גיטין לז

גיטין לז

בּוּלֵי – אֵלּוּ עֲשִׁירִים, דִּכְתִיב: ״וְשָׁבַרְתִּי אֶת גְּאוֹן עוּזְּכֶם״, וְתָנֵי רַב יוֹסֵף: אֵלּוּ בּוּלָאוֹת שֶׁבִּיהוּדָה. בּוּטֵי – אֵלּוּ הָעֲנִיִּים, דִּכְתִיב: ״הַעֲבֵט תַּעֲבִיטֶנּוּ״. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא לְלָעוֹזָא: מַאי פְּרוֹסְבּוּל? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: פּוּרְסָא דְמִילְּתָא.

Bulei, these are the wealthy, as it is written: “And I will break the pride of your power” (Leviticus 26:19), and Rav Yosef taught with regard to this verse: These are the bula’ot, the wealthy people, of Judea. Butei, these are the poor, who are in need of a loan, as it is written: “You shall not shut your hand from your needy brother; but you shall open your hand to him, and you shall lend him [ha’avet ta’avitenu] sufficient for his need” (Deuteronomy 15:7–8). Therefore, the prosbol was instituted both for the sake of the wealthy, so that the loans they would give to the poor person would not be canceled, and for the sake of the poor, so that they would continue to find those willing to lend them money. Rava said to a foreigner who spoke Greek: What is the meaning of the word prosbol? He said to him: It means the institution [pursa] of a matter.

אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: יְתוֹמִין, אֵין צְרִיכִין פְּרוֹסְבּוּל. וְכֵן תָּנֵי רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא: יְתוֹמִין אֵין צְרִיכִין פְּרוֹסְבּוּל, דְּרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל וּבֵית דִּינוֹ אֲבִיהֶן שֶׁל יְתוֹמִין.

§ Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: Orphans do not require a prosbol in order to collect payment of debts owed to them. And similarly, Rami bar Ḥama taught in a baraita: Orphans do not require a prosbol, as Rabban Gamliel and his court, i.e., any rabbinic court, are considered the fathers of orphans, meaning that all matters that relate to orphans are already managed by the court, including their promissory notes.

תְּנַן הָתָם: אֵין כּוֹתְבִין פְּרוֹסְבּוּל אֶלָּא עַל הַקַּרְקַע. אִם אֵין לוֹ – מְזַכֵּהוּ בְּתוֹךְ שָׂדֵהוּ כׇּל שֶׁהוּ. וְכַמָּה כׇּל שֶׁהוּ? אָמַר רַב חִיָּיא בַּר אָשֵׁי אָמַר רַב: אֲפִילּוּ קֶלַח שֶׁל כְּרוּב. אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה: אֲפִילּוּ הִשְׁאִילוֹ מָקוֹם לְתַנּוּר וּלְכִירַיִם – כּוֹתְבִין עָלָיו פְּרוֹסְבּוּל.

§ We learned in a mishna there (Shevi’it 10:6): One may write a prosbol only on the basis of the debtor owning land. If the debtor has no land, then the creditor transfers any amount of his own field to him so that he can write a prosbol. The Gemara asks: And how much is sufficient to be classified as any amount? Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi says that Rav says: Even the amount of land sufficient to grow a stalk of cabbage is sufficient. Rav Yehuda says: Even if he lent him a place sufficient for an oven and a stove, one may write a prosbol on this basis.

אִינִי?! וְהָתָנֵי הִלֵּל: אֵין כּוֹתְבִין פְּרוֹסְבּוּל אֶלָּא עַל עָצִיץ נָקוּב בִּלְבָד. נָקוּב – אִין, שֶׁאֵינוֹ נָקוּב – לָא;

The Gemara challenges this statement: Is that so? But didn’t Hillel teach (Tosefta, Shevi’it 8:10): One writes a prosbol only on the basis of the debtor owning merely a perforated pot placed on the ground. This demonstrates that a perforated pot can serve as the basis for the writing of a prosbol, as it is considered to be part of the ground due to the perforation; however, a pot that is not perforated cannot serve as the basis for the writing of a prosbol.

אַמַּאי? וְהָא אִיכָּא מְקוֹמוֹ! לָא צְרִיכָא, דְּמַנַּח אַסִּיכֵּי.

The Gemara continues the question: Since Rav Yehuda stated that possession of the place occupied by the oven is also considered possession of the land underneath with regard to this issue, why can’t a non-perforated pot serve as the basis for a prosbol; but isn’t there the place where the pot is resting? The Gemara answers: No, one cannot compare the case of Rav Yehuda to this case, as it is necessary for Hillel to state his halakha in a case where the pot is resting on stakes and the borrower has no possession of any land at all. Hillel teaches that even so, if the pot is perforated it is considered to be land and may serve as the basis for the writing of a prosbol.

רַב אָשֵׁי מַקְנֵי לֵיהּ גִּידְמָא דְּדִיקְלָא, וּכְתַב עֲלֵיהּ פְּרוֹסְבּוּל. רַבָּנַן דְּבֵי רַב אָשֵׁי מָסְרִי מִילַּיְיהוּ לַהֲדָדֵי. רַבִּי יוֹנָתָן מְסַר מִילֵּי לְרַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא; אֲמַר לֵיהּ: צְרִיכְנָא מִידֵּי אַחֲרִינָא? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לָא צְרִיכַתְּ.

The Gemara recounts a related incident: When Rav Ashi would lend money and wish to write a prosbol he would transfer to the borrower a stump of a palm tree that was still attached to the ground, and he wrote a prosbol based on this. The Sages of the school of Rav Ashi would transfer their matters, i.e., their debts, to each other without writing a prosbol, by stating: You are hereby a court, and the debt is given over to you. Rabbi Yonatan transferred a matter by means of such a statement to Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba. Rabbi Yonatan said to him: Do I need anything else? He said to him: You do not need anything else, as this statement alone is sufficient.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: אֵין לוֹ קַרְקַע, וְלֶעָרֵב יֵשׁ לוֹ קַרְקַע – כּוֹתְבִין עָלָיו פְּרוֹסְבּוּל. לוֹ וְלֶעָרֵב אֵין לָהֶן קַרְקַע, וְלַחַיָּיב לוֹ יֵשׁ לוֹ קַרְקַע – כּוֹתְבִין עָלָיו פְּרוֹסְבּוּל, מִדְּרַבִּי נָתָן –

The Gemara discusses the requirement for the debtor to have land. The Sages taught: If the debtor has no land but the guarantor has land then one writes a prosbol on the basis of the land of the guarantor. If both he and the guarantor have no land, but another person who is obligated to pay money to the debtor has land, then one writes a prosbol on the basis of this land. This halakha is derived from a statement of Rabbi Natan.

דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי נָתָן אוֹמֵר: מִנַּיִן לַנּוֹשֶׁה בַּחֲבֵרוֹ מָנֶה, וַחֲבֵרוֹ בַּחֲבֵרוֹ, מִנַּיִן שֶׁמּוֹצִיאִין מִזֶּה וְנוֹתְנִין לָזֶה? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְנָתַן לַאֲשֶׁר אָשַׁם לוֹ״.

As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Natan says: From where is it derived that when one lends one hundred dinars to his friend, and that friend lends an identical sum to his own friend, that the court appropriates the money from this one, the second debtor, and gives it to that one, the first creditor, without going through the middleman, who is both the first debtor and the second creditor? The verse states with regard to returning stolen property: “And gives it to him in respect of whom he has been guilty” (Numbers 5:7). The fact that the verse explains that the money is given to one: “In respect of whom he has been guilty,” indicates that the money should be given directly to the one to whom the money is ultimately owed. In this case as well, the second debtor possesses land, and as he owes money to the first debtor, it is considered as if the second debtor owes money to the first creditor, enabling the first creditor to write a prosbol.

תְּנַן הָתָם: הַשְּׁבִיעִית מְשַׁמֶּטֶת אֶת הַמִּלְוָה, בֵּין בִּשְׁטָר בֵּין שֶׁלֹּא בִּשְׁטָר. רַב וּשְׁמוּאֵל דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ: בִּשְׁטָר – שְׁטָר שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ אַחְרָיוּת נְכָסִים, שֶׁלֹּא בִּשְׁטָר – שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ אַחְרָיוּת נְכָסִים; כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן מִלְוֶה עַל פֶּה.

§ We learned in a mishna there (Shevi’it 10:1): The Sabbatical Year abrogates debt both for loans that were contracted with a promissory note and for loans that were contracted without a promissory note. The amora’im disagree with regard to the interpretation of the mishna: It is Rav and Shmuel who both say: Loans that were contracted with a promissory note, is referring to loans that were contracted with a promissory note that contains a property guarantee; loans that were contracted without a promissory note, is referring even to loans that were contracted with a promissory note that does not contain a property guarantee. All the more so, a loan by oral agreement is canceled by the Sabbatical Year.

רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ: בִּשְׁטָר – שְׁטָר שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ אַחְרָיוּת נְכָסִים, שֶׁלֹּא בִּשְׁטָר – מִלְוֶה עַל פֶּה. אֲבָל שְׁטָר שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ אַחְרָיוּת נְכָסִים – אֵינוֹ מְשַׁמֵּט.

By contrast, it is Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish who both say: Loans that were contracted with a promissory note is referring to loans that were contracted with a promissory note that does not contain a property guarantee, whereas loans that were contracted without a promissory note is referring to a loan by oral agreement. However, the Sabbatical Year does not abrogate a loan contracted with a promissory note that contains a property guarantee, as it is as though the creditor had already taken possession of the debtor’s land.

תַּנְיָא כְּוָתֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ: שְׁטַר חוֹב – מְשַׁמֵּט, וְאִם יֵשׁ בּוֹ אַחְרָיוּת נְכָסִים – אֵינוֹ מְשַׁמֵּט. תַּנְיָא אִידַּךְ: סִיֵּים לוֹ שָׂדֶה אַחַת בְּהַלְווֹאָתוֹ, אֵינוֹ מְשַׁמֵּט. וְלֹא עוֹד, אֶלָּא אֲפִילּוּ כָּתַב: ״כׇּל נְכָסַיי אַחְרָאִין וְעַרְבָאִין לָךְ״ – אֵינוֹ מְשַׁמֵּט.

It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish: The Sabbatical Year abrogates a promissory note, but if the promissory note contains a property guarantee the Sabbatical Year does not abrogate it. Similarly, it is taught in another baraita: If the debtor specified one field for the repayment of his loan, then it is not canceled. And not only that, but even if he wrote: All of my property is pledged and guaranteed to you, then the Sabbatical Year does not abrogate it, even if he does not specify a field for the repayment of the loan.

קָרִיבֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי אַסִּי הֲוָה לֵיהּ הָהוּא שְׁטָרָא דַּהֲוָה כְּתִיב בֵּיהּ אַחְרָיוּת נְכָסִים, אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי אַסִּי, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מְשַׁמֵּט אוֹ אֵינוֹ מְשַׁמֵּט? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֵינוֹ מְשַׁמֵּט. שַׁבְקֵיהּ, וַאֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מְשַׁמֵּט.

The Gemara relates: The relative of Rabbi Asi had a certain promissory note that had a property guarantee written in it. He came before Rabbi Asi and said to him: Does the Sabbatical Year abrogate this loan, or does it not abrogate it? He said to him: It does not abrogate it. He left Rabbi Asi and came before Rabbi Yoḥanan and asked him the same question. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: It does abrogate it.

אֲתָא רַבִּי אַסִּי לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מְשַׁמֵּט אוֹ אֵינוֹ מְשַׁמֵּט? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מְשַׁמֵּט. וְהָא מָר הוּא דְּאָמַר אֵינוֹ מְשַׁמֵּט! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: וְכִי מִפְּנֵי שֶׁאָנוּ מְדַמִּין, נַעֲשֶׂה מַעֲשֶׂה?! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: וְהָתַנְיָא כְּווֹתֵיהּ דְּמָר! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: דִּלְמָא הָהִיא בֵּית שַׁמַּאי הִיא, דְּאָמְרִי: שְׁטָר הָעוֹמֵד לִגְבּוֹת – כְּגָבוּי דָּמֵי.

Rabbi Asi came before Rabbi Yoḥanan and said to him: Does the Sabbatical Year abrogate this loan, or does it not abrogate it? He said to him: It does abrogate it. Rabbi Asi challenged him: But wasn’t it the Master himself who said that the Sabbatical Year does not abrogate a promissory note that contains a property guarantee? Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: Because we think that this should be the halakha should we perform an action based on this? Rabbi Asi said to him: But isn’t it taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of the Master? He said to him: Perhaps that baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, who say more generally: A promissory note that stands to be collected is considered as though it has been collected, and this is why the loan is not abrogated, as it is considered as though the loan had already been repaid. And the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai in that issue.

תְּנַן הָתָם: הַמַּלְוֶה אֶת חֲבֵירוֹ מָעוֹת עַל הַמַּשְׁכּוֹן, וְהַמּוֹסֵר שְׁטָרוֹתָיו לְבֵית דִין – אֵין מְשַׁמְּטִין. בִּשְׁלָמָא מוֹסֵר שְׁטָרוֹתָיו לְבֵית דִּין – דְּתָפְסִי לְהוּ בֵּי דִינָא. אֶלָּא מַלְוֶה עַל הַמַּשְׁכּוֹן, מַאי טַעְמָא?

§ We learned in a mishna there (Shevi’it 10:2): With regard to one who lends money to another based on collateral, and one who transfers his promissory notes to a court, the debt owed to them is not canceled. The Gemara asks: Granted, the debt is not canceled when one transfers his promissory notes to a court, as the court seizes the promissory notes, and they are able to collect this debt. But what is the reason that the debt is not canceled for one who lends money based on collateral?

אָמַר רָבָא: מִשּׁוּם דְּתָפֵס לֵיהּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, הִלְוָהוּ וְדָר בַּחֲצֵרוֹ – דְּתָפֵיס לֵיהּ, הָכִי נָמֵי דְּלָא מְשַׁמֵּט?!

Rava said: Due to the fact that the creditor has seized an item that belongs to the debtor, it is considered as though the debt has already been collected. Abaye said to him: If that is so, then if a creditor loaned money to someone and lives in his courtyard as a collateral for the loan, since he seizes the courtyard, which belongs to the debtor, would you also say that the Sabbatical Year does not abrogate the debt? That would contradict the accepted halakha that in this case the debt is canceled.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: שָׁאנֵי מַשְׁכּוֹן, דְּקָנֵי לֵיהּ מִדְּרַבִּי יִצְחָק – דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק: מִנַּיִן לְבַעַל חוֹב שֶׁקּוֹנֶה מַשְׁכּוֹן? שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וּלְךָ תִּהְיֶה צְדָקָה״ – אִם אֵינוֹ קוֹנֶה, צְדָקָה מִנַּיִן? מִכָּאן לְבַעַל חוֹב שֶׁקּוֹנֶה מַשְׁכּוֹן.

Rava said to him: Collateral is different, as the creditor acquires it for himself, as learned from the statement of Rabbi Yitzḥak, as Rabbi Yitzḥak says: From where is it derived that a creditor acquires collateral given to him and is considered its owner so long as the item is in his possession? As it is stated in the verse with regard to the obligation of a creditor to return collateral at night: “And it shall be righteousness for you” (Deuteronomy 24:13). Rabbi Yitzḥak infers: If the creditor does not acquire the collateral, then from where is the righteousness involved in returning it? He would be simply returning an item to its rightful owner. From here it is learned that a creditor acquires the collateral. Therefore, when he returns the collateral to the debtor he is performing an act of charity.

תְּנַן הָתָם:

§ We learned in a mishna there (Shevi’it 10:8):

הַמַּחֲזִיר חוֹב לַחֲבֵירוֹ בַּשְּׁבִיעִית – צָרִיךְ שֶׁיֹּאמַר לוֹ: ״מְשַׁמֵּט אֲנִי״; וְאִם אָמַר לוֹ: ״אַף עַל פִּי כֵן״, יְקַבֵּל הֵימֶנּוּ. שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְזֶה דְּבַר הַשְּׁמִטָּה״.

In the case of one who repays a debt to his friend during the Sabbatical Year, the creditor must say to him: I abrogate the debt, but if the debtor then said to him: Nevertheless, I want to repay you, he may accept it from him, as it is stated: “And this is the manner [devar] of the abrogation” (Deuteronomy 15:2). From the fact that the verse employed a term, devar, that can also mean: This is the statement of the cancellation, the Sages derived that the creditor must state that he cancels the debt, but he is allowed to accept the payment if the debtor insists on repaying.

אָמַר רַבָּה: וְתָלֵי לֵיהּ עַד דְּאָמַר הָכִי. אֵיתִיבֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: כְּשֶׁהוּא נוֹתֵן לוֹ, אַל יֹאמַר לוֹ: ״בְּחוֹבִי אֲנִי נוֹתֵן לָךְ״, אֶלָּא יֹאמַר לוֹ: ״שֶׁלִּי הֵן, וּבְמַתָּנָה אֲנִי נוֹתֵן לָךְ״! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: תָּלֵי לֵיהּ נָמֵי עַד דְּאָמַר הָכִי.

Rabba said: And the creditor is permitted to lift up his eyes to him hopefully, demonstrating that he wishes to accept the payment, until the debtor says this, that he nevertheless wishes to repay him. Abaye raised an objection to Rabba’s statement from a baraita: When the debtor gives the creditor payment for a debt that has been canceled he should not say to him: I give this to you in payment of my debt; rather, he should say to him: This is my money and I give it to you as a gift. This indicates that the debt is repaid only by the initiative of the debtor. Rabba said to him: The creditor is permitted to lift up his eyes to him hopefully as well, until the debtor says this, that he gives it as a gift, but the initiative may come from the creditor.

אַבָּא בַּר מָרְתָּא, דְּהוּא אַבָּא בַּר מִנְיוֹמֵי, הֲוָה מַסֵּיק בֵּיהּ רַבָּה זוּזֵי. אַיְיתִינְהוּ נִיהֲלֵיהּ בִּשְׁבִיעִית, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מְשַׁמֵּט אֲנִי. שַׁקְלִינְהוּ וַאֲזַל. אֲתָא אַבָּיֵי, אַשְׁכְּחֵיהּ דַּהֲוָה עֲצִיב, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אַמַּאי עֲצִיב מָר? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הָכִי הֲוָה מַעֲשֶׂה.

The Gemara relates: There was a man by the name of Abba bar Marta, who is also known as Abba bar Minyumi, from whom Rabba was attempting to collect a debt. He brought it to him in the Sabbatical Year. Rabba said to him: I abrogate this debt. Abba bar Marta took the money and left. Abaye came before Rabba and found that he was sad. Abaye said to him: Why is the Master sad? Rabba said to him: This was the incident that occurred, explaining that Abba bar Marta understood his statement literally and did not repay the debt.

אֲזַל לְגַבֵּיהּ, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אַמְטֵית לֵיהּ זוּזֵי לְמָר? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִין. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: וּמַאי אֲמַר לָךְ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: ״מְשַׁמֵּט אֲנִי״. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: וַאֲמַרְתְּ לֵיהּ ״אַף עַל פִּי כֵן״? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לָא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: וְאִי אֲמַרְתְּ לֵיהּ ״אַף עַל פִּי כֵן״, הֲוָה שַׁקְלִינְהוּ מִינָּךְ; הַשְׁתָּא מִיהַת אַמְטִינְהוּ נִיהֲלֵיהּ, וְאֵימָא לֵיהּ ״אַף עַל פִּי כֵן״. אֲזַל אַמְטִינְהוּ נִיהֲלֵיהּ, וַאֲמַר לֵיהּ ״אַף עַל פִּי כֵן״. שַׁקְלִינְהוּ מִינֵּיהּ, אָמַר: לָא הֲוָה בֵּיהּ דַּעְתָּא בְּהַאי צוּרְבָּא מֵרַבָּנַן מֵעִיקָּרָא.

Abaye went to Abba bar Marta, and said to him: Did you bring the money to the Master? He said to him: Yes. Abaye said to him: And what did he say to you? He said to him that Rabba had responded: I abrogate this debt. Abaye said to him: And did you say to him: Nevertheless, I want to repay you? Abba bar Marta said to him: No. Abaye said to him: But if you had said to him: Nevertheless, I want to repay you, he would have taken it from you. Now, in any event, bring it to him and say to him: Nevertheless, I want to repay you. Abba bar Marta went and brought the money to Rabba and said to him: Nevertheless, I want to repay you, and Rabba took it from him. In the end, Rabba said: This Torah scholar was not knowledgeable from the beginning, as it was necessary to teach him how to react.

אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: נֶאֱמָן אָדָם לוֹמַר: ״פְּרוֹסְבּוּל הָיָה בְּיָדִי, וְאָבַד מִמֶּנִּי״. מַאי טַעְמָא? כֵּיוָן דְּתַקִּינוּ רַבָּנַן פְּרוֹסְבּוּל, לָא שָׁבֵיק הֶיתֵּירָא וְאָכֵיל אִיסּוּרָא.

§ Rav Yehuda says that Rav Naḥman says: A person is deemed credible to say: I had a prosbol and I lost it, and collect payment of his debt. The Gemara explains: What is the reason for this? Since the Sages instituted the prosbol in a manner that allows anyone to write one without difficulty, in a situation such as this one does not leave aside a permitted item, i.e., collecting a debt after having written a prosbol, and eat a forbidden item, i.e., collecting a debt without having written a prosbol.

כִּי אֲתוֹ לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מִידֵּי פְּרוֹסְבּוּל הָיָה לְךָ וְאָבַד? כְּגוֹן זֶה, ״פְּתַח פִּיךָ לָאִלֵּם״ הוּא.

When they would come before Rav with a case where a creditor who did not have a prosbol was demanding payment of a debt after the Sabbatical Year, he would say to the creditor: Did you have any prosbol and it was lost? The Gemara explains that this is a case where the directive of the verse: “Open your mouth for the mute” (Proverbs 31:8) is applicable; this is not considered an intervention on behalf of one party, as it is only providing assistance for someone who was unaware of a claim that he should make.

תְּנַן: וְכֵן בַּעַל חוֹב שֶׁמּוֹצִיא שְׁטַר חוֹב, וְאֵין עִמּוֹ פְּרוֹסְבּוּל – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ לֹא יִפָּרְעוּ.

The Gemara challenges: Didn’t we learn in a mishna (Ketubot 89a): And similarly, a creditor who presents a promissory note unaccompanied by a prosbol, these debts may not be collected. This demonstrates that even if a creditor himself claims that he had written a prosbol but it was lost, his claim is not accepted and the debt is canceled.

תַּנָּאֵי הִיא – דְּתַנְיָא: הַמּוֹצִיא שְׁטַר חוֹב – צָרִיךְ שֶׁיְּהֵא עִמּוֹ פְּרוֹסְבּוּל. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ.

The Gemara answers: It is a dispute between tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who presents a promissory note after the Sabbatical Year, he must present a prosbol along with it in order to collect payment, and the Rabbis say: He does not need to present a prosbol, as it is assumed that he wrote one.

מַתְנִי׳ עֶבֶד שֶׁנִּשְׁבָּה וּפְדָאוּהוּ, אִם לְשׁוּם עֶבֶד – יִשְׁתַּעְבֵּד; אִם לְשׁוּם בֶּן חוֹרִין – לֹא יִשְׁתַּעְבֵּד. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: בֵּין כָּךְ וּבֵין כָּךְ יִשְׁתַּעְבֵּד.

MISHNA: In the case of a Canaanite slave that was captured, and Jews who had not owned him redeemed him, if he was redeemed to be a slave then he will be a slave. If he was redeemed to be a freeman then he will not be a slave. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Both in this case and in that case he will be a slave.

גְּמָ׳ בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? אִילֵימָא לִפְנֵי יֵאוּשׁ, לְשׁוּם בֶּן חוֹרִין – אַמַּאי לָא יִשְׁתַּעְבֵּד? אֶלָּא לְאַחַר יֵאוּשׁ, לְשׁוּם עֶבֶד – אַמַּאי יִשְׁתַּעְבֵּד?

GEMARA: With what are we dealing? If we say that the slave was redeemed before the first owner reached a state of despairing with regard to recovering the slave, then even if he was redeemed to be a freeman, he should still belong to his first owner; why would the mishna state that he will not be a slave? Rather, we might say that the slave was redeemed after the despairing of the first owner. Then, even if he was redeemed to be a slave, why will he be a slave? After his owner despairs of recovering him, he becomes ownerless property and consequently acquires his own freedom.

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: לְעוֹלָם לִפְנֵי יֵאוּשׁ, וּלְשׁוּם עֶבֶד – יִשְׁתַּעְבֵּד לְרַבּוֹ רִאשׁוֹן, לְשׁוּם בֶּן חוֹרִין – לֹא יִשְׁתַּעְבֵּד לֹא לְרַבּוֹ רִאשׁוֹן וְלֹא לְרַבּוֹ שֵׁנִי; לְרַבּוֹ שֵׁנִי לָא, דְּהָא לְשׁוּם בֶּן חוֹרִין פַּרְקֵיהּ, לְרַבּוֹ רִאשׁוֹן נָמֵי לָא, דִּילְמָא מִמַּנְעִי וְלָא פָּרְקִי.

Abaye said: Actually, the mishna is referring to a case where the slave was redeemed before the despairing of the owner. Therefore, according to the unattributed opinion of the mishna, if he was redeemed to be a slave, he will be a slave to his first master. If he was redeemed to be a freeman, he will not be a slave, neither to his first master nor to his second master, i.e., the one who redeemed him. He will not be a slave to his second master because he redeemed him as a freeman and cannot now demand that he become a slave. He will also not be a slave to his first master lest people refrain from redeeming slaves. If they know that a redeemed slave remains a slave of his original owner, they will not see any reason to redeem them from captivity.

רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: בֵּין כָּךְ וּבֵין כָּךְ יִשְׁתַּעְבֵּד – קָסָבַר: כְּשֵׁם שֶׁמִּצְוָה לִפְדּוֹת אֶת בְּנֵי חוֹרִין, כָּךְ מִצְוָה לִפְדּוֹת אֶת הָעֲבָדִים.

Abaye continues his explication of the mishna: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Both in this case and in that case he will be a slave to his first master. The Gemara explains: He holds that just as it is a mitzva to redeem freemen, so too, it is a mitzva to redeem slaves, and there is no concern that people will refrain from redeeming captured slaves.

רָבָא אָמַר: לְעוֹלָם לְאַחַר יֵאוּשׁ, וּלְשׁוּם עֶבֶד – יִשְׁתַּעְבֵּד לְרַבּוֹ שֵׁנִי, לְשׁוּם בֶּן חוֹרִין – לֹא יִשְׁתַּעְבֵּד לֹא לְרַבּוֹ רִאשׁוֹן וְלֹא לְרַבּוֹ שֵׁנִי; לְרַבּוֹ שֵׁנִי לָא, דְּהָא לְשׁוּם בֶּן חוֹרִין פַּרְקֵיהּ, לְרַבּוֹ רִאשׁוֹן נָמֵי לָא, דְּהָא לְאַחַר יֵאוּשׁ הֲוָה.

Rava said: The mishna should be understood differently. Actually, the mishna is referring to a case where the slave was redeemed after the despairing of the owner. And therefore, according to the unattributed opinion in the mishna, if he was redeemed to be a slave then he will be a slave to his second master, as his original owner had despaired of recovering him. If he was redeemed to be a freeman then he will not be a slave, neither to his first master nor to his second master. He will not be a slave to his second master as he redeemed him as a freeman. He will also not be a slave to his first master, as he was freed after the despairing of the first master.

רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: בֵּין כָּךְ וּבֵין כָּךְ יִשְׁתַּעְבֵּד – כִּדְחִזְקִיָּה, דְּאָמַר חִזְקִיָּה: מִפְּנֵי מָה אָמְרוּ בֵּין כָּךְ וּבֵין כָּךְ יִשְׁתַּעְבֵּד? שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵא כׇּל אֶחָד וְאֶחָד הוֹלֵךְ וּמַפִּיל עַצְמוֹ לִגְיָיסוֹת, וּמַפְקִיעַ עַצְמוֹ מִיָּד רַבּוֹ.

Rava continues his explication of the mishna: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Both in this case and in that case he will be a slave. This should be understood in accordance with the statement of Ḥizkiyya, as Ḥizkiyya said: For what reason did they say that both in this case and in that case he will be a slave? They said it so that each and every slave should not go and hand himself over to gentile troops, and in this manner release himself from the possession of his master.

מֵיתִיבִי, אָמַר לָהֶן רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל: כְּשֵׁם שֶׁמִּצְוָה לִפְדּוֹת אֶת בְּנֵי חוֹרִין, כָּךְ מִצְוָה לִפְדּוֹת אֶת הָעֲבָדִים. בִּשְׁלָמָא לְאַבָּיֵי – דְּאָמַר לִפְנֵי יֵאוּשׁ, הַיְינוּ דְּקָאָמַר ״כְּשֵׁם״;

The Gemara raises an objection to Rava’s explanation from a baraita: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said to them: Just as it is a mitzva to redeem freemen, so too, it is a mitzva to redeem slaves. Granted, according to Abaye this works out well as he said that the mishna is referring to a slave that was redeemed before the despairing of his owner, and the unattributed opinion of the mishna rules that he will not be a slave to his original owner due to a concern that people will refrain from redeeming slaves. This is the reason that he said: Just as, since he was explaining that this concern does not exist.

אֶלָּא לְרָבָא – דְּאָמַר לְאַחַר יֵאוּשׁ, הַאי ״כְּשֵׁם״?! מִשּׁוּם דְּחִזְקִיָּה הוּא!

However, according to Rava, who said that the mishna is referring to a slave that was redeemed after the owner’s despairing, and the unattributed opinion of the mishna is not concerned that people will refrain from redeeming slaves, is this the rationale of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, that just as it is a mitzva to redeem freemen, so too, it is a mitzva to redeem slaves? His reason is because of the statement of Ḥizkiyya.

אָמַר לָךְ רָבָא: רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל לָא הָוֵי יָדַע מַאי קָאָמְרִי רַבָּנַן, וְהָכִי קָאָמַר לְהוּ: אִי לִפְנֵי יֵאוּשׁ קָאָמְרִיתוּ – הַיְינוּ ״כְּשֵׁם״; אִי לְאַחַר יֵאוּשׁ קָאָמְרִיתוּ – כִּדְחִזְקִיָּה.

The Gemara answers: Rava could have said to you: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel did not know what exactly the Rabbis said, and this is what he said to them: If you say this ruling with regard to a slave who was redeemed before his owner’s despairing, this is my response, that just as it is a mitzva to redeem freemen, so too, it is a mitzva to redeem slaves. If you say that this case was after his owner’s despairing, then the reason that I disagree is in accordance with the statement of Ḥizkiyya.

וּלְרָבָא – דְּאָמַר לְאַחַר יֵאוּשׁ, וּלְרַבּוֹ שֵׁנִי; רַבּוֹ שֵׁנִי מִמַּאן קָנֵי לֵיהּ – מִשַּׁבַּאי, שַׁבַּאי גּוּפֵיהּ מִי קָנֵי לֵיהּ?!

The Gemara asks: And according to Rava, who said that the mishna is referring to where the slave was redeemed after the despairing of the owner, and he will be a slave to his second master, one can ask: With regard to the second master, from whom did he acquire the slave? If you say that he acquired him from the captor, did the gentile captor himself acquire the slave? The ownership of the second master is contingent on his acquiring the slave from someone who himself had ownership over the slave.

אִין; קָנֵי לֵיהּ לְמַעֲשֶׂה יָדָיו – דְּאָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: מִנַּיִן לְגוֹי, שֶׁקָּנָה אֶת הַגּוֹי לְמַעֲשֵׂה יָדָיו? שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְגַם מִבְּנֵי הַתּוֹשָׁבִים הַגָּרִים עִמָּכֶם מֵהֶם תִּקְנוּ״ – אַתֶּם קוֹנִים מֵהֶם,

The Gemara answers: Yes, he acquired ownership with regard to his labor, as Reish Lakish says: From where is it derived that a gentile can acquire another gentile as a slave with regard to his labor? As it is stated: “Moreover, of the children of the strangers who sojourn among you, of them you may acquire” (Leviticus 25:45). This indicates that you, Jews, can acquire slaves from them,