חולין עד

חולין עד

אֵין בָּהֶן אֶלָּא מִצְוַת פְּרוֹשׁ בִּלְבָד.

In fact, such limbs and flesh are not prohibited by Torah law, as the slaughter does not render them as though they had already fallen off prior to the slaughter, and the verse cited in the baraita is not a true derivation but a mere support. Accordingly, with regard to them, there is nothing other than a rabbinic mitzva to separate oneself from consuming them.

יָתֵיב רַב יוֹסֵף קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב הוּנָא, וְיָתֵיב וְקָאָמַר: אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: אֲכָלוֹ לָזֶה – לוֹקֶה. אֲמַר לֵיהּ הָהוּא מֵרַבָּנַן: לָא תְּצִיתוּ לֵיהּ, הָכִי אָמַר רַב יִצְחָק בַּר שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר מָרְתָא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְרַב: אֲכָלוֹ לָזֶה – אֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה.

§ Rav Yosef sat before Rav Huna, and he sat and said: Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: If one ate this hanging limb he is flogged for violating the prohibition against eating a limb from a living animal. One of the Sages said to him: Do not listen to his statement in the name of Rav, as this is what Rav Yitzḥak bar Shmuel bar Marta says in the name of Rav: If one ate this hanging limb he is not flogged.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב הוּנָא: אֲנַן אַמַּאן נִסְמוֹךְ? אַהְדְּרִינְהוּ רַב יוֹסֵף לְאַפֵּיהּ, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מַאי קוּשְׁיָא? כִּי אֲמַרִי אֲנָא – בְּמִיתָה, דְּעוֹשָׂה נִיפּוּל; כִּי אֲמַר אִיהוּ – בִּשְׁחִיטָה, דְּאֵינָהּ עוֹשָׂה נִיפּוּל.

Rav Huna said to Rav Yosef: Upon whose version of Rav’s ruling shall we rely? Rav Yosef turned his face away in anger and said to him: What is the difficulty? When I said in Rav’s name that one is flogged for eating a limb that had been hanging from an animal when it died, I was referring to a case of death by means other than slaughter, which renders the limb as though it had already fallen off prior to the animal’s death. When Rav Yitzḥak bar Shmuel bar Marta said in the name of Rav that one is not flogged, he was referring to the case of a slaughter, which does not render the limb as though it had already fallen off prior to the slaughter and therefore serves to render the limb permitted for consumption.

אָמַר רָבָא: מְנָא הָא מִלְּתָא דַאֲמוּר רַבָּנַן: מִיתָה עוֹשָׂה נִיפּוּל, שְׁחִיטָה אֵינָהּ עוֹשָׂה נִיפּוּל, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְכֹל אֲשֶׁר יִפֹּל עָלָיו מֵהֶם בְּמֹתָם יִטְמָא״, לְמַעוֹטֵי מַאי? אִילֵּימָא לְמַעוֹטֵי בְּחַיֵּיהֶם – מִ״נִּבְלָתָם״ נָפְקָא, אֶלָּא שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: מִיתָה עוֹשָׂה נִיפּוּל, וְאֵין שְׁחִיטָה עוֹשָׂה נִיפּוּל.

§ Rava said: From where is this matter that the Sages stated derived: The death of an animal by means other than slaughter renders a hanging limb as though it had already fallen off prior to the slaughter, whereas the slaughter of the animal does not render a limb as though it had already fallen off? As it is written with regard to the eight species of impure creeping animals: “And anything that these fall upon, when they are dead, it shall be impure” (Leviticus 11:32). What does the term “when they are dead” serve to exclude? If we say it serves to exclude the time when they are alive, that principle is derived from: “And everything upon which any part of their carcass falls shall be impure” (Leviticus 11:35), which explicitly states that only their carcasses impart impurity. Rather, learn from the verse that death renders a hanging limb as though it had already fallen off, and slaughter does not render a hanging limb as though it had already fallen off.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה לְרָבָא: וְהָא קְרָא בִּשְׁרָצִים כְּתִיב! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִם אֵינוֹ עִנְיָן לִשְׁרָצִים, דְּלָאו בְּנֵי שְׁחִיטָה נִינְהוּ – תְּנֵהוּ עִנְיָן לִבְהֵמָה.

Rav Adda bar Ahava said to Rava: But this verse is written with regard to creeping animals, which do not require slaughter. How then can a halakha with regard to slaughter be derived from here? Rava said to him: If, because it is superfluous, this verse is not referring to the matter of creeping animals, which are not subject to the requirement of slaughter, apply it to the matter of an animal, which is subject to slaughter.

וְאַכַּתִּי מִבְּעֵי לֵיהּ, כְּעֵין מִיתָה: לַחִין – מְטַמְּאִים, יְבֵשִׁים – אֵין מְטַמְּאִים! תְּרֵי ״בְּמֹתָם״ כְּתִיבִי.

The Gemara objects: But the phrase “when they are dead, it shall be impure” is still necessary to teach a different halakha, i.e., that they impart impurity only when they are still in a state similar to their state at the time of their death, i.e., if they are moist they impart impurity, whereas if they are dry they do not impart impurity. The Gemara explains that “when they are dead” is written twice, once in the verse cited, and once in the previous verse, which states: “Whoever touches them when they are dead shall be impure until the evening” (Leviticus 11:31).

אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: מַחְלוֹקֶת בְּאֵבֶר דְּעוּבָּר חַי, אֲבָל בְּאֵבֶר דְּעוּבָּר מֵת – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל שְׁחִיטָה עוֹשָׂה נִיפּוּל. וְרַבָּה אָמַר: כְּמַחְלוֹקֶת בָּזֶה כָּךְ מַחְלוֹקֶת בָּזֶה.

§ The Gemara returns to the dispute in the mishna (72a) with regard to a fetus that extended its foreleg and then its mother was slaughtered. Rabbi Meir holds that the foreleg is regarded as a carcass with the associated impurity, while the Rabbis hold that although it is not permitted for consumption, the slaughter prevents it from having the impurity of a carcass. With regard to this dispute, Rav Ḥisda said: The dispute concerns only the limb of a fetus that was alive when the mother was slaughtered; but concerning the case of the limb of a fetus that was dead when the mother was slaughtered, everyone agrees that slaughter renders the fetus’s limb as though it had already fallen off prior to the slaughter, and it imparts impurity as a limb from a living animal. But Rabba said: Just as there is a dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis concerning this case, where the fetus was alive, so too, there is a dispute between them concerning that case, where the fetus had died.

בֶּן שְׁמֹנֶה חַי. וְהָתַנְיָא: בֶּן שְׁמֹנֶה חַי יוֹכִיחַ, שֶׁאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁיֵּשׁ בְּמִינוֹ שְׁחִיטָה – אֵין שְׁחִיטָתוֹ מְטַהַרְתּוֹ.

§ The mishna states that an eight-month-old fetus that was born alive is not rendered ritually pure by slaughtering it. The reason given is that the concept of permitting an animal through slaughter is never stated with regard to that kind of animal. The Gemara challenges: But isn’t it taught in a baraita in a discussion about whether slaughter renders a tereifa pure from the impurity of a carcass: An eight-month-old fetus that was born alive will prove the point, as even though there are other animals of that kind that are permitted through slaughter, its slaughter does not render it pure from having the impurity of a carcass. This refutes the claim that the issue of slaughter rendering an animal pure from having the impurity of a carcass is a function of whether or not the concept of slaughter applies to that kind of animal.

אָמַר רַב כָּהֲנָא: יֵשׁ בְּמִינוֹ שְׁחִיטָה אַגַּב אִמּוֹ, וְתַנָּא דִּידַן מִינָא דְּאִמֵּיהּ לָא פָּרֵיךְ.

Rav Kahana said: The tanna of the baraita holds that even with regard to an eight-month-old fetus it can be said that there are animals of that kind that are permitted through slaughter, i.e., when they are still inside the womb and the mother is slaughtered; such an animal is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of its mother. Therefore, he cites the case of an eight-month-old fetus as a refutation. But the tanna of our mishna holds that the fact that this kind of animal is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of its mother does not define it as a kind of animal concerning which there is a concept of slaughter, and therefore he holds that this case cannot be used as a refutation.

וּלְהַאי תַּנָּא דְּפָרֵיךְ, טְרֵפָה דִּשְׁחִיטָתָהּ מְטַהַרְתָּהּ מְנָא לֵיהּ? נָפְקָא לֵיהּ מִדְּרַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב, דְּאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ בְּמַתְנִיתָא תָּנָא: אָמַר קְרָא ״וְכִי יָמוּת מִן הַבְּהֵמָה״, מִקְצָת בְּהֵמָה מְטַמְּאָה וּמִקְצָת בְּהֵמָה אֵינָהּ מְטַמְּאָה, וְאֵיזוֹ זוֹ? זוֹ טְרֵפָה שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ.

The Gemara asks: And according to that tanna of the baraita, who does use it as a refutation, from where does he derive that the slaughter of a tereifa renders it pure from having the impurity of a carcass? The Gemara answers that he derives it from that which Rav Yehuda says that Rav says, as Rav Yehuda says that Rav says, and some say it was taught in a baraita: The verse states: “And if some domesticated animal, of which you may eat, dies, one who touches its carcass shall be impure until the evening” (Leviticus 11:39). The word “some” teaches that only some dead animals impart impurity as a carcass, but some dead animals do not impart impurity as a carcass. And what is it that does not impart impurity? That is a tereifa that one slaughtered.

בָּעֵי רַב הוֹשַׁעְיָא: הוֹשִׁיט אֶת יָדוֹ לִמְעֵי בְּהֵמָה, וְשָׁחַט בֶּן תִּשְׁעָה חַי, מַהוּ? תִּבְּעֵי לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר, וְתִבְּעֵי לְרַבָּנַן.

§ Rav Hoshaya raises a dilemma: If one inserted his hand inside the womb of an animal and slaughtered a nine-month-old fetus that was alive, what is the halakha? Does the slaughter performed inside the mother render the fetus permitted? The Gemara notes: This dilemma may be raised according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and it may be raised according to the opinion of the Rabbis.

תִּבְּעֵי לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר: עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר בֶּן פְּקוּעָה טָעוּן שְׁחִיטָה – הָנֵי מִילֵּי הֵיכָא דְּיָצָא לַאֲוִיר הָעוֹלָם, אֲבָל בִּמְעֵי אִמּוֹ – לָא שָׁרְיָא לֵיהּ שְׁחִיטָה.

The Gemara elaborates: It may be raised according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir. It is possible that Rabbi Meir states in the mishna below that a nine-month-old ben pekua requires slaughter, and slaughter renders the animal permitted only in that case, because that statement may apply only in a case where the animal emerged into the airspace of the world, i.e., once it was born alive. But if it is still inside its mother, its slaughter does not render it permitted.

אוֹ דִילְמָא, אֲפִילּוּ לְרַבָּנַן, אַרְבָּעָה סִימָנִין אַכְשַׁר בֵּיהּ רַחֲמָנָא.

Or perhaps even the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Meir and maintain that a nine-month-old ben pekua is permitted by virtue of its mother’s slaughter, would concede that the slaughter of the fetus itself also permits it. Perhaps with regard to such an animal the Merciful One considers four simanim, i.e., the windpipe and the gullet of the mother and the windpipe and the gullet of the fetus, to be fit for slaughter, and the fetus is permitted by the cutting of either pair.

אָמַר רַב חֲנַנְיָא, תָּא שְׁמַע: הֲרֵי שֶׁנּוֹלְדָה טְרֵפָה מִן הַבֶּטֶן, וְאִי אִיתָא, מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ דְּהָיְתָה לָהּ שְׁעַת הַכּוֹשֶׁר, דְּאִי בָּעֵי עַיֵּיל יְדֵיהּ וְשַׁחֲטַהּ!

Rav Ḥananya said: Come and hear a resolution of this dilemma from the mishna (72b), as it considers an animal that was born as a tereifa from the womb as one that never had a period of potential fitness. But if it is so, that one can slaughter a fetus in its mother’s womb, you find that actually it did have a period of potential fitness, as if one wants to, he can insert his hand into the womb and slaughter it before it develops into a tereifa.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: תָּנֵי שֶׁנּוֹצְרָה טְרֵפָה מִן הַבֶּטֶן, וּמַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ בְּבַעֲלַת חָמֵשׁ רַגְלַיִם.

Rava said to Rav Ḥananya: Teach that mishna as referring to a case where the fetus was formed as a tereifa from its outset while inside the womb, and you find such a case where a fetus has five legs, which certainly developed from the outset. Consequently, there was never a possibility of slaughtering it.

מַתְנִי׳ הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַבְּהֵמָה, וּמָצָא בָּהּ בֶּן שְׁמֹנֶה חַי אוֹ מֵת, אוֹ בֶּן תִּשְׁעָה מֵת – קוֹרְעוֹ וּמוֹצִיא אֶת דָּמוֹ.

MISHNA: In the case of one who slaughtered an animal and found within it an eight-month-old fetus, i.e., one that was not full term, whether it was alive or dead, or a nine-month-old fetus, i.e., one that was full term, that was dead, that fetus is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of its mother, as it is considered part of its mother. Therefore, its blood is considered part of its mother’s blood and is prohibited, so one must tear the fetus and remove its blood before it may be consumed.

מָצָא בֶּן תִּשְׁעָה חַי – טָעוּן שְׁחִיטָה, וְחַיָּיב בְּ״אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ״, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: שְׁחִיטַת אִמּוֹ מְטַהַרְתּוֹ.

If he found within it a live nine-month-old fetus, it requires its own slaughter, as it is considered an independent full-fledged animal, and if one slaughters both the mother and fetus on the same day, one is liable for violating the prohibition against slaughtering an animal itself and its offspring on the same day; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Even when the fetus is nine months old, it is still considered part of its mother, and the slaughter of its mother renders it permitted for consumption.

רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן שֵׁזוּרִי אוֹמֵר: אֲפִילּוּ בֶּן חָמֵשׁ שָׁנִים וְחוֹרֵשׁ בַּשָּׂדֶה – שְׁחִיטַת אִמּוֹ מְטַהַרְתּוֹ. קְרָעָהּ וּמָצָא בָּהּ בֶּן תִּשְׁעָה חַי – טָעוּן שְׁחִיטָה, לְפִי שֶׁלֹּא נִשְׁחֲטָה אִמּוֹ.

Rabbi Shimon Shezuri says: Even if the fetus emerged alive and is now five years old and plowing in the field, the earlier slaughter of its mother rendered it permitted and it does not require slaughter before it is eaten. But if one tore an animal, i.e., he killed it without slaughtering it, and inside he found a live nine-month-old fetus, everyone agrees that the fetus requires its own slaughter because its mother was not slaughtered.

גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אָמַר רַבִּי אוֹשַׁעְיָא: לֹא הִילְּכוּ בּוֹ אֶלָּא עַל עִסְקֵי שְׁחִיטָה בִּלְבַד. לְמַעוֹטֵי מַאי? לְמַעוֹטֵי חֶלְבּוֹ וְגִידוֹ.

GEMARA: Rabbi Elazar says that Rabbi Oshaya says: The Sages discussed the permissibility of a live nine-month-old fetus found inside a slaughtered animal only with regard to the matter of whether it requires its own slaughter. The Gemara asks: What does Rav Oshaya’s statement serve to exclude? Rav Oshaya’s statement indicates that with regard to other matters all agree that it is considered an independent animal, with the associated prohibitions. The Gemara suggests: It serves to exclude its fat, i.e., the fats that are prohibited in a regular animal, such as the fat of the kidneys and innards, and its sciatic nerve.

חֶלְבּוֹ דְּמַאי? אִילֵּימָא: חֶלְבּוֹ דִּשְׁלִיל, מִפְלָג פְּלִיגִי! דְּתַנְיָא: גִּיד הַנָּשֶׁה נוֹהֵג בַּשְּׁלִיל וְחֶלְבּוֹ אָסוּר, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אֵינוֹ נוֹהֵג בַּשְּׁלִיל וְחֶלְבּוֹ מוּתָּר. וְאָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אָמַר רַבִּי אוֹשַׁעְיָא: מַחְלוֹקֶת בְּבֶן תִּשְׁעָה חַי, וְהָלַךְ רַבִּי מֵאִיר לְשִׁיטָתוֹ, וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה לְשִׁיטָתוֹ.

The Gemara asks: The fat of which part? If we say that this is referring to the fat of the fetus, that is difficult because the Sages disagree as to whether or not it is permitted, as it is taught in a baraita: The prohibition of the sciatic nerve applies to a fetus and its fat is prohibited; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: The prohibition of the sciatic nerve does not apply to a fetus, and its fat is permitted. And Rabbi Elazar says that Rabbi Oshaya says: This dispute concerns a live nine-month-old fetus, and Rabbi Meir follows his standard line of reasoning, which he expressed in the mishna, that such a fetus is considered an independent full-fledged animal; and Rabbi Yehuda follows his standard line of reasoning, as expressed by the Rabbis in the mishna, that such a fetus is considered a part of the mother.

אֶלָּא, חֶלְבּוֹ דְּגִיד מִפְלָג פְּלִיגִי, דְּתַנְיָא: גִּיד הַנָּשֶׁה – מְחַטֵּט אַחֲרָיו בְּכׇל מָקוֹם שֶׁהוּא, וְחוֹתֵךְ שַׁמְנוֹ מֵעִיקָּרוֹ, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: גּוֹמְמוֹ עִם הַשּׁוֹפִי.

Rather, say that Rabbi Elazar is referring to the fat of the sciatic nerve of the fetus, which all agree is permitted. The Gemara rejects this as well: But the Sages also disagree with regard to that, as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to the sciatic nerve, one scrapes around it to remove it entirely in any place that it is found in the thigh, and one cuts out its fat completely, even those fats that are sunk into the flesh; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: One cuts out the nerve and the fat that is level with the flesh of the thigh, but there is no obligation to remove all traces of the fat.

אֶלָּא אִי אִתְּמַר – הָכִי אִתְּמַר, אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אָמַר רַבִּי אוֹשַׁעְיָא: לֹא הִילְּכוּ בּוֹ אֶלָּא עַל עִסְקֵי אֲכִילָה בִּלְבַד, לְמַעוֹטֵי רוֹבְעוֹ, וְחוֹרֵשׁ בּוֹ.

Rather, if Rabbi Oshaya’s statement was stated, it was stated like this: Rabbi Elazar says that Rabbi Oshaya says: The Sages discussed the permissibility of the fetus only with regard to matters of consumption, i.e., whether or not it must be slaughtered in order to permit its flesh and whether or not the fat and the sciatic nerve are permitted. This statement serves to exclude only one who copulates with the animal, or one who plows with it together with an animal of a different species, as everyone agrees that these prohibitions apply to such a fetus just as they do to any other animal.

אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ: לְדִבְרֵי הַמַּתִּיר בְּחֶלְבּוֹ – מַתִּיר בְּדָמוֹ, לְדִבְרֵי הָאוֹסֵר בְּחֶלְבּוֹ – אוֹסֵר בְּדָמוֹ. וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: אַף לְדִבְרֵי הַמַּתִּיר בְּחֶלְבּוֹ – אוֹסֵר בְּדָמוֹ.

§ A related amoraic dispute is cited concerning a live nine-month-old fetus found inside a slaughtered animal: Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: According to the statement of Rabbi Yehuda, who permits the fat, he also permits its blood; according to the statement of Rabbi Meir, who prohibits its fat, he also prohibits its blood. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Even according to Rabbi Yehuda, who permits its fat, he prohibits its blood.

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ: קוֹרְעוֹ וּמוֹצִיא אֶת דָּמוֹ. אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא: לוֹמַר שֶׁאֵין עָנוּשׁ כָּרֵת.

Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish from the mishna, which states with regard to an eight-month-old fetus, whether alive or dead, or a dead nine-month-old fetus, found inside a slaughtered animal, that since it is considered part of the mother its blood is prohibited. Therefore, one must tear the fetus and remove its blood before it may be consumed. The mishna prohibits the blood but apparently permits the rest of the fetus, including its fat, which contradicts the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish. In resolution of this difficulty, Rabbi Zeira said: Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish meant to say only that the consumption of blood lost as the fetus died is not punishable by excision from the World-to-Come [karet], whereas Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that it is.

לְמַאן קָאָמְרִי? לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, לֹא יְהֵא אֶלָּא דַּם הַתַּמְצִית, דְּתַנְיָא: דַּם הַתַּמְצִית בְּאַזְהָרָה, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: בְּהִכָּרֵת.

The Gemara clarifies: According to whom did Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish state that one who permits the fat of the fetus also holds that the consumption of its blood is not punishable by karet? Ostensibly, it is according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who permits its fat. But that is difficult, because this blood should be regarded only as blood of exudate, i.e., blood that exudes from the neck of the animal after the initial spurt of its slaughter concludes. This blood did not spurt out during the slaughter of the mother. Rabbi Yehuda holds that consumption of even this blood is punishable by karet, as it is taught in a baraita: The consumption of blood of exudate is prohibited by a regular prohibition and is punishable with lashes, unlike the initial spurt of blood, known as blood of the soul, whose consumption is punishable by karet. Rabbi Yehuda says: Blood of exudate is also punishable by karet.

תַּרְגְּמָא רַב יוֹסֵף בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב סַלָּא חֲסִידָא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב פָּפָּא: אִית לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה ״דָּם״ וְ״כׇל דָּם״, כֹּל הֵיכָא דְּמִיחַיַּיב אַדַּם הַנֶּפֶשׁ – מִיחַיַּיב אַדַּם הַתַּמְצִית, וְכֹל הֵיכָא דְּלָא מִחַיַּיב אַדַּם הַנֶּפֶשׁ – לָא מִחַיַּיב אַדַּם הַתַּמְצִית.

Rav Yosef, son of Rav Salla the Pious, interpreted this matter before Rav Pappa: One of the verses prohibiting the consumption of blood states: “And whoever…eats any blood, and I will set My face against that soul that eats the blood, and will cut him off from among his people” (Leviticus 17:10). Rabbi Yehuda holds that since it would have been sufficient for the verse to state: Blood, but instead it states: “Any blood,” it is interpreted as teaching that wherever one is liable for karet for the consumption of blood of the soul, i.e., the initial spurt from the slaughter, as is the halakha with regard to a regular animal, one is also liable for karet for the consumption of blood of exudate, i.e., the rest of the blood. But wherever one is not liable for karet for the consumption of blood of the soul, as is the halakha with regard to the blood of a fetus according to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that the fetus is not considered an independent life, one is also not liable for karet for the consumption of blood of exudate; rather, its blood is subject to a regular prohibition.

אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: מַהוּ לִפְדּוֹת בְּבֶן פְּקוּעָה? אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר לָא תִּיבְּעֵי לָךְ, דְּכֵיוָן דְּאָמַר טָעוּן שְׁחִיטָה – שֶׂה מְעַלְּיָא הוּא.

§ A dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the halakha with regard to redeeming a firstborn donkey with a ben pekua? Can one perform the mitzva, as stated in the Torah: “And every firstborn of a donkey you shall redeem with a lamb” (Exodus 13:13), with this animal? The Gemara elaborates: According to the opinion of Rabbi Meir do not raise the dilemma, as, since he says a ben pekua requires slaughter, evidently it is a full-fledged lamb, and therefore it can certainly be used to redeem a donkey.

כִּי תִּיבְּעֵי לָךְ אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבָּנַן, דְּאָמְרִי: שְׁחִיטַת אִמּוֹ מְטַהַרְתּוֹ, מַאי? כֵּיוָן דְּאָמְרִי שְׁחִיטַת אִמּוֹ מְטַהַרְתּוֹ – כְּבִשְׂרָא בְּדִיקּוּלָא הוּא, אוֹ דִילְמָא, כֵּיוָן דְּרָהֵיט וְאָזֵיל וְרָהֵיט וְאָתֵי – ״שֶׂה״ קָרֵינָא בֵּיהּ?

When should you raise the dilemma? Raise it according to the opinion of the Rabbis, as they say that the slaughter of its mother renders it permitted. What is the halakha in this case? Does one say that since the Rabbis say that the slaughter of its mother renders it permitted, it is apparent that despite being physically alive, a ben pekua is halakhically regarded like meat placed in a pot, which cannot be used to redeem a donkey (see Bekhorot 12a)? Or perhaps, since the animal is running back and forth, i.e., it is alive, we call it a lamb and it can be used?

מָר זוּטְרָא אָמַר: אֵין פּוֹדִין, וְרַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: פּוֹדִין.

Mar Zutra said: One cannot redeem a donkey with this lamb, and Rav Ashi said: One can redeem it.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אָשֵׁי לְמָר זוּטְרָא: מַאי דַּעְתָּךְ? דְּגָמְרַתְּ ״שֶׂה״ ״שֶׂה״ מִפְּסָחִים?

Rav Ashi said to Mar Zutra: What is the reason for your opinion? Is it because you derive the halakhot of redeeming a firstborn donkey from Paschal offerings by means of a verbal analogy between the term “lamb” (Exodus 13:13) written concerning a firstborn donkey and “lamb” (Exodus 12:5) written concerning a Paschal offering, and a ben pekua is unfit for sacrifice as a Paschal offering?

אִי מָה לְהַלָּן – זָכָר, תָּמִים, וּבֶן שָׁנָה, אַף כָּאן – זָכָר, תָּמִים, וּבֶן שָׁנָה! ״תִּפְדֶּה״ ״תִּפְדֶּה״ רִיבָּה.

If so, just as there, with regard to the Paschal offering, it must be male, unblemished, and in its first year, so too here, the lamb must be male, unblemished, and in its first year. Yet the mishna in Bekhorot (9a) states explicitly that one may redeem with a female lamb, and even if it is blemished, and also with one that is past its first year. Mar Zutra responded: The repetition of the words “You shall redeem,” “You shall not redeem” written in the verse: “And every firstborn of a donkey you shall redeem with a lamb, and if you shall not redeem it then you shall break its neck” (Exodus 13:13), included a lamb that does not fulfill these criteria.

אִי ״תִּפְדֶּה״ ״תִּפְדֶּה״ רִיבָּה, אֲפִילּוּ כֹּל מִילֵּי נָמֵי, אִם כֵּן ״שֶׂה״ ״שֶׂה״ מַאי אַהֲנִי לָךְ?

Rav Ashi responds: If the repetition of “You shall redeem,” “You shall not redeem” serves to amplify, then it should even amplify all other types of lambs, including a ben pekua, i.e., they should also be included in the category of those that are fit for redemption. Mar Zutra answers: If that was so, what purpose would the verbal analogy of “lamb,” “lamb” serve? Rather, the repetition of “You shall redeem” serves to include all types of lambs, but the verbal analogy still serves to exclude a ben pekua.

אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: מַהוּ לִמְנוֹת בּוֹ רִאשׁוֹן וְשֵׁנִי?

§ A dilemma was raised before the Sages: According to the Rabbis, a ben pekua is permitted for consumption and is therefore susceptible to ritual impurity. If the ben pekua was still inside the slaughtered mother and the body of the mother came in contact with a primary source of ritual impurity, what is the halakha with regard to counting the mother as having first-degree ritual impurity and the ben pekua as having second-degree ritual impurity? If the fetus is considered independent of the mother, it is rendered impure only through its contact with the mother and so would have second-degree impurity. But if it is considered part of the mother it would have the same first-degree impurity as the mother.

רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: מוֹנִין בּוֹ רִאשׁוֹן וְשֵׁנִי. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ אוֹמֵר: אֵין מוֹנִין בּוֹ רִאשׁוֹן וְשֵׁנִי, נַעֲשָׂה כֶּאֱגוֹז הַמִּתְקַשְׁקֵשׁ בִּקְלִיפָּתוֹ.

Rabbi Yoḥanan says: One counts the mother as having first-degree impurity and the ben pekua as having second-degree impurity. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: One does not count the mother as having first-degree impurity and the ben pekua as having second-degree impurity. Rather, the fetus has first-degree impurity like its mother, as it is considered like a nut rattling in its shell; this is considered a single entity such that if impurity touches the shell, both the nut and the shell are rendered impure with the same degree of impurity.

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַבָּשָׂר מַגַּע נְבֵלָה – דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר.

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish raised an objection to Rabbi Yoḥanan from the mishna (72a): If a fetus extended its foreleg outside its mother’s womb and then the mother was slaughtered, and afterward the foreleg was severed, the flesh of both the mother and the fetus are ritually impure due to having been in contact with a carcass. Since the foreleg was not permitted through an act of slaughter it is regarded as a carcass with the associated ritual impurity. The rest of the flesh, which was permitted, was in contact with it and was thereby rendered ritually impure; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: מַגַּע טְרֵפָה שְׁחוּטָה.

And the Rabbis say: The flesh has the ritual impurity of having been in contact with a tereifa that was slaughtered. The limb is regarded as a tereifa that was slaughtered, which by Torah law is prohibited for consumption but does not carry ritual impurity. Nevertheless, the Sages decreed that if a tereifa was slaughtered and then came in contact with another item, the other item should be regarded as ritually impure to the extent that it will disqualify sacrificial foods that come in contact with it.

בִּשְׁלָמָא לְדִידִי, דְּאָמֵינָא חַד גּוּפָא הוּא – הַיְינוּ דְּאִיתַּכְשַׁר בִּדְמָא דְּאִמֵּיהּ, אֶלָּא לְדִידָךְ, בְּמַאי אִיתַּכְשַׁר?

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish explains his objection: Granted, according to my opinion, as I say that the mother and fetus together are one entity; that is why the flesh of the fetus is rendered susceptible to ritual impurity through the blood of its mother that spilled onto the body of the mother. When the blood from the mother’s slaughter renders the mother susceptible to impurity, the fetus is also rendered susceptible to impurity, as it is considered part of the mother. But according to your opinion, that the fetus is an independent entity, through what means is it rendered susceptible to contracting impurity from its foreleg?

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: בִּשְׁחִיטָה, וּכְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish: It is rendered susceptible through the slaughter of its mother, which also permits the consumption of the fetus, and this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who maintains that the flesh of a slaughtered animal is rendered susceptible to ritual impurity by virtue of the fact that it is permitted for consumption, even if it did not come in contact with blood or one of the other six liquids. Accordingly, the fetus will be susceptible to impurity even if it is not considered part of its mother.

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ: עָבַר בְּנָהָר – הוּכְשַׁר, הָלַךְ לְבֵית הַקְּבָרוֹת – נִטְמָא.

Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish from a baraita: If a ben pekua grew up and passed through a river, it was thereby rendered susceptible to impurity. Therefore, if it went from there to a cemetery, it is rendered impure.

בִּשְׁלָמָא לְדִידִי דְּאָמֵינָא תְּרֵי גּוּפֵי נִינְהוּ, מִשּׁוּם הָכִי: הוּכְשַׁר – אִין, לֹא הוּכְשַׁר – לָא, אֶלָּא לְדִידָךְ דְּאָמְרַתְּ חַד גּוּפָא הוּא, הָא אִיתַּכְשַׁר בִּדְמָא דְּאִמֵּיהּ!

Rabbi Yoḥanan explains his objection: Granted, according to my opinion, as I say that the mother and fetus are two entities; it is due to that reason that only if the ben pekua itself has been rendered susceptible to impurity by coming in contact with the water of the river, yes, it can be rendered impure upon entering a cemetery, whereas if it has not been rendered susceptible to impurity through these waters, no, it does not become impure when it enters a cemetery. But according to your opinion, in which you said that the mother and fetus together are one entity, why is it necessary for it to have passed through a river? It was already rendered susceptible to impurity through the blood of its mother that spilled onto the mother’s body when it was slaughtered.