בבא מציעא צא

בבא מציעא צא

לֹא שֶׁאָדָם רַשַּׁאי לְהָמִיר, אֶלָּא שֶׁאִם הֵמִיר – מוּמָר, וְסוֹפֵג אֶת הָאַרְבָּעִים. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הָא מַנִּי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הִיא, דְּאָמַר: לָאו שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה לוֹקִין עָלָיו.

It is taught at the beginning of tractate Temura that the Torah prohibits the substitution of a non-consecrated animal for a consecrated one. The mishna teaches (Temura 2a): That is not to say that it is permitted for a person to effect substitution; rather it means that if one substituted a non-sacred animal for a consecrated animal, the substitution takes effect. The non-sacred animal becomes consecrated, the consecrated animal remains sacred, and the one who substituted the non-sacred animal incurs the forty lashes. This indicates that one is held liable for mere speech, even without any accompanying action. Reish Lakish said to him: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that one is flogged for violating a prohibition that does not involve an action. By contrast, the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who maintain that one is punished only for a transgression that includes a full-fledged action.

וּמִי מָצֵית מוֹקְמַתְּ לַהּ כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה? וְהָא קָתָנֵי רֵישָׁא: הַכֹּל מְמִירִין, אֶחָד הָאֲנָשִׁים וְאֶחָד הַנָּשִׁים, וְהָוֵינַן בָּהּ: ״הַכֹּל״ לְאֵתוֹיֵי מַאי? לְאֵתוֹיֵי יוֹרֵשׁ, וּדְלָא כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה,

The Gemara asks: But can you establish and explain that mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? After all, it teaches in the first clause: Everyone substitutes a non-sacred animal for a consecrated animal, both men and women. And we discussed this statement by asking the following question: This term: Everyone, serves to add what? What is the tanna including by this phrase? We answered that it serves to add an heir, who can substitute an animal for an animal he inherited that was designated as an offering. And this clause is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

דְּאִי כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, הָאָמַר: יוֹרֵשׁ אֵינוֹ מֵמִיר, יוֹרֵשׁ אֵינוֹ סוֹמֵךְ! הַאי תַּנָּא סָבַר לַהּ כְּווֹתֵיהּ בַּחֲדָא, וּפָלֵיג עֲלֵיהּ בַּחֲדָא.

The Gemara elaborates: As, if it were in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, doesn’t he say that an heir cannot effect substitution, and an heir cannot place his hands on the head of an offering? The Gemara refutes this difficulty: This is not a conclusive proof, as it is possible to say that this tanna of the mishna in Temura holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to one matter and disagrees with him with regard to one other matter.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הַחוֹסֵם אֶת הַפָּרָה וְדָשׁ בָּהּ – לוֹקֶה, וּמְשַׁלֵּם אַרְבָּעָה קַבִּין לְפָרָה וּשְׁלֹשָׁה קַבִּין לַחֲמוֹר. וְהָא אֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה וָמֵת, וְאֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה וּמְשַׁלֵּם. אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: הָא מַנִּי – רַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא, דְּאָמַר: לוֹקֶה וּמְשַׁלֵּם.

§ The Sages taught: One who muzzles a cow and threshes with it is flogged, and in addition he must pay the owner of the cow four kav for a cow, the usual amount it consumes while threshing, and three kav for a donkey. The Gemara asks: But isn’t there a principle that an offender is not flogged and also punished by death, and likewise he is not flogged and rendered liable to pay? One who transgresses a prohibition is liable to receive only one punishment for a single offense. Abaye said: In accordance with whose opinion is this ruling? It is that of Rabbi Meir, who says in general that one can be flogged and be liable to pay.

רָבָא אָמַר: ״אֶתְנַן״ אָסְרָה תּוֹרָה, וַאֲפִילּוּ בָּא עַל אִמּוֹ.

Rava said that there is a difference between the transgression itself, which is between the offender and God, for which he is liable to be flogged, and the loss he caused the owner of the cow, for which he must pay restitution. The Torah prohibits one from bringing as an offering an animal given as the payment to a prostitute for services rendered (Deuteronomy 23:19); and this prohibition applies even if the man in question engaged in intercourse with his own mother, which is a capital offence. Although this man would certainly not be rendered liable to pay compensation by a court, as he is liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment, nevertheless, since he is technically liable to pay compensation, the money is subject to the prohibition as well. In this case too, despite the fact that the court cannot compel one to pay for the produce his cow ate, he does owe this sum. Furthermore, if the owner of the produce were to seize this sum from him, the court would not force him to return the money.

רַב פָּפָּא אָמַר: מִשְּׁעַת מְשִׁיכָה אִיחַיַּיב לֵהּ בִּמְזוֹנוֹתֶיהָ, וּמִילְקָא לָא לָקֵי עַד שְׁעַת חֲסִימָה.

Rav Pappa stated a different answer: From the time of his pulling of the cow to rent it for threshing he was rendered obligated to provide its sustenance when it threshes, but as for flogging, he is not liable to be flogged until the actual time of muzzling. In other words, he was liable to pay the monetary payment before he incurred liability to receive lashes, which means that they are two separate liabilities.

אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: הָנֵי מִילֵּי בְּעוֹ מִינַּאי דְּבֵי רַב פָּפָּא בַּר אַבָּא, וּפְשַׁטִי לְהוּ לְאִיסּוּרָא – חֲדָא כְּהִלְכְתָא, וַחֲדָא דְּלָאו כְּהִלְכְתָא.

In relation to the above discussion, Rav Pappa said: These matters, stated below, were raised as a dilemma to me by the members of the house of Rav Pappa bar Abba, and I resolved these matters for them by saying that there is a prohibition in both cases. One of my decisions was in accordance with the halakha, and the other one was not in accordance with the halakha.

בְּעוֹ מִינַּאי: מַהוּ לָלוּשׁ אֶת הָעִיסָּה בְּחָלָב? וּפְשַׁטִי לְהוּ לְאִיסּוּרָא כְּהִלְכְתָא, דְּתַנְיָא: אֵין לָשִׁין אֶת הָעִיסָּה בְּחָלָב, וְאִם לָשׁ – כׇּל הַפַּת כּוּלָּהּ אֲסוּרָה, מִפְּנֵי הֶרְגֵּל עֲבֵירָה. כַּיּוֹצֵא בוֹ: אֵין טָשִׁין אֶת הַתַּנּוּר בְּאַלְיָה, וְאִם טָשׁ – כׇּל הַפַּת כּוּלָּהּ אֲסוּרָה, עַד שֶׁיַּסִּיק אֶת הַתַּנּוּר.

They first raised this dilemma before me: What is the halakha with regard to the possibility of kneading dough with milk? And I resolved it for them by saying that there is a prohibition, in accordance with the halakha. As it is taught in a baraita: One may not knead dough with milk, lest one eat this bread with meat, and if he kneaded dough in this manner the entire loaf is forbidden, because he will become accustomed to sin. Similarly, one may not smear over an oven with the fat of an animal’s tail, and if he did smear the oven in this manner then the entire loaf baked in that oven is forbidden, lest he eat it with milk, until he heats the oven without bread for long enough to burn off the fat.

וְאִידָּךְ בְּעוֹ מִינַּאי: מַהוּ לְהַכְנִיס מִין וְשֶׁאֵינוֹ מִינוֹ לַדִּיר? וּפְשַׁטִי לְהוּ לְאִיסּוּרָא דְּלָאו כְּהִלְכְתָא.

And the other question they asked of me was as follows: What is the halakha with regard to bringing in a male animal and a female animal of different species together into a single pen? Is there a concern that they might mate, which would violate the prohibition against crossbreeding animals? And I resolved it for them by saying that there is a prohibition, but this was not in accordance with the halakha.

דְּאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: וּבִמְנָאֲפִים – עַד שֶׁיִּרְאוּ כְּדֶרֶךְ הַמְנָאֲפִים. וּבְכִלְאַיִם – עַד שֶׁיַּכְנִיס כְּמִכְחוֹל בַּשְּׁפוֹפֶרֶת.

As Shmuel says: With regard to adulterers, the witnesses must observe from when they appear as behaving in the manner of adulterers, and they do not need to directly observe the actual moment of the act of intercourse. But with regard to one who crossbreeds two animals of diverse kinds, he is liable only if witnesses attest that he inserted the male organ into the female like a brush into a tube. This clearly shows that crossbreeding is punishable only if performed manually, not if the animals were merely enclosed together.

מֵתִיב רַב אַחָדְבוּי בַּר אַמֵּי: אִילּוּ נֶאֱמַר ״בְּהֶמְתְּךָ לֹא תַרְבִּיעַ״ הָיִיתִי אוֹמֵר, לֹא יֶאֱחוֹז אָדָם הַבְּהֵמָה בְּשָׁעָה שֶׁעוֹלֶה עָלֶיהָ זָכָר, תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״כִּלְאַיִם״.

Rav Aḥadvoi bar Ami raises an objection against this opinion, from a baraita: Had the Torah stated merely: “You shall not let your cattle copulate,” I would have said that it is prohibited to assist animals in their mating at all, and consequently a person may not hold the female animal when a male mounts it. Therefore, the verse states: “You shall not let your cattle copulate with a diverse kind” (Leviticus 19:19), which indicates that it is prohibited to mate only different species, but not animals of the same type.

לָאו מִכְּלָל דְּכִלְאַיִם אֲחִיזָה נָמֵי לָא? מַאי ״אֲחִיזָה״ – הַכְנָסָה, וְאַמַּאי קָרֵי לַהּ ״אֲחִיזָה״ – לִישָּׁנָא מְעַלְּיָא.

Can one not derive from here by inference that with regard to diverse kinds, holding the animal is also not allowed? This indicates that not only is the act of crossbreeding itself prohibited, but any type of assistance is also prohibited, e.g., restraining the female animal. But if this is the case, placing two animals in the same pen should also be considered a violation. The Gemara refutes this argument: What is the meaning of the term: Holding? It means the insertion of the sexual organ, and why does the tanna call it holding? This is a euphemism.

אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה: מִין בְּמִינוֹ, מוּתָּר לְהַכְנִיס כְּמִכְחוֹל בַּשְּׁפוֹפֶרֶת, וַאֲפִילּוּ מִשּׁוּם פְּרִיצוּתָא לֵיכָּא. מַאי טַעְמָא – בַּעֲבִידְתֵּיהּ טְרִיד. מֵתִיב רַב אַחָדְבוּי בַּר אַמֵּי:

Rav Yehuda says: If one desires to mate an animal of one species with an animal of its own species, it is permitted to insert the male organ into the female like a brush into a tube, and there is not even a concern due to licentiousness and immoral thoughts here. What is the reason for this lenient ruling? It is because he is occupied with his work, and therefore his mind will not entertain sinful thoughts. Rav Aḥadvoi bar Ami raises an objection against this:

אִלּוּ נֶאֱמַר ״בְּהֶמְתְּךָ לֹא תַרְבִּיעַ״ הָיִיתִי אוֹמֵר: לֹא יֶאֱחוֹז אָדָם אֶת הַבְּהֵמָה כְּדֵי שֶׁיַּעֲלֶה עָלֶיהָ זָכָר, תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״כִּלְאַיִם״. כִּלְאַיִם הוּא דְּאָסוּר, הָא מִין בְּמִינוֹ – שְׁרֵי.

Had the Torah merely stated: “You shall not let your cattle copulate,” I would have said that a person may not hold the female animal when a male mounts it. Therefore, the verse states: “With a diverse kind” (Leviticus 19:19). This shows that it is a crossbreed of diverse kinds that is prohibited, from which it may be inferred that mating an animal of one species with an animal of its own species is permitted.

וּמִין בְּמִינוֹ נָמֵי: אֲחִיזָה אִין, הַכְנָסָה – לָא! מַאי ״אֲחִיזָה״ – הַכְנָסָה, וְאַמַּאי קָרֵי לֵיהּ ״אֲחִיזָה״ – לִישָּׁנָא מְעַלְּיָא.

Rav Aḥadvoi bar Ami infers from the baraita: And even concerning mating an animal of one species with an animal of its own species, with regard to holding, yes, this is permitted, but with regard to inserting, no, this is not allowed. The fact that the tanna specifies the act of holding indicates that inserting is prohibited even in the case of two animals of the same species. The Gemara again rejects this claim: What is the meaning of holding in this context? It means inserting. And why does the tanna call it holding? It is a euphemism.

אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: הָא מִילְּתָא בְּעוֹ מִינַּאי דְּבֵי רַב נְחֶמְיָה רֵישׁ גָּלוּתָא: מַהוּ לְהַכְנִיס מִין וּמִינוֹ וְשֶׁאֵינוֹ מִינוֹ לַדִּיר? כֵּיוָן דְּאִיכָּא מִינֵיהּ – בָּתַר מִינֵיהּ גְּרִיר. אוֹ דִלְמָא אֲפִילּוּ הָכִי לָא? וּפְשַׁטִי לְהוּ לְאִיסּוּרָא דְּלָא כְּהִלְכְתָא, מִשּׁוּם פְּרִיצוּתָא דְּעַבְדֵי.

Rav Ashi said: This matter was asked of me by the members of the house of Rav Neḥemya, the Exilarch: What is the halakha with regard to bringing into the same pen an animal of one species with two other animals, one of its own species and the other of a species different from it? Is the halakha that since there is another animal of its own species, it will be drawn after its species, and therefore there is no concern whatsoever with regard to diverse kinds, or perhaps one should not act even in this manner, in case it leads to crossbreeding? And I resolved it for them by saying that there is a prohibition, but this was not in accordance with the halakha. The reason for my decision was due to the immorality of the slaves. I reasoned that if they are permitted to engage in this practice, they will intentionally crossbreed and claim that it occurred without their intervention.

מַתְנִי׳ הָיָה עוֹשֶׂה בְּיָדָיו אֲבָל לֹא בְּרַגְלָיו, בְּרַגְלָיו אֲבָל לֹא בְּיָדָיו, אֲפִילּוּ בִּכְתֵיפוֹ – הֲרֵי זֶה אוֹכֵל. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: עַד שֶׁיַּעֲשֶׂה בְּיָדָיו וּבְרַגְלָיו.

MISHNA: If a laborer was performing labor with his hands but not with his feet, or with his feet but not with his hands, e.g., pressing grapes, or even if he was performing labor only with his shoulder, this one may eat the produce of the field. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: A laborer may not eat unless he performs labor with his hands and with his feet.

גְּמָ׳ מַאי טַעְמָא? ״כִּי תָבֹא בְּכֶרֶם רֵעֶךָ״, בְּכֹל מַאי דְּעָבֵיד.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the ruling of the Rabbis stated in the first clause of the mishna? The Gemara explains that the verse states: “When you come into your neighbor’s vineyard” (Deuteronomy 23:25). Since the Torah does not specify a particular kind of task, it is understood as referring to any labor he performs.

רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: עַד שֶׁיַּעֲשֶׂה בְּיָדָיו וּבְרַגְלָיו. מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה? כִּי שׁוֹר, מָה שׁוֹר עַד שֶׁיַּעֲשֶׂה בְּיָדָיו וּבְרַגְלָיו – אַף פּוֹעֵל עַד שֶׁיַּעֲשֶׂה בְּיָדָיו וּבְרַגְלָיו.

The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: A laborer may not eat unless he performs labor with his hands and with his feet. The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda? The Gemara explains: This halakha is like that of a threshing ox; just as one is not required to let an ox feed unless it is performing labor with its hands and with its feet, as it uses all four of its legs to thresh, so too a laborer is not entitled to eat unless he is performing labor with his hands and with his feet.

בָּעֵי רַבָּה בַּר רַב הוּנָא: דָּשׁ בַּאֲווֹזִין וְתַרְנְגוֹלִים, לְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה מַהוּ? בְּכׇל כֹּחוֹ בָּעֵינַן – וְהָא אִיכָּא, אוֹ דִלְמָא בְּיָדָיו וּבְרַגְלָיו בָּעֵינַן – וְהָא לֵיכָּא. תֵּיקוּ.

§ With regard to a similar issue, Rabba bar Rav Huna raised a dilemma: If one threshed with geese and chickens, rather than four-legged animals, what is the halakha according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda? The Gemara clarifies the sides of the dilemma: Do we require threshing with all its force, as it is for this reason that an ox must thresh with all four of its legs, and that condition is fulfilled here, as these birds perform labor with all their strength, or perhaps we require that the animal must actually perform labor with its hands and with its feet, i.e., with all four legs, and this is not the case here? No answer was found, and the Gemara says that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.

אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ: פּוֹעֲלִים, עַד שֶׁלֹּא הִילְּכוּ שְׁתִי וָעֵרֶב בַּגַּת – אוֹכְלִין עֲנָבִים וְאֵין שׁוֹתִין יַיִן. מִשֶּׁהִילְּכוּ שְׁתִי וָעֵרֶב בַּגַּת – אוֹכְלִין עֲנָבִים וְשׁוֹתִין יַיִן.

Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says: With regard to laborers in a vineyard, until they have walked lengthwise and crosswise in the winepress, the first stage of the making of wine, they may eat grapes, as they are performing labor with grapes, but they may not yet drink wine, since their labor has not produced wine. Once they have walked lengthwise and crosswise in the winepress, they are now performing labor with wine as well, and therefore they may eat grapes and drink wine.

מַתְנִי׳ הָיָה עוֹשֶׂה בִּתְאֵנִים – לֹא יֹאכַל בַּעֲנָבִים. בַּעֲנָבִים – לֹא יֹאכַל בִּתְאֵנִים. אֲבָל מוֹנֵעַ אֶת עַצְמוֹ עַד שֶׁמַּגִּיעַ לִמְקוֹם יָפוֹת וְאוֹכֵל.

MISHNA: If a laborer was performing labor with figs he may not eat grapes; if he was performing labor with grapes he may not eat figs, as he may eat only the type of food with which he is working. This is the halakha even if he was employed to perform labor with both types of produce but is currently performing labor with only one of them. But he may hold himself back from eating until he reaches a place of good-quality grapes or figs and eat from these, as they are the same type of food.

וְכוּלָּן לֹא אָמְרוּ אֶלָּא בִּשְׁעַת מְלָאכָה, אֲבָל מִשּׁוּם הָשֵׁב אֲבֵידָה לַבְּעָלִים אָמְרוּ: פּוֹעֲלִין אוֹכְלִין בַּהֲלִיכָתָן מֵאוֹמָן לְאוֹמָן, וּבַחֲזִירָתָן מִן הַגַּת, וּבַחֲמוֹר כְּשֶׁהִיא פּוֹרֶקֶת.

And with regard to all of these cases the Sages said that he may eat only at the time of work. But due to the obligation to restore lost property to its owners, i.e., so that workers would not neglect their task, they said that laborers may eat as they walk from one row of a vineyard or plantation to another row, and upon their return from the winepress. And with regard to a donkey, it is permitted to eat when it is being unloaded. This statement will be explained in the Gemara.

גְּמָ׳ אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: עוֹשֶׂה בְּגֶפֶן זֶה, מַהוּ שֶׁיֹּאכַל בְּגֶפֶן אַחֵר? מִמִּין שֶׁאַתָּה נוֹתֵן לְכֵלָיו שֶׁל בַּעַל הַבַּיִת בָּעֵינַן – וְהָא אִיכָּא, אוֹ דִלְמָא מִמַּה שֶׁאַתָּה נוֹתֵן לְכֵלָיו שֶׁל בַּעַל הַבַּיִת בָּעֵינַן – וְהָא לֵיכָּא?

GEMARA: A dilemma was raised before the Sages with regard to the ruling of the mishna: If a laborer was performing labor on this vine, what is the halakha concerning the possibility that he may eat from another vine? Do we require only that the food must be from the type that you are placing into the homeowner’s vessels, and this condition is fulfilled here, or perhaps we require that it must be from that very food which you are placing into the homeowner’s vessels, and this is not the case here?

וְאִם תִּמְצֵי לוֹמַר עוֹשֶׂה בְּגֶפֶן זֶה לֹא יֹאכַל בְּגֶפֶן אַחֵר, שׁוֹר בִּמְחוּבָּר הֵיכִי אָכֵיל? אָמַר רַב שִׁישָׁא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אִידִי: בִּשְׁרָכָא.

And if you say that one who was performing labor on this vine may not in fact eat from another vine, a further question arises: With regard to an ox performing labor with produce attached to the ground, how can one enable it to eat? The ox is tied to the front of the wagon, while the laborers are working on a vine adjacent to the wagon. Consequently, it is impossible for the ox to eat from the vine on which labor is being performed. Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, said: In the case of long branches it is possible for the animal to perform labor at one end of the branch while eating from the other.

תָּא שְׁמַע: הָיָה עוֹשֶׂה בִּתְאֵנִים – לֹא יֹאכַל בַּעֲנָבִים. הָא תְּאֵנִים וּתְאֵנִים דּוּמְיָא דִּתְאֵנִים וַעֲנָבִים – אוֹכֵל. וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ: עוֹשֶׂה בְּגֶפֶן זֶה אֵינוֹ אוֹכֵל בְּגֶפֶן אַחֵר, הֵיכִי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ? אָמַר רַב שִׁישָׁא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אִידִי: בְּמוּדְלֵית.

This difficulty has been resolved, but the original dilemma remains. The Gemara therefore suggests: Come and hear a resolution from the mishna: If a laborer was performing labor with figs he may not eat grapes. This indicates that if the two types of produce are figs and other figs, similar to the figs and grapes mentioned in the mishna, he may eat. Now, if you say that one who was performing labor on this vine may not eat from another vine, how can you find these circumstances? Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, said: The ruling of the mishna is stated with regard to a hanging vine, and he eats from one edge of the branch while working on the other side.

תָּא שְׁמַע: אֲבָל מוֹנֵעַ אֶת עַצְמוֹ עַד שֶׁמַּגִּיעַ לִמְקוֹם הַיָּפוֹת, וְאוֹכֵל. וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ עוֹשֶׂה בְּגֶפֶן זֶה אוֹכֵל בְּגֶפֶן אַחֵר, נֵיזִיל וְנֵיתֵי וְנֵיכוֹל! הָתָם מִשּׁוּם בִּיטּוּל מְלָאכָה לָא קָא מִיבַּעְיָא לַן, כִּי קָא מִבַּעְיָא לַן הֵיכָא דְּאִיכָּא אִשְׁתּוֹ וּבָנָיו, מַאי?

The Gemara offers another suggestion: Come and hear another resolution from the mishna: But he may hold himself back from eating until he reaches a place of good-quality fruit and eat. And if you say that one who was performing labor on this vine may eat from another vine, let him go and bring and eat. Why must he wait until he reaches that particular vine? The Gemara answers: There, the reason is due to the neglect of work caused by the laborer walking to the other vine. We do not raise the dilemma with regard to that case, as he may certainly not stop performing labor to go and eat elsewhere. When the dilemma was raised before us, it was with regard to a case where his wife and children are present. What is the halakha as to whether his family members, who are not performing labor, may bring him fruit?

תָּא שְׁמַע: וְכוּלָּם לֹא אָמְרוּ אֶלָּא בִּשְׁעַת מְלָאכָה, אֲבָל מִפְּנֵי הָשֵׁב אֲבֵידָה לַבְּעָלִים אָמְרוּ: פּוֹעֲלִים אוֹכְלִים בַּהֲלִיכָתָן מֵאוֹמָן לְאוֹמָן וּבַחֲזִירָתָן מִן הַגַּת.

Once again the Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution from the mishna: And with regard to all of these cases they said that he may eat only at the time of work. But due to the mitzva to restore lost property to its owners, the Sages said that laborers may eat as they walk from one row to another row, and upon their return from the winepress.

סַבְרוּהָ מְהַלֵּךְ כְּעוֹשֶׂה מַעֲשֶׂה דָּמֵי, וּמִשּׁוּם הָשֵׁב אֲבֵידָה לִבְעָלִים הוּא דְּאָכֵיל, מִדְּאוֹרָיְיתָא לָא אָכֵיל. אַלְמָא עוֹשֶׂה בְּגֶפֶן זֶה אֵינוֹ אוֹכֵל בְּגֶפֶן אַחֵר.

The Gemara explains the attempted resolution: The Sages assumed that the basic principle of this halakha is that a laborer who was walking is considered like one who was performing his labor, and it is therefore permitted for him to eat. And yet, it is due to the mitzva to restore lost property to its owner that he may eat, whereas by Torah law he may not eat. But if he is performing labor, why is he not allowed to eat? Apparently, this indicates that one who was performing labor on this vine may not eat from another vine, and therefore once he starts walking and is no longer alongside the vine he may not partake of it by Torah law.

לָא, לְעוֹלָם אֵימָא לָךְ: עוֹשֶׂה בְּגֶפֶן זֶה אוֹכֵל בְּגֶפֶן אַחֵר, וּמְהַלֵּךְ לָאו כְּעוֹשֶׂה מַעֲשֶׂה דָּמֵי.

The Gemara refutes this argument: No; actually, I could say to you that one who was performing labor on this vine may even eat from another vine, but a laborer who was walking is not considered like one who was performing his labor. The reason that he is not permitted to eat by Torah law is not because he is performing labor on a different vine, but because he is walking at the time.

אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי סַבְרוּהָ מְהַלֵּךְ לָאו כְּעוֹשֶׂה מַעֲשֶׂה דָּמֵי. וְהַיְינוּ טַעְמָא דְּמִדְּאוֹרָיְיתָא לָא אָכֵיל – מִשּׁוּם דְּלָאו כְּעוֹשֶׂה מַעֲשֶׂה דָּמֵי, הָא עוֹשֶׂה מַעֲשֶׂה – אָכֵיל מִדְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, אַלְמָא עוֹשֶׂה בְּגֶפֶן זֶה אוֹכֵל בְּגֶפֶן אַחֵר!

The Gemara cites an alternative version of this discussion. There are those who say as follows: The Sages assumed that a worker who was walking is not considered like one who was performing his labor, and this is the reason that the baraita says that he may not eat by Torah law: Because he is not considered like one who was performing his labor. This indicates that if he is performing his labor, he may eat by Torah law. Apparently, it may be inferred that one who was performing labor on this vine may eat from another vine.

לָא. לְעוֹלָם אֵימָא לָךְ: עוֹשֶׂה בְּגֶפֶן זֶה אֵינוֹ אוֹכֵל בְּגֶפֶן אַחֵר,

The Gemara rejects this claim: No; this is not a proof, as actually I could say to you that one who was performing labor on this vine may not eat from another vine,