עירובין מט

עירובין מט

אַף זוֹ דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, אֲבָל חֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: שְׁלָשְׁתָּן אֲסוּרוֹת.

This teaching, that carrying objects from either of the outer courtyards into the middle courtyard is permitted, is also the statement of, i.e., in accordance with, the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. But the Rabbis say: All three courtyards are prohibited, that is to say, carrying is prohibited from any of the courtyards to any of the others.

תַּנְיָא כְּווֹתֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוּדָה אַלִּיבָּא דִּשְׁמוּאֵל, אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: לְמָה הַדָּבָר דּוֹמֶה לְשָׁלֹשׁ חֲצֵירוֹת הַפְּתוּחוֹת זוֹ לָזוֹ וּפְתוּחוֹת לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים, עֵירְבוּ שְׁתַּיִם עִם הָאֶמְצָעִית — זוֹ מְבִיאָה מִתּוֹךְ בֵּיתָהּ וְאוֹכֶלֶת, וְזוֹ מְבִיאָה מִתּוֹךְ בֵּיתָהּ וְאוֹכֶלֶת. זוֹ מַחְזֶרֶת מוֹתָרָהּ לְתוֹךְ בֵּיתָהּ, וְזוֹ מַחְזֶרֶת מוֹתָרָהּ לְתוֹךְ בֵּיתָהּ.

It was taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yehuda, in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. Rabbi Shimon said: To what is this comparable? It is comparable to three courtyards that open into one another, and that also open into a public domain. If the two outer courtyards established an eiruv with the middle one, a resident of one of the outer courtyards may bring food from a house in that courtyard and eat it in the middle courtyard, and likewise a resident of the other courtyard may bring food from a house in that courtyard and eat it in the middle courtyard. And similarly, this resident may bring leftovers from the house where he ate back into the house in that courtyard, and that resident may bring leftovers from the house where he ate back into the house in this courtyard.

אֲבָל חֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: שְׁלָשְׁתָּן אֲסוּרוֹת.

However, the Rabbis say: All three courtyards are prohibited. Since the residents of the outer courtyards are prohibited to carry from one outer courtyard to the other, this results in a place where carrying is prohibited, and such a place prohibits carrying in all three courtyards.

וְאַזְדָּא שְׁמוּאֵל לְטַעְמֵיהּ, דְּאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: חָצֵר שֶׁבֵּין שְׁנֵי מְבוֹאוֹת, עֵירְבָה עִם שְׁנֵיהֶם — אֲסוּרָה עִם שְׁנֵיהֶם.

The Gemara notes that Shmuel follows his line of reasoning that he used elsewhere, as Shmuel said: With regard to a courtyard that is between two alleyways, if that courtyard established an eiruv with both alleyways, it is prohibited with both of them. Since the residents of the two alleyways are prohibited to carry from one to the other and the eiruv enables the residents of the two alleyways to carry in the courtyard, it is prohibited to carry from the courtyard into the alleyways, so that the residents of the alleyways do not transfer objects from one alleyway to the other via the courtyard.

לֹא עֵירְבָה עִם שְׁנֵיהֶם — אוֹסֶרֶת עַל שְׁנֵיהֶן.

If the courtyard did not establish an eiruv with either alleyway, it prohibits one to carry in both of them. Since the residents of the courtyard were accustomed to utilizing both alleyways and did not establish an eiruv with either alleyway, the result is that each alleyway has a courtyard that did not establish an eiruv, which prohibits carrying from the courtyard into either alleyway.

הָיְתָה בְּאֶחָד רְגִילָה, וּבְאֶחָד אֵינָהּ רְגִילָה, זֶה שֶׁרְגִילָה בּוֹ — אָסוּר, וְזֶה שֶׁאֵינָהּ רְגִילָה בּוֹ — מוּתָּר.

If, however, the residents of the courtyard were accustomed to utilizing only one alleyway, while they are not accustomed to utilizing one alleyway, then with regard to the alleyway which they are accustomed to utilizing, it is prohibited to carry there, as the residents of the courtyard did not establish an eiruv with it. But with regard to the alleyway which they are not accustomed to utilizing, it is permitted to carry there, as the residents of the courtyard are not considered residents of that alleyway.

אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר רַב הוּנָא: עֵירְבָה עִם שֶׁאֵינָהּ רְגִילָה בּוֹ — הוּתַּר רְגִילָה לְעַצְמוֹ.

Rabba bar Rav Huna said: With regard to residents of a courtyard who established an eiruv with the alleyway which they were not accustomed to utilizing, the alleyway which they were accustomed to utilizing is permitted to establish an eiruv on its own without the courtyard. The residents of the courtyard have demonstrated their intention to use the other alleyway, despite their not being accustomed to doing so.

וְאָמַר רַבָּה בַּר רַב הוּנָא אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: אִם עֵירְבָה רְגִילָה לְעַצְמוֹ, וְזֶה שֶׁאֵינָהּ רְגִילָה בּוֹ לֹא עֵירַב, וְהִיא עַצְמָהּ לֹא עֵירְבָה — דּוֹחִין אוֹתָהּ אֵצֶל שֶׁאֵינָהּ רְגִילָה בּוֹ.

And Rabba bar Rav Huna said that Shmuel said: If the alleyway which the residents of the courtyard were accustomed to utilizing established an eiruv on its own without the courtyard, while the alleyway which they were not accustomed to utilizing did not establish an eiruv, and also the courtyard itself did not establish an eiruv with either alleyway, we divert the residents of the courtyard to use the alleyway which they are not accustomed to utilizing. This is because there is one alleyway in which it is prohibited to carry due to the lack of an eiruv, and a second alleyway in which it is permitted to carry; while it is prohibited for the residents of the courtyard to carry. As explained above, were they to utilize the alleyway which they are accustomed to utilizing, the other residents of the alleyway would also be prohibited to carry from their courtyards into the alleyway, despite having established an eiruv for their own alleyway. However, if they use the other alleyway, the residents of that alleyway will not lose anything; since they did not establish an eiruv, it is prohibited for them to carry in that alleyway regardless.

וּכְגוֹן זֶה כּוֹפִין עַל מִדַּת סְדוֹם.

In a case such as this, one compels another to refrain from behavior characteristic of Sodom. We force a person to waive his legal rights in order to prevent him from acting in a manner characteristic of the wicked city of Sodom. If one denies another use of his possessions, even though he would incur no loss or damage by granting use of his property, his conduct is considered to be characteristic of Sodom. The courts may sometimes compel such a person to waive his legal rights.

אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הַמַּקְפִּיד עַל עֵירוּבוֹ — אֵין עֵירוּבוֹ עֵירוּב. מָה שְׁמוֹ — עֵירוּב שְׁמוֹ.

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: With regard to one who is particular about his eiruv, i.e., that the other people should not eat of the food he contributed, his eiruv is not a valid eiruv. After all, what is its name? Joining [eiruv] is its name, indicating that it must be jointly owned [me’urav] by all the participants in the eiruv. If one person does not allow the other participants to eat of it, it does not belong to all of them and cannot be called an eiruv.

רַבִּי חֲנִינָא אָמַר: עֵירוּבוֹ עֵירוּב, אֶלָּא שֶׁנִּקְרָא מֵאַנְשֵׁי וַרְדִּינָא.

Rabbi Ḥanina said: Even in that case, his eiruv is a valid eiruv, however, that person is called one of the men of Vardina. The men of Vardina were renowned misers, meaning that he is considered to be like them.

אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הַחוֹלֵק אֶת עֵירוּבוֹ — אֵינוֹ עֵירוּב.

Rav Yehuda also said that Shmuel said: With regard to one who divides his eiruv into two parts, his eiruv is not a valid eiruv. This is for the aforementioned reason that, by definition, an eiruv needs to be indicative of joining, and this eiruv is separated into different parts.

כְּמַאן? כְּבֵית שַׁמַּאי, דְּתַנְיָא: חֲמִשָּׁה שֶׁגָּבוּ אֶת עֵירוּבָן וּנְתָנוּהוּ בִּשְׁנֵי כֵלִים, בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: אֵין זֶה עֵירוּב, וּבֵית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים: הֲרֵי זֶה עֵירוּב!

The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion did Shmuel state this teaching? Could it be in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, as it was taught in a baraita: With regard to five people who collected their eiruv and placed it in two separate utensils, Beit Shammai say: This is not a valid eiruv, whereas Beit Hillel say: This is an eiruv. It does not stand to reason that Shmuel would follow Beit Shammai, whose opinion is not accepted as normative law.

אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא בֵּית הִלֵּל: עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמְרִי בֵּית הִלֵּל הָתָם אֶלָּא דְּמָלְיָין לְמָנָא וְאִיַּיתַּר, אֲבָל הֵיכָא דְּפַלְגֵיהּ מִיפְלָג — לָא.

The Gemara answers: Even if you say that Shmuel stated his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel, Beit Hillel stated their opinion only there, where the first utensil was filled and there was still some food left over, and therefore, some of the leftover food had to be placed in a second utensil. But where they divided it from the outset, even Beit Hillel agree that the eiruv is not valid.

וְתַרְתֵּי, לְמָה לִי? צְרִיכִי, דְּאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן הָתָם — מִשּׁוּם דְּקָפֵיד. אֲבָל הָכָא — אֵימָא לָא.

The Gemara asks: Why do I need two rulings that are based on the same principle, i.e., that an eiruv must demonstrate joining? The Gemara answers: Both rulings were necessary. As, had the Gemara taught us the ruling only there, with regard to one who is particular about his eiruv, one might have said that the eiruv is not valid because the person is particular and expressly does not desire that his eiruv be eaten by others. However here, with regard to one who divides the eiruv into different parts, one might say that his portion should not be considered as separated from the rest.

וְאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן הָכָא — מִשּׁוּם דְּפַלְגֵיהּ מִיפְלָג, אֲבָל הָתָם — אֵימָא לָא, צְרִיכָא.

And had the Gemara taught us the ruling only here, with regard to one who divides his eiruv, one might have said that the eiruv is not valid because he divided it up, thereby physically separating himself from the others. However there, with regard to one who is particular about his eiruv, one might say that his portion should not be considered as separated from the rest, since no act of separation was performed. Consequently, both rulings were necessary.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי אַבָּא לְרַב יְהוּדָה בְּבֵי מַעְצַרְתָּא דְּבֵי רַב זַכַּאי: מִי אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל ״הַחוֹלֵק אֶת עֵירוּבוֹ — אֵינוֹ עֵירוּב״? וְהָאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: בַּיִת שֶׁמַּנִּיחִין בּוֹ עֵירוּב — אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ לִיתֵּן אֶת הַפַּת. מַאי טַעְמָא, לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּאָמַר דְּכֵיוָן דְּמַנַּח בְּסַלָּא — כְּמַאן דְּמַנַּח הָכָא דָּמֵי? הָכִי נָמֵי: כֵּיוָן דְּמַנַּח בְּסַלָּא — כְּמַאן דְּמַנַּח הָכָא דָּמֵי!

Rabbi Abba said to Rav Yehuda in the olive press in Rav Zakkai’s house: Did Shmuel actually say that in the case of one who divides his eiruv, it is not a valid eiruv? Didn’t Shmuel say elsewhere: The house in which the eiruv is placed need not contribute bread for the eiruv. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this ruling? Is it not because Shmuel maintains that since there is bread lying in a basket somewhere in the house, it is regarded as if it were placed here with the rest of the eiruv? Here too, one should say that since the bread is placed in a basket, i.e., in one of the two utensils containing the eiruv, it is regarded as if it were placed here with the rest of the eiruv.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הָתָם — אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין פַּת, מַאי טַעְמָא — דְּכוּלְּהוּ הָכָא דָּיְירִי.

Rav Yehuda said to him: There Shmuel validates the eiruv although there is no bread in the house in which the eiruv is deposited. And what is the reason for his ruling? It is because by placing food in a particular house, all the residents of the courtyard are regarded as living here. Therefore, those living in that house need not contribute bread for the eiruv, as they are certainly residents of the house.

אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: עֵירוּב מִשּׁוּם קִנְיָן.

Shmuel said: An eiruv that is deposited in a house is effective due to the principle of acquisition, as each person who contributes a portion of food acquires the right to a certain use of the residence and is considered one of its residents.

וְאִם תֹּאמַר: מִפְּנֵי מָה אֵין קוֹנִין בְּמָעָה — מִפְּנֵי שֶׁאֵינָהּ מְצוּיָה בְּעַרְבֵי שַׁבָּתוֹת.

And if you say: Why then can one not acquire this right through payment of a coin such as a ma’a, but rather only through bread? It is because a ma’a is not always available on Shabbat eve, as many people spend all of their available money for the necessities of Shabbat, and it is difficult to find money available at that hour.

הֵיכָא דְּעֵירַב, מִיהוּ לִקְנֵי!

The Gemara asks: If so, according to Shmuel’s opinion, in a case where he established an eiruv with money, it should nonetheless acquire, i.e., be valid. According to his opinion, there is no fundamental reason to invalidate the acquisition of rights in the residence through the payment of money, yet there is no indication that this position is valid.

גְּזֵירָה שֶׁמָּא יֹאמְרוּ מָעָה עִיקָּר, וְזִמְנִין דְּלָא שְׁכִיחַ מָעָה, וְלָא אָתֵי לְאִיעָרוֹבֵי בְּפַת, דְּאָתֵי עֵירוּב לְאִיקַלְקוֹלֵי.

The Gemara answers: Even Shmuel did not permit one to establish an eiruv with money, due to a decree lest people say that a ma’a is essential, and sometimes a ma’a will not be available, and they will not come to prepare an eiruv with bread, and the halakhic category of eiruv will be forgotten.

רַבָּה אָמַר: עֵירוּב מִשּׁוּם דִּירָה.

Rabba disagreed with Shmuel and said: An eiruv is effective due to the principle of residence. Each person who contributes a portion of food is considered as if he resides, for that Shabbat, in the residence in which the food is deposited.

מַאי בֵּינַיְיהוּ? אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ: כְּלִי,

The Gemara asks: What is the practical, halakhic difference between these two understandings? The Gemara answers: There is a practical difference between them with regard to the question of whether an eiruv may be established with a utensil. If an eiruv is effective based on the principle of acquisition, in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, then one should be able to establish an eiruv with a utensil; whereas, this would not constitute a valid eiruv, according to the opinion of Rabba.

וּפָחוֹת מִשָּׁוֶה פְּרוּטָה,

And another practical difference between them is with regard to whether an eiruv may be established with food that is less than the value of a peruta. According to Shmuel’s opinion, this would not be a valid eiruv, as there is no acquisition with something less than the value of a peruta; whereas according to Rabba’s opinion, since an eiruv is effective by establishing a person’s residence, this can be done even with an amount of food worth less than a peruta.

וְקָטָן.

And there is another practical difference between them with regard to the question whether a minor may collect the eiruv from the residents of the courtyard and deposit it in one of the houses. According to Shmuel’s opinion, this would not be a valid eiruv, for a minor cannot serve as an agent to effect acquisition, whereas according to Rabba’s opinion, the eiruv is valid, as the food itself establishes the common residence for all the residents.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי לְרַבָּה: לְדִידָךְ קַשְׁיָא וְלִשְׁמוּאֵל קַשְׁיָא. הָא תַּנְיָא: חֲמִשָּׁה שֶׁגָּבוּ אֶת עֵירוּבָן, כְּשֶׁהֵם מוֹלִיכִין אֶת עֵירוּבָן לְמָקוֹם אַחֵר — אֶחָד מוֹלִיךְ לְכוּלָּן. הוּא נִיהוּ דְּקָא קָנֵי, וְתוּ לָא. הוּא נִיהוּ דְּקָא דָּיַיר, וְתוּ לָא!

Abaye said to Rabba: It is difficult according to your opinion that an eiruv is effective based on the principle of residence, and it is difficult according to the opinion of Shmuel that it is effective based on the principle of acquisition. As it was taught in a baraita: With regard to five people who collected their eiruv, when they take their eiruv elsewhere, in order to establish an eiruv together with another courtyard, one person may take it there for all of them. This indicates that it is only that person who acquires rights, and nobody else, and it is only that person who gains residence, and nobody else. In that case, how can the others rely on this eiruv?

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לָא לְדִידִי קַשְׁיָא, וְלָא לִשְׁמוּאֵל קַשְׁיָא, שְׁלִיחוּת דְּכוּלְּהוּ קָא עָבֵיד.

Rabba said to him: It is neither difficult according to my opinion, nor is it difficult according to the opinion of Shmuel, as, the person who takes the eiruv acts as an agent, effecting acquisition or determining residence on behalf of all of them.

אָמַר רַבָּה אָמַר רַב חָמָא בַּר גּוּרְיָא אָמַר רַב: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן.

With regard to the case of the three courtyards addressed above, Rabba said that Rav Ḥama bar Gurya said that Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon that it is permitted to carry from the middle courtyard into either of the two outer ones; and vice versa, however, it is prohibited to carry from one outer courtyard to the other.

מַתְנִי׳ מִי שֶׁבָּא בְּדֶרֶךְ וְחָשְׁכָה לוֹ, וְהָיָה מַכִּיר אִילָן אוֹ גָדֵר, וְאָמַר: ״שְׁבִיתָתִי תַּחְתָּיו״ — לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם.

MISHNA: With regard to one who was coming along the way on Shabbat eve, and it grew dark while he was traveling, and he was familiar with a tree or a fence located two thousand cubits from his current location, and two thousand cubits from his house, and he said: My residence is beneath that tree, rather than in his present location, he has not said anything, as he did not establish a fixed location as his residence.

״שְׁבִיתָתִי בְּעִיקָּרוֹ״ — מְהַלֵּךְ מִמְּקוֹם רַגְלָיו וְעַד עִיקָּרוֹ אַלְפַּיִם אַמָּה, וּמֵעִיקָּרוֹ וְעַד בֵּיתוֹ אַלְפַּיִם אַמָּה. נִמְצָא מְהַלֵּךְ מִשֶּׁחָשֵׁיכָה אַרְבַּעַת אֲלָפִים אַמָּה.

If, however, he said: My residence is at the tree’s trunk, he acquired residence there, and he may therefore walk from the place he is standing to the trunk of the tree two thousand cubits away, and from the trunk of the tree to his house, an additional two thousand cubits. Consequently, he walks after nightfall a total of four thousand cubits.

אִם אֵינוֹ מַכִּיר, אוֹ שֶׁאֵינוֹ בָּקִי בַּהֲלָכָה, וְאָמַר ״שְׁבִיתָתִי בִּמְקוֹמִי״ — זָכָה לוֹ מְקוֹמוֹ אַלְפַּיִם אַמָּה לְכׇל רוּחַ.

If one is not familiar with a tree or any other noticeable landmark, or if he is not an expert in the halakha, unaware that residence can be established from a distance, and he said: My residence is at my current location, then his presence at his current location acquires for him the right to walk two thousand cubits in each direction.

עֲגוּלּוֹת, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי חֲנִינָא בֶּן אַנְטִיגְנוֹס, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: מְרוּבָּעוֹת, כְּטַבְלָא מְרוּבַּעַת, כְּדֵי שֶׁיִּהְיֶה נִשְׂכָּר לַזָּוִיּוֹת.

The manner in which the two thousand cubits are measured is the subject of a tannaitic dispute. These cubits are measured circularly, i.e., as a circle with a radius of two thousand cubits; this is the statement of Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigenos. And the Rabbis say: These are measured squarely, i.e., as a square tablet, with each side measuring four thousand cubits, so that he gains the corners. He is permitted to walk from the middle to the corners of the square as well, a distance of approximately 2,800 cubits.

וְזוֹ הִיא שֶׁאָמְרוּ: הֶעָנִי מְעָרֵב בְּרַגְלָיו. אָמַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר: אָנוּ אֵין לָנוּ אֶלָּא עָנִי. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אֶחָד עָנִי וְאֶחָד עָשִׁיר, לֹא אָמְרוּ מְעָרְבִין בְּפַת אֶלָּא לְהָקֵל עַל הֶעָשִׁיר, שֶׁלֹּא יֵצֵא וִיעָרֵב בְּרַגְלָיו.

And this is the meaning of that which the Sages said: The pauper establishes an eiruv with his feet, i.e., one who does not have the bread required to establish an eiruv may walk anywhere within his Shabbat limit and declare: This is my residence, and his Shabbat limit is measured from that location. Rabbi Meir said: We have this leniency in effect only for a pauper, who does not have food for two meals. However, one who has bread may only establish residence with bread. Rabbi Yehuda says: This leniency is in effect for both a pauper and a wealthy person. The Sages said that one establishes an eiruv with bread only in order to be lenient with the wealthy person, so that he need not exert himself and go out and establish an eiruv with his feet. Instead, he can appoint an agent to place bread for him in that location. This, however, does not negate the option of personally going to that location in order to establish residence without bread.

גְּמָ׳ מַאי ״לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם״?

GEMARA: We learned in the mishna that one who declares his intention to establish residence beneath a tree, without specifying the precise location, has not said anything. The Gemara asks: What is the precise meaning of he has not said anything?

אָמַר רַב: לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם כׇּל עִיקָּר, דַּאֲפִילּוּ לְתַחְתָּיו שֶׁל אִילָן לָא מָצֵי אָזֵיל.

Rav said: He has not said anything at all, and has failed to establish residence anywhere, and he may not even go to the place beneath that tree. His failure to specify a particular location prevents him from establishing residence beneath the tree. The fact that he sought to establish residence someplace other than his present location prevents him from establishing residence at his present location. Accordingly, he may walk no more than four cubits from the place that he is standing.

וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם לְבֵיתוֹ, אֲבָל לְתַחְתָּיו שֶׁל אִילָן מָצֵי אָזֵיל.

And Shmuel said: He has not said anything with regard to going to his home, if it is two thousand cubits past the tree; however, with regard to the area beneath the tree, if its bough is entirely within two thousand cubits of his present location he may indeed go there.

וְנַעֲשֶׂה תַּחְתָּיו שֶׁל אִילָן חַמָּר גַּמָּל.

And when we learned in the mishna that he did not establish residence, it means that the legal status of the area beneath the tree becomes comparable to both a donkey driver, who walks behind the animal and prods it, and a camel driver, who walks before the animal and leads it in the sense that the tree is pulling him in both directions. Since he did not specify a particular location as his residence, any part of the area beneath the tree could be the place where he established residence.

בָּא לִמְדּוֹד מִן הַצָּפוֹן — מוֹדְדִין לוֹ מִן הַדָּרוֹם, בָּא לִמְדּוֹד מִן הַדָּרוֹם — מוֹדְדִין לוֹ מִן הַצָּפוֹן.

Therefore, if he comes to measure two thousand cubits from the north of the tree in order to ascertain whether or not he may go to his home, because of the uncertainty with regard to the precise location where he established residence, one measures the distance for him stringently from the south. And likewise, if he comes to measure the distance to his home from the south, one measures the distance for him from the north.