בבא בתרא קמד

בבא בתרא קמד

אוּדְיָינֵי – הַשָּׂכָר לָאֶמְצַע. וְהָא אוּדְיָינֵי, דְּמֵחֲמַת עַצְמוֹ הוּא! שָׁאנֵי אוּדְיָינֵי – דְּלִנְטִירוּתָא הוּא דַּעֲבִידָא, וַאֲפִילּוּ קְטַנִּים נָמֵי מָצוּ מְנַטְּרִי לַהּ.

a mortar [udaini], which people pay to use, the rent goes to the middle? But isn’t the profit accruing from a mortar considered profit accruing on his, i.e., the adult son’s, own account, as the adult son must supervise its operation, and there is no outlay from the property? The Gemara dismisses this objection: A mortar is different, as for its typical use it can suffice with supervision, and even minors are able to supervise its use. Since the adults do not contribute anything more than the minors, they cannot demand a greater share of the profits.

אָמְרוּ ״רְאוּ מַה שֶּׁהִנִּיחַ אַבָּא, הֲרֵי אָנוּ עוֹשִׂין וְאוֹכְלִין״ – הִשְׁבִּיחוּ לְעַצְמָן. רַב סָפְרָא שְׁבַק אֲבוּהּ זוּזֵי. שַׁקְלִינְהוּ, עֲבַד בְּהוּ עִיסְקָא. אֲתוֹ אַחֵי, תַּבְעוּהוּ בְּדִינָא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרָבָא; אֲמַר לְהוּ: רַב סָפְרָא גַּבְרָא רַבָּה הוּא, לָא שָׁבֵיק גִּירְסֵיהּ וְטָרַח לְאַחֲרִינֵי.

§ The mishna teaches: If the adult sons said from the outset: See that which our father left behind; we are going to engage in business with our share of the property and profit from it, then they enhanced the property for themselves. The Gemara relates: Rav Safra’s father left him dinars. Rav Safra took them and entered into a business venture with them. His brothers came and charged him in a court of law before Rava, claiming their share of the profits. Rava said to them: Rav Safra is a great man; he does not abandon his studies and toil for others. It is therefore clear that if he invested the money, it was for his own profit, even if he did not explicitly declare so at the outset.

הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁהִשְׁבִּיחָה אֶת הַנְּכָסִים – הִשְׁבִּיחָה לָאֶמְצַע. אִשָּׁה בְּנִכְסֵי יַתְמֵי מַאי עֲבִידְתַּהּ? אָמַר רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה: בְּאִשָּׁה יוֹרֶשֶׁת.

§ The mishna teaches: With regard to a wife who enhanced the property of her deceased husband, she enhanced it so that the profit goes to the middle. The Gemara asks: What is the deceased’s wife doing with the orphans’ property? What rights does she have to the property? Rav Yirmeya said: The mishna is referring to a wife who is an heiress, e.g., if she were the daughter of her husband’s brother, and both brothers died without leaving sons, in which case she inherits in her father’s stead.

פְּשִׁיטָא! מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: כֵּיוָן דְּלָאו דַּרְכַּהּ לְמִטְרַח, אַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא פָּרֵישׁ – כְּמוֹ דְּפָרֵישׁ דָּמֵי, קָמַשְׁמַע לַן.

The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious that the halakha in this case is the same as with regard to any other heir? The Gemara replies: It is necessary to state this, lest you say that since it is not a woman’s way to toil to enhance property, then even though she did not expressly state that she is toiling for herself, it is considered as though she had expressly stated this. The mishna teaches us that only if she expressly stated this do the profits accrue to her.

וְאִם אָמְרָה: ״רְאוּ מַה שֶּׁהִנִּיחַ לִי בַּעְלִי, הֲרֵינִי עוֹשָׂה וְאוֹכֶלֶת״ – הִשְׁבִּיחָה לְעַצְמָהּ. פְּשִׁיטָא! מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: כֵּיוָן דִּשְׁבִיחָא לַהּ מִילְּתָא, דְּאָמְרִי: קָא טָרְחָא קַמֵּי יַתְמֵי – אַחוֹלֵי אַחֲלָה; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

The mishna teaches: And if she said: See that which my husband left me; I am going to engage in business with my share and profit from it, then she enhanced the property for herself. The Gemara asks: Isn’t this obvious? The Gemara explains: It is necessary to state this, lest you say that since it is praiseworthy for her to enhance the property on behalf of the orphans, as people will say: See how she toils for the orphans, she relinquishes her right to the profits and they should divide them equally. The mishna teaches us that this is not the case.

אָמַר רַבִּי חֲנִינָא: הַמַּשִּׂיא אִשָּׁה לִבְנוֹ גָּדוֹל בַּבַּיִת – קְנָאוֹ. וְדַוְקָא גָּדוֹל, וְדַוְקָא בְּתוּלָה, וְדַוְקָא אִשְׁתּוֹ רִאשׁוֹנָה, וְדַוְקָא שֶׁהִשִּׂיאוֹ רִאשׁוֹן.

Rabbi Ḥanina says: In the case of one who marries a woman to his eldest son and arranges the wedding feast in a house that he designated for the purpose of the wedding canopy and the wedding feast, the son acquires the house as a gift. The Gemara notes: And this is the halakha specifically in the case of the eldest son, and specifically if he is marrying a virgin, and specifically when this woman is his first wife, and specifically when the father married him off first among his sons. When all these conditions exist, it is presumed that the father has a particular fondness toward the son, due to which he gave him the house.

פְּשִׁיטָא, יִיחֵד לוֹ אָבִיו בַּיִת וַעֲלִיָּיה – בַּיִת קָנָה, עֲלִיָּיה לֹא קָנָה. בַּיִת וְאַכְסַדְרָה, מַהוּ? שְׁנֵי בָתִּים זֶה לִפְנִים מִזֶּה, מַהוּ? תֵּיקוּ.

The Gemara clarifies the details of this halakha: It is obvious that if his father designated a house for the son’s nuptials and there is an upper story above the house, the son acquired the house, but he did not acquire the upper story. If he designated a house for the son, and there is a portico [ve’akhsadra] in front of the house, what is the halakha? If there were two houses, one within the other, and the inner one was designated for the son’s nuptials, what is the halakha? The Gemara concludes: These questions shall stand unresolved.

מֵיתִיבִי: יִיחֵד לוֹ אָבִיו בַּיִת וּכְלֵי בַיִת – כְּלֵי בַיִת קָנָה, בַּיִת לֹא קָנָה! אָמַר רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה: כְּגוֹן שֶׁהָיָה אוֹצָרוֹ שֶׁל אָבִיו מוּנָּח שָׁם. נְהַרְדָּעֵי אָמְרִי: אֲפִילּוּ שׁוֹבָכָא דְיוֹנֵי. רַב יְהוּדָה וְרַב פַּפֵּי אָמְרִי: אֲפִילּוּ עֲצִיצָא דְהַרְסָנָא. מָר זוּטְרָא אַנְסְבֵיהּ לִבְרֵיהּ, וּתְלָא לֵיהּ סַנְדָּלָא. רַב אָשֵׁי אַנְסְבֵיהּ לִבְרֵיהּ, וּתְלָא לֵיהּ אֲשִׁישָׁא דְמִשְׁחָא.

The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: If his father designated a house and furniture for his son’s nuptials, the son acquired the furniture, but he did not acquire the house. Rabbi Yirmeya says: This is referring to a case where his father’s storeroom was placed there. It is clear that just as his father did not intend to give him the storeroom, neither did he intend to give him the house. The Sages of Neharde’a say: Even if there is only a dovecote in the house that belongs to the father, the son does not acquire the house. Rav Yehuda and Rav Pappi say: Even if there is only a pot [atzitza] of small fried fish, the son does not acquire the house. Mar Zutra married off his son, and hung a sandal in the house, to indicate that he did not intend to give the house as a gift. Rav Ashi married off his son, and hung a jug [ashisha] of oil in the house.

אָמַר מָר זוּטְרָא, הָנֵי תְּלָת מִילֵּי שַׁוִּינְהוּ רַבָּנַן כְּהִלְכְתָא בְּלָא טַעְמָא: חֲדָא – הָא, אִידַּךְ – דְּאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הַכּוֹתֵב כׇּל נְכָסָיו לְאִשְׁתּוֹ – לֹא עֲשָׂאָהּ אֶלָּא אַפּוֹטְרוֹפָּא. אִידַּךְ – דְּאָמַר רַב: מָנֶה לִי בְּיָדְךָ, תְּנֵהוּ לִפְלוֹנִי; בְּמַעֲמַד שְׁלָשְׁתָּן – קָנָה.

Mar Zutra says: These three matters were instituted by the Sages as a halakha without any explanation of their process, i.e., they instituted these enactments despite the fact that the mechanism by which they function is unclear: One is this halakha with regard to the son acquiring the house designated for his nuptials. Another is that which Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: One who writes a deed granting all of his property to his wife renders her only a steward of his property, i.e., he intends only to put her in charge of the property and she does not acquire it. Another is that which Rav says: With regard to one who says to another: I have one hundred dinars in your possession; give it to so-and-so, if this occurred in the presence of all three parties, that third person acquires it, without need of witnesses or a formal act of acquisition.

מַתְנִי׳ אַחִין הַשּׁוּתָּפִין שֶׁנָּפַל אֶחָד מֵהֶן לְאוּמָּנוּת – נָפַל לָאֶמְצַע. חָלָה וְנִתְרַפֵּא – נִתְרַפֵּא מִשֶּׁל עַצְמוֹ.

MISHNA: With regard to brothers who were also partners, and it occurred that one of them was summoned to public service, which is assessed per family, he was summoned from the middle, i.e., the profits or expenses of his service are divided among them. If one of the brothers became sick and sought treatment, the cost of the treatment is paid from his own resources.

גְּמָ׳ תָּנָא: הַאי אוּמָּנוּת – לְאוּמָּנוּת הַמֶּלֶךְ. תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: אֶחָד מִן הָאַחִין שֶׁמִּינּוּהוּ גַּבַּאי אוֹ פּוּלְמוֹסְטוּס; אִם מֵחֲמַת הָאַחִין – לָאַחִין, אִם מֵחֲמַת עַצְמוֹ – לְעַצְמוֹ.

GEMARA: The Sages taught: This service mentioned in the mishna is referring to forced imperial service, but if one of the brothers engaged in a trade of his own volition, the profits are his alone. The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta 10:5): In the case of one of the brothers who was appointed as a tax collector or a military commander [polmustos], a position with the potential for profit, if he was appointed on account of all the brothers, as the procedure was to impress a representative from each family for this purpose, any profit accrues to all the brothers. If he was appointed on account of himself, the profit accrues to himself.

אִם מֵחֲמַת אַחִין לָאַחִין – פְּשִׁיטָא! לָא צְרִיכָא, דְּחָרִיף טְפֵי; מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: חוּרְפֵּיהּ גָּרֵים לֵיהּ, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious that if he was appointed on account of all the brothers, then the profit accrues to all the brothers? The Gemara responds: No, it is necessary to state this halakha in a case where the brother appointed was sharper, i.e., more capable, than the other brothers. Lest you say that his sharpness caused him to be selected for the position, and he should receive all the profits, the baraita teaches us that his talent notwithstanding, since he was selected as a representative of the family, the profit accrues to all the brothers.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: אֶחָד מִן הָאַחִין שֶׁנָּטַל מָאתַיִם זוּז לִלְמוֹד תּוֹרָה אוֹ לִלְמוֹד אוּמָּנוּת – יְכוֹלִין הָאַחִין לוֹמַר לוֹ: אִם אַתָּה אֶצְלֵנוּ – יֵשׁ לְךָ מְזוֹנוֹת, אִם אֵין אַתָּה אֶצְלֵנוּ – אֵין לְךָ מְזוֹנוֹת.

The Sages taught: With regard to one of the brothers, who took two hundred dinars from the common inheritance to support himself when he went to another place to study Torah or to learn a trade, the brothers can say to him: If you are here with us, you are entitled to sustenance along with us. If you are not here with us, you are not entitled to sustenance.

וְלִיתְּבוּ לֵיהּ כֹּל הֵיכָא דְּאִיתֵיהּ! מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ לְרַב הוּנָא, דְּאָמַר רַב הוּנָא: בִּרְכַּת הַבַּיִת בְּרוּבָּה. וְלִיתְּבוּ לֵיהּ לְפִי בִּרְכַּת הַבַּיִת! הָכִי נָמֵי.

The Gemara asks: But shouldn’t they give him his sustenance wherever he is? The Gemara answers: This ruling supports the opinion of Rav Huna, as Rav Huna says: The blessing of the house is in its abundance. This means that the extent to which blessing permeates a home is proportionate to the number of people who live there, and when many people live together the expenses per capita decrease. The Gemara asks: But shouldn’t they give him his sustenance according to the blessing of the house, i.e., the expenses he would incur even if he were in the house? The Gemara responds: Indeed, they are required to provide for those expenses that he would incur in any event.

חָלָה וְנִתְרַפֵּא – נִתְרַפֵּא מִשֶּׁל עַצְמוֹ. שְׁלַח רָבִין מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי אִלְעָא: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא שֶׁחָלָה בִּפְשִׁיעָה, אֲבָל בְּאוֹנֶס – נִתְרַפֵּא מִן הָאֶמְצַע. הֵיכִי דָּמֵי בִּפְשִׁיעָה? כִּדְרַבִּי חֲנִינָא – דְּאָמַר רַבִּי חֲנִינָא: הַכֹּל בִּידֵי שָׁמַיִם, חוּץ מִצִּנִּים פַּחִים; שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״צִנִּים פַּחִים בְּדֶרֶךְ עִקֵּשׁ, שׁוֹמֵר נַפְשׁוֹ יִרְחַק מֵהֶם״.

§ The mishna teaches: If one of the brothers became sick and sought treatment, the cost of the treatment is paid from his own resources. Ravin sent a ruling in the name of Rabbi Ela: They taught this only in a case where he became ill through negligence. But if he became ill through circumstances beyond his control, the cost of the treatment is paid from the middle, i.e., from the common inheritance. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances in which it is considered negligence? This is in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Ḥanina, as Rabbi Ḥanina says: All occurrences that befall man are in the hand of Heaven except for colds and obstacles [paḥim], from which one is able to protect himself, as it is stated: “Colds and snares are on the path of the crooked; he who guards his soul shall keep far from them” (Proverbs 22:5).

מַתְנִי׳ הָאַחִין שֶׁעָשׂוּ מִקְצָתָן שׁוֹשְׁבִינוּת בְּחַיֵּי הָאָב, חָזְרָה שׁוֹשְׁבִינוּת – חָזְרָה לָאֶמְצַע; שֶׁהַשּׁוֹשְׁבִינוּת נִגְבֵּית בְּבֵית דִּין. אֲבָל הַשּׁוֹלֵחַ לַחֲבֵירוֹ כַּדֵּי יַיִן וְכַדֵּי שֶׁמֶן – אֵין נִגְבִּין בְּבֵית דִּין, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהֵן גְּמִילוּת חֲסָדִים.

MISHNA: It was common practice for friends of a groom to give him gifts in order to help cover the expenses of the wedding feast. These gifts are known as gifts of groomsmen, and would be reciprocated in turn. While the groom and the groomsman were at times the recipient and the giver of the gifts, respectively, the gifts were at times provided by the father of the groomsman and received by the father of the groom. In the case of brothers, some of whom brought gifts of groomsmen in their father’s lifetime, which were provided by their father, when the gifts of groomsmen are reciprocated after the father’s death, when one of the brothers gets married, they are reciprocated to the middle, i.e., the gift is divided among the brothers. This is because gifts of groomsmen are a legal debt owed to the father, collectible in court. But with regard to one who sends his friend jugs of wine or jugs of oil, a reciprocal gift is not collectible in court, because they are considered acts of kindness.

גְּמָ׳ וּרְמִינְהִי: שָׁלַח לוֹ אָבִיו שׁוֹשְׁבִינוּת, כְּשֶׁהִיא חוֹזֶרֶת – חוֹזֶרֶת לוֹ. נִשְׁתַּלְּחָה לְאָבִיו שׁוֹשְׁבִינוּת, כְּשֶׁהִיא חוֹזֶרֶת – חוֹזֶרֶת מִן הָאֶמְצַע. אָמַר רַבִּי אַסִּי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: כִּי תְּנַן נָמֵי מַתְנִיתִין, נִשְׁתַּלְּחָה לְאָבִיו תְּנַן.

GEMARA: And the Gemara raises a contradiction between the mishna’s ruling that the gifts of groomsmen are reciprocated to the middle, and the first clause of a baraita: If a father sent his son with gifts of groomsmen, when they are reciprocated when that son gets married, they are reciprocated to that son. If his father was sent gifts of groomsmen for the wedding of one of his sons, when they are reciprocated from the father’s estate, they are reciprocated from the middle, i.e., the cost of the gift is divided among the brothers. Rabbi Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: When we learned the mishna as well, we learned it as teaching the halakha with regard to gifts of groomsmen that were sent to the father for the wedding of one of his sons, not with regard to gifts of groomsmen sent by the father.

וְהָא ״אַחִין שֶׁעָשׂוּ מִקְצָתָן שׁוֹשְׁבִינוּת״ קָתָנֵי! תְּנִי: ״לְמִקְצָתָן״. וְהָא ״חָזְרָה שׁוֹשְׁבִינוּת״ קָתָנֵי! הָכִי קָאָמַר: חָזְרָה לִגְבּוֹת – נִגְבֵּית מֵאֶמְצַע.

The Gemara objects: But the mishna teaches the halakha with regard to brothers, some of whom brought gifts of groomsmen. The Gemara responds: Emend the text of the mishna and teach it as saying: With regard to brothers, to some of whom gifts of groomsmen were brought. The Gemara objects: But the mishna explicitly teaches the halakha if the gifts of groomsmen are reciprocated. The Gemara responds: This is what the mishna is saying: When it is collected from the brothers in return, it is collected from the middle.

רַבִּי אַסִּי אָמַר: לָא קַשְׁיָא; כָּאן בִּסְתָם, כָּאן בִּמְפָרֵשׁ – כִּדְתַנְיָא: שָׁלַח לוֹ אָבִיו שׁוֹשְׁבִינוּת, כְּשֶׁהִיא חוֹזֶרֶת – חוֹזֶרֶת לוֹ. שָׁלַח אָבִיו שׁוֹשְׁבִינוּת סְתָם, כְּשֶׁהִיא חוֹזֶרֶת – חוֹזֶרֶת לָאֶמְצַע.

Rabbi Asi says: Even if the text of the mishna is not emended, it is not difficult and can be reconciled with the baraita. Here in the mishna it is referring to where the father sent the gifts of groomsmen without specifying which son should be ascribed credit for bringing the gifts. There in the baraita, it is referring to where the father specified that the credit for the gifts of groomsmen should be ascribed to a specific son, who receives gifts in return, as it is taught in another baraita: If his father sent gifts of groomsmen on his, i.e., the son’s, behalf, then when the gift is reciprocated, it is reciprocated to him, i.e., to that specific son. If his father sent gifts of groomsmen without specification, then when the gift is reciprocated, it is reciprocated to the middle.

וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: הָכָא בְּיָבָם עָסְקִינַן, שֶׁאֵינוֹ נוֹטֵל בָּרָאוּי כִּבְמוּחְזָק.

And Shmuel says: Here in the mishna we are dealing with a man whose married brother died childless [yavam]. The son who brought the gifts of groomsmen died childless, his brother entered into levirate marriage with the widow, and the gifts of groomsmen were reciprocated at the wedding of the yavam. Although the yavam inherits the property of his brother, since the reciprocal gifts were not extant when his brother died, they do not belong solely to him; rather, they are divided among the brothers. This is because the yavam does not take in inheritance the property due the deceased as he does the property the deceased already possessed.

מִכְּלָל דְּאִידַּךְ – מְשַׁלֵּם? לֵימָא: ״תְּנוּ לִי שׁוֹשְׁבִינִי וְאֶשְׂמַח עִמּוֹ״!

The Gemara asks: Is it possible to conclude by inference from Shmuel’s statement that the other side, i.e., a friend who had received gifts of groomsmen from the deceased, is obligated to repay the gifts of groomsmen he received from the deceased? Why should this be so? Let him say: Give me my groomsman and I will rejoice with him. Since the one who gave him the gifts is deceased, he is not obligated to reciprocate.

מִי לָא תַּנְיָא: מָקוֹם שֶׁנָּהֲגוּ לְהַחְזִיר קִדּוּשִׁין – מַחְזִירִין, מָקוֹם שֶׁנָּהֲגוּ שֶׁלֹּא לְהַחְזִיר – אֵין מַחְזִירִין. וְאָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר מָר עוּקְבָא אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא שֶׁמֵּתָה הִיא, אֲבָל מֵת הוּא – אֵין מַחְזִירִין, מַאי טַעְמָא? יְכוֹלָה הִיא שֶׁתֹּאמַר:

Isn’t it taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Pesaḥim 3:1) with regard to similar circumstances: In a place where people are accustomed to return the betrothal money when the betrothed man or woman dies, they return it; in a place where people are accustomed not to return it, they do not return it. And Rav Yosef bar Abba says that Mar Ukva says that Shmuel says: They taught this only with regard to when the woman dies, in which case one follows the local custom. But if the man dies, all agree that they do not return the money. What is the reason for this? Since she can say: