גיטין כח

גיטין כח

אוֹ שֶׁמְּצָאוֹ בֵּין כֵּלָיו; אֲפִילּוּ לִזְמַן מְרוּבֶּה – כָּשֵׁר.

or in a case where he found it among his utensils in his house, then even if a long time passed, the bill of divorce is valid.

אִיתְּמַר: רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל, הֲלָכָה: שֶׁלֹּא שָׁהָה אָדָם שָׁם. רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רַב יִצְחָק בַּר שְׁמוּאֵל, הֲלָכָה: שֶׁלֹּא עָבַר אָדָם שָׁם.

It was stated that the amora’im disagreed with regard to the halakha in this dispute: Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The halakha is that the bill of divorce is valid as long as no person stopped there. Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rav Yitzḥak bar Shmuel says: The halakha is that the bill of divorce is valid as long as no other person passed there.

לֵימָא מָר הֲלָכָה כְּמָר, וּמָר הֲלָכָה כְּמָר! מִשּׁוּם דְּאָפְכִי לְהוּ.

The Gemara asks: Why is it necessary to state the actual opinion? Let this Sage, Rav Yehuda citing Shmuel, say that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of this Sage, the opinion cited as: Some say; and let this Sage, Rabba bar bar Ḥana citing Rav Yitzḥak bar Shmuel, say that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of this Sage, Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar. The Gemara answers: Because there are those who reverse the opinions of the tanna’im, they needed to state the opinions explicitly so that there would be no mistake with regard to the halakha.

מְצָאוֹ בַּחֲפִיסָה אוֹ בִּדְלוֹסְקָמָא: מַאי ״חֲפִיסָה״? אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה: חֵמֶת קְטַנָּה. מַאי ״דְּלוֹסְקָמָא״? טְלִיקָא דְסָבֵי.

§ The mishna teaches that if one found the bill of divorce in a ḥafisa or in a deluskema, then it is valid. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the word ḥafisa? Rabba bar bar Ḥana says: It is a small flask. What is the meaning of deluskema? It is a purse [telika] of the elderly.

מַתְנִי׳ הַמֵּבִיא גֵּט, וְהִנִּיחוֹ זָקֵן אוֹ חוֹלֶה – נוֹתֵן לָהּ בְּחֶזְקַת שֶׁהוּא קַיָּים.

MISHNA: In the case of an agent who brings a bill of divorce to a woman, and when he had left the husband was elderly or sick, the agent gives her the bill of divorce based on the presumption that the husband is still alive, and there is no concern that in the meantime he has died, thereby canceling the bill of divorce.

בַּת יִשְׂרָאֵל הַנְּשׂוּאָה לְכֹהֵן, וְהָלַךְ בַּעְלָהּ לִמְדִינַת הַיָּם – אוֹכֶלֶת בִּתְרוּמָה בְּחֶזְקַת שֶׁהוּא קַיָּים. הַשּׁוֹלֵחַ חַטָּאתוֹ מִמְּדִינַת הַיָּם – מַקְרִיבִין אוֹתָהּ בְּחֶזְקַת שֶׁהוּא קַיָּים.

Similarly, with regard to an Israelite woman who is married to a priest and may therefore partake of teruma, and her husband went to a country overseas, she may continue to partake of teruma based on the presumption that her husband is still alive. Similarly, in the case of one who sends his sin–offering from a country overseas, the priests may offer it on the altar based on the presumption that the one who sent it is still alive.

גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רָבָא: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא זָקֵן שֶׁלֹּא הִגִּיעַ לִגְבוּרוֹת; וְחוֹלֶה – שֶׁרוֹב חוֹלִים לְחַיִּים; אֲבָל זָקֵן שֶׁהִגִּיעַ לִגְבוּרוֹת, וְגוֹסֵס – שֶׁרוֹב גּוֹסְסִין לְמִיתָה; לָא.

GEMARA: Rava says: They taught that this presumptive status exists only concerning an elderly man who has not reached his years of strength, i.e., the age of eighty, and an ordinary sick person, as the majority of sick people continue to live and recover from their illnesses. But if the husband was an elderly man who had reached his years of strength, or if he was moribund, then, as the majority of moribund people proceed to die, he does not have this presumptive status.

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: הַמֵּבִיא גֵּט וְהִנִּיחוֹ זָקֵן – אֲפִילּוּ בֶּן מֵאָה שָׁנָה, נוֹתֵן לָהּ בְּחֶזְקַת שֶׁהוּא קַיָּים! תְּיוּבְתָּא.

Abaye raised an objection to Rava’s statement from a baraita: With regard to an agent who brings a bill of divorce and left the husband when he was old, even one hundred years old, he gives the bill of divorce to the wife, based on the presumption that her husband is still alive. The Gemara concludes: This is a conclusive refutation, and Rava’s statement is rejected.

וְאִי בָּעֵית אֵימָא, כֵּיוָן דְּאִיפְּלִיג – אִיפְּלִיג.

The Gemara comments: And if you wish, say that this is not a conclusive refutation. In the case of the baraita, since it is so that the man reached an exceptionally old age, one cannot apply the general presumptions to him and must instead apply presumptions that are for one who has reached an exceptionally old age. However, in a case where someone has not demonstrated that he is an exception to the rule, once he reaches the age of eighty there is a concern that perhaps he has died in the interim.

רָמֵי לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי לְרַבָּה, תְּנַן: הַמֵּבִיא גֵּט, וְהִנִּיחוֹ זָקֵן אוֹ חוֹלֶה – נוֹתֵן לָהּ בְּחֶזְקַת שֶׁהוּא קַיָּים. וּרְמִינְהוּ: ״הֲרֵי זֶה גִּיטִּיךְ״ – שָׁעָה אַחַת קוֹדֶם לְמִיתָתוֹ, אֲסוּרָה לֶאֱכוֹל בִּתְרוּמָה מִיָּד!

§ Abaye raises a contradiction before Rabba: We learned in the mishna that in the case of an agent who brings a bill of divorce to a woman and left the husband when he was elderly or sick, the agent gives her the bill of divorce based on the presumption that the husband is still alive. And one can raise a contradiction from a baraita (Tosefta 6:11) that states: If one is leaving his place of residence, and in order to preclude a situation where his wife would have the status of a deserted wife he gives her a conditional bill of divorce and stipulates: This is your bill of divorce that will take effect one hour prior to my death, it is immediately prohibited for her to partake of teruma, due to the concern that he may die immediately after an hour has passed. Apparently, there is a concern that one may die at any point.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: תְּרוּמָה אַגִּיטִּין קָא רָמֵית?! תְּרוּמָה אֶפְשָׁר, גֵּט לָא אֶפְשָׁר.

Rabba said to him: Do you raise a contradiction from the halakhot of teruma to the halakhot of bills of divorce? Concerning teruma, it is possible for the wife to eat only non-sacred produce in order to be stringent due to the possibility that her husband may die. However, concerning a bill of divorce it is not possible to take into account the possibility that her husband may die, as there would then be no way for a husband to send a bill of divorce to her with an agent.

וְרָמֵי תְּרוּמָה אַתְּרוּמָה; תְּנַן: בַּת יִשְׂרָאֵל הַנְּשׂוּאָה לְכֹהֵן, וְהָלַךְ בַּעְלָהּ לִמְדִינַת הַיָּם – אוֹכֶלֶת בִּתְרוּמָה בְּחֶזְקַת שֶׁהוּא קַיָּים.

And the Gemara raises a contradiction from the halakhot of teruma in the mishna to the halakhot of teruma in a baraita. We learned in the mishna: With regard to an Israelite woman who is married to a priest and may therefore partake of teruma, and her husband went to a country overseas, she may continue to partake of teruma based on the presumption that her husband is still alive.

וּרְמִינְהוּ: ״הֲרֵי זֶה גִּיטִּיךְ״ – שָׁעָה אַחַת קוֹדֶם מִיתָתוֹ, אֲסוּרָה לֶאֱכוֹל בִּתְרוּמָה מִיָּד!

And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a baraita: If one says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce that will take effect one hour prior to my death, it is immediately prohibited for her to partake of teruma due to the concern that he may die immediately after an hour has passed. These two halakhot appear to contradict one another.

אָמַר רַב אַדָּא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יִצְחָק: שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, שֶׁהֲרֵי אֲסָרָהּ עָלָיו שָׁעָה אַחַת קוֹדֶם מִיתָתוֹ. מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב פָּפָּא: מִמַּאי דְּאִיהוּ מָיֵית בְּרֵישָׁא? דִּלְמָא אִיהִי מָיְיתָא בְּרֵישָׁא!

Rav Adda, son of Rav Yitzḥak, said: It is different there, as he rendered her forbidden to himself one hour prior to his death, meaning that she will definitely be prohibited from partaking of teruma at some point. Therefore, it is considered to be an uncertainty immediately. Rav Pappa objects to this answer: From where is it known that he will die first and she will be prohibited from partaking of teruma? Perhaps she will die first, and the bill of divorce will never take effect.

אֶלָּא אָמַר אַבָּיֵי, לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא רַבִּי מֵאִיר – דְּלָא חָיֵישׁ לְמִיתָה, הָא רַבִּי יְהוּדָה – דְּחָיֵישׁ לְמִיתָה.

Rather, Abaye said that this is not difficult: This mishna, which permits the woman to partake of teruma, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who is not concerned about potential death. That baraita, which prohibits the woman from partaking of teruma, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who is concerned about potential death.

דִּתְנַן: הַלּוֹקֵחַ יַיִן מִבֵּין הַכּוּתִים, אוֹמֵר: שְׁנֵי לוּגִּין שֶׁאֲנִי עָתִיד לְהַפְרִישׁ – הֲרֵי הֵן תְּרוּמָה; עֲשָׂרָה – מַעֲשֵׂר רִאשׁוֹן; תִּשְׁעָה – מַעֲשֵׂר שֵׁנִי; וּמֵיחֵל וְשׁוֹתֶה מִיָּד – דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר.

As we learned in a baraita in the Tosefta (Demai 8:7): In the case of one who purchases wine from among the Samaritans, about whom it is assumed that they did not separate teruma and tithes, and he is not in a position to separate teruma, he acts as follows: If there are, for example, one hundred log of wine in the barrels, he says: Two log that I will separate in the future are teruma, as the mandated average measure of teruma is one-fiftieth; ten log are first tithe; and one-tenth of the remainder, which is approximately nine log, are second tithe. And he deconsecrates the second tithe that he will separate in the future, transferring its sanctity to money, and he may drink the wine immediately, relying on the separation that he will perform later, which will clarify retroactively what he designated for the tithes and for teruma. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

רַבִּי יְהוּדָה וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹסְרִין.

The baraita continues: However, Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon prohibit this practice. These Sages, Rabbi Yehuda among them, were concerned that perhaps the wineskin would burst before he would manage to separate the teruma, whereas Rabbi Meir is not concerned about this occurring. Similarly, it is said that Rabbi Meir is not concerned about potential death, and Rabbi Yehuda is concerned.

רָבָא אָמַר:

Rava said:

שֶׁמָּא מֵת לָא חָיְישִׁינַן, שֶׁמָּא יָמוּת חָיְישִׁינַן.

There is a different distinction: We are not concerned that perhaps he has already died, which is why the mishna rules that she may continue to partake of teruma. However, in the case of one who stipulates that the bill of divorce will take effect one hour before his death, we are concerned that perhaps he will die at an unknown moment in the future and she will no longer be permitted to partake of teruma.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַדָּא בַּר מַתְנָה לְרָבָא: וְהָא נוֹד דִּכְשֶׁמָּא יָמוּת הוּא, וּפְלִיגִי! אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה מִדִּסְקַרְתָּא: שָׁאנֵי נוֹד דְּאֶפְשָׁר דְּמָסַר לֵיהּ לְשׁוֹמֵר.

Rav Adda bar Mattana said to Rava: But the concern in the case of the wineskin is that it might burst before one is able to separate the teruma and tithes, which is similar to the concern that perhaps he will die, as both are concerns with respect to the future, and Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Meir disagree. Rav Yehuda of Diskarta said: A wineskin is different, as it is possible to give it to a watchman who will protect it from bursting, which is why Rabbi Meir is not concerned that it might burst. This reasoning does not apply to the concern that the husband might die.

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב מְשַׁרְשְׁיָא: עָרְבָיךְ עָרְבָא צְרִיךְ! אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: שֶׁמָּא מֵת – לָא חָיְישִׁינַן, שֶׁמָּא יָמוּת – תַּנָּאֵי הִיא.

Rav Mesharshiyya objects to this answer: Your guarantor himself needs a guarantor, as there is no way of knowing that the guardian will not be negligent, so the wineskin may burst. Rather, Rava said: Everyone agrees that we are not concerned that perhaps he has already died, in accordance with the mishna here. As to the issue of whether there is a concern that perhaps he will die, as in the case of the baraita, this is a dispute between tanna’im.

הַשּׁוֹלֵחַ חַטָּאתוֹ מִמְּדִינַת הַיָּם וְכוּ׳: וְהָא בָּעֵינָא סְמִיכָה! אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: בְּקׇרְבַּן נָשִׁים. רַב פָּפָּא אָמַר: בְּחַטַּאת הָעוֹף.

§ The mishna teaches that in the case of one who sends his sin-offering from a country overseas, the priests may sacrifice it on the altar, based on the presumption that the one who sent it is still alive. The Gemara asks: But doesn’t an offering require the placing of hands on the head of an offering by the one who brings the offering? In this case the owner of the offering is elsewhere and cannot place his hands on the offering. Rav Yosef says: The mishna states this ruling with regard to the offering of women, as women are not required to place their hands on the head of their offerings. Rav Pappa says: The mishna states this ruling with regard to a bird sacrificed as a sin-offering, where it is not required that the owner place his hands on the head of the offering.

וּצְרִיכָא; דְּאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן גֵּט – מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא אֶפְשָׁר, אֲבָל תְּרוּמָה דְּאֶפְשָׁר – אֵימָא לָא.

Noting that the mishna states the same halakha, that the presumption is that one remains alive, in three different contexts, the Gemara comments: And it is necessary for the mishna to state this in all three cases, as, if it had taught us only the case of a bill of divorce, one might have said that it is due to the fact that it is not possible to take into account the possible death of the husband, as there would then be no way for the husband to send a bill of divorce to his wife with an agent. That is why the presumption that the husband is alive is relied upon. But with regard to teruma, where it is possible for the wife to partake of non-sacred produce, say the presumption is not relied upon, and there is a concern that he died.

וְאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן תְּרוּמָה – דְּזִמְנִין דְּלָא אֶפְשָׁר; אֲבָל חַטַּאת הָעוֹף – מִסְּפֵיקָא לָא לֵיעוּל חוּלִּין לָעֲזָרָה, צְרִיכָא.

And if it had taught us also the case of teruma, one might have said that there are times that it is not possible for the wife to avoid partaking of teruma, e.g., if she does not have sufficient non-sacred produce. But with regard to a bird sacrificed as a sin-offering, one might say that for a situation of uncertainty as to whether the sin-offering may be sacrificed, since its owners might not be alive, one should not bring non-sacred animals, i.e., an animal that may not be sacrificed, into the Temple courtyard. Therefore, it is necessary for the mishna to mention all of these cases.

מַתְנִי׳ שְׁלֹשָׁה דְּבָרִים אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן פַּרְטָא לִפְנֵי חֲכָמִים, וְקִיְּימוּ אֶת דְּבָרָיו: עַל עִיר שֶׁהִקִּיפָהּ כַּרְקוֹם, וְעַל הַסְּפִינָה הַמּוּטְרֶפֶת בַּיָּם, וְעַל הַיּוֹצֵא לִידּוֹן – שֶׁהֵן בְּחֶזְקַת קַיָּימִין.

MISHNA: Rabbi Elazar ben Perata said three statements before the Sages as testimony from previous generations, and they upheld his statements: He spoke concerning the residents of a town that was surrounded by a camp of besiegers [karkom]; and concerning the travelers in a ship that is cast about in the sea; and concerning one who is going out to be judged in a capital case; that they are all presumed to be alive.

אֲבָל עִיר שֶׁכְּבָשָׁהּ כַּרְקוֹם, וּסְפִינָה שֶׁאָבְדָה בַּיָּם, וְהַיּוֹצֵא לֵיהָרֵג – נוֹתְנִין עֲלֵיהֶן חוּמְרֵי חַיִּים וְחוּמְרֵי מֵתִים – בַּת יִשְׂרָאֵל לְכֹהֵן, וּבַת כֹּהֵן לְיִשְׂרָאֵל, לֹא תֹּאכַל בִּתְרוּמָה.

However, concerning the residents of a town that was conquered by a camp of besiegers; and the travelers on a ship that was lost at sea; and one who is going out to be executed after receiving his verdict; in these cases one applies to them the stringencies of the living and the stringencies of the dead. How so? An Israelite woman married to a priest in one of these situations or a daughter of a priest married to an Israelite in one of these situations may not partake of teruma. The first woman may not do so because she may partake of teruma only while her husband is alive, and the second may not do so because she may partake of teruma only if he has died.

גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא בְּבֵית דִּין שֶׁל יִשְׂרָאֵל; אֲבָל בְּבֵית דִּין שֶׁל אוּמּוֹת הָעוֹלָם, כֵּיוָן דִּגְמִיר לֵיהּ דִּינָא לִקְטָלָא – מִיקְטָל קָטְלִי לֵיהּ.

GEMARA: Rav Yosef says: They taught that one applies the stringencies of the living only to one who is being taken to be executed in a Jewish court, where even once he is being taken to be executed, he will be released if the court finds evidence for his innocence; but in a court of the nations of the world, once he is sentenced to death, he is killed in any case. Therefore, he should be considered as a dead man in every regard.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: בֵּית דִּין שֶׁל אוּמּוֹת הָעוֹלָם נָמֵי, דִּמְקַבְּלִי שׁוּחְדָּא! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: כִּי שָׁקְלִי – מִקַּמֵּי דְּלַחְתּוֹם פּוּרְסִי שְׁנָמַג; לְבָתַר דְּמִיחְתַּם פּוּרְסִי שְׁנָמַג – לָא שָׁקְלִי.

Abaye said to him: In a court of the nations of the world as well, perhaps they will not execute him, as they accept bribes. Rav Yosef said to him: When they take a bribe, it is only before the verdict [puresei shenmag] has been sealed; but after the verdict has been sealed, they do not take bribes.

מֵיתִיבִי, כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁיַּעַמְדוּ שְׁנַיִם וְיֹאמְרוּ: ״מְעִידִין אָנוּ אֶת אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי שֶׁנִּגְמַר דִּינוֹ בְּבֵית דִּינוֹ שֶׁל פְּלוֹנִי, וּפְלוֹנִי וּפְלוֹנִי עֵדָיו״ – הֲרֵי זֶה יֵהָרֵג! דִּלְמָא בּוֹרֵחַ שָׁאנֵי.

According to Rav Yosef, in a Jewish court, even after one’s verdict is complete the presumption is that he is alive. The Gemara raises an objection to this from a mishna (Makkot 7a) concerning one who fled from the court after his verdict had been issued: Any place where two witnesses arise and say: We testify about so-and-so that his judgment was finalized in the court of so-and-so, and so-and-so and so-and-so were his witnesses, the halakha is that this person should be killed. It is evident from the mishna in tractate Makkot that there is no concern that the court may have later found a reason to release him. The Gemara answers: Perhaps one who flees is different, as the court will not reconsider his verdict once he has fled.

תָּא שְׁמַע: שְׁמַע מִבֵּית דִּין שֶׁל יִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁהָיוּ אוֹמְרִים ״אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי מֵת״; ״אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי נֶהֱרָג״ – יַשִּׂיאוּ אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ. מֵקוֹמֶנְטָרִיסִין שֶׁל גּוֹיִם ״אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי מֵת״; ״אִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי נֶהֱרַג״ – אַל יַשִּׂיאוּ אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ.

The Gemara suggests another proof: Come and hear: If one heard from a Jewish court that they were saying: The man so-and-so died, or: The man so-and-so was killed, then the court allows his wife to marry. If he heard from a gentile judicial registrar [komentirisin]: The man so-and-so died, or: The man so-and-so was killed, then the court does not allow his wife to marry.

מַאי ״מֵת״, וּמַאי ״נֶהֱרַג״? אִילֵימָא ״מֵת״ – מֵת מַמָּשׁ, וְ״נֶהֱרַג״ – נֶהֱרַג מַמָּשׁ; דִּכְווֹתֵיהּ גַּבֵּי גּוֹיִם, אַמַּאי אַל יַשִּׂיאוּ אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ? הָא קַיְימָא לַן דְּכֹל מֵסִיחַ לְפִי תּוּמּוֹ הֵימוֹנֵי מְהֵימְנִי לֵיהּ!

The Gemara clarifies: What does it mean when it says: Died, and what does it mean when it says: Was killed? If we say that: Died, means that he actually died, and: Was killed, means that he was actually killed, such that the case concerning the gentiles is stated in a similar manner, i.e., that he heard from the gentile registrar that the person was actually dead, why may the court not allow his wife to marry? Don’t we maintain that with regard to any gentile who speaks offhandedly, the Sages deemed him credible? Therefore, the gentile should be deemed credible when he says that someone died or was killed.

אֶלָּא לָאו ״מֵת״ – יוֹצֵא לָמוּת, ״נֶהֱרַג״ – יוֹצֵא לֵיהָרֵג? וְקָתָנֵי: בְּבֵית דִּין יִשְׂרָאֵל יַשִּׂיאוּ אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ!

Rather, is it not necessary to explain that when it says: Died, it means that he is going out to die, and when it says: Was killed, it means going out to be executed. And it teaches that if it occurred in a Jewish court then the court allows his wife to marry, as it is assumed that he was already executed, contrary to the statement of Rav Yosef.

לְעוֹלָם מֵת מַמָּשׁ וְנֶהֱרַג מַמָּשׁ, וּדְקָאָמְרַתְּ: דִּכְווֹתֵיהּ גַּבֵּי גּוֹיִם אַמַּאי לָא, וְהָא קַיְימָא לַן דְּכֹל מֵסִיחַ לְפִי תּוּמּוֹ הֵימוֹנֵי מְהֵימְנִי; הָנֵי מִילֵּי בְּמִילְּתָא דְּלָא שָׁיְיכִי בָּהּ, אֲבָל בְּמִילְּתָא דְּשָׁיְיכִי בַּהּ, עָבְדִי לְאַחְזוֹקֵי שִׁיקְרַיְיהוּ.

The Gemara answers: Actually, it can be explained that he actually died, and actually was killed. And with regard to that which you said: Such that the case concerning the gentiles is stated in a similar manner, why may the court not allow his wife to marry? Don’t we maintain that with regard to any gentile who speaks offhandedly, the Sages deemed him credible? The answer is that this credibility applies only in a matter that is not relevant to the gentiles; but in a matter that is relevant to the gentiles, such as here, where they desire to publicize that they carried out their verdict, it is common for them to reinforce their false verdict, i.e., once they reach a verdict they will say that the accused was killed. Therefore, one cannot rely on their statements.

אִיכָּא דְאָמְרִי אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא בְּבֵית דִּין שֶׁל אוּמּוֹת הָעוֹלָם,

This is one version of the discourse; there is also another version: There are those who say that Rav Yosef said: They taught that one applies the stringencies of the living and the dead only in a court of the nations of the world;