בבא בתרא מח

בבא בתרא מח

״יַקְרִיב אֹתוֹ״ – מְלַמֵּד שֶׁכּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ. יָכוֹל בְּעַל כׇּרְחוֹ? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״לִרְצוֹנוֹ״. הָא כֵּיצַד? כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר: ״רוֹצֶה אֲנִי״.

With regard to one who pledges to bring a burnt-offering, the verse states: “If his offering be a burnt-offering of the herd, he shall offer it a male without blemish; he shall bring it to the door of the Tent of Meeting, according to his will, before the Lord” (Leviticus 1:3). The seemingly superfluous phrase “he shall offer it” teaches that they can coerce him to bring the offering. One might have thought that it can be offered entirely against his will, by taking it from his possession and sacrificing it. Therefore, the verse states: “According to his will” (Leviticus 1:3). How can these texts be reconciled? They coerce him with various punishments until he says: I want to bring the offering. This seems to prove that consent resulting from coercion is considered to be valid consent. Perhaps this principle can apply to acquisition, as a source for Rav Huna’s ruling.

וְדִלְמָא שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּנִיחָא לֵיהּ דְּתִיהְוֵי לֵיהּ כַּפָּרָה! וְאֶלָּא מִסֵּיפָא: וְכֵן אַתָּה אוֹמֵר בְּגִיטֵּי נָשִׁים – כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר: ״רוֹצֶה אֲנִי״.

The Gemara rejects this proof: But perhaps there it is different, since he is in fact amenable to achieving atonement, despite his earlier statement to the contrary. But rather, prove Rav Huna’s ruling from the latter clause of a mishna (Arakhin 21a): And similarly you find this halakha with bills of divorce, that when the court rules that he must divorce his wife, they coerce him until he says: I want to divorce my wife.

וְדִלְמָא שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּמִצְוָה לִשְׁמוֹעַ דִּבְרֵי חֲכָמִים! אֶלָּא סְבָרָא הוּא – אַגַּב אוּנְסֵיהּ גָּמַר וּמַקְנֵה.

The Gemara rejects this proof as well: But perhaps there it is different, because it is a mitzva to listen to the statement of the Sages. The assumption is that when he is required by the court to divorce his wife, his real desire is to perform the mitzva of listening to the Sages, and therefore he actually wants to divorce her. This does not apply to the case of a transaction performed under duress. Rather, Rav Huna’s ruling does not have a source in a mishna or baraita, but is based on logical reasoning: By means of his being coerced, the seller then willingly decides to sell the field and transfers it.

מוֹתֵיב רַב יְהוּדָה: גֵּט הַמְעוּשֶּׂה; בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל – כָּשֵׁר, וּבְגוֹיִם – פָּסוּל. וּבְגוֹיִם – חוֹבְטִין אוֹתוֹ, וְאוֹמְרִין לוֹ: עֲשֵׂה מַה שֶּׁיִּשְׂרָאֵל אוֹמֵר לָךְ. וְאַמַּאי? הָתָם נָמֵי, נֵימָא: אַגַּב אוּנְסֵיהּ גָּמַר וּמְגָרֵשׁ!

Rav Yehuda raises an objection to Rav Huna’s ruling from a mishna (Gittin 88b): With regard to a bill of divorce that the husband was compelled by the court to write and give his wife, if he was compelled by a Jewish court it is valid, but if he was compelled by gentiles it is not valid. And with regard to gentiles, they may beat him at the request of the Jewish court and say to him: Do what the Jews are telling you, and the divorce would then be valid. The Gemara asks: But why is a bill of divorce compelled by a gentile court invalid? There too, let us say that as a result of his coercion, the husband decides to do what the court says and divorces her.

הָא אִיתְּמַר עֲלַהּ, אָמַר רַב מְשַׁרְשְׁיָא: דְּבַר תּוֹרָה – אֲפִילּוּ בְּגוֹיִם כָּשֵׁר, וּמַה טַּעַם אָמְרוּ בְּגוֹיִים פָּסוּל? כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא תְּהֵא כׇּל אַחַת וְאַחַת הוֹלֶכֶת וְתוֹלָה עַצְמָהּ בְּיַד גּוֹי, וּמַפְקַעַת עַצְמָהּ מִיַּד בַּעְלָהּ.

The Gemara answers: In fact that reasoning is correct, as for this reason wasn’t it stated with regard to that mishna that Rav Mesharshiyya says: By Torah law a bill of divorce that the husband was compelled to give, even if he was compelled by gentiles, is valid. And what is the reason the Sages said that if it is compelled by gentiles it is not valid? It is so that each and every woman will not go and through temptation or bribery depend on a gentile to compel her husband to divorce her, and thereby release herself from her husband illegitimately.

מוֹתֵיב רַב הַמְנוּנָא: לָקַח מִסִּיקָרִיקוֹן, וְחָזַר וְלָקַח מִבַּעַל הַבַּיִת – מִקָּחוֹ בָּטֵל. וְאַמַּאי? הָתָם נָמֵי נֵימָא: אַגַּב אוּנְסֵיהּ גְּמַר וּמַקְנֵי!

Rav Hamnuna raises an objection to Rav Huna’s ruling from a mishna (Gittin 55b): If one purchased land from a Sicarius and afterward returned and purchased the same field from the prior owner, his purchase is void, as the prior owner of the field can say that he did not actually intend to sell the field to this buyer. But why is the sale invalid? There too, let us say that by means of his being coerced, the seller then willingly decides to sell the field and transfers it.

הָא אִתְּמַר עֲלַהּ, אָמַר רַב: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ: ״לֵךְ חֲזֵק וּקְנִי״, אֲבָל בִּשְׁטָר – קָנָה.

The Gemara answers: In fact that reasoning is correct, as it was stated with regard to that mishna that Rav says: They taught that the purchase from the prior owner after the purchase from a Sicarius is void only when the prior owner said to the buyer at the time of the sale: Go take possession and thereby acquire the field, but did not write a bill of sale. But if the transaction was performed along with a bill of sale being given, the buyer acquires the field.

וְלִשְׁמוּאֵל, דְּאָמַר: אַף בִּשְׁטָר נָמֵי לֹא קָנָה, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? מוֹדֶה שְׁמוּאֵל הֵיכָא דִּיהַב זוּזֵי.

The Gemara asks: And according to Shmuel, who says: He does not acquire the field even if the transaction was performed along with a bill of sale being given, what can be said? The Gemara answers: Shmuel concedes that the sale is valid where the buyer gave money for the field even though the owner sold it under duress, as is the case in the ruling of Rav Huna.

וּלְרַב בִּיבִי, דִּמְסַיֵּים בַּהּ מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן: קַרְקַע אֵין לוֹ, מָעוֹת יֵשׁ לוֹ – מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? רַב בִּיבִי מֵימְרָא הוּא, וּמֵימְרָא לְרַב הוּנָא לָא סְבִירָא לֵיהּ.

The Gemara asks: And according to Rav Beivai, who concludes that statement of Rav Huna with a comment in the name of Rav Naḥman: The robber does not have rights to the land, but he does have rights to the money that he paid for the land, and the owner has to reimburse him, what can be said? Rav Beivai, who is referring to a case where there was a payment, as the robber is being reimbursed, seems to hold that the sale is invalid even where the robber paid for the field. The Gemara answers: The statement of Rav Beivai is an amoraic statement, not a citation of a tannaitic ruling, and Rav Huna, who is also an amora, does not hold in accordance with that amoraic statement.

אָמַר רָבָא, הִלְכְתָא: תַּלְיוּהוּ וְזַבֵּין – זְבִינֵיהּ זְבִינֵי. וְלָא אֲמַרַן אֶלָּא

Rava says: The halakha is that if one was suspended and thereby coerced to sell a certain item, and he sold it, his sale is valid. And we said that this is the halakha only

בְּ״שָׂדֶה״ סְתָם, אֲבָל בְּ״שָׂדֶה זוֹ״ – לֹא.

in a case where the seller was compelled to sell an unspecified field. Since he had a choice as to which field to sell, the presumption is that he sold it sincerely. But in a case where the one coercing him specified this specific field to be sold, the sale is not valid, as the seller did not decide freely on any aspect of the sale.

וּבְ״שָּׂדֶה זוֹ״ נָמֵי לָא אֲמַרַן – אֶלָּא דְּלָא אַרְצִי זוּזֵי, אֲבָל אַרְצִי זוּזֵי – לָא.

And even in a case where the one coercing him specified this specific field to be sold, we said that the sale is invalid only where the seller did not count [artzei] the money for the field, but if the seller did count the money, then we do not say that the sale is invalid.

וְלָא אֲמַרַן אֶלָּא דְּלָא הֲוָה לְאִישְׁתְּמוֹטֵי, אֲבָל הֲוָה לֵיהּ לְאִישְׁתְּמוֹטֵי – לָא.

And we said that the sale is invalid in the case of a specified field when money was not counted only where the seller had no way to avoid the coercion. But if the seller had a way to avoid the coercion and did not avoid it, then we do not say that the sale is invalid.

וְהִלְכְתָא בְּכוּלְּהוּ דְּהָווּ זְבִינֵיהּ זְבִינֵי, וַאֲפִילּוּ בְּשָׂדֶה זוֹ – דְּהָא אִשָּׁה כְּ״שָׂדֶה זוֹ״ דָּמְיָא, וְאָמַר אַמֵּימָר: תַּלְיוּהָ וְקַדֵּישׁ – קִדּוּשָׁיו קִדּוּשִׁין.

The Gemara concludes: And the halakha in all of these cases is that the sale is valid, and this is so even in the case of a specified field. This can be inferred because the case of a woman forced to accept betrothal is comparable to the case of a specified field, as a specific man is performing the betrothal, and Ameimar says: If a man suspended a woman and betrothed her, his betrothal is valid, despite the fact that she was coerced.

מָר בַּר רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: בְּאִשָּׁה וַדַּאי קִדּוּשִׁין לָא הָווּ; הוּא עָשָׂה שֶׁלֹּא כַּהוֹגֶן, לְפִיכָךְ עָשׂוּ עִמּוֹ שֶׁלֹּא כַּהוֹגֶן – וְאַפְקְעִינְהוּ רַבָּנַן לְקִידּוּשֵׁיהּ מִינֵּיהּ.

Mar bar Rav Ashi said: In the case of a woman who was forced to accept betrothal, the betrothal is certainly not valid. This man acted improperly; consequently, the Sages acted improperly with him, and the Sages expropriated her betrothal from him.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: תִּינַח דְּקַדֵּישׁ בְּכַסְפָּא, קַדֵּישׁ בְּבִיאָה מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: שַׁוְּיוּהּ רַבָּנַן לִבְעִילָתוֹ בְּעִילַת זְנוּת.

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: This works out well in a case where he betrothed his wife with money, as it is possible to say that the Sages expropriated from the possession of its owner the money used for the betrothal, resulting in a retroactive cancellation of the betrothal. But if he betrothed her by means of sexual intercourse, then what is there to say? Rav Ashi said to him: The Sages deemed his sexual intercourse as licentious sexual intercourse, which does not create a bond of betrothal.

טָאבִי תְּלָא לְפָאפִּי אַכִּינָּרָא, וְזַבֵּין. חֲתַם רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אַמּוֹדָעָא, וְאַאַשְׁקָלְתָּא. אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: מַאן דְּחָתֵים אַמּוֹדָעָא – שַׁפִּיר חָתֵים, וּמַאן דְּחָתֵים אַאַשְׁקָלְתָּא – שַׁפִּיר חָתֵים.

§ The Gemara relates: Someone named Tavi suspended another person named Pafi on a kinara and compelled him to sell his field. Rabba bar bar Ḥana signed both on Pafi’s preemptive declaration nullifying the sale (see 40b) and on the bill of sale [ashkalta]. Rav Huna said: The one who signed on the preemptive declaration acted well by signing, and the one who signed on the bill of sale acted well by signing.

מָה נַפְשָׁךְ? אִי מוֹדָעָא – לָא אַשְׁקָלְתָּא, וְאִי אַשְׁקָלְתָּא – לָא מוֹדָעָא! הָכִי קָאָמַר: אִי לָאו מוֹדָעָא, מַאן דְּחָתֵים אַאַשְׁקָלְתָּא – שַׁפִּיר חָתֵים. רַב הוּנָא לְטַעְמֵיהּ – דְּאָמַר רַב הוּנָא: תַּלְיוּהוּ וְזַבֵּין – זְבִינֵיהּ זְבִינֵי.

The Gemara challenges: Whichever way you look at it, Rav Huna’s statement is problematic. If the preemptive declaration is valid, then there is no place for a bill of sale. And if the bill of sale is valid, then there is no place for a preemptive declaration. How can Rav Huna commend signing on both of these mutually exclusive documents? The Gemara explains: This is what Rav Huna is saying: If it were not for his also having signed the preemptive declaration, the one who signed on the bill of sale acted well by signing. In this statement, Rav Huna conforms to his line of reasoning, as Rav Huna says: If one was suspended and thereby coerced to sell a certain item and he sold it, his sale is valid.

אִינִי?! וְהָאָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: הָעֵדִים שֶׁאָמְרוּ ״אֲמָנָה הָיוּ דְּבָרֵינוּ״ –

The Gemara asks: Is that so that Rabba bar bar Ḥana can, by means of the preemptive declaration, invalidate the bill of sale that he himself signed? But doesn’t Rav Naḥman say: With regard to witnesses who said: Our statement that we signed was a document of trust, i.e., a false promissory note given by one person to another, trusting that he will not make use of it until there is an actual loan,