בבא מציעא ל

בבא מציעא ל

בְּתוֹרֵי דִּנְפִישׁ פְּסֵידַיְיהוּ.

that this applies to laborers who work with oxen, whose potential for causing damage is great if they are not supervised, as they will trample the crops.

שׁוֹטְחָהּ לְצוֹרְכָּהּ אֲבָל לֹא לִכְבוֹדוֹ וְכוּ׳. אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: לְצוֹרְכּוֹ וּלְצוֹרְכָּהּ, מַאי?

§ The mishna teaches that one who found a lost garment spreads it for its sake to ventilate it, but may not use it as a decoration for his own prestige. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If one spreads it both for his sake and for its sake, what is the halakha?

תָּא שְׁמַע: ״שׁוֹטְחָהּ לְצוֹרְכָּהּ״, לְצוֹרְכָּהּ – אִין. הָא לְצוֹרְכּוֹ וּלְצוֹרְכָּהּ לָא! אֵימָא סֵיפָא: ״אֲבָל לֹא לִכְבוֹדוֹ״, לִכְבוֹדוֹ הוּא דְּלָא, הָא לְצוֹרְכָּהּ וּלְצוֹרְכּוֹ – שַׁפִּיר דָּמֵי. אֶלָּא מֵהָא לֵיכָּא לְמִשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof from the mishna: He spreads it for its sake. The Gemara infers: For its sake, yes, he spreads it, but both for his sake and for its sake, he may not do so. The Gemara rejects the proof: Say the latter clause of the mishna: But not for his own prestige. The Gemara infers: It is for his prestige alone that he may not spread it, but for its sake and for his sake, one may well do so. Rather, no inference is to be learned from this mishna, as there are conflicting inferences from the first clause and the latter clause.

תָּא שְׁמַע: לֹא יִשְׁטָחֶנָּה לֹא עַל גַּבֵּי מִטָּה וְלֹא עַל גַּבֵּי מַגּוֹד לְצׇרְכּוֹ, אֲבָל יִשְׁטָחֶנָּה עַל גַּבֵּי מִטָּה וְעַל גַּבֵּי מַגּוֹד לְצׇרְכָּהּ. נִזְדַּמְּנוּ לוֹ אוֹרְחִים – לֹא יִשְׁטָחֶנָּה לֹא עַל גַּבֵּי מִטָּה וְלֹא עַל גַּבֵּי מַגּוֹד, בֵּין לְצוֹרְכּוֹ בֵּין לְצוֹרְכָּהּ!

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: If one finds a lost garment, he may not spread it on a bed or on a hanger for his sake, but he may spread it on a bed or on a hanger for its sake. If guests happened to visit, he may not spread it, neither on a bed nor on a hanger and neither for his sake nor for its sake. Apparently, it is prohibited to spread it for both his sake, to enhance his prestige before his guests, and for its sake.

שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּמִקְלָא קָלֵי לַהּ אִי מִשּׁוּם עֵינָא, אִי מִשּׁוּם גַּנָּבֵי.

The Gemara rejects this proof: It is different there, as spreading it before his guests is tantamount to burning it, either due to the evil eye that will result, or due to thieves, as once the guests are aware of the valuable item in his possession they may be tempted to steal it.

תָּא שְׁמַע: הִכְנִיסָה לְרִבְקָה וְדָשָׁה – כְּשֵׁירָה. בִּשְׁבִיל שֶׁתִּינַק וְתָדוּשׁ – פְּסוּלָה. וְהָא הָכָא דִּלְצוֹרְכּוֹ וּלְצוֹרְכָּהּ הוּא, וְקָתָנֵי פְּסוּלָה!

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: If one introduced a calf into a yoke [lirvaka] so that it would suckle, and it threshed with the cows, it is fit for use in the ritual of the heifer whose neck is broken, because the owner did not intend for it to perform labor. But if the owner introduces it so that it will suckle and it will thresh, it is unfit for use in that ritual because his intent is for the calf to perform labor, and the intentional performance of labor disqualifies it. And here, isn’t the placement of the calf in the yoke for both his sake, threshing, and for its sake, suckling, and the baraita teaches that the calf is unfit? Apparently, it is prohibited for one who found a lost garment to spread it for both his sake and for its sake.

שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״אֲשֶׁר לֹא עֻבַּד בָּהּ״ מִכׇּל מָקוֹם.

The Gemara rejects this proof by citing a verse written with regard to the heifer whose neck is broken. It is different there, as the verse states: “The Elders of that city shall take a heifer of the herd that has not been worked with and that has not pulled a yoke” (Deuteronomy 21:3), indicating that the heifer is rendered unfit in any case of labor performed. Therefore, no conclusion can be drawn with regard to spreading the garment.

אִי הָכִי אֲפִילּוּ רֵישָׁא נָמֵי!

The Gemara asks: If it is so that the calf is rendered unfit by any labor that it performed, then it should be unfit even in the first clause, where the owner did not intend for the calf to perform labor.

הָא לָא דָּמְיָא אֶלָּא לְהָא, דִּתְנַן: שָׁכַן עָלֶיהָ עוֹף – כְּשֵׁירָה, עָלָה עָלֶיהָ זָכָר – פְּסוּלָה. מַאי טַעְמָא?

The Gemara answers. This is comparable only to this other case, as we learned in a mishna (Para 2:4): If a bird rested upon a red heifer, it remains fit for use in the purification ritual, as supporting the bird on its back is considered neither labor nor comparable to pulling a yoke. If a male animal mounted it for mating, it is unfit for use in the purification ritual. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the difference between the two cases?

כִּדְרַב פָּפָּא, דְּאָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: אִי כְּתִיב ״עוּבַּד״ וְקָרֵינַן ״עוּבַּד״ – הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: אֲפִילּוּ מִמֵּילָא. וְאִי כְּתִיב ״עָבַד״ וְקָרֵינַן ״עָבַד״ – הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: עַד דַּעֲבַד בָּהּ אִיהוּ.

The difference is in accordance with the statement of Rav Pappa, as Rav Pappa says with regard to the verse written concerning the heifer whose neck is broken: “And the Elders of that city shall take a heifer of the herd that has not been worked with and that has not pulled a yoke” (Deuteronomy 21:3). If the word were written with an additional letter vav, which would mean the passive: Has been worked with [ubbad], and we also vocalized the word in the passive voice, ubbad, I would say that even if the heifer performed labor by itself, it is disqualified for use in the ritual. If the word were written without an additional letter vav, which would mean the active: He used it for labor [avad], and we also vocalized the word in the active voice, avad, I would say that indicates that the heifer was fit for use in the ritual until its owner intentionally used it for labor.

הַשְׁתָּא דִּכְתִיב ״עָבַד״ וְקָרֵינַן ״עוּבַּד״ – בָּעֵינַן ״עוּבַּד״ דּוּמְיָא דְּ״עָבַד״. מָה ״עָבַד״ דְּנִיחָא לֵיהּ, אַף ״עוּבַּד״ דְּנִיחָא לֵיהּ.

Now that the word is written without an additional letter vav as avad and we vocalize the word with an additional letter vav, as ubbad, in order to render the heifer unfit we require the situation described by the word ubbad be similar to the situation described by the word avad. Just as the word avad indicates that the owner is amenable to the performance of that labor, so too, the word ubbad means that the owner is amenable to the performance of that labor. Since the owner is amenable to the heifer mating, the heifer is rendered unfit. So too, in the first clause of the baraita: If one introduced a calf into a yoke so that it may suckle, and it threshed with the cows, it is fit for use in the ritual of the heifer whose neck is broken, because the owner is not amenable to its performing labor.

כְּלֵי כֶסֶף וּכְלֵי נְחוֹשֶׁת מִשְׁתַּמֵּשׁ בָּהֶן וְכוּ׳. תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הַמּוֹצֵא כְּלֵי עֵץ מִשְׁתַּמֵּשׁ בָּהֶן בִּשְׁבִיל שֶׁלֹּא יֵרָקְבוּ, כְּלֵי נְחוֹשֶׁת מִשְׁתַּמֵּשׁ בָּהֶן בְּחַמִּין, אֲבָל לֹא עַל יְדֵי הָאוּר, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁמַּשְׁחִיקָן. כְּלֵי כֶּסֶף מִשְׁתַּמֵּשׁ בָּהֶן בְּצוֹנֵן, אֲבָל לֹא בְּחַמִּין, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁמַּשְׁחִירָן. מַגְרֵיפוֹת וְקַרְדּוּמּוֹת מִשְׁתַּמֵּשׁ בָּהֶן בְּרַךְ, אֲבָל לֹא בְּקָשֶׁה מִפְּנֵי שֶׁמַּפְחִיתָן. כְּלֵי זָהָב וּכְלֵי זְכוּכִית לֹא יִגַּע בָּהֶן עַד שֶׁיָּבֹא אֵלִיָּהוּ.

§ The mishna teaches: If one found silver vessels or copper vessels, he may use them for their own sake; and the same halakha applies to other vessels. The Sages taught in a baraita: One who finds wooden vessels uses them, so that they will not deteriorate due to lack of use. If one found copper vessels he uses them with hot water, but not directly on the fire, due to the fact that it erodes them. If one found silver vessels he uses them with cold water, but not with hot water, because it tarnishes them. If one found rakes or axes, he may use them with soft substances but not with hard substances because using them with those substances damages them. If one found gold vessels or glass vessels, which do not deteriorate due to lack of use, he may not touch them until Elijah will come and identify the owner.

כְּדֶרֶךְ שֶׁאָמְרוּ בַּאֲבֵידָה כָּךְ אָמְרוּ בְּפִקָּדוֹן. פִּקָּדוֹן מַאי עֲבִידְתֵּיהּ גַּבֵּיהּ? אָמַר רַב אַדָּא בַּר חָמָא אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: בְּפִקָּדוֹן שֶׁהָלְכוּ בַּעֲלֵיהֶן לִמְדִינַת הַיָּם.

The baraita continues: In the manner that the Sages said with regard to a lost item, so they said with regard to a deposit. The Gemara asks: What is the bailee doing with a deposit; i.e., the owner should tend to his own item, why is the bailee using it at all? The Gemara answers: Rav Adda bar Ḥama said that Rav Sheshet said: It is referring to a deposit whose owner went to a country overseas. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the bailee to tend to the deposit until his return.

מָצָא שַׂק אוֹ קוּפָּה [וְכׇל דָּבָר] שֶׁאֵין דַּרְכּוֹ לִיטּוֹל – הֲרֵי זֶה לֹא יִטּוֹל. מְנָהָנֵי מִילֵּי? דְּתָנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״וְהִתְעַלַּמְתָּ״, פְּעָמִים שֶׁאַתָּה מִתְעַלֵּם וּפְעָמִים שֶׁאִי אַתָּה מִתְעַלֵּם.

§ The mishna teaches: If a person found a sack or a basket or any other item that it is not his typical manner to take and carry because it is beneath his dignity, he shall not take it. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? It is as the Sages taught in a baraita: It is stated with regard to the return of a lost item: “You shall not see your brother’s ox or his sheep wandering and disregard them; you shall return them to your brother” (Deuteronomy 22:1). The tanna explains that the phrase “and disregard them” means that there are occasions in which you may disregard lost items and there are occasions in which you may not disregard them.

הָא כֵּיצַד? הָיָה כֹּהֵן וְהִיא בְּבֵית הַקְּבָרוֹת, אוֹ שֶׁהָיָה זָקֵן וְאֵינָהּ לְפִי כְּבוֹדוֹ, אוֹ שֶׁהָיְתָה מְלָאכָה שֶׁלּוֹ מְרוּבָּה מִשֶּׁל חֲבֵירוֹ, לְכָךְ נֶאֱמַר: ״וְהִתְעַלַּמְתָּ מֵהֶם״.

How so; under what circumstances may one disregard a lost item? One may do so in a case where he was a priest and the lost item is in the graveyard (Leviticus 21:1–4), or where he was an elderly person and it is not in keeping with his dignity to tend to the item, or where the value of his labor was greater than the value of the lost item of the other person, i.e., if the finder was to return the item, reimbursing him for his lost wages would cost more than the value of the item; therefore, it is stated: “And disregard them.”

לְמַאי אִיצְטְרִיךְ קְרָא? אִילֵימָא לְכֹהֵן וְהִיא בְּבֵית הַקְּבָרוֹת – פְּשִׁיטָא, הַאי עֲשֵׂה וְהַאי לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה וַעֲשֵׂה, וְלָא אָתֵי עֲשֵׂה וְדָחֵי אֶת לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה וַעֲשֵׂה, וְתוּ: לָא דָּחֵינַן אִיסּוּרָא מִקַּמֵּי מָמוֹנָא.

The Gemara asks: For what case was a verse necessary to derive that one may disregard a lost item? If we say that the verse is necessary for the case of a priest and the lost item in the graveyard, it is obvious that he need not return the item, as this obligation to return the lost item is a positive mitzva: “You shall return them to your brother” (Deuteronomy 22:1), and that entry of a priest into a graveyard is prohibited by both a prohibition: “To the dead among his people he shall not defile himself” (Leviticus 21:1), and a positive mitzva: “You shall be holy” (Leviticus 21:6); and there is a principle that a positive mitzva does not override a prohibition and a positive mitzva. And furthermore, we do not override a ritual prohibition in the face of monetary matters.

אֶלָּא לְשֶׁלּוֹ מְרוּבֶּה מִשֶּׁל חֲבֵירוֹ – מִדְּרַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב נָפְקָא, דְּאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: ״אֶפֶס כִּי

The Gemara suggests: Rather, say that the verse is necessary to derive the exemption from returning the lost item in the case where the value of his labor was greater than the value of the lost item of the other. The Gemara rejects that possibility: That halakha is derived not from the phrase: “And disregard them,” but from that which Rav Yehuda says that Rav says. As Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: It is written: “Only so that

לֹא יִהְיֶה בְּךָ אֶבְיוֹן״ – שֶׁלְּךָ קוֹדֵם לְשֶׁל כׇּל אָדָם,

there shall be no needy among you” (Deuteronomy 15:4). This verse can be understood as a command, indicating that it is incumbent upon each individual to ensure that he will not become needy. Therefore, your assets take precedence over the assets of any other person.

אֶלָּא לְזָקֵן וְאֵינָהּ לְפִי כְּבוֹדוֹ.

The Gemara concludes: Rather, the verse is necessary to derive the exemption from returning the lost item in the case where he was an elderly person and it is not in keeping with his dignity to tend to the item.

אָמַר רַבָּה: הִכִּישָׁהּ – חַיָּיב בָּהּ. אַבָּיֵי הֲוָה יָתֵיב קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבָּה, חֲזָא לְהָנָךְ עִיזֵּי דְּקָיְימוּ, שְׁקַל קָלָא וּשְׁדָא בְּהוּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִיחַיַּיבְתְּ בְּהוּ, קוּם אַהְדְּרִינְהוּ.

Rabba says: If there was a lost animal and the elderly person began the process of returning it, e.g., if he struck it even once to guide it in a certain direction, he is obligated to tend to it and return it. The Gemara relates: Abaye was sitting before Rabba and saw these goats standing nearby. He picked up a clod of dirt and threw it at them, causing them to move. Rabba said to him: You have thereby obligated yourself to return them. Arise and return them to their owner.

אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: דַּרְכּוֹ לְהַחְזִיר בַּשָּׂדֶה, וְאֵין דַּרְכּוֹ לְהַחְזִיר בָּעִיר, מַהוּ? מִי אָמְרִינַן הֲשָׁבָה מְעַלְּיָא בָּעֵינַן, וְכֵיוָן דְּלָאו דַּרְכֵּיהּ לְהַחְזִיר בָּעִיר – לָא לִחַיַּיב? אוֹ דִלְמָא בַּשָּׂדֶה מִיהַת הוּא דְּאִיחַיַּיב לֵיהּ, וְכֵיוָן דְּאִיחַיַּיב עֲלֵיהּ בַּשָּׂדֶה – אִיחַיַּיב לֵיהּ בָּעִיר? תֵּיקוּ.

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: In a case of a person for whom it is his typical manner to return an item of that type in the field, where there are fewer onlookers, but it is not his typical manner to return an item of that type in the city, what is the halakha? Do we say that for one to be obligated to return a lost item we need an unequivocal obligation to return it that applies in all cases, and since it is not his typical manner to return an item of that sort in the city, let him not be obligated to return such an item at all? Or perhaps, he is obligated in any event to return the item in the field, and once he is obligated to return it in the field, he is also obligated in the city. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

אָמַר רָבָא: כֹּל שֶׁבְּשֶׁלּוֹ מַחְזִיר, בְּשֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ נָמֵי מַחְזִיר. וְכֹל שֶׁבְּשֶׁלּוֹ פּוֹרֵק וְטוֹעֵן, בְּשֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ נָמֵי פּוֹרֵק וְטוֹעֵן.

Rava says: In any case where he would recover his own item and would consider it to be in keeping with his dignity, he is also obligated to return another’s item. And any case where he unloads and loads his own animal’s burden, he is also obligated to unload and load the burden of another’s animal.

רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל בְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הֲוָה קָאָזֵיל בְּאוֹרְחָא, פְּגַע בֵּיהּ הָהוּא גַּבְרָא, הֲוָה דָּרֵי פִּתְכָּא דְאוֹפֵי, אוֹתְבִינְהוּ וְקָא מִיתְּפַח, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: דְּלִי לִי, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: כַּמָּה שָׁוִין? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: פַּלְגָא דְזוּזָא, יְהַיב לֵיהּ פַּלְגָא דְזוּזָא וְאַפְקְרֵהּ.

The Gemara relates: Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, was walking on the road. A certain man encountered him, and that man was carrying a burden that consisted of sticks of wood. He set down the wood and was resting. The man said to him: Lift them for me and place them upon me. Since it was not in keeping with the dignity of Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, to lift the wood, Rabbi Yishmael said to him: How much are they worth? The man said to him: A half-dinar. Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, gave him a half-dinar, took possession of the wood, and declared the wood ownerless.

הֲדַר זְכָה בְּהוּ, הֲדַר יְהַיב לֵיהּ פַּלְגָא דְזוּזָא וְאַפְקְרֵהּ. חַזְיֵיהּ דַּהֲוָה קָא בָּעֵי לְמֶיהְדַּר לְמִזְכֵּיה בְּהוּ, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לְכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא אַפְקַרְ[תִּי]נְהוּ וְלָךְ לָא אַפְקַרְ[תִּי]נְהוּ.

The man then reacquired the wood and again requested that Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, lift the wood for him. Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, again gave him a half-dinar, again took possession of the wood, and again declared the wood ownerless. He then saw that the man desired to reacquire the sticks of wood. Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, said to him: I declared the sticks of wood ownerless with regard to everyone else, but I did not declare them ownerless with regard to you.

וּמִי הָוֵי הֶפְקֵר כִּי הַאי גַוְונָא? וְהָתְנַן, בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: הֶפְקֵר לַעֲנִיִּים – הֶפְקֵר. וּבֵית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים: אֵינוֹ הֶפְקֵר עַד שֶׁיְּהֵא הֶפְקֵר לַעֲנִיִּים וְלַעֲשִׁירִים, כִּשְׁמִיטָּה.

The Gemara asks: But is property rendered ownerless in a case like this? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Pe’a 6:1) that Beit Shammai say: Property declared ownerless for the poor is thereby rendered ownerless. And Beit Hillel say: It is not ownerless, until the property will be ownerless for the poor and for the rich, like produce during the Sabbatical Year, which is available for all. As the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel, how could Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, declare the wood ownerless selectively, excluding the prior owner of the wood?

אֶלָּא רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל בְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי לְכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא אַפְקְרִינְהוּ, וּבְמִלְּתָא בְּעָלְמָא הוּא דְּאוֹקְמֵיהּ.

Rather, Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, actually declared the wood ownerless to everyone without exception, and it was with a mere statement that he prevented him from reacquiring the wood, i.e., he told the man not to reacquire the wood even though there was no legal impediment to that reacquisition.

וְהָא רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל בְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי זָקֵן וְאֵינָהּ לְפִי כְבוֹדוֹ הֲוָה! רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל בְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי לִפְנִים מִשּׁוּרַת הַדִּין הוּא דַּעֲבַד.

The Gemara asks: But wasn’t Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, an elderly person and it was not in keeping with his dignity to tend to the item? Why did he purchase the wood and render it ownerless in order to absolve himself of the obligation to lift the burden if he had no obligation to do so in the first place? The Gemara answers: In the case of Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, he conducted himself beyond the letter of the law, and he could have simply refused the request for help.

דְּתָנֵי רַב יוֹסֵף: ״וְהוֹדַעְתָּ לָהֶם״ – זֶה בֵּית חַיֵּיהֶם, ״אֶת הַדֶּרֶךְ״ – זוֹ גְּמִילוּת חֲסָדִים, ״אֲשֶׁר יֵלְכוּ״ – זֶה בִּיקּוּר חוֹלִים, ״בָּהּ״ – זוֹ קְבוּרָה, ״וְאֶת הַמַּעֲשֶׂה״ – זֶה הַדִּין, ״אֲשֶׁר יַעֲשׂוּן״ – זוֹ לִפְנִים מִשּׁוּרַת הַדִּין.

The Gemara cites a source for going beyond the letter of the law in the performance of mitzvot. As Rav Yosef taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “And you shall teach them the statutes and the laws, and shall show them the path wherein they shall walk and the action that they must perform” (Exodus 18:20). The baraita parses the various directives in the verse. “And you shall teach them,” that is referring to the structure of their livelihood, i.e., teach the Jewish people trades so that they may earn a living; “the path,” that is referring to acts of kindness; “they shall walk,” that is referring to visiting the ill; “wherein,” that is referring to burial; “and the action,” that is referring to acting in accordance with the letter of the law; “that they must perform,” that is referring to acting beyond the letter of the law.

אָמַר מָר: ״אֲשֶׁר יֵלְכוּ״ – זֶה בִּיקּוּר חוֹלִים, הַיְינוּ גְּמִילוּת חֲסָדִים! לֹא נִצְרְכָה אֶלָּא לְבֶן גִּילוֹ, דְּאָמַר מָר: בֶּן גִּילוֹ נוֹטֵל אֶחָד מִשִּׁשִּׁים בְּחׇלְיוֹ, וַאֲפִילּוּ הָכִי מִבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְמֵיזַל לְגַבֵּיהּ.

The Gemara analyzes the baraita. The Master said: With regard to the phrase “they shall walk,” that is referring to visiting the ill. The Gemara asks: That is a detail of acts of kindness; why does the baraita list it separately? The Gemara answers: The reference to visiting the ill is necessary only for the contemporary of the ill person, as the Master said: When one who is a contemporary of an ill person visits him, he takes one-sixtieth of his illness. Since visiting an ill contemporary involves contracting a bit of his illness, a special derivation is necessary to teach that even so, he is required to go and visit him.

״בָּהּ״ – זוֹ קְבוּרָה. הַיְינוּ גְּמִילוּת חֲסָדִים! לֹא נִצְרְכָה אֶלָּא לְזָקֵן וְאֵינָהּ לְפִי כְּבוֹדוֹ.

It was taught in the baraita: With regard to the phrase “wherein,” that is referring to burial. The Gemara asks: That is a detail of acts of kindness; why does the baraita list it separately? The Gemara answers: The reference to burial is necessary only to teach the halakha of an elderly person, and it is in a circumstance where it is not in keeping with his dignity to bury the dead. Therefore, a special derivation is necessary to teach that even so, he is required to participate in the burial.

אֲשֶׁר יַעֲשׂוּן זוֹ לִפְנִים מִשּׁוּרַת הַדִּין. דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: לֹא חָרְבָה יְרוּשָׁלַיִם אֶלָּא עַל שֶׁדָּנוּ בָּהּ דִּין תּוֹרָה. אֶלָּא דִּינֵי דְּמָגִיזְתָּא לְדַיְּינוּ?! אֶלָּא אֵימָא: שֶׁהֶעֱמִידוּ דִּינֵיהֶם עַל דִּין תּוֹרָה וְלָא עֲבַדוּ לִפְנִים מִשּׁוּרַת הַדִּין.

It was taught in the baraita: “That they must perform”; that is referring to acting beyond the letter of the law, as Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Jerusalem was destroyed only for the fact that they adjudicated cases on the basis of Torah law in the city. The Gemara asks: Rather, what else should they have done? Should they rather have adjudicated cases on the basis of arbitrary decisions [demagizeta]? Rather, say: That they established their rulings on the basis of Torah law and did not go beyond the letter of the law.

מַתְנִי׳ אֵי זוֹ הִיא אֲבֵידָה? מָצָא חֲמוֹר אוֹ פָּרָה רוֹעִין בַּדֶּרֶךְ – אֵין זוֹ אֲבֵידָה. חֲמוֹר וְכֵלָיו הֲפוּכִין, פָּרָה רָצָה בֵּין הַכְּרָמִים – הֲרֵי זוֹ אֲבֵידָה. הֶחְזִירָהּ וּבָרְחָה, הֶחְזִירָהּ וּבָרְחָה, אֲפִילּוּ אַרְבָּעָה וַחֲמִישָׁה פְּעָמִים – חַיָּיב לְהַחְזִירָהּ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״הָשֵׁב תְּשִׁיבֵם״.

MISHNA: Which is the item that is considered lost property? If one found a donkey or a cow grazing on the path, that is not lost property, as presumably the owners are nearby and are aware of the animals’ whereabouts. If one found a donkey with its accoutrements overturned, or a cow that ran through the vineyards, that is lost property. In a case where one returned the lost animal and it fled, and he again returned it and it fled, even if this scenario repeats itself four or five times, he is obligated to return it each time, as it is stated: “You shall not see your brother’s ox or his sheep wandering and disregard them; you shall return them to your brother” (Deuteronomy 22:1).

הָיָה בָּטֵל מִסֶּלַע, לֹא יֹאמַר לוֹ: תֵּן לִי סֶלַע, אֶלָּא נוֹתֵן לוֹ שְׂכָרוֹ כְּפוֹעֵל. אִם יֵשׁ שָׁם בֵּית דִּין – מַתְנֶה בִּפְנֵי בֵּית דִּין, אִם אֵין שָׁם בֵּית דִּין – בִּפְנֵי מִי יַתְנֶה? שֶׁלּוֹ קוֹדֵם.

If in the course of tending to and returning the lost item, the finder was idle from labor that would have earned him a sela, he shall not say to the owner of the item: Give me a sela to compensate me for my lost income. Rather, the owner gives him his wage as if he were a laborer, a payment that is considerably smaller. If there are three men there who can convene as a court, he may stipulate before the court that he will undertake to return the item provided that he receives full compensation for lost income. If there is no court there before whom he can stipulate his condition, his financial interests take precedence and he need not return the lost item.

גְּמָ׳ אַטּוּ כֹּל הָנֵי דְּאָמְרִינַן, לָאו אֲבֵידָה הָווּ? אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה: הָכִי קָאָמַר, אֵי זוֹ הִיא כְּלַל אֲבֵידָה שֶׁהוּא חַיָּיב בָּהּ? מָצָא חֲמוֹר וּפָרָה רוֹעִין בַּדֶּרֶךְ – אֵין זוֹ אֲבֵידָה וְלָא מִיחַיַּיב בַּהּ. חֲמוֹר וְכֵלָיו הֲפוּכִים, פָּרָה וְרָצָה בֵּין הַכְּרָמִים – הֲרֵי זוֹ אֲבֵידָה וּמִיחַיַּיב בַּהּ.

GEMARA: With regard to the question in the mishna: Which is the item that is considered lost property, the Gemara asks: Is that to say that all those other cases that we stated in this chapter are not lost property? Rav Yehuda said that this is what the tanna is saying: What is the principle employed in defining a lost item that one is obligated to return? The mishna cites examples to illustrate the principle: If one found a donkey or a cow grazing on the path, that is not lost property, and he is not obligated to return it. But if one found a donkey with its accoutrements overturned, or a cow that was running through the vineyards, that is lost property, and he is obligated to return it.

וּלְעוֹלָם?! אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: עַד שְׁלֹשָׁה יָמִים. הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי בְּלֵילָוָתָא – אֲפִילּוּ חֲדָא שַׁעְתָּא נָמֵי, אִי בִּימָמָא – אֲפִילּוּ טוּבָא נָמֵי לָא!

With regard to the ruling in the mishna that a donkey and cow grazing on the path are not considered lost property, the Gemara asks: And is that the case even if they graze there untended forever? Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: Until three days pass they are not lost. Thereafter, they are considered lost. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If the animal is found grazing at night, even if it is untended for even one hour it can be presumed to be lost, as an owner never grazes his animals untended at night. If the animal is found grazing during the day, even if it is untended for more than three days, it is also not presumed to be lost.

לָא צְרִיכָא, דַּהֲוָה חָזֵי לַהּ בְּקַדְמְתָא וּבַחֲשֶׁכְתָּא, תְּלָתָא יוֹמֵי אָמְרִינַן: אִיתְרְמוֹיֵי אִתְרְמִי לַהּ וְנָפְקָא, טְפֵי וַדַּאי אֲבֵידָה הִיא.

The Gemara answers: No, the measure of three days is necessary only in a case where one saw the animal grazing in the early hours in the morning and in the dark of nightfall. For the first three days, we say: It happened that the animal went out a bit earlier or a bit later than usual, but nevertheless, it was with the owner’s knowledge. Once this is observed for more than three days, it is certainly a lost item.

תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי: מָצָא טַלִּית וְקַרְדּוֹם

This is also taught in a baraita: If one found a cloak or an ax