חולין לא

חולין לא

גִּידְפֵי דְּמִיפַּרְמִי.

that the feathers at the front of the neck were unraveled by the arrow, a clear indication that slaughter was performed from the front of the neck.

וְהָא בָּעֵי כִּסּוּי, וְכִי תֵּימָא דִּמְכַסּוּ לֵיהּ, וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא אָמַר רַב: הַשּׁוֹחֵט צָרִיךְ שֶׁיִּתֵּן עָפָר לְמַטָּה וְעָפָר לְמַעְלָה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְכִסָּהוּ בֶּעָפָר״, ״עָפָר״ לֹא נֶאֱמַר אֶלָּא ״בֶּעָפָר״, מְלַמֵּד שֶׁהַשּׁוֹחֵט צָרִיךְ שֶׁיִּתֵּן עָפָר לְמַטָּה וְעָפָר לְמַעְלָה!

The Gemara notes another difficulty encountered in the slaughter of a flying bird with an arrow. But doesn’t the bird’s blood require covering with earth? And if you would say that Rabbi Yona bar Taḥlifa covers the blood, but doesn’t Rabbi Zeira say that Rav says: In fulfilling the mitzva of covering the blood, one who slaughters an undomesticated animal or bird must place earth beneath the blood and earth above it, as it is stated: “He shall spill its blood, and cover it in earth” (Leviticus 17:13). It is not stated: Cover it with earth, but rather “in earth.” This teaches that one who slaughters must place earth beneath the blood and earth above the blood, so that the blood will be within the earth.

דְּמַזְמֵין לֵיהּ לְעָפָר דְּכוּלַּהּ פִּתְקָא.

The Gemara answers that Rabbi Yona bar Taḥlifa would designate for himself the earth of the entire valley [patka] before shooting the arrow. That earth would serve as the layer of earth beneath the blood and he would proceed to cover the blood with another layer of earth.

הָיָה שׁוֹחֵט וְהִתִּיז, אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא: מְלֹא צַוָּאר וְחוּץ לַצַּוָּאר.

§ The mishna teaches: In a case where one was in the process of slaughtering the animal in the standard manner and he decapitated the animal in one motion, if the length of the knife is equivalent to the breadth of the animal’s entire neck, the slaughter is valid. Rabbi Zeira says: The knife must be equivalent to the breadth of the animal’s entire neck and extend beyond the neck.

אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: מְלֹא צַוָּאר וְחוּץ לַצַּוָּאר כִּמְלֹא צַוָּאר, דַּהֲווֹ לַהּ תְּרֵי צַוָּארֵי, אוֹ דִלְמָא מָלֵא צַוָּאר וְחוּץ לַצַּוָּאר מַשֶּׁהוּ?

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Did Rabbi Zeira mean: Equivalent to the breadth of the animal’s entire neck and extend beyond the neck by an amount equivalent to the breadth of the entire neck, in which case the length of the knife would equal the breadth of two necks? Or perhaps he meant: Equivalent to the breadth of the entire neck and beyond the neck by any amount?

תָּא שְׁמַע: הָיָה שׁוֹחֵט וְהִתִּיז שְׁנֵי רָאשִׁין בְּבַת אַחַת, אִם יֵשׁ לַסַּכִּין מְלֹא צַוָּאר אֶחָד – כָּשֵׁר. מַאי מְלֹא צַוָּאר אֶחָד? אִילֵּימָא מְלֹא צַוָּאר אֶחָד וְתוּ לָא, הַשְׁתָּא בִּבְהֵמָה אַחַת בָּעֵינַן מְלֹא צַוָּאר וְחוּץ לַצַּוָּאר, בִּשְׁתֵּי בְּהֵמוֹת סַגִּי לְהוּ כִּמְלֹא צַוָּאר אֶחָד? אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא מְלֹא צַוָּאר חוּץ לִשְׁנֵי צַוָּארִין.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear proof to resolve the dilemma from the continuation of the mishna: If one was in the process of slaughtering two animals simultaneously, and he decapitated two heads in one motion, if the length of the knife is equivalent to the breadth of an entire neck of one of the animals the slaughter is valid. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the phrase: The breadth of an entire neck of one of the animals? If we say that it means the breadth of one entire neck and nothing more, that is difficult. Now, for the slaughter of one animal, we require that the knife be equivalent to the breadth of the animal’s entire neck and extend beyond the neck; for the slaughter of two animals, is it possible that a knife whose length is equivalent to the breadth of one animal’s entire neck would be sufficient? Rather, it is obvious that it means that the length of the knife must be equivalent to the breadth of one entire neck beyond the breadth of two necks.

שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ, מְלֹא צַוָּאר חוּץ לַצַּוָּאר, שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.

The Gemara suggests: Learn from the mishna that Rabbi Zeira means that the length of the knife must be equivalent to the breadth of the animal’s entire neck and extend beyond the neck by the breadth of the entire neck. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, learn from it that this was Rabbi Zeira’s intent.

בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים – בִּזְמַן שֶׁהוֹלִיךְ וְלֹא הֵבִיא וְכוּ׳. אָמַר רַב מְנַשֶּׁה: בְּאִיזְמֵל שֶׁאֵין לוֹ קַרְנַיִם.

§ The mishna continues: In what case is this statement said? It is when one drew the knife back and did not draw it forth, or drew it forth and did not draw it back. But if he drew it back and forth, even if the knife was of any length, even if he slaughtered with a scalpel, the slaughter is valid. Rav Menashe said: This is the halakha in the case of a scalpel that does not have protrusions from the sides. If there are protrusions, since the scalpel is short, there is concern that the corners may perforate the simanim or enter between the simanim and invalidate the slaughter.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אַוְיָא לְרַב מְנַשֶּׁה: מַחְטָא מַאי? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַחְטָא מִבְזָע בָּזַע.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Avya, said to Rav Menashe: What is the halakha with regard to slaughter with a needle? Rav Menashe said to him: A needle pierces the simanim, as it perforates the neck instead of cutting it.

מַחְטָא דְּאוּשְׁכָּפֵי, מַאי? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: תְּנֵינָא ״אֲפִילּוּ כׇּל שֶׁהוּא״. מַאי לָאו מַחְטָא דְּאוּשְׁכָּפֵי? לָא, אִיזְמֵל. אִיזְמֵל בְּהֶדְיָא קָתָנֵי לַהּ! פָּרוֹשֵׁי קָא מְפָרֵשׁ: מַאי ״כׇּל שֶׁהוּ״ – אִיזְמֵל.

Rav Aḥa then asked Rav Menashe: What is the halakha with regard to slaughtering with a cobbler’s needle, which is flat and has sharp sides? Rav Menashe said to him: We already learn in the mishna: Even if the knife was of any length, the slaughter is valid. What, is it not referring to slaughter with a cobbler’s needle? The Gemara responds: No. The reference is to slaughtering with a scalpel, which is larger than a cobbler’s needle. The Gemara objects: The tanna teaches the case of a scalpel explicitly in the mishna. Therefore, the phrase in the mishna: A knife of any length, must be referring to an item smaller than a scalpel. The Gemara explains: The subsequent mention of the scalpel is explaining the phrase: Even if the knife was of any length. What is the knife of any length with which slaughter is valid? It is a scalpel.

הָכִי נָמֵי מִסְתַּבְּרָא, דְּאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ מַחְטָא דְּאוּשְׁכָּפֵי, הַשְׁתָּא מַחְטָא דְּאוּשְׁכָּפֵי שַׁרְיָא, אִיזְמֵל מִיבַּעְיָא? אִיזְמֵל אִצְטְרִיכָא לֵיהּ, סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: לִיגְזַר אִיזְמֵל שֶׁאֵין לוֹ קַרְנַיִם אַטּוּ אִיזְמֵל שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ קַרְנַיִם, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

This too stands to reason, as, if it enters your mind that the phrase: A knife of any length, is referring to a cobbler’s needle, now that it is permitted to slaughter with a cobbler’s needle, is it necessary for the tanna to teach that it is permitted to slaughter with a scalpel, which is larger than a cobbler’s needle? The Gemara rejects that reasoning: It is necessary for the mishna to teach both the case of a cobbler’s needle and the case of a scalpel, as it could enter your mind to say that it is prohibited to slaughter with a scalpel even though it is permitted to slaughter with a cobbler’s needle. The reasoning for this distinction would be: Let the Sages issue a decree prohibiting the use of a scalpel with no protrusions due to the prohibition against using a scalpel with protrusions. Therefore, the tanna teaches us that there is no decree and it is permitted to slaughter with a scalpel that has no protrusions.

מַתְנִי׳ נָפְלָה סַכִּין וְשָׁחֲטָה, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁשָּׁחֲטָה כְּדַרְכָּהּ – פְּסוּלָה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְזָבַחְתָּ … וְאָכַלְתָּ״, מַה שֶּׁאַתָּה זוֹבֵחַ אַתָּה אוֹכֵל.

MISHNA: If a knife fell and slaughtered an animal, although the knife slaughtered the animal in the standard manner, the slaughter is not valid, as it is stated: “And you shall slaughter…and you shall eat” (Deuteronomy 27:7), from which it is derived: That which you slaughter you may eat, and that which was slaughtered on its own, you may not eat.

גְּמָ׳ טַעְמָא דְּנָפְלָה, הָא הִפִּילָהּ הוּא – כְּשֵׁרָה, וְאַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא מִיכַּוֵּין.

GEMARA: The mishna teaches that if a knife fell and slaughtered an animal the slaughter is not valid. The Gemara notes: The reason the slaughter is not valid is that the knife fell. But by inference, if one dropped the knife the slaughter is valid, and that is the halakha even though when dropping the knife he did not intend to slaughter the animal.

מַאן תַּנָּא דְּלָא בָּעֵינַן כַּוָּונָה לִשְׁחִיטָה? אָמַר רָבָא: רַבִּי נָתָן הִיא, דְּתָנֵי אוֹשַׁעְיָא זְעֵירָא דְּמִן חַבְרַיָּא: זָרַק סַכִּין לְנוֹעֳצָהּ בַּכּוֹתֶל, וְהָלְכָה וְשָׁחֲטָה כְּדַרְכָּהּ – רַבִּי נָתָן מַכְשִׁיר, וַחֲכָמִים פּוֹסְלִים. הוּא תָּנֵי לַהּ, וְהוּא אָמַר לַהּ: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי נָתָן.

The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna who holds that we do not require intent for slaughter? Rava said: It is Rabbi Natan, as Oshaya, the youngest of the company of Sages, taught a baraita: If one threw a knife to embed it in the wall and in the course of its flight the knife went and slaughtered an animal in its proper manner, Rabbi Natan deems the slaughter valid and the Rabbis deem the slaughter not valid. Oshaya teaches the baraita and he says about it: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan that there is no need for intent to perform a valid act of slaughter.

וְהָא אַמְרַהּ רָבָא חֲדָא זִימְנָא, דִּתְנַן: וְכוּלָּן שֶׁשָּׁחֲטוּ וַאֲחֵרִים רוֹאִין אוֹתָן – שְׁחִיטָתָן כְּשֵׁרָה. וְאָמְרִינַן: מַאן תַּנָּא דְּלָא בָּעֵי כַּוָּונָה לִשְׁחִיטָה? וְאָמַר רָבָא: רַבִּי נָתָן הִיא.

The Gemara asks: But didn’t Rava already say it one time that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan? As we learned in a mishna (2a): And with regard to any of them, a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, who slaughtered an animal and others see and supervise them, their slaughter is valid even though they are incapable of intent. And we said: Who is the tanna who holds that we do not require intent for slaughter? And Rava said: It is Rabbi Natan.

צְרִיכָא, דְּאִי אַשְׁמְועִינַן הָתָם – מִשּׁוּם דְּקָא מִיכַּוֵּין לְשׁוּם חֲתִיכָה בְּעוֹלָם, אֲבָל הָכָא, דְּלָא קָא מִיכַּוֵּין – אֵימָא לָא.

The Gemara answers: Both statements are necessary. As had Rava taught us his statement there with regard to a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, one would have thought that the slaughter is valid due to the fact that although the individual lacks intent to slaughter the animal, he intends his action for the sake of cutting in general. But here, with regard to throwing a knife at the wall, where he does not intend to cut at all, say no, the slaughter is not valid.

וְאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן הָכָא, מִשּׁוּם דְּקָאָתֵי מִכֹּחַ בֶּן דַּעַת, אֲבָל הָתָם דְּלָא קָאָתֵי מִכֹּחַ בֶּן דַּעַת – אֵימָא לָא, צְרִיכָא.

And had Rava taught us his statement here with regard to throwing the knife, one would have thought that the slaughter is valid is due to the fact that it comes due to the action of a mentally competent person. But there, with regard to slaughter by a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, where the slaughter does not come due to the action of a mentally competent person, say that the slaughter is not valid. Therefore, it is necessary for Rava to teach both cases.

אִתְּמַר: נִדָּה שֶׁנֶּאֶנְסָה וְטָבְלָה, אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: טְהוֹרָה לְבֵיתָהּ, וַאֲסוּרָה לֶאֱכוֹל בִּתְרוּמָה. וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: אַף לְבֵיתָהּ לֹא טָהֲרָה.

§ The mishna is now cited as proof in an amoraic dispute. It was stated: With regard to a menstruating woman who, after the menstrual flow ended, was compelled against her will and immersed in a ritual bath, Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: She is ritually pure vis-à-vis her house, i.e., it is permitted for her to engage in intercourse with her husband, but it is prohibited for her to partake of teruma because the immersion is not considered valid for that purpose. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: She was not purified even vis-à-vis her house.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא לְרַב נַחְמָן, לְרַב דְּאָמַר: טְהוֹרָה לְבֵיתָהּ וַאֲסוּרָה לֶאֱכוֹל בִּתְרוּמָה – עֲוֹן כָּרֵת (הוּתְּרָה) [הִתַּרְתָּ], אִיסּוּר מִיתָה מִיבַּעְיָא?

Rava said to Rav Naḥman: According to the opinion of Rav, who says that she is ritually pure vis-à-vis her house but it is prohibited for her to partake of teruma, it is difficult. With regard to a transgression punishable by karet, i.e., intercourse with a menstruating woman, she was rendered permitted by immersion against her will; with regard to partaking of teruma, a prohibition punishable by death at the hand of Heaven, which is a lesser punishment, is it necessary to say that it is permitted for her through immersion against her will? Why then does Rav deem it prohibited for her to partake of teruma?

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: בַּעְלָהּ חוּלִּין הוּא, וְחוּלִּין לָא בָּעֵי כַּוָּונָה. וּמְנָא תֵּימְרָא? דִּתְנַן: גַּל שֶׁנִּתְלַשׁ וּבוֹ אַרְבָּעִים סְאָה וְנָפַל עַל הָאָדָם וְעַל הַכֵּלִים – טְהוֹרִין. מַאי לָאו אָדָם דּוּמְיָא דְּכֵלִים? מָה כֵּלִים דְּלָא מִיכַּוְּונִי, אַף אָדָם נָמֵי לָא בָּעֵי כַּוָּונָה.

Rav Naḥman said to him: The halakhic status of her husband is non-sacred, and non-sacred items do not require intent for purification. And from where do you say so? It is as we learned in a mishna (Mikvaot 5:6): In the case of a wave that was detached from the sea, and in it were forty se’a of water, and that wave fell on an impure person or on impure vessels, they are ritually pure. What, is it not that a person is similar to vessels? Just as vessels do not intend to be purified and they are purified by the wave, so too, a person does not require intent in order to be purified.

מִמַּאי? דִּלְמָא בְּיוֹשֵׁב וּמְצַפֶּה עָסְקִינַן, אֵימָתַי יִתָּלֵשׁ הַגַּל,

The Gemara rejects that proof: From where is there proof that this is the meaning of the mishna? Perhaps we are dealing with the case of one who sits near the water and waits to determine when the wave will be detached, which is tantamount to having intent to immerse,

וְכֵלִים דּוּמְיָא דְּאָדָם, מָה אָדָם דְּבָעֵינַן כַּוָּונָה, אַף כֵּלִים נָמֵי דְּקָא מְכַוֵּין לְהוּ אָדָם!

and vessels are similar to a person: Just as for a person, we require his intent for purification, so too for vessels, they are purified only in a case where a person intends for them to be purified.

וְכִי תֵּימָא, בְּיוֹשֵׁב וּמְצַפֶּה, מַאי לְמֵימְרָא?

And if you would say: If the mishna is referring to the case of one who sits and waits to determine when the wave will be detached, what is the purpose of stating this halakha? It is obvious and introduces no novel element.

מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: לִיגְזַר מִשּׁוּם חַרְדָּלִית שֶׁל גְּשָׁמִים, אִי נָמֵי לִיגְזַר רָאשִׁין אַטּוּ כִּיפִּין, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דְּלָא גָּזְרִינַן!

The Gemara responds that there is a novel element in this halakha. Lest you say: Let us issue a decree that a detached wave does not effect purification due to the concern that otherwise, one would receive the mistaken impression that one is purified in a cascade [ḥardalit] of rainwater containing forty se’a. The halakha is that rainwater purifies only when pooled in one place. Alternatively, let us issue a decree that the edges of the waves, which are in contact with the ground, are ineffective in purifying people and vessels standing on the ground due to the concern that otherwise one would receive the mistaken impression that vessels are purified even if one pushes them upward into the arc of the waves while the water remains airborne. Therefore, the tanna teaches us that we do not issue either of those decrees.

וּמְנָא תֵּימְרָא דְּלָא מַטְבְּלִינַן בְּכִיפִּין? דִּתְנַן: מַטְבִּילִין בְּרָאשִׁין, וְאֵין מַטְבִּילִין בְּכִיפִּין, שֶׁאֵין מַטְבִּילִין בָּאֲוִיר.

And from where do you say that we do not immerse in the arcs of waves? As we learned in a baraita: One may immerse in the edges of waves, but one may not immerse in their arcs, as one may not immerse in air. Immersion may be performed only on the ground.

אֶלָּא חוּלִּין דְּלָא בָּעֵי כַּוָּונָה מִיהָא מְנָלַן? דִּתְנַן: פֵּירוֹת שֶׁנָּפְלוּ לְתוֹךְ אַמַּת הַמַּיִם, וּפָשַׁט מִי שֶׁיָּדָיו טְמֵאוֹת וּנְטָלָן – יָדָיו טְהוֹרוֹת, וּפֵירוֹת אֵינָן בְּ״כִי יוּתַּן״.

The Gemara again asks: But in any event, from where do we derive that non-sacred items do not require intent? The Gemara answers: It is as we learned in a mishna (Makhshirin 4:7): Produce becomes susceptible to ritual impurity only if it is dampened by one of seven liquids and its owner was amenable to its dampening. This is derived from the verse: “But when water is placed on the seed, and some of their carcass shall fall on it, it is impure to you” (Leviticus 11:38). If produce fell into a stream, and one whose hands were ritually impure extended his hands and took the produce from the water channel, his hands are ritually pure through immersion in the stream, and this produce is not in the category of: “But when water is placed.” The produce is not susceptible to ritual impurity because the owner did not intend that his hands become wet.

וְאִם בִּשְׁבִיל שֶׁיּוּדְחוּ יָדָיו – טְהוֹרוֹת, וּפֵירוֹת בְּ״כִי יוּתַּן״.

But if he placed his hands into the stream so that his hands would be rinsed and purified, his hands are ritually pure, and the produce is in the category of: “But when water is placed.” Since he was amenable to the dampening of his hands, the water on his hands renders the produce susceptible to ritual impurity. From the first case in the mishna it is clear that his hands are purified even though his intent was not to immerse them in the water.

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רָבָא לְרַב נַחְמָן: טָבַל לְחוּלִּין וְהוּחְזַק לְחוּלִּין – אָסוּר לְמַעֲשֵׂר. הוּחְזַק – אִין, לֹא הוּחְזַק – לָא.

Rava raised an objection to Rav Naḥman from a mishna (Ḥagiga 18b): If one immersed for the purpose of eating non-sacred food and assumed the presumptive status of ritual purity for non-sacred food, it is prohibited for him to partake of second-tithe produce. The Gemara infers: If one assumed the presumptive status of ritual purity with regard to non-sacred food, yes, it is permitted for him to eat non-sacred food; if he did not assume the presumptive status, he may not eat non-sacred food. This indicates that even when immersing in order to partake of non-sacred food, one must intend to assume the presumptive status of ritual purity.

הָכִי קָאָמַר: אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהוּחְזַק לְחוּלִּין – אָסוּר לְמַעֲשֵׂר.

Rav Naḥman rejects the proof from the mishna and says that no intent is required to assume the presumptive status of ritual purity in order to eat non-sacred food. Rather, this is what the mishna is saying: Although he assumes the presumptive status of ritual purity for non-sacred food, it is prohibited for him to partake of second-tithe produce.

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ: טָבַל וְלֹא הוּחְזַק – כְּאִילּוּ לֹא טָבַל. מַאי לָאו: כְּאִילּוּ לֹא טָבַל כְּלָל?

Rava raised an objection to Rav Naḥman from that same mishna: If one immersed without intent to assume the presumptive status of ritual purity, it is as though he did not immerse. What, is the meaning of the mishna not that it is as though he did not immerse at all?

לָא, כְּאִילּוּ לֹא טָבַל לְמַעֲשֵׂר, אֲבָל טָבַל לְחוּלִּין. הוּא סָבַר: דַּיחוֹיֵי קָא מְדַחֵי לֵיהּ. נְפַק דָּק וְאַשְׁכַּח, דְּתַנְיָא: טָבַל וְלֹא הוּחְזַק – מוּתָּר לַחוּלִּין וְאָסוּר לַמַּעֲשֵׂר.

Rav Naḥman rejects that proof as well. No, it means that if he immersed without intent it is as though he did not immerse to partake of second-tithe produce, but in that case, he immersed for non-sacred food, for which no intent is necessary. The Gemara comments: Rava believed that Rav Naḥman was merely putting him off with his claim that the formulation of the mishna does not conclusively support his objection; he believed that Rav Naḥman was not stating the real meaning of the mishna. Rava then went out, examined the sources, and discovered that it is taught in a baraita explicitly in accordance with the opinion of Rav Naḥman: If one immersed and had no intent to assume the presumptive status of ritual purity, it is permitted for him to eat non-sacred food, but it is prohibited for him to partake of second-tithe produce.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי לְרַב יוֹסֵף: לֵימָא תֶּיהְוֵי תְּיוּבְתָּא דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן מֵהָא?

Abaye said to Rav Yosef: Let us say that there will be a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan from this baraita. This baraita states that immersion without intent is effective for non-sacred items, while Rabbi Yoḥanan said (31a) that if a woman who is impure due to menstruation immerses without intent she is forbidden to her husband, who is non-sacred.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן הוּא דְּאָמַר כְּרַבִּי יוֹנָתָן בֶּן יוֹסֵף.

Rav Yosef said to him: Indeed, the baraita is contrary to his opinion, but Rabbi Yoḥanan is saying his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yonatan ben Yosef.

דְּתַנְיָא: רַבִּי יוֹנָתָן בֶּן יוֹסֵף אוֹמֵר: ״וְכוּבַּס״, מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״שֵׁנִית״? מַקִּישׁ תִּכְבּוֹסֶת שְׁנִיָּה לְתִכְבּוֹסֶת רִאשׁוֹנָה: מָה תִּכְבּוֹסֶת רִאשׁוֹנָה לְדַעַת, אַף תִּכְבּוֹסֶת שְׁנִיָּה לְדַעַת.

As it is taught in a baraita with regard to the verse dealing with the purification of a leprous garment, which must be laundered, quarantined for a week, and then immersed in a ritual bath: “And the garment…that you shall wash and the leprosy departed from them, and it shall be washed a second time and shall be pure” (Leviticus 13:58). Rabbi Yonatan ben Yosef says: It would have been sufficient for the verse to simply state: And it shall be washed and shall be pure. For what purpose does the verse state: “A second time”? The Torah juxtaposes the second washing, the immersion, with the first washing, the laundering. Just as the first washing is performed with intent, as it is written: “And the priest shall command that they wash the garment that has the leprous mark, and he shall quarantine it seven days more” (Leviticus 13:54), so too, the second washing, the immersion in a ritual bath, must be performed with intent.

אִי מָה לְהַלָּן בָּעֵינַן דַּעַת כֹּהֵן, אַף כָּאן בָּעֵינַן דַּעַת כֹּהֵן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְטָהֵר״, מִכׇּל מָקוֹם.

If so, based on the same juxtaposition, perhaps derive: Just as there, with regard to the first washing, we require the intent of a priest, who commands to wash the garment, so too here, with regard to the second washing, we require the intent of a priest. Therefore, the verse states: “And shall be pure” (Leviticus 13:58), indicating that there is purity in any case where there is intent, even without a command from a priest. In the opinion of Rabbi Yonatan ben Yosef, even the immersion of the non-sacred garment must be performed with intent. Rav Yosef states that Rabbi Yoḥanan bases his statement on Rabbi Yonatan ben Yosef’s opinion.

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב שִׁימִי בַּר אָשֵׁי: וּמִי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן הָכִי? וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הֲלָכָה כִּסְתַם מִשְׁנָה.

Rav Shimi bar Ashi objects to the association of the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan with the opinion of Rabbi Yonatan ben Yosef: Did Rabbi Yoḥanan say that immersion of a non-sacred garment requires intent? But doesn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say that the halakha is in accordance with an unattributed mishna?

וּתְנַן: נָפְלָה סַכִּין וְשָׁחֲטָה, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁשָּׁחֲטָה כְּדַרְכָּהּ – פְּסוּלָה. וְהָוֵינַן בָּהּ: טַעְמָא דְּנָפְלָה, הָא הִפִּילָהּ הוּא – כְּשֵׁרָה, וְאַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא מִיכַּוֵּין. וְאָמְרִינַן: מַאן תַּנָּא דְּלָא בָּעֵי כַּוָּונָה לִשְׁחִיטָה? אָמַר רָבָא: רַבִּי נָתָן הִיא.

And we learned in the mishna: If a knife fell and slaughtered an animal, although the knife slaughtered the animal in the standard manner, the slaughter is not valid. And we discussed it: The reason the slaughter is not valid is that the knife fell. But by inference, if one dropped the knife the slaughter is valid, and that is the ruling even though when dropping the knife he did not intend to slaughter the animal. And we say: Who is the tanna who holds that we do not require intent for slaughter? Rava said: It is Rabbi Natan. Based on his principle that the halakha is in accordance with an unattributed mishna, Rabbi Yoḥanan should rule in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan cited in the unattributed mishna, and not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yonatan ben Yosef.

בִּשְׁחִיטָה, אֲפִילּוּ רַבִּי יוֹנָתָן בֶּן יוֹסֵף [מוֹדֵי], מִדְּגַלִּי רַחֲמָנָא מִתְעַסֵּק בְּקָדָשִׁים פָּסוּל – מִכְּלָל דְּחוּלִּין לָא בָּעֵינַן כַּוָּונָה.

The Gemara answers: With regard to slaughter, even Rabbi Yonatan ben Yosef concedes that intent is not necessary. He learns this from the fact that the Merciful One revealed that if one acts unawares in performing the slaughter of sacrificial animals, with no intent to slaughter, the offering is disqualified. This is derived (13a) from the verse: “You shall slaughter it to your will” (Leviticus 19:5). By inference, conclude that with regard to the slaughter of non-sacred animals we do not require intent.

וְרַבָּנַן, נְהִי דְּלָא בָּעֵינַן כַּוָּונָה לִזְבִיחָה, לַחֲתִיכָה בָּעֵינַן.

While on this subject the Gemara clarifies: And the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Natan and hold that slaughter of non-sacred animals requires intent would say: Although we do not require intent to slaughter non-sacred animals, we require intent to cut the neck of the animal. Throwing the knife down is not sufficient.

אָמַר רָבָא: בְּהָא זְכָנְהוּ רַבִּי נָתָן לְרַבָּנַן, מִי כְּתִיב ״וְחָתַכְתָּ״? ״וְזָבַחְתָּ״ כְּתִיב, אִי בָּעֵינַן כַּוָּונָה לַחֲתִיכָה – אֲפִילּוּ לִזְבִיחָה נָמֵי לִיבְעֵי, אִי לָא בָּעֵינַן כַּוָּונָה לִזְבִיחָה – לַחֲתִיכָה נָמֵי לָא לִיבְעֵי.

Rava said that it was with this contention that Rabbi Natan overcame the Rabbis: He said: Is it written with regard to the slaughter of non-sacred animals: And you shall cut? It is written: “And you shall slaughter” (Deuteronomy 12:21). The Torah does not distinguish between cutting and slaughtering; if we require intent for cutting, we should require intent even for slaughtering. Conversely, if we do not require intent for slaughtering, we should also not require intent for cutting.

הֵיכִי דָּמֵי נִדָּה שֶׁנֶּאֶנְסָה וְטָבְלָה? אִילֵימָא דְּאַנְסַהּ חֲבִירְתַּהּ וְאַטְבְּלַהּ, כַּוָּונָה דַּחֲבִרְתַּהּ כַּוָּונָה מְעַלַּיְיתָא הִיא.

The Gemara revisits the matter of immersion without intent. What are the circumstances of a menstruating woman who, after the menstrual flow ended, was compelled against her will and immersed in a ritual bath? If we say that another woman compelled her and immersed her in a ritual bath, the immersion should be valid even according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, as the intent of another woman is full-fledged intent.

וְעוֹד, בִּתְרוּמָה נָמֵי אָכְלָה, דִּתְנַן: הַחֵרֶשֶׁת, וְהַשּׁוֹטָה, וְהַסּוֹמָא, וְשֶׁנִּטְרְפָה דַּעְתָּהּ, אִם יֵשׁ לָהֶן פִּקְּחוֹת מְתַקְּנוֹת אוֹתָן – אוֹכְלוֹת בִּתְרוּמָה.

And furthermore, in that case the immersion enables her to partake of teruma as well, as we learned in a mishna (Nidda 13b): In the case of a woman who is a deaf-mute, or an imbecile, or blind, or who went insane, and is therefore unable to examine herself reliably, if one of these women has a competent friend, that friend prepares her by examining her and immersing them in a ritual bath. And on that basis the incompetent woman may partake of teruma.

אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: לְרַבִּי נָתָן, שֶׁנָּפְלָה מִן הַגֶּשֶׁר, וּלְרַבָּנַן, שֶׁיָּרְדָה לְהָקֵר.

Rav Pappa said: According to Rabbi Natan, who does not require intent for the slaughter of non-sacred animals, immersion against her will that renders it permitted for a woman to engage in intercourse with her husband is in a case where she fell from a bridge into a river, with no intent at all. According to the Rabbis, who require intent to cut for slaughter to be valid and intent to enter the water for immersion to be valid, it is referring to a case where she descended into the water to cool herself, with no thought of purification.

אָמַר רָבָא: שָׁחַט פָּרָה וְשָׁחַט בְּהֵמָה אַחֶרֶת עִמָּהּ, לְדִבְרֵי הַכֹּל פְּסוּלָה.

The Gemara continues its discussion of the dispute between Rabbi Natan and the Rabbis. Rava said: If one slaughtered a red heifer and in the same action slaughtered another animal together with it, everyone agrees that the red heifer is disqualified.