בבא מציעא פב

בבא מציעא פב

הִלְוָהוּ עַל הַמַּשְׁכּוֹן קָתָנֵי! אֶלָּא לָא קַשְׁיָא: כָּאן – שֶׁהִלְוָהוּ מָעוֹת, כָּאן – שֶׁהִלְוָהוּ פֵּירוֹת.

teach the same phrase: One who lent to another based on collateral, which indicates that the collateral was given at the time of the loan? Rather, the Gemara proposes a different resolution: It is not difficult. Here, the baraita is referring to a case where he lent him money, whereas there, the mishna is referring to a situation where he lent him produce. Since produce will spoil, the lender benefits from the deal, as he will receive fresher produce in return. Therefore, he is considered a paid bailee for the collateral.

וְהָא מִדְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: הִלְוָהוּ מָעוֹת – שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם, הִלְוָהוּ פֵּירוֹת – שׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר. מִכְלָל דִּלְתַנָּא קַמָּא לָא שָׁנֵי לֵיהּ!

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But from the fact that the latter clause of the mishna teaches that Rabbi Yehuda says: One who lent another money is an unpaid bailee, whereas one who lent another produce is a paid bailee, by inference you can conclude that according to the first tanna there is no difference between one who lends money and one who lends produce. If so, the proposed resolution does not fit the text.

כּוּלַּהּ רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הִיא, וְחַסּוֹרֵי מִיחַסְּרָא וְהָכִי קָתָנֵי: הִלְוָהוּ עַל הַמַּשְׁכּוֹן – שׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר, בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים – שֶׁהִלְוָהוּ פֵּירוֹת, אֲבָל הִלְוָהוּ מָעוֹת – שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם. שֶׁרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: הִלְוָהוּ מָעוֹת – שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם, הִלְוָהוּ פֵּירוֹת – שׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר.

The Gemara responds: The entire mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and the mishna is incomplete and this is what it is teaching: One who lent to another based on collateral is a paid bailee. In what case is this statement said? When he lent him produce. But if he lent him money, he is an unpaid bailee. As Rabbi Yehuda says: One who lent another money is an unpaid bailee with regard to the collateral, whereas one who lent produce is a paid bailee.

אִי הָכִי, קָמָה לַהּ מַתְנִיתִין דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא. אֶלָּא מְחַוַּורְתָּא מַתְנִיתִין דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: If that is so, it turns out that the mishna is established not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. This is problematic, as most of the Sages of the mishna were Rabbi Akiva’s students, and anonymous mishnayot are generally presumed to follow his rulings. Rather, it is clear that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.

לֵימָא בִּדְלָא שָׁוֵי מַשְׁכּוֹן שִׁיעוּר זוּזֵי, וּבְדִשְׁמוּאֵל קָא מִיפַּלְגִי. דְּאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הַאי מַאן דְּאוֹזְפֵיהּ אַלְפָּא זוּזֵי לְחַבְרֵיהּ וְאַנַּח לֵיהּ קַתָּא דְמַגְּלָא עִילָּוַיְיהוּ, אֲבַד קַתָּא דְמַגְּלָא – אֲבַדוּ אַלְפָּא זוּזֵי.

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Eliezer applies only in a case where the collateral is not equal to the monetary value of the loan, and they disagree with regard to a statement of Shmuel. As Shmuel says: With regard to one who lends one thousand dinars to another and the borrower puts before the lender as collateral for the loan the handle of a sickle, which is worth only a small fraction of the loan, nevertheless, if the sickle is lost, the thousand dinars are lost. The Gemara is suggesting that Rabbi Akiva would agree with this ruling, whereas Rabbi Eliezer would disagree with it.

אִי בִּדְלָא שָׁוֵי מַשְׁכּוֹן שִׁיעוּר זוּזֵי – דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לֵית לְהוּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל, וְהָכָא בִּדְשָׁוֵי שִׁיעוּר זוּזֵי, וְקָא מִיפַּלְגִי בִּדְרַבִּי יִצְחָק.

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: If the case is one where the collateral is not equal to the amount of money constituting the loan, everyone holds that the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. But here the dispute is referring to a situation where the collateral does equal the amount of the money constituting the loan, and they disagree with regard to a statement of Rabbi Yitzḥak.

דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק: מִנַּיִן לְבַעַל חוֹב שֶׁקּוֹנֶה מַשְׁכּוֹן, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וּלְךָ תִּהְיֶה צְדָקָה״. אִם אֵינוֹ קוֹנֶה מַשְׁכּוֹן, צְדָקָה מְנָא לֵיהּ? מִכָּאן לְבַעַל חוֹב שֶׁקּוֹנֶה מַשְׁכּוֹן.

As Rabbi Yitzḥak says: From where is it derived that a creditor acquires collateral given to him and is considered its owner as long as the item is in his possession? It is derived from a verse, as it is stated: “You shall return the pledge to him when the sun goes down that he may sleep in his garment, and bless you; and it shall be a righteousness for you before the Lord your God” (Exodus 24:13). Rabbi Yitzḥak infers: If the creditor does not acquire the collateral, then from where is the righteousness involved in returning it? In this case, the creditor would not be giving up anything of his own. From here it is derived that a creditor acquires the collateral.

וְתִסְבְּרָא? אֵימוֹר דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק בְּמִשְׁכְּנוֹ שֶׁלֹּא בִּשְׁעַת הַלְוָאָתוֹ, אֲבָל מִשְׁכְּנוֹ בִּשְׁעַת הַלְוָאָתוֹ – מִי אָמַר?

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: And can you understand it that way? You can say that Rabbi Yitzḥak stated this halakha in a case where he took his collateral not at the time of his loan but at a later stage, in order to collect his debt. But did Rabbi Yitzḥak say this ruling in a situation where he took his collateral at the time of his loan?

אֶלָּא מִשְׁכְּנוֹ שֶׁלֹּא בִּשְׁעַת הַלְוָאָתוֹ – כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא אִית לְהוּ דְּרַבִּי יִצְחָק. וְהָכָא בְּמִשְׁכְּנוֹ בִּשְׁעַת הַלְוָאָתוֹ, וּבְשׁוֹמֵר אֲבֵידָה קָא מִיפַּלְגִי. דְּאִיתְּמַר: שׁוֹמֵר אֲבֵידָה, רַבָּה אָמַר: כְּשׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם, רַב יוֹסֵף אָמַר: כְּשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר.

Rather, if he took his collateral not at the time of his loan, everyone holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yitzḥak. And here it is discussing a case where he took his collateral at the time of his loan, and Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva disagree with regard to the case of a bailee of a lost item. As it was stated that amora’im disagreed concerning the responsibility of the bailee for a lost item. If someone found a lost item and it is subsequently lost or stolen from him, what responsibility does he bear toward the owner? Rabba said: This individual is considered to be like an unpaid bailee. Rav Yosef said: He is like a paid bailee.

לֵימָא דְּרַב יוֹסֵף תַּנָּאֵי הִיא? לָא, בְּשׁוֹמֵר אֲבֵידָה – דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא אִית לְהוּ דְּרַב יוֹסֵף, וְהָכָא

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the opinion of Rav Yosef is the subject of a dispute between tanna’im. There is no question that Rabba’s opinion is the subject of a dispute between tanna’im, as Rabbi Akiva’s opinion cannot be reconciled with his ruling: If one who takes collateral for his loan is considered a paid bailee, the same certainly applies to one who goes out of his way to safeguard a lost item. The Gemara is asking whether there is any way to explain Rav Yosef’s ruling in accordance with the opinions of both tanna’im, or if he must accept that Rabbi Eliezer disputes his opinion. The Gemara responds: No, it is possible with regard to a bailee for a lost item that everyone holds in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yosef, even Rabbi Eliezer. And here, in the baraita,

בְּמִלְוֶה צָרִיךְ לְמַשְׁכּוֹן קָמִיפַּלְגִי. מָר סָבַר: מִצְוָה קָא עָבֵיד שֶׁהִלְוָהוּ, וְהָוֵי שׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר. וּמָר סָבַר: לָאו מִצְוָה קָא עָבֵיד, שֶׁלַּהֲנָאָתוֹ מִתְכַּוֵּין, וְהָוֵי שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם.

they disagree with regard to a lender who needs the collateral, i.e., the lender wants to use the collateral and deduct the value of its use from the amount of the loan. One Sage, Rabbi Akiva, holds that he is performing a mitzva in that he lent to him, and therefore he is considered a paid bailee. And one Sage, Rabbi Eliezer, holds that he is not performing a mitzva, as his intention is to lend for his own benefit. And consequently he is considered an unpaid bailee for the collateral.

אַבָּא שָׁאוּל אוֹמֵר: מוּתָּר לָאָדָם לְהַשְׂכִּיר מַשְׁכּוֹנוֹ שֶׁל עָנִי לִהְיוֹת פּוֹחֵת וְהוֹלֵךְ. אָמַר רַב חָנָן בַּר אַמֵּי אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הֲלָכָה כְּאַבָּא שָׁאוּל. וְאַף אַבָּא שָׁאוּל לָא אָמַר אֶלָּא בְּמָרָא וּפָסָל וְקַרְדּוֹם, הוֹאִיל וּנְפִישׁ אַגְרַיְיהוּ וְזוּטַר פְּחָתַיְיהוּ.

§ The mishna teaches that Abba Shaul says: It is permitted for a person to rent out a poor person’s collateral that was given to him for a loan, so that he shall set a rental price for it and thereby progressively reduce the debt, because this is considered like returning a lost item. Rav Ḥanan bar Ami says that Shmuel says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Abba Shaul, but even Abba Shaul said his ruling only with regard to a hoe, a chisel, and an ax, since the remuneration from these utensils is great and their depreciation is small.

מַתְנִי׳ הַמַּעֲבִיר חָבִית מִמָּקוֹם לְמָקוֹם וּשְׁבָרָהּ, בֵּין שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם בֵּין שׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר – יִשָּׁבַע. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: זֶה וְזֶה יִשָּׁבַע, וְתָמֵיהַּ אֲנִי אִם יְכוֹלִין זֶה וָזֶה לִישָּׁבַע.

MISHNA: With regard to one who was transporting a barrel from one place to another and he broke it, whether he was an unpaid bailee or a paid bailee, if he takes an oath that he was not negligent he is exempt from payment. Rabbi Eliezer says: Both this one, an unpaid bailee, and that one, a paid bailee, must take an oath to exempt themselves from payment, but I wonder whether both this one and that one can take an oath. In other words, this is the halakha that I heard from my teachers, but I do not understand their ruling.

גְּמָ׳ תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הַמַּעֲבִיר חָבִית לַחֲבֵירוֹ מִמָּקוֹם לְמָקוֹם וּשְׁבָרָהּ, בֵּין שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם בֵּין שׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר – יִשָּׁבַע, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם – יִשָּׁבַע, נוֹשֵׂא שָׂכָר – יְשַׁלֵּם. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: זֶה וְזֶה יִשָּׁבַע, וְתָמֵיהַּ אֲנִי אִם יְכוֹלִין זֶה וָזֶה לִישָּׁבַע.

GEMARA: The Sages taught: With regard to one who was transporting a barrel for another person from one place to another and he broke it, whether he was an unpaid bailee or a paid bailee, if he takes an oath that he was not negligent, he is exempt from payment. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: An unpaid bailee takes an oath and does not pay, but a paid bailee pays. Rabbi Eliezer says: This one and that one take an oath, and I wonder whether both this one and that one can take an oath.

לְמֵימְרָא דְּסָבַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר נִתְקַל לָאו פּוֹשֵׁעַ הוּא? וְהָתַנְיָא: נִשְׁבְּרָה כַּדּוֹ וְלֹא סִילְּקָהּ נָפְלָה גְּמַלּוֹ וְלֹא הֶעֱמִידָהּ, רַבִּי מֵאִיר מְחַיֵּיב בְּהֶיזֵּיקָן, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: פָּטוּר מִדִּינֵי אָדָם וְחַיָּיב בְּדִינֵי שָׁמַיִם. וְקַיְימָא לַן דִּבְנִתְקַל פּוֹשֵׁעַ פְּלִיגִי!

The Gemara analyzes these opinions. Is that to say that Rabbi Meir holds that one who stumbles is not considered negligent, but the victim of an accident? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: If one’s pitcher broke in a public place and he did not remove it from there, or if his camel fell and he did not stand it up, Rabbi Meir renders him liable for the damage they caused? And the Rabbis say that he is exempt according to human laws but is liable according to the laws of Heaven. Although the court cannot impose liability, nevertheless he is morally culpable. And we maintain that they disagree with regard to the question of whether one who stumbles is negligent. This indicates that Rabbi Meir holds that one who stumbles is considered negligent.

אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: תִּבְרַהּ, מִי שֶׁשָּׁנָה זוֹ לֹא שָׁנָה זוֹ. וַאֲתָא רַבִּי יְהוּדָה לְמֵימַר: שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם – יִשָּׁבַע, נוֹשֵׂא שָׂכָר – יְשַׁלֵּם. הַאי כִּי דִינֵיהּ וְהַאי כִּי דִינֵיהּ. וַאֲתָא רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר לְמֵימַר: אִין, גְּמָרָא כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר. וּמִיהוּ תָּמֵיהַּ אֲנִי אִם יְכוֹלִין זֶה וָזֶה לִישָּׁבַע.

Rabbi Elazar said: Break the mishna, as he who taught this did not teach that, i.e., there are two traditions with regard to Rabbi Meir’s opinion. And Rabbi Yehuda came to say a different ruling: An unpaid bailee takes an oath and does not pay while a paid bailee pays, this one in accordance with his law and that one in accordance with his law, as an unpaid bailee is exempt from liability for theft and loss, while a paid bailee is liable in those cases and exempt only in cases of circumstances beyond his control. And Rabbi Eliezer came to say: Yes, there is a tradition that is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, as I learned from my teachers, but I wonder whether both this one and that one can take an oath.

בִּשְׁלָמָא שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם מִשְׁתְּבַע דְּלָא פְּשַׁע בַּהּ: אֶלָּא שׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר אַמַּאי מִשְׁתְּבַע? כִּי לָא פְּשַׁע נָמֵי שַׁלּוֹמֵי בָּעֵי. וַאֲפִילּוּ שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם נָמֵי, הָתִינַח בִּמְקוֹם מִדְרוֹן. שֶׁלֹּא בִּמְקוֹם מִדְרוֹן, מִי מָצֵי מִשְׁתְּבַע דְּלָא פְּשַׁע בַּהּ!

The Gemara asks: Granted, an unpaid bailee takes an oath that he was not negligent with regard to the barrel, as required by Torah law, but why does a paid bailee take an oath? Even if he was not negligent he is still required to pay, as he is obligated to pay for theft and loss. And even with regard to an unpaid bailee, this works out well if the barrel broke on an inclined plane [midron], as the accident occurred due to the difficulty of transporting it, but if it broke not on an inclined plane but under different circumstances, how can he take an oath that he was not negligent with it? Evidently his negligence caused the accident.