בבא בתרא קמב

בבא בתרא קמב

וְלֵימָא לֵיהּ דְּאָמַר לִכְשֶׁתֵּלֵד! רַב הוּנָא לְטַעְמֵיהּ, דְּאָמַר רַב הוּנָא: אַף לִכְשֶׁתֵּלֵד – לֹא קָנָה.

The Gemara proposes another resolution to Rav Naḥman’s objection: But let Rav Huna say to Rav Naḥman that the mishna is referring to one who says that the transfer of ownership should take effect when she gives birth, at which point the child already exists. The Gemara rejects this resolution: Rav Huna does not interpret the mishna in this way, because Rav Huna conforms to his line of reasoning, as Rav Huna says: Even if one says that the transfer of ownership should take effect when she gives birth, the fetus does not acquire it.

דְּאָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: הַמְזַכֶּה לְעוּבָּר – לֹא קָנָה. לִכְשֶׁתֵּלֵד – קָנָה. וְרַב הוּנָא אָמַר: אַף לִכְשֶׁתֵּלֵד – לֹא קָנָה. וְרַב שֵׁשֶׁת אָמַר: אֶחָד זֶה וְאֶחָד זֶה קָנָה.

The Gemara clarifies: As Rav Naḥman says: With regard to one who transfers ownership of an item to a fetus, the fetus does not acquire it. But if he says that the transfer of ownership of the item should take effect when she gives birth, the fetus acquires it. And Rav Huna says: Even if he says that the transfer of ownership of the item should take effect when she gives birth, the fetus does not acquire it, because the fetus did not exist in the world when he transferred ownership. And Rav Sheshet says: In both this case and that case, the fetus acquires the item.

אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: מְנָא אָמֵינָא לַהּ? דְּתַנְיָא: גֵּר שֶׁמֵּת, וּבִזְבְּזוּ יִשְׂרָאֵל נְכָסָיו, וְשָׁמְעוּ שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ בֵּן אוֹ שֶׁהָיְתָה אִשְׁתּוֹ מְעוּבֶּרֶת – חַיָּיבִין לְהַחֲזִיר. הֶחְזִירוּ הַכֹּל, וְאַחַר כָּךְ שָׁמְעוּ שֶׁמֵּת בְּנוֹ אוֹ שֶׁהִפִּילָה אִשְׁתּוֹ – הֶחְזִיק בַּשְּׁנִיָּה, קָנָה; וּבָרִאשׁוֹנָה, לֹא קָנָה.

Rav Sheshet said: From where do I say that the fetus acquires the item? As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to a convert who died, apparently without offspring, and Jews plundered [uvizbezu] his property, assuming that he had no heirs and his property was therefore ownerless, and subsequently they heard that he had a son or that his wife was pregnant, they are obligated to return the property. If they returned it all, and then they heard that his son died or that his wife miscarried, if one took possession at the second time, after hearing about the death or the miscarriage, he acquired the property, but if one took possession only at the first time, before it was known there was an heir at all, he did not acquire the property.

וְאִי סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ: עוּבָּר לָא קָנֵי, לְמָה לְהוּ אַחְזוֹקֵי בַּשְּׁנִיָּה? הָא אַחְזִיקוּ לְהוּ חֲדָא זִימְנָא!

Rav Sheshet explains: And if it enters your mind that a fetus does not acquire property, why do they need to take possession again the second time? Didn’t they already take possession one time? Evidently, the miscarried fetus had acquired ownership in the meantime.

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: יְרוּשָּׁה הַבָּאָה מֵאֵילֶיהָ שָׁאנֵי. רָבָא אָמַר: שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּרַפּוֹיֵי מְרַפְּיָאן בִּידַיְיהוּ מֵעִיקָּרָא.

Abaye said in reply to Rav Sheshet: Inheritance, which comes into the possession of the heir by itself without a formal act of acquisition, is different. Even if a fetus inherits property, it may not be able to acquire property in any other manner, e.g., receiving a gift. Rava said: It is different there, in the case where they plundered the property of the convert, as the property was initially only loosely held in their hands, as they did not clearly know whether or not the deceased convert had heirs. Therefore, the first time they took possession was not sufficient, and they needed to take possession again in order to acquire the property.

מַאי בֵּינַיְיהוּ? אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ שֶׁשָּׁמְעוּ בּוֹ שֶׁמֵּת – וְלֹא מֵת; וְאַחַר כָּךְ מֵת.

The Gemara asks: What is the difference between Abaye’s refutation and Rava’s refutation? The practical difference between them is in a case where they initially heard with regard to the fetus that he had died, and they then took possession of the property. But in reality, he had not died, and then he died. According to Abaye, a fetus inherits property. Therefore, the property was not ownerless, and the plunderers did not acquire it. According to Rava, since the plunderers heard that the fetus had died, they took a firm hold upon the property, and they acquired it the first time.

תָּא שְׁמַע: תִּינוֹק בֶּן יוֹם אֶחָד – נוֹחֵל וּמַנְחִיל. בֶּן יוֹם אֶחָד אִין, עוּבָּר לָא! הָא אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: נוֹחֵל בְּנִכְסֵי הָאֵם, לְהַנְחִיל לָאַחִין מִן הָאָב. וְדַוְקָא בֶּן יוֹם אֶחָד, אֲבָל עוּבָּר – לָא. מַאי טַעְמָא?

The Gemara offers another refutation of the opinion of Rav Sheshet: Come and hear a proof from a mishna (Nidda 43b–44a): A one-day-old child inherits property and bequeaths property. One can infer that if the child is one day old, yes, he inherits property; but a fetus does not. The Gemara replies: Doesn’t Rav Sheshet say that the mishna teaches a different halakha? The mishna teaches that a one-day-old child inherits his mother’s property the moment he is born, so that he is able to bequeath it, if he then dies, to his heirs who are not the mother’s heirs, e.g., his paternal brothers. This halakha specifically applies from when he is one day old, but a fetus whose mother died does not inherit from her. What is the reason for this?

דְּהוּא מָיֵית בְּרֵישָׁא, וְאֵין הַבֵּן יוֹרֵשׁ אֶת אִמּוֹ בַּקֶּבֶר לְהַנְחִיל לָאַחִין מִן הָאָב.

The reason is that we presume that the fetus died first, before its mother died, and the son does not inherit from his mother while in the grave, in order to bequeath the inheritance to his paternal brothers. The halakha is that if a son dies, and afterward his mother dies, the deceased son does not inherit from his mother and subsequently bequeath the inheritance to his paternal brothers, who are not related to the mother. But in other cases, where it is not his mother’s estate, a fetus inherits property.

לְמֵימְרָא דְּהוּא מָיֵית בְּרֵישָׁא?! וְהָא הֲוָה עוֹבָדָא, וּפַרְכֵּס תְּלָתָא פִּרְכּוּסֵי! אָמַר מָר בַּר רַב אָשֵׁי: מִידֵּי דְּהָוֵה אַזְּנַב הַלְּטָאָה, שֶׁמְּפַרְכֶּסֶת.

The Gemara asks: Is this to say that it is certain that the fetus died first? But there was an incident where the mother died and the fetus made three spasmodic motions afterward. Apparently, a fetus can die after the mother. Mar bar Rav Ashi said: That incident was just as it is with the tail of the lizard, which jerks after being severed from the lizard, but it is just a spasmodic motion which does not indicate that it is still alive.

מָר בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יוֹסֵף מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא אָמַר: לוֹמַר שֶׁמְּמַעֵט בְּחֵלֶק בְּכוֹרָה. וְדַוְקָא בֶּן יוֹם אֶחָד, אֲבָל עוּבָּר – לָא. מַאי טַעְמָא? ״וְיָלְדוּ לוֹ״ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא.

Mar, son of Rav Yosef, says in the name of Rava: The mishna comes to say that a one-day-old child reduces the portion of the firstborn. The firstborn is entitled to a double portion of the inheritance, and this is calculated taking into account the portion due to his dead brother. And it is in this context that specifically the portion of a one-day-old child is taken into account, but the portion of a fetus is not taken into account, even though a fetus also inherits property. What is the reason for this? The Merciful One states concerning the portion of the firstborn: “If a man has two wives, the one beloved, and the other hated, and they bore him children, both the beloved and the hated; and if the firstborn son be hers that was hated” (Deuteronomy 21:15). The term “children” excludes a fetus.

דְּאָמַר מָר בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יוֹסֵף מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא: בֵּן שֶׁנּוֹלַד לְאַחַר מִיתַת אָבִיו – אֵינוֹ מְמַעֵט בְּחֵלֶק בְּכוֹרָה. מַאי טַעְמָא? ״וְיָלְדוּ לוֹ״ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא, וְהָא לֵיכָּא.

This is similar to another halakha, as Mar, son of Rav Yosef, says in the name of Rava: A son who was born after his father’s death does not reduce the firstborn’s portion. What is the reason for this? The Merciful One states in the Torah: “And they bore him children,” and this term “children” does not apply to a fetus.

בְּסוּרָא – מַתְנוּ הָכִי. בְּפוּמְבְּדִיתָא – מַתְנוּ הָכִי: אָמַר מָר בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יוֹסֵף מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא: בְּכוֹר שֶׁנּוֹלַד לְאַחַר מִיתַת אָבִיו – אֵינוֹ נוֹטֵל פִּי שְׁנַיִם. מַאי טַעְמָא? ״יַכִּיר״ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא, וְהָא לֵיתָא דְּיַכִּיר. וְהִלְכְתָא כְּכׇל הָנֵי לִישָּׁנֵי דְּאָמַר מָר בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יוֹסֵף מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא.

The Gemara notes: In Sura they taught Mar’s statement that way, but in Pumbedita they taught it this way: Mar, son of Rav Yosef, says in the name of Rava: A firstborn who was born after his father’s death does not receive a double portion. What is the reason for this? The Merciful One states in the Torah: “But he shall acknowledge the firstborn, the son of the hated, by giving him a double portion” (Deuteronomy 21:17), and in this case the father is not there that he can acknowledge him. The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is in accordance with all these versions of that which Mar, son of Rav Yosef, says in the name of Rava. Accordingly, a one-day-old child reduces the portion of the firstborn, a son born after his father’s death does not reduce the firstborn’s portion, and a firstborn born after his father’s death does not receive a double portion.

אָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַמְזַכֶּה לְעוּבָּר – לֹא קָנָה. וְאִם תֹּאמַר: מִשְׁנָתֵינוּ! הוֹאִיל וְדַעְתּוֹ שֶׁל אָדָם קְרוֹבָה אֵצֶל בְּנוֹ.

§ Rabbi Yitzḥak says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to one who transfers ownership of an item to a fetus, the fetus does not acquire the item. And if you say that the statement of our mishna (140b), with regard to one who gives a gift to his unborn child, indicates that an item can be transferred to a fetus, the circumstances there are unique. Since the disposition of a person is to be inclined toward his son, the Sages validated such a transfer, but one cannot transfer an item to the unborn child of another.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ שְׁמוּאֵל לְרַב חָנָא בַּגְדָּתָאָה: פּוֹק אַיְיתִי לִי בֵּי עַשְׂרָה, וְאֵימַר לָךְ בְּאַפַּיְיהוּ: הַמְזַכֶּה לְעוּבָּר קָנָה. וְהִלְכְתָא: הַמְזַכֶּה לְעוּבָּר לֹא קָנָה.

Shmuel said to Rav Ḥana of Baghdad: Go out and bring me an assembly of ten men, and I will say a halakha to you in their presence, so that it will be well publicized. The halakha was: With regard to one who transfers ownership of an item to a fetus, the fetus acquires the item. The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is that with regard to one who transfers ownership of an item to a fetus, the fetus does not acquire the item.

הָהוּא דַּאֲמַר לִדְבֵיתְהוּ: ״נִכְסַי לִבְנֵי דְּיִהְווּ לִי מִינִּיךְ״. אֲתָא בְּרֵיהּ קַשִּׁישָׁא, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: ״הַהוּא גַּבְרָא מַאי תֶּיהְוֵי עֲלֵיהּ?״ אָמַר לֵיהּ: ״זִיל קְנִי כְּחַד מִבְּרָא״. הָנָךְ – וַדַּאי לָא קָנוּ, דְּאַכַּתִּי לֵיתַנְהוּ.

§ The Gemara relates: There was a certain man who said to his wife, before she conceived: My property is given to the sons that I will have from you. His older son from a previous marriage came and said to him: That man, i.e., me, what will become of him, i.e., will I receive nothing? He said to his son: Go and acquire a portion like one of the sons who will be born, i.e., you will receive a share as well. The Gemara comments: Those sons who were not yet born certainly did not acquire the property, and do not receive more than their share as heirs, as they are not yet in existence.

הַאי – אִית חוּלָק לְטַלְיָא בִּמְקוֹם בְּנַיָּא, אוֹ לֵית לֵיהּ חוּלָק לְטַלְיָא בִּמְקוֹם בְּנַיָּא? רַבִּי אָבִין וְרַבִּי מְיָישָׁא וְרַבִּי יִרְמְיָה דְּאָמְרִי: אִית חוּלָק לְטַלְיָא בִּמְקוֹם בְּנַיָּא. רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ וְרַבִּי חֲנִינָא בַּר פַּפִּי וְרַבִּי יִצְחָק נַפָּחָא דְּאָמְרִי: לֵית חוּלָק לְטַלְיָא בִּמְקוֹם בְּנַיָּא.

The Gemara asks: With regard to this son, does the young man [letalya] receive an additional share of the inheritance in a case where there are other sons from the second wife, since his father gave him an additional share, or does the young man not receive an additional share of the inheritance where there are other sons? There are Rabbi Avin, and Rabbi Meyasha, and Rabbi Yirmeya, who all say: The young man does receive an additional share of the inheritance where there are other sons. And there are Rabbi Abbahu, and Rabbi Ḥanina bar Pappi, and Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa, who all say: The young man does not receive an additional share of the inheritance where there are other sons.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ לְרַבִּי יִרְמְיָה: הִלְכְתָא כְּווֹתַן, אוֹ הִלְכְתָא כְּוָתַיְיכוּ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: פְּשִׁיטָא דְּהִלְכְתָא כְּווֹתַן – דְּקַשִּׁישְׁנָא מִינַּיְיכוּ, וְלָאו הִלְכְתָא כְּווֹתַיְיכוּ – דְּדַרְדְּקֵי אַתּוּן. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מִידֵּי בְּקַשִּׁישׁוּתָא תַּלְיָא מִילְּתָא?! בְּטַעְמָא תַּלְיָא מִילְּתָא! וְטַעְמָא מַאי? זִיל לְגַבֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי אָבִין – דְּאַסְבַּרְתַּהּ נִיהֲלֵיהּ,

Rabbi Abbahu said to Rabbi Yirmeya: Is the halakha in accordance with our opinion, or is the halakha in accordance with your opinion? Rabbi Yirmeya said to Rabbi Abbahu: It is obvious that the halakha is in accordance with our opinion, as we are older than you, and the halakha is not in accordance with your opinion, as you are youngsters [dardekei]. Rabbi Abbahu said to Rabbi Yirmeya in reply: Does the matter depend upon age? The matter depends upon the reason behind the ruling. Rabbi Yirmeya asked him: And what is your reason? Rabbi Abbahu replied: Go to Rabbi Avin, as I explained this halakha to him,