָדְעִי.

Rav Ḥanina of Sura objects to this distinction: Is there anything that we, the Sages, do not know, and the scribes know? The distinction between the two opposite orderings of the above statement was unknown to the Sages. The Gemara relates that the Sages asked Abaye’s scribes and they knew the distinction, and they asked Rava’s scribes and they also knew the distinction.

רַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אָמַר: בֵּין ״אַקְנְיֵיהּ וּקְנֵינָא מִינֵּיהּ״, בֵּין ״קְנֵינָא מִינֵּיהּ וְאַקְנְיֵיהּ״ – לָא צְרִיךְ; וּבְ״דוּכְרַן פִּתְגָמֵי דַּהֲוֵי בְּאַנְפַּנָא״ פְּלִיגִי.

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: Whether the wording is he transferred it to him and we acquired it from him, or whether it is we acquired it from him and he transferred it to him, he need not write: From today and after my death, as the act of transfer is mentioned in any event. And Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei in the mishna disagree whether the phrase: From today and after my death, is necessary only with regard to a case where the deed merely states: This is a record of the proceedings that took place in our presence, without any mention of an act of transfer.

אָמַר רַב כָּהֲנָא: אַמְרִיתַהּ לִשְׁמַעְתָּא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב זְבִיד מִנְּהַרְדְּעָא, וַאֲמַר לִי: אַתּוּן – הָכִי מַתְנִיתוּ לַהּ; אֲנַן – הָכִי מַתְנֵינַן לָהּ: אָמַר רָבָא אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן, בְּהַקְנָאָה, אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ – בֵּין ״אַקְנְיֵיהּ וּקְנֵינָא מִינֵּיהּ״, בֵּין ״קְנֵינָא מִינֵּיהּ וְאַקְנְיֵיהּ״ – לָא צְרִיךְ. בְּ״דוּכְרַן פִּתְגָמֵי דַּהֲווֹ בְּאַנְפַּנָא״ – פְּלִיגִי.

Rav Kahana said: I stated this halakha in the presence of Rav Zevid of Neharde’a, and he said to me: You teach it like this, i.e., as a question and answer followed by a dispute; we teach it like this, i.e., as a single, unbroken statement: Rava says that Rav Naḥman says that in a case where transfer is mentioned in the deed, the owner need not write: From today and after my death. This is the halakha whether the wording is he transferred it to him and we acquired it from him, or whether the wording is we acquired it from him and he transferred it to him; he need not write: From today and after my death. They disagree only with regard to a case where the wording is: This is a record of the proceedings that took place in our presence.

הַכּוֹתֵב נְכָסָיו לִבְנוֹ לְאַחַר מוֹתוֹ. אִיתְּמַר: מָכַר הַבֵּן בְּחַיֵּי הָאָב, וּמֵת הַבֵּן בְּחַיֵּי הָאָב –

§ The mishna teaches that if one writes a document granting his property to his son from today and after his death, neither he nor the son can sell the property. It was stated that in a case where the son sold the property during the father’s lifetime, and then the son died during the father’s lifetime, after which the father died as well,

אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: לֹא קָנָה לוֹקֵחַ. וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: קָנָה לוֹקֵחַ.

Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The purchaser did not acquire the property, and Reish Lakish says: The purchaser acquired the property.

רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: לֹא קָנָה לוֹקֵחַ – קִנְיַן פֵּירוֹת כְּקִנְיַן הַגּוּף דָּמֵי.

The Gemara explains their reasoning: Rabbi Yoḥanan says that the purchaser did not acquire the property because he holds that ownership of the rights to use an item and the profits it engenders is considered to be like ownership of the item itself. Even though the property itself did not belong to the father, it is as though the father owned the property, because all of the produce belonged to him in practice. Therefore, the son’s sale can take effect only after the father’s death. If the son dies first, since he never attained ownership, his sale can never come to fruition.

וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: קָנָה לוֹקֵחַ – קִנְיַן פֵּירוֹת לָאו כְּקִנְיַן הַגּוּף דָּמֵי.

And Reish Lakish says: The purchaser acquired the property, because he holds that ownership of the rights to use an item and the profits it engenders is not considered to be like ownership of the item itself. Therefore, the father’s rights do not prevent the son, who owns the property itself, from selling it, and eventually the purchaser receives full rights to it.

וְהָא אִיפְּלִיגוּ בַּהּ חֲדָא זִימְנָא! דְּאִיתְּמַר: הַמּוֹכֵר שָׂדֵהוּ לְפֵירוֹת – רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: מֵבִיא וְקוֹרֵא. וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: מֵבִיא, וְאֵינוֹ קוֹרֵא.

The Gemara asks: But didn’t they already engage in a dispute concerning this issue one time? As it was stated: With regard to one who sells his field for just its produce, meaning that he retains ownership over the field itself and he sells the rights to all of its produce to someone else, Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The purchaser brings first fruits from this field to the Temple and recites the verses in the Torah associated with the bringing of the first fruits, in which he thanks God for: “The land that You, Lord, have given me” (Deuteronomy 26:10). And Reish Lakish says: The purchaser brings the first fruits, but he does not recite the verses, since it is not his field.

רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר מֵבִיא וְקוֹרֵא – קָסָבַר: קִנְיַן פֵּירוֹת כְּקִנְיַן הַגּוּף דָּמֵי. וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: מֵבִיא וְאֵינוֹ קוֹרֵא – קִנְיַן פֵּירוֹת לָאו כְּקִנְיַן הַגּוּף דָּמֵי!

The Gemara explains the reason behind the dispute: Rabbi Yoḥanan says he brings the first fruits and recites the verses because he maintains that ownership of the rights to use an item and the profits it engenders is considered to be like the ownership of the item itself. Even though the field itself does not belong to him, it is as if he acquired the field because all of the produce belongs to him in practice. And Reish Lakish says that he brings the first fruits and does not recite the verses because he holds that ownership of the rights to use an item and the profits it engenders is not considered to be like the ownership of the item itself. Why was it necessary for them to engage in a dispute concerning this issue twice?

אָמַר לָךְ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: אַף עַל גַּב דִּבְעָלְמָא קִנְיַן פֵּירוֹת כְּקִנְיַן הַגּוּף דָּמֵי, הָכָא אִצְטְרִיךְ; סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: אַבָּא לְגַבֵּי בְּרֵיהּ אַחוֹלֵי אַחֵיל, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

The Gemara answers: It was necessary for the dispute to be stated also in the context of one who sells his father’s property and then dies. This is because Rabbi Yoḥanan could have said to you that although in general ownership of the rights to use an item and the profits it engenders is considered to be like the ownership of the item itself, here it was necessary to emphasize this principle, because it might enter your mind to say that with regard to a father and son, the father presumably waived his rights in the property itself. Rabbi Yoḥanan teaches us that even in this case, the father’s ownership of the rights to use an item and the profits it engenders is considered to be like the ownership of the item itself.

וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ אָמַר: אַף עַל גַּב דִּבְעָלְמָא קִנְיַן פֵּירוֹת לָאו כְּקִנְיַן הַגּוּף דָּמֵי, הָכָא אִצְטְרִיךְ; סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: כֹּל לְגַבֵּי נַפְשֵׁיהּ, אֲפִילּוּ בִּמְקוֹם בְּרֵיהּ, נַפְשֵׁיהּ עֲדִיפָא לֵיהּ; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish could have said that although in general ownership of the rights to use an item and the profits it engenders is not considered to be like the ownership of the item itself, as one who sells the produce of his field retains full ownership of the land itself, here it was necessary to emphasize this principle, as it might enter your mind to say that in any sale concerning oneself, even vis-à-vis his son, one grants preference to himself. Accordingly, if one grants the property itself to his son, reserving the rights to the produce for himself, he retains the rights to the property itself as well. Reish Lakish teaches us that he does not retain the rights to the property.

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן לְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: ״נְכָסַי לְךָ, וְאַחֲרֶיךָ יִירַשׁ פְּלוֹנִי, וְאַחֲרָיו יִירַשׁ פְּלוֹנִי״ – מֵת רִאשׁוֹן, קָנָה שֵׁנִי. מֵת שֵׁנִי, קָנָה שְׁלִישִׁי.

Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to the opinion of Reish Lakish from a baraita (Tosefta 8:4): If one states: My property will go to you after my death for your use during your lifetime, and after you die, so-and-so will inherit the property, and after the one who inherits after you dies, so-and-so will inherit the property, in this case, when the first recipient dies, the second acquires it, and when the second dies, the third acquires it.

מֵת שֵׁנִי בְּחַיֵּי רִאשׁוֹן – יַחְזְרוּ נְכָסִים לְיוֹרְשֵׁי רִאשׁוֹן.

If the second dies during the lifetime of the first, the property returns after his death to the heirs of the first, and does not go to the third designated recipient, as his right was to inherit it from the second, who never received it.

וְאִם אִיתָא, לְיוֹרְשֵׁי נוֹתֵן מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ!

And if it is so that ownership of the rights to use an item and the profits is not considered to be like ownership of the item itself, the baraita should have stated that the property returns to the heirs of the giver, as the first and second recipients received only the right to use the property and enjoy its profits during their lifetimes, after which it was designated to be transferred to others. Therefore, in a case where the transfer does not apply, the property should return to the possession of the one who owns the property itself, namely the giver and his heirs.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: כְּבָר תַּרְגְּמַהּ רַב הוֹשַׁעְיָא בְּבָבֶל: ״אַחֲרֶיךָ״ שָׁאנֵי. וְכֵן רָמֵי רַבָּה בַּר רַב הוּנָא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב, וְאָמַר: ״אַחֲרֶיךָ״ שָׁאנֵי.

Reish Lakish said to him: Rav Hoshaya already interpreted in Babylonia that a case of after you, i.e., where the owner said to the recipient: After you die so-and-so will inherit the property, is different, as the giver intended to grant full ownership of the property to the first recipient as well, including both the rights to the produce and the property itself. And Rabba bar Rav Huna also raised this contradiction before Rav, and Rav said in response: After you, is different.

וְהָתַנְיָא: יַחְזְרוּ לְיוֹרְשֵׁי נוֹתֵן!

The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in another baraita that if the second designated recipient dies before the first, after the death of the first the property returns to the heirs of the giver?