בבא מציעא צד

בבא מציעא צד

כָּךְ וְכָךְ גַּבְרֵי אִיכָּא בַּהֲדַן, כָּךְ וְכָךְ כַּלְבֵי אִיכָּא בַּהֲדַן, כָּךְ וְכָךְ זוּקָתָא פְּסִיקָא לַן. וַאֲזַל וּשְׁקַל מִינֵּיהּ, מַאי? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הֲרֵי הוֹלִיכָן לִמְקוֹם גְּדוּדֵי חַיָּה וְלִסְטִים.

we have such and such men with us; such and such dogs with us, and such and such slings [zukata] with us. In other words, we are fully protected and you should not dare to take anything from us. If the thief subsequently went and took an animal from him, what is the halakha? Rava said to Abaye: It is as though he has taken them to a place of groups of beasts and bandits, as his taunting of the thief motivated the theft.

מַתְנִי׳ מַתְנֶה שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם לִהְיוֹת פָּטוּר מִשְּׁבוּעָה, וְהַשּׁוֹאֵל לִהְיוֹת פָּטוּר מִלְּשַׁלֵּם, נוֹשֵׂא שָׂכָר וְהַשּׂוֹכֵר לִהְיוֹת פְּטוּרִין מִשְּׁבוּעָה וּמִלְּשַׁלֵּם. כׇּל הַמַּתְנֶה עַל מַה שֶּׁכָּתוּב בַּתּוֹרָה – תְּנָאוֹ בָּטֵל,

MISHNA: The halakhot of bailees stated in the previous mishna apply to standard cases. The halakha is that in any case involving monetary matters the parties may agree to special terms. Therefore, an unpaid bailee may stipulate with the owner that he will be exempt from taking an oath if the item is lost, and similarly, a borrower may stipulate that he will be exempt from having to pay, and a paid bailee or a renter can stipulate that he will be exempt from taking an oath and from having to pay, as one can relinquish his monetary rights. With regard to matters that do not involve monetary claims, anyone who stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah, his stipulation is void.

וְכׇל תְּנַאי שֶׁיֵּשׁ מַעֲשֶׂה בִּתְחִילָּתוֹ – תְּנָאוֹ בָּטֵל. וְכׇל שֶׁאֶפְשָׁר לוֹ לְקַיְּימוֹ בְּסוֹפוֹ, וְהִתְנָה עִמּוֹ מִתְּחִילָּתוֹ – תְּנָאוֹ קַיָּים.

And any condition that is preceded by an action, i.e., the agreement is formulated with the promise of an action followed by a statement that this action will be carried out only under certain terms, the condition is void and the promise remains intact. The condition must be stated before the action. And with regard to any condition that one can ultimately fulfill, but he stipulated with him initially, i.e., in practice the action is performed first, followed by the fulfillment of the condition, nevertheless, because it was formulated in the proper manner, with the condition first, his condition is valid. If the condition cannot be fulfilled at all, once the action has been carried out the condition is void.

גְּמָ׳ אַמַּאי? מַתְנֶה עַל מַה שֶּׁכָּתוּב בַּתּוֹרָה הוּא, וְכׇל הַמַּתְנֶה עַל מַה שֶּׁכָּתוּב בַּתּוֹרָה תְּנָאוֹ בָּטֵל!

GEMARA: The Gemara asks a question with regard to the mishna’s statement that bailees can issue conditions and change the liabilities imposed on them by Torah law: Why are they able to do so? This is a case of one who stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah, as the Torah determines who takes an oath and who must pay, and with regard to anyone who stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah, his condition is void.

הָא מַנִּי – רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הִיא, דְּאָמַר: בְּדָבָר שֶׁבְּמָמוֹן – תְּנָאוֹ קַיָּים. דְּתַנְיָא: הָאוֹמֵר לְאִשָּׁה ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לִי עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֵין לִיךְ עָלַי שְׁאֵר כְּסוּת וְעוֹנָה״ – הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, וּתְנָאוֹ בָּטֵל, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: בְּדָבָר שֶׁבְּמָמוֹן – תְּנָאוֹ קַיָּים.

The Gemara explains: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is that of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that if the condition that runs counter to that which is written in the Torah is referring to monetary matters, his condition is valid. As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me on the condition that you have no claim against me to give you food, clothing, and conjugal rights, she is betrothed but his condition is void; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And Rabbi Yehuda said: With regard to monetary matters, i.e., her food and clothing, his condition is valid.

וּמִי מָצֵית מוֹקְמַתְּ לַהּ כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה? אֵימָא סֵיפָא: כׇּל הַמַּתְנֶה עַל מַה שֶּׁכָּתוּב בַּתּוֹרָה – תְּנָאוֹ בָּטֵל, אֲתָאן לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר! הָא לָא קַשְׁיָא: לְעוֹלָם רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הִיא, וְסֵיפָא – בְּדָבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ שֶׁל מָמוֹן.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But can you establish the mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? Say the latter clause of the mishna: Anyone who stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah, his condition is void. In this clause we arrive at the opinion of Rabbi Meir. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as actually you can explain that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and the latter clause is referring to non-monetary matters.

אֵימָא סֵיפָא: כׇּל תְּנַאי שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה בִּתְחִילָּתוֹ – תְּנָאוֹ בָּטֵל, מַאן שָׁמְעַתְּ לֵיהּ דְּאִית לֵיהּ הָא סְבָרָא – רַבִּי מֵאִיר, דְּתַנְיָא: אַבָּא חֲלַפְתָּא אִישׁ כְּפַר חֲנַנְיָא אָמַר מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי מֵאִיר: תְּנַאי קוֹדֵם לַמַּעֲשֶׂה – הֲרֵי זֶה תְּנַאי, מַעֲשֶׂה קוֹדֵם לַתְּנַאי – אֵינוֹ תְּנַאי.

The Gemara continues to question this explanation: But say the latter clause from near the end of the mishna: And any condition that is preceded by an action, the condition is void. Who have you heard who accepts this reasoning? It is Rabbi Meir, as it is taught in a baraita: Abba Ḥalafta, from the village of Ḥananya, said in the name of Rabbi Meir: If a condition was stated before the action, this is a valid condition, but if the action came before the condition, it is not a valid condition.

אֶלָּא כּוּלַּהּ רַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא, וְשָׁאנֵי הָכָא, דְּמֵעִיקָּרָא לָא שַׁעְבֵּד נַפְשֵׁיהּ.

Rather, the Gemara retracts the previous explanation and states that the entire mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. Why, then, is the bailee exempt from payment or an oath? Because here it is different, as at the outset he did not obligate himself in the halakhot of a bailee as stated in the Torah. Before he entered into the agreement, he clearly stated that he is unwilling to accept upon himself the liabilities of a paid or an unpaid bailee by Torah law.

תָּנָא: וּמַתְנֶה שׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר לִהְיוֹת כְּשׁוֹאֵל. בְּמַאי? בִּדְבָרִים?! אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: בְּשֶׁקָּנוּ מִיָּדוֹ.

A Sage taught in a baraita: Just as a bailee can issue a condition that he should be exempt, the converse is also possible: A paid bailee can stipulate to be like a borrower, i.e., he can accept upon himself all the responsibilities of a borrower. The Gemara asks: By what means is this commitment binding? Is it merely by speech alone? Mere speech is not sufficient to demonstrate a commitment of this kind. Shmuel said: No; it is referring to a case where the owner performed an act of acquisition with the bailee affirming this arrangement. The obligation goes into effect only if there was an act of acquisition.

וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא בְּשֶׁלֹּא קָנוּ מִיָּדוֹ, בְּהָהִיא הֲנָאָה דְּקָא נָפֵיק לֵיהּ קָלָא דְּאִינִישׁ מְהֵימְנָא הוּא – גָּמַיר וּמְשַׁעְבֵּד נַפְשֵׁיהּ.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: You may even say that it is referring to a situation where the owner did not perform an act of acquisition with the bailee, and even so he is liable as a borrower. The reason is that by means of that benefit he receives from the fact that a rumor goes out about him that he is a trustworthy person, he commits wholeheartedly to obligate himself, even by means of a verbal promise alone. Therefore, there is no need for a formal act of acquisition.

וְכׇל שֶׁאֶפְשָׁר לוֹ לְקַיְּימוֹ בְּסוֹפוֹ וְכוּ׳. אָמַר רַב טַבְלָא אָמַר רַב: זוֹ דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן תֵּימָא. אֲבָל חֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאִי אֶפְשָׁר לוֹ לְקַיְּימוֹ בְּסוֹפוֹ וְהִתְנָה עָלָיו מִתְּחִילָּתוֹ – תְּנָאוֹ קַיָּים.

§ The mishna teaches: With regard to any condition that ultimately can be fulfilled, if he stipulated it initially, his condition is valid. Rav Tavla says that Rav says: This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima, but the Rabbis say: Even though one cannot ultimately fulfill the condition, and he stipulated with regard to it initially, his condition is valid.

דְּתַנְיָא: ״הֲרֵי זֶה גִּיטִּךְ עַל מְנָת שֶׁתַּעֲלִי לָרָקִיעַ, עַל מְנָת שֶׁתֵּרְדִי לַתְּהוֹם, עַל מְנָת שֶׁתִּבְלְעִי קָנֶה שֶׁל מֵאָה אַמָּה, עַל מְנָת שֶׁתַּעַבְרִי אֶת הַיָּם הַגָּדוֹל בְּרַגְלַיִךְ״, נִתְקַיֵּים הַתְּנַאי – הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט, לֹא נִתְקַיֵּים הַתְּנַאי – אֵינוֹ גֵּט.

As it is taught in a baraita: If a man said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you ascend to the skies, or on the condition that you descend to the depths; or on the condition that you swallow a reed of one hundred cubits in size; or on the condition that you cross the Great Sea by foot, only if the condition was fulfilled and she did as he demanded is this a valid bill of divorce, but if the condition was not fulfilled it is not a valid bill of divorce. According to this tanna, the condition is binding despite the fact that it cannot be fulfilled in practice.

רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן תֵּימָא אוֹמֵר: כָּזֶה – גֵּט. כְּלָל אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן תֵּימָא: כֹּל שֶׁאִי אֶפְשָׁר לוֹ לְקַיְּימוֹ בְּסוֹפוֹ, וְהִתְנָה עָלָיו מִתְּחִילָּתוֹ – אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא כְּמַפְלִיגָהּ וְכָשֵׁר.

Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima says: A document such as this is a valid bill of divorce. The condition is negated, and therefore the bill of divorce is valid even though the condition was not fulfilled. As Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima stated a principle: With regard to any condition that one cannot ultimately fulfill, i.e., a condition that cannot be fulfilled at all, and yet he stipulated to this effect, even if he did so initially, he is considered as only exaggerating, and the document is valid. The supposed condition is not taken seriously and is not binding.

אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַב: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן תֵּימָא. אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: מַתְנִיתִין נָמֵי דַּיְקָא, דְּקָתָנֵי: כׇּל שֶׁאֶפְשָׁר לוֹ לְקַיְּימוֹ בְּסוֹפוֹ וְהִתְנָה עָלָיו מִתְּחִילָּתוֹ – תְּנָאוֹ קַיָּים, הָא אִי אֶפְשָׁר לוֹ לְקַיְּימוֹ – תְּנָאוֹ בָּטֵל. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.

Rav Naḥman says that Rav says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: The mishna is also precisely formulated in accordance with this opinion, as it teaches: With regard to any condition that ultimately he can fulfill, and he stipulated with regard to it initially, his condition is valid. This indicates that if he cannot fulfill it, his condition is void. The Gemara affirms: One can learn from this formulation that the unattributed mishna does in fact represent the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima.

הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ הַשּׂוֹכֵר אֶת הַפּוֹעֲלִים.

מַתְנִי׳ הַשּׁוֹאֵל אֶת הַפָּרָה וְשָׁאַל בְּעָלֶיהָ עִמָּהּ, אוֹ שָׂכַר בְּעָלֶיהָ עִמָּהּ, שָׁאַל הַבְּעָלִים אוֹ שְׂכָרָן וְאַחַר כָּךְ שָׁאַל אֶת הַפָּרָה וָמֵתָה – פָּטוּר, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״אִם בְּעָלָיו עִמּוֹ לֹא יְשַׁלֵּם״.

MISHNA: In the case of one who borrowed a cow and borrowed the services of its owner with it, or he borrowed a cow and hired its owner with it, or he borrowed the services of the owner or hired him and afterward borrowed the cow; in all such cases, if the cow died, the borrower is exempt from liability. Although a borrower is generally liable to pay if a cow he borrowed dies, here he is exempt, as it is stated: “If its owner is with him, he does not pay” (Exodus 22:14).

אֲבָל שָׁאַל אֶת הַפָּרָה וְאַחַר כָּךְ שָׁאַל אֶת הַבְּעָלִים, אוֹ שְׂכָרָן, וָמֵתָה – חַיָּיב, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״בְּעָלָיו אֵין עִמּוֹ שַׁלֵּם יְשַׁלֵּם״.

But if one first borrowed the cow and only afterward borrowed the services of the owner or hired him, and the cow died, he is liable to pay the owner for the cow. This is the halakha even if the owner was working for the borrower at the time, as it is stated: “If its owner is not with him, he shall pay” (Exodus 22:13).

גְּמָ׳ מִדְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: וְאַחַר כָּךְ שָׁאַל אֶת הַפָּרָה, מִכְּלָל דְּרֵישָׁא דְּקָתָנֵי ״עִמָּהּ״ – עִמָּהּ מַמָּשׁ. עִמָּהּ מַמָּשׁ, מִי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ פָּרָה בִּמְשִׁיכָה, וּבְעָלִים בַּאֲמִירָה?

GEMARA: From the fact that the latter clause teaches: And afterward borrowed the cow, it may be inferred that when the first clause teaches: Borrowed its owner with it, the intention is: Literally with it, i.e., at the same moment. The Gemara asks: Can you find such a case where the owner obligates himself to serve the borrower literally with it? Given that one borrows the cow through pulling the cow and contracts the services of the owner through their verbal agreement, it emerges that if they agree to both matters at the same time, one borrows the services of the owner before he borrows the cow, which is the case mentioned in the latter clause of the mishna. What, then, is the case mentioned in the first clause?

אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: כְּגוֹן דְּקַיְימָא פָּרָה בַּחֲצֵרוֹ דְּשׁוֹאֵל, דְּלָא מְחַסְּרָא מְשִׁיכָה. אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ ״אַתְּ גּוּפָךְ לֹא תִּשָּׁאֵל עַד שְׁעַת מְשִׁיכַת פָּרָתְךָ״.

The Gemara answers: If you wish, say that the mishna is referring to a case such as where the cow is standing in the borrower’s courtyard, which can effect acquisition of the rights to use the cow for him, so that it does not lack, i.e., there is no need for, pulling. Accordingly, both the borrowing of the owner’s services and the borrowing of his cow will take effect simultaneously upon their agreement. Alternatively, if you wish, say that the case is where the borrower says to him: You, yourself, will not be lent to me until the moment of the pulling of your cow.

תְּנַן הָתָם, אַרְבָּעָה שׁוֹמְרִים הֵם: שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם וְהַשּׁוֹאֵל, נוֹשֵׂא שָׂכָר וְהַשּׂוֹכֵר.

§ The Gemara analyses the halakhot of the four types of bailees that were delineated in the previous chapter: We learned in a mishna there (93a): There are four types of bailees: An unpaid bailee, and the borrower, a paid bailee, and the renter.

שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם נִשְׁבָּע עַל הַכֹּל, וְהַשּׁוֹאֵל מְשַׁלֵּם אֶת הַכֹּל, נוֹשֵׂא שָׂכָר וְהַשּׂוֹכֵר – נִשְׁבָּעִין עַל הַשְּׁבוּרָה וְעַל הַשְּׁבוּיָה וְעַל הַמֵּתָה, וּמְשַׁלְּמִים אֶת הָאֲבֵידָה וְאֶת הַגְּנֵיבָה.

The mishna there continues: If the item was stolen, lost, or broken, or if the animal died in any manner, the halakhot with regard to them are as follows: An unpaid bailee takes an oath over every outcome; whether the item was lost, stolen, or broken, or if the animal died, the unpaid bailee must take an oath that it happened as he described, and he is then exempt from payment. And the borrower does not take an oath, but pays for every outcome, whether it was stolen or lost, even in a circumstance beyond his control. The halakhot of a paid bailee and a renter are the same: They take an oath over an injured animal, over a captured animal, and over a dead animal, attesting that the mishaps were caused by circumstances beyond their control, and they are exempt; but they must pay for loss or theft.

מְנָא הָנֵי מִילֵּי? דְּתָנוּ רַבָּנַן: פָּרָשָׁה רִאשׁוֹנָה נֶאֶמְרָה בְּשׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם, שְׁנִיָּה – בְּשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר, שְׁלִישִׁית – בְּשׁוֹאֵל.

The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? As the Sages taught in a baraita: The verses in the Torah about bailees can be divided into three passages. The first passage (Exodus 22:6–8) is stated about an unpaid bailee; the second (Exodus 22:9–12) is about a paid bailee; and the third (Exodus 22:13–14) is about a borrower.

בִּשְׁלָמָא שְׁלִישִׁית בְּשׁוֹאֵל – מְפוֹרָשׁ: ״וְכִי יִשְׁאַל אִישׁ מֵעִם רֵעֵהוּ וְנִשְׁבַּר אוֹ מֵת בְּעָלָיו אֵין עִמּוֹ שַׁלֵּם יְשַׁלֵּם״. אֶלָּא רִאשׁוֹנָה בְּשׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם, שְׁנִיָּה בְּשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר – אֵיפוֹךְ אֲנָא!

The Gemara asks: Granted, it is clear that the third passage is about a borrower, as the verse explicitly states: “And when a man borrows from another, and it is injured or dies, if its owner is not with him, he shall pay” (Exodus 22:13). But with regard to the claim of the baraita that the first passage is about an unpaid bailee and the second is about a paid bailee, I could also say the reverse, as the verses do not state which type of bailee they are referring to.

מִסְתַּבְּרָא שְׁנִיָּה בְּשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר, שֶׁכֵּן חַיָּיב בִּגְנֵיבָה וַאֲבֵידָה. אַדְּרַבָּה: רִאשׁוֹנָה בְּשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר, שֶׁכֵּן מְשַׁלֵּם תַּשְׁלוּמֵי כֶפֶל בְּטוֹעֵן טַעֲנַת גַּנָּב!

The Gemara justifies the claim of the baraita: Clearly a paid bailee carries a more severe level of liability than an unpaid bailee. Accordingly, it stands to reason that the second passage is about a paid bailee, as it states a stringency, that the bailee is liable even in cases of theft or loss (see Exodus 22:11). The Gemara challenges this claim: On the contrary, it stands to reason that the first passage is about a paid bailee, as it states a stringency, that the bailee pays the double payment in a case where he takes a false oath stating the claim that a thief stole the item he was safeguarding (see Exodus 22:6).

אֲפִילּוּ הָכִי, קַרְנָא בְּלָא שְׁבוּעָה עֲדִיפָא מִכְּפֵילָא בִּשְׁבוּעָה.

The Gemara explains: Even so, being liable to pay the principal whenever one claims the deposit was stolen, without the ability to exempt oneself by taking an oath, is a greater stringency than being liable for the double payment, as that liability is only when one takes a false oath to that effect. Otherwise, he is exempt.

תִּדַּע, דְּהָא שׁוֹאֵל כׇּל הֲנָאָה שֶׁלּוֹ וְאֵינוֹ מְשַׁלֵּם אֶלָּא קֶרֶן.

The Gemara adds: Know that this is so, as a borrower bears the most severe level of liability, because he is privileged. All benefit from the transaction is his, without incurring any cost to himself. And in cases of theft he pays only the principal but is never required to pay the double payment.

וְהַשּׁוֹאֵל כׇּל הֲנָאָה שֶׁלּוֹ? וְהָא בָּעֲיָא מְזוֹנֵי! דְּקַיְימָא בַּאֲגַם. וְהָא בָּעֲיָא נְטִירָה! בְּנָטַר מָתָא. וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: לָא תֵּימָא ״כׇּל הֲנָאָה שֶׁלּוֹ״, אֶלָּא אֵימָא ״רוֹב הֲנָאָה שֶׁלּוֹ״. וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: בִּשְׁאֵילַת כֵּלִים.

The Gemara questions the proof just cited: But is it true that with regard to the borrower all benefit from the transaction is his? But doesn’t the animal require food, which the borrower must provide? The Gemara answers: The halakhot of a borrower also apply when the animal is standing in a marsh, where food is freely available. The Gemara persists: But doesn’t the animal require safeguarding? The Gemara answers: The halakhot of a borrower also apply when the borrower is a city guard and does not need to do anything additional to safeguard the animal. And if you wish, say: Do not say that all benefit is his, rather say: Most of the benefit is his, and that is sufficient reason to render him liable in all circumstances. And if you wish, say that the halakhot of a borrower apply also with regard to borrowing vessels, which do not require constant care. In any event, it is clear that a borrower is uniquely privileged and accordingly bears the most severe level of liability.

נוֹשֵׂא שָׂכָר וְהַשּׂוֹכֵר נִשְׁבָּעִין עַל הַשְּׁבוּרָה וְעַל הַשְּׁבוּיָה וְעַל הַמֵּתָה, וּמְשַׁלְּמִין אֶת הָאֲבֵידָה וְאֶת הַגְּנֵיבָה.

§ The mishna cited previously states: The halakhot of a paid bailee and a renter are the same: They take an oath over an injured animal, over a captured animal, and over a dead animal, attesting that the mishaps were caused by circumstances beyond their control, and they are exempt; but they must pay for loss or theft.

בִּשְׁלָמָא גְּנֵיבָה, דִּכְתִיב: ״אִם גָּנוֹב יִגָּנֵב מֵעִמּוֹ יְשַׁלֵּם לִבְעָלָיו״, אֶלָּא אֲבֵידָה מְנָא לַן? דְּתַנְיָא: ״אִם גָּנֵב יִגָּנֵב״ – אֵין לִי אֶלָּא גְּנֵיבָה, אֲבֵידָה מִנַּיִן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״אִם גָּנוֹב יִגָּנֵב״, מִכׇּל מָקוֹם.

The Gemara asks: Granted, a paid bailee is liable in the case of theft, as it is written: “If it is stolen from him, he must pay its owner” (Exodus 22:11). But in a case of loss, from where do we derive that a paid bailee is liable? The Gemara answers: As it is taught in a baraita: From the verse: “If it is stolen [ganov yigganev],” I have derived only that a paid bailee is liable if the item he is safeguarding is stolen; from where do I derive he is liable also if it is lost? The verse states: “ganov yigganev,” repeating the verb for emphasis. This teaches that he is liable in any case, i.e., for loss as well as theft.

הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר: לָא אָמְרִינַן דִּבְּרָה תוֹרָה כִּלְשׁוֹן בְּנֵי אָדָם. אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר: אָמְרִינַן דִּבְּרָה תוֹרָה כִלְשׁוֹן בְּנֵי אָדָם, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?

The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who says: We do not say that the Torah spoke in the language of people, and so any repeated verb must serve to teach additional halakhot. But according to the one who says: We do say that the Torah spoke in the language of people, and so the use of a repeated verb is only for stylistic reasons, what can be said? From where is it derived that the bailee is liable for losing the item?

אָמְרִי בְּמַעְרְבָא: קַל וָחוֹמֶר; וּמָה גְּנֵיבָה שֶׁקְּרוֹבָה לְאוֹנֶס – מְשַׁלֵּם, אֲבֵידָה שֶׁקְּרוֹבָה לִפְשִׁיעָה – לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן!

They say in the West, Eretz Yisrael: It is derived through an a fortiori inference: If in a case of theft, which is near to being a case of circumstances beyond his control, the halakha is that the bailee pays the owner the item’s value, then in a case of loss, which is near to being a case of negligence, is it not all the more so logical that he should pay?

וְאִידַּךְ, מִילְּתָא דְּאָתְיָא בְּקַל וְחוֹמֶר טָרַח וְכָתַב לַהּ קְרָא.

The Gemara asks: And according to the other opinion, why is there a need for a verse to teach this halakha if it can be derived from an a fortiori inference? The Gemara answers: At times, there is a matter that can be derived through an a fortiori inference, and the verse nevertheless takes the trouble and writes it explicitly.

וְהַשּׁוֹאֵל מְשַׁלֵּם אֶת הַכֹּל. בִּשְׁלָמָא שְׁבוּרָה וּמֵתָה, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְכִי יִשְׁאַל אִישׁ מֵעִם רֵעֵהוּ וְנִשְׁבַּר אוֹ מֵת״. אֶלָּא שְׁבוּיָה בְּשׁוֹאֵל מְנָא לַן?

§ The mishna cited above states: And the borrower does not take an oath, but pays for every outcome, whether it was stolen or lost, even in a circumstance beyond his control. The Gemara asks: Granted, the bailee is liable if the animal is injured or dies, as it is written: “And if a man borrows from another and it is injured or dies…he shall pay” (Exodus 22:13). But from where do we derive the liability of a borrower when the animal is captured?

וְכִי תֵּימָא נֵילַף מִשְּׁבוּרָה וּמֵתָה, מָה לִשְׁבוּרָה וּמֵתָה – שֶׁכֵּן אוּנְסָא דְּסָלֵיק אַדַּעְתָּא הוּא. תֹּאמַר בִּשְׁבוּיָה – שֶׁכֵּן אוּנְסָא דְּלָא סָלֵיק אַדַּעְתָּא הוּא!

And if you would say: Let us derive it from the fact the borrower is liable if the animal was injured or dies because they are all similarly cases of circumstances beyond his control, then one could counter as follows: What is notable about a case where the animal is injured or died? It is notable in that it is the type of unavoidable accident whose possibility of occurring entered one’s mind, so it is reasonable that the borrower accepted responsibility for such mishaps. Can you say the same about being captured, which is an unavoidable accident whose possibility of occurring does not enter one’s mind?

אֶלָּא: נֶאֶמְרָה שְׁבוּרָה וּמֵתָה בְּשׁוֹאֵל, וְנֶאֶמְרָה שְׁבוּרָה וּמֵתָה בְּשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר. מָה לְהַלָּן שְׁבוּיָה עִמּוֹ, אַף כָּאן שְׁבוּיָה עִמּוֹ.

Rather, the liability of a borrower in a case where the animal is captured is derived as follows: The cases where the animal is injured or dies are stated in the passage about a borrower, and similarly the cases where it is injured or dies are stated in the passage about a paid bailee. Just as below, i.e., in the passage in the Torah concerning a paid bailee, the case in which it is captured is included with it, as the verse there states: “If a man deliver to his neighbor a donkey, or an ox, or a sheep, or any beast, to safeguard, and it die, or be hurt, or is captured” (Exodus 22:9); so too here, with regard to a borrower, the case where it is captured is included with it.

אִיכָּא לְמִיפְרַךְ: מָה לְשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר שֶׁכֵּן לִפְטוּר, תֹּאמַר בַּשּׁוֹאֵל שֶׁכֵּן לְחִיּוּב!

The Gemara explains that this derivation can be refuted as follows: What is notable about a paid bailee? He is notable in that the cases in which the animal is injured or dies are mentioned in order to exempt him from liability. Can you say this is also true with regard to a borrower, where the cases are mentioned in order to teach that he is liable?

אֶלָּא כְּרַבִּי נָתָן, דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי נָתָן אוֹמֵר: ״אוֹ״ לְרַבּוֹת שְׁבוּיָה.

Rather, the liability of a borrower in a case where the animal is captured is derived in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Natan, as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Natan says: The word “or” in the phrase “injured or dies” (Exodus 22:13) serves to include the case in which the animal was captured.

הַאי ״אוֹ״ מִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ לְחַלֵּק. דְּסָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: עֵד דְּמִיתַּבְרָא וּמֵתָה לָא מְחַיֵּיב, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

The Gemara asks: But this word “or” is required in order to divide the cases, as otherwise it could enter your mind to say that the bailee is not liable unless the animal is first injured and then also dies. Therefore, the term “or” is necessary to teach us that these are two separate cases.

הָנִיחָא לְרַבִּי יוֹנָתָן. אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי יֹאשִׁיָּה, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?

The Gemara comments: This works out well according to the opinion of Rabbi Yonatan, that it is obvious that the borrower is liable even if the animal died without being injured first. Consequently, “or” is unnecessary, and so it can be used for Rabbi Natan’s derivation. But according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoshiya, what is there to say? According to his opinion, it is necessary for the Torah to state “or” in this case, to teach that the borrower is liable even if the animal dies without being injured first, and so it cannot be used for a derivation.

דְּתַנְיָא: ״אִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יְקַלֵּל אֶת אָבִיו וְאֶת אִמּוֹ״, אֵין לִי אֶלָּא אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ. אָבִיו בְּלֹא אִמּוֹ, אִמּוֹ בְּלֹא אָבִיו, מִנַּיִן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ קִלֵּל״. אָבִיו קִלֵּל, אִמּוֹ קִלֵּל. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יֹאשִׁיָּה.

The Gemara explains: As it is taught in a baraita: From the verse: “A man who curses his father and his mother shall die” (Leviticus 20:9), I have derived only that one is liable if he curses both his father and his mother. From where do I derive that if one curses his father but not his mother, or his mother but not his father, that he is liable? The continuation of the verse states: “His father and his mother he has cursed, his blood is upon him.” In the first part of the verse, the word “curses” is in proximity to “his father,” and in the last part of the verse, it is in proximity to “his mother.” This teaches that the verse is referring to both a case where he cursed only his father and a case where he cursed only his mother; this is the statement of Rabbi Yoshiya.

רַבִּי יוֹנָתָן אוֹמֵר: מַשְׁמַע שְׁנֵיהֶם כְּאֶחָד, וּמַשְׁמַע אֶחָד בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ –

Rabbi Yonatan says: There is no need for this derivation, because the phrase “his father and his mother” indicates that one is liable if he curses both of them together, and it also indicates that he is liable if he curses either one of them on their own,