גיטין מד

גיטין מד

וְאִי בָּעֵית אֵימָא: בְּשֶׁלָּוָה עַל מְנָת לְמַשְׁכְּנוֹ, וְלֹא מִשְׁכְּנוֹ.

And if you wish, say instead: Even if the time for the slave or the field to be taken as collateral had arrived, there is something novel about this in a case where he borrowed on the condition that the creditors collect from it, i.e., the slave or field, but they did not yet collect from it. Since the field had not yet been collected from the gentile by the Jew as payment of the debt, it remains exempt from tithes, but the mere fact that the Jew agreed to have his slave be collected suffices for the rabbinic penalty to take effect, and the slave is emancipated.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: גְּבָאוֹ בְּחוֹבוֹ אוֹ שֶׁלְּקָחוֹ סִיקָרִיקוֹן, לֹא יָצָא לְחֵירוּת. וּבְחוֹבוֹ לֹא?!

§ The Sages taught (Tosefta, Avoda Zara 3:16): If a gentile collected a slave for payment of his debt, or the slave was taken by a Sicarius, i.e., one who would use violence and intimidation to force people to give them their property, then he is not emancipated. The Gemara asks: And is it so that if a gentile collected a slave for payment of his debt, the Sages did not institute a penalty and the slave is not emancipated?

וּרְמִינְהִי: הֲרֵי שֶׁאָנְסוּ בֵּית הַמֶּלֶךְ גּוֹרְנוֹ, אִם בְּחוֹבוֹ – חַיָּיב לְעַשֵּׂר, אִם בָּאַנְפָּרוֹת – פָּטוּר מִלְּעַשֵּׂר!

And the Gemara raises a contradiction based on what was taught in a baraita: With regard to a case where the household of the king seized one’s threshing floor by force, if they took it for payment of his debt to the king, then he is obligated to tithe in order to render fit for consumption the grain that they seized. The reason for this is because if he were not to tithe it, it would be considered as if he paid a debt using tithe. If they engaged in unjust seizure [anparot] then he is exempt from tithing. This baraita indicates that an item taken for payment of a debt is akin to a sale, so why should the slave taken in payment of the debt not be emancipated?

שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּקָא מִשְׁתָּרְשִׁי לֵיהּ.

The Gemara answers: It is different there, because he profits by repaying a portion of his debt with tithe. If they would have taken regular produce, it would have been more of a financial loss for him. Therefore, he must separate tithe for the seized grain. In the case of the slave, he did not profit from the seizure. Therefore, the Sages did not penalize him.

תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּאָמַר רַב: הַמּוֹכֵר עַבְדּוֹ לְפַרְהַנְגְּ גּוֹי – יָצָא לְחֵירוּת! הָתָם, הֲוָה לֵיהּ לְפַיֵּיס וְלֹא פִּיֵּיס.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof, as Rav says: One who sells his slave to a gentile government official [parhang], then the slave is emancipated even though the owner agreed to the sale only because he was pressured by the official. There too, he neither desired nor profited from the sale. The Gemara answers: There, the owner should have appeased the official in some other way so that he would not take the slave, and he did not appease him, therefore it is appropriate to penalize him.

גּוּפָא – אָמַר רַב: הַמּוֹכֵר עַבְדּוֹ לְפַרְהַנְגְּ גּוֹי – יָצָא לְחֵירוּת. מַאי הֲוָה לֵיהּ לְמֶעְבַּד? הֲוָה לֵיהּ לְפַיֵּיס, וְלֹא פִּיֵּיס.

The Gemara discusses the matter itself. Rav says: One who sells his slave to a gentile government official, then the slave is emancipated. The Gemara asks: What could he have done; the gentile government official forced him to agree to the sale. The Gemara answers: He should have appeased the official in some other way, and he did not appease him.

בָּעֵי רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה: מְכָרוֹ לִשְׁלשִׁים יוֹם, מַהוּ? תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּאָמַר רַב: הַמּוֹכֵר עַבְדּוֹ לְפַרְהַנְגְּ גּוֹי – יָצָא לְחֵירוּת! הָתָם בְּפַרְהַנְגְּ גּוֹי שֶׁאֵינָהּ חוֹזֶרֶת.

Rabbi Yirmeya raises a dilemma: If he sold the slave to a gentile for thirty days, then what is the halakha; is this considered to be a sale and he is emancipated as a result, or is it not a sale? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof, as Rav says: With regard to one who sells his slave to a gentile government official, the slave is emancipated. The assumption is that he would be sold to the official in order to work for a limited amount of time or perform a specific task, yet he is emancipated. The Gemara answers: There, he was sold to a gentile government official, as this sale is not reversed. No proof can be brought from here with regard to the halakha of a sale that is in effect for a limited duration.

מְכָרוֹ חוּץ מִמְּלַאכְתּוֹ, מַהוּ? חוּץ מִן הַמִּצְוֹת, מַהוּ? חוּץ מִשַּׁבָּתוֹת וְיָמִים טוֹבִים, מַהוּ? לְגֵר תּוֹשָׁב, לְיִשְׂרָאֵל מְשׁוּמָּד, מַהוּ? לְכוּתִי, מַהוּ? פְּשׁוֹט מִיהָא חֲדָא: גֵּר תּוֹשָׁב הֲרֵי הוּא כְּגוֹי. כּוּתִי וְיִשְׂרָאֵל מְשׁוּמָּד – אָמְרִי לַהּ כְּגוֹי, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ כְּיִשְׂרָאֵל.

Rabbi Yirmeya asks several questions with regard to the extent of the application of this penalty: If he sold the slave to a gentile aside from his labor, i.e., the gentile will own the slave but he will still perform labor for the Jewish master, what is the halakha? If he sold him to a gentile aside from the mitzvot, i.e., he stipulated that the slave would be able to continue observing the mitzvot, what is the halakha? If he sold him aside from Shabbatot and Festivals, what is the halakha? If he sold him to a gentile who resides in Eretz Yisrael and observes the seven Noahide mitzvot [ger toshav], or to a Jewish apostate, what is the halakha? If he sold him to a Samaritan, what is the halakha? The Gemara suggests: You can resolve at least one of these questions, as it was taught: A ger toshav is like a gentile. With regard to a Samaritan and a Jewish apostate, some say they are like gentiles and some say they are like Jews.

בְּעוֹ מִינֵּיהּ מֵרַבִּי אַמֵּי: עֶבֶד שֶׁהִפִּיל עַצְמוֹ לִגְיָיסוֹת, וְאֵין רַבּוֹ יָכוֹל לְהוֹצִיאוֹ – לֹא בְּדִינֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְלֹא בְּדִינֵי אוּמּוֹת הָעוֹלָם, מַהוּ שֶׁיִּטּוֹל אֶת דָּמָיו?

They raised a dilemma before Rabbi Ami: If a slave fled from his master and gave himself over to a foreign army to serve as a solider, and his master cannot remove him, neither through Jewish law nor through the laws of the nations of the world, what is the halakha? Is it permitted for the master to at least take his value from the army, or would this be considered as if he is selling the slave?

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה לְרַבִּי זְרִיקָא: פּוֹק עַיֵּין בִּמְכִילָתָיךְ. נְפַק דָּק וְאַשְׁכַּח, דְּתַנְיָא: הַמּוֹכֵר בֵּיתוֹ לְגוֹי – דָּמָיו אֲסוּרִין. וְגוֹי שֶׁאָנַס בֵּיתוֹ שֶׁל יִשְׂרָאֵל, וְאֵין בְּעָלָיו יָכוֹל לְהוֹצִיאוֹ – לֹא בְּדִינֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְלֹא בְּדִינֵי אוּמּוֹת הָעוֹלָם, מוּתָּר לִיטּוֹל אֶת דָּמָיו, וְכוֹתֵב וּמַעֲלֶה בְּעַרְכָּאוֹת שֶׁלָּהֶן – מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא כְּמַצִּיל מִיָּדָם.

Rabbi Yirmeya said to Rabbi Zerika: Go out and examine your mishnayot to find an answer. He went out, examined, and discovered an answer, as it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Avoda Zara 6:2): One who sells his house in Eretz Yisrael to a gentile, the monies received from the sale of the house are forbidden to him. And if there was a gentile who seized a Jew’s house by force and its owner cannot remove it, i.e., get it back, neither through Jewish law nor through the laws of the nations of the world, then he is permitted to take the house’s value from the gentile, and he may even write a document and register the sale in their courts, because he is like one who rescues the money from their possession. Although it is prohibited for a Jew to sell his house in Eretz Yisrael to a gentile, if it was taken from him by force he is permitted to take payment for it. Similarly, if the slave cannot be retrieved from a gentile, it should be permitted for him to take money in return.

וְדִילְמָא הָנֵי מִילֵּי בַּיִת – דְּכֵיוָן דְּלָא סַגִּי לֵיהּ בְּלֹא בַּיִת, לָא אָתֵי לְזַבּוֹנֵיהּ; אֲבָל עַבְדָּא – דְּסַגִּי לֵיהּ בְּלָא עַבְדָּא, אָתֵי לְזַבּוֹנֵיהּ – אוֹ לָא.

The Gemara rejects this comparison: But perhaps this matter applies only to a house, that since it is not sufficient, i.e., not possible, for him to live without a house, he would not sell it willingly. Therefore, there is no reason to penalize him when it is taken by force. But with regard to a slave, as it is sufficient for him to live without a slave, there is a concern that he will also come to sell him willingly, and therefore there should be a penalty in this case as well. Or it is possible that this distinction is not made.

שְׁלַח לְהוּ רַבִּי אַמֵּי: ״מִינַּי אַמֵּי בַּר נָתָן, תּוֹרָה יוֹצְאָה לְכׇל יִשְׂרָאֵל: עֶבֶד שֶׁהִפִּיל עַצְמוֹ לִגְיָיסוֹת, וְאֵין רַבּוֹ יָכוֹל לְהוֹצִיאוֹ – לֹא בְּדִינֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְלֹא בְּדִינֵי אוּמּוֹת הָעוֹלָם, מוּתָּר לִיטּוֹל אֶת דָּמָיו, וְכוֹתֵב וּמַעֲלֶה בְּעַרְכָּאוֹת שֶׁל גּוֹיִם – מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא כְּמַצִּיל מִיָּדָם.

Rabbi Ami sent the following message to the other Sages: From me, Ami bar Natan, Torah emerges to all of Israel: If a slave fled his master and gave himself to a foreign army to serve as a solider, and his master cannot remove him, neither through Jewish law nor through the laws of the nations of the world, then he is permitted to take the slave’s value, and he writes a deed of sale and registers this transaction in gentile courts, because he is like one who rescues the money from their possession.

אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי: הַמּוֹכֵר עַבְדּוֹ לְגוֹי – קוֹנְסִים אוֹתוֹ עַד מֵאָה בְּדָמָיו.

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: With regard to one who sells his slave to a gentile, even though he can no longer enslave him, he is penalized and is forced to redeem the slave from the gentile for up to one hundred times the slave’s value.

דַּוְקָא, אוֹ לָאו דַּוְקָא? תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּאָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: הַמּוֹכֵר בְּהֵמָה גַּסָּה לְגוֹי – קוֹנְסִים אוֹתוֹ עַד עֲשָׂרָה בְּדָמֶיהָ!

The Gemara asks: Is this amount stated specifically or not specifically? Perhaps this number is an exaggeration? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear an answer from that which Reish Lakish says: One who sells a large domesticated animal to a gentile, he is penalized and is forced to purchase the animal back from the gentile for up to ten times its value. It can be seen here that one who violates an ordinance of the Sages by engaging in a prohibited sale must pay up to only ten times the item’s value to purchase it back, and the same would presumably apply to the case of the slave.

וְדִלְמָא שָׁאנֵי עֶבֶד, דְּכֹל יוֹמָא וְיוֹמָא מַפְקַע לֵיהּ מִמִּצְוֹת.

The Gemara rejects this: But perhaps a slave is different, as each and every day the owner releases him from the fulfillment of mitzvot by selling him to a gentile, so there may be a greater penalty as a result.

וְאִיכָּא דְאָמְרִי, אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי: הַמּוֹכֵר עַבְדּוֹ לְגוֹי – קוֹנְסִין אוֹתוֹ עַד עֲשָׂרָה בְּדָמָיו. דַּוְקָא אוֹ לָאו דַּוְקָא? תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּאָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: הַמּוֹכֵר בְּהֵמָה גַּסָּה לְגוֹי – קוֹנְסִין אוֹתוֹ עַד מֵאָה בְּדָמֶיהָ!

And there are those who say a different version of this discussion: Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says that with regard to one who sells his slave to a gentile, even though he can no longer enslave him, he is penalized and is forced to redeem the slave from the gentile for up to ten times the slave’s value. The Gemara asks: Is this amount stated specifically or not specifically; is his penalty limited to up to ten times the value of the slave? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear an answer from that which Reish Lakish says: With regard to one who sells a large domesticated animal to a gentile, he is penalized and is forced to purchase the animal back from the gentile for up to one hundred times its value, and the penalty in the case of the slave should be at least as large as in the case of the animal.

שָׁאנֵי עֶבֶד, דְּלָא הָדַר לֵיהּ.

The Gemara rejects this: A slave is different, as he does not return to him. Since the slave will be emancipated once the master redeems him, it may be that the Sages would not penalize him to such a great extent.

אֶלָּא בְּהֵמָה טַעְמָא מַאי – מִשּׁוּם דְּהָדְרָא לֵיהּ?! לִקְנְסֵיהּ טְפֵי חַד! אֶלָּא עֶבֶד מִילְּתָא דְלָא שְׁכִיחָא, וּמִלְּתָא דְלָא שְׁכִיחָא לָא גָּזְרִי בַּהּ רַבָּנַן.

The Gemara challenges: Rather, what is the reason that he is penalized in the case of an animal more so than in the case of a slave; because of the fact that it returns to him? If so, he should be penalized only one additional amount. If the difference is that an animal returns to its owners and a slave does not, then the difference in penalties should be reflective of this, and he should have to purchase the animal for no more than eleven times its value. Rather, the Gemara offers a different distinction: The sale of a slave is an uncommon matter, and the Sages did not decree with regard to an uncommon matter. Therefore, one cannot compare the penalty in the case of selling a slave to the penalty in the case of selling an animal.

בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה מֵרַבִּי אַסִּי: מָכַר עַבְדּוֹ וָמֵת, מַהוּ שֶׁיִּקְנְסוּ אֶת בְּנוֹ אַחֲרָיו? אִם תִּימְצֵי לוֹמַר: ״צָרַם אוֹזֶן בְּכוֹר, וָמֵת – קָנְסוּ בְּנוֹ אַחֲרָיו״ – מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיסּוּרָא דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא הִיא, אֲבָל הָכָא אִיסּוּרָא דְרַבָּנַן.

Rabbi Yirmeya raised a dilemma before Rabbi Asi: If one sold his slave to a gentile and died, what is the halakha: Is his son penalized after him? Is the son also required to redeem the slave, or does the penalty apply only to the seller? The Gemara compares this to other penalties assessed by the Sages. If you say, in accordance with the opinion that holds that if one slit the ear of a firstborn animal and by doing so intentionally blemishes it so that it may be eaten, and then that person died, then his son is penalized after him and his son may not slaughter and eat it, perhaps this is because it is a prohibition by Torah law. Here, however, with regard to the sale of a slave, it is a prohibition only by rabbinic law and perhaps the son is not penalized.

וְאִם תִּימְצֵי לוֹמַר: ״כִּוֵּון מְלַאכְתּוֹ בַּמּוֹעֵד, וָמֵת – לֹא קָנְסוּ בְּנוֹ אַחֲרָיו״ – מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא עֲבַד אִיסּוּרָא, הָכָא מַאי? לְדִידֵיהּ קְנַסוּ רַבָּנַן – וְהָא לֵיתֵיהּ; אוֹ דִילְמָא לְמָמוֹנֵיהּ קְנַסוּ רַבָּנַן – וְהָא אִיתֵיהּ?

And if you say that there is a different comparison: The halakha is that while there are types of labor that one is permitted to perform on the intermediate days of Passover and Sukkot, one may not intentionally schedule the labor to be performed at those times. One who does so is penalized and must forfeit the profits of that labor. The halakha is that if one planned to perform his labor on the intermediate days of the Festival, and he died, then his child is not penalized after him, because the son did not perform a prohibited act. Here, what is the halakha? Did the Sages penalize only him, and he is no longer alive, or perhaps the Sages penalized his property, by saying that he should lose it, and his property still exists?

אֲמַר לֵיהּ, תְּנֵיתוּהָ: שָׂדֶה שֶׁנִּתְקַוְּוצָה בַּשְּׁבִיעִית, תִּזָּרַע לְמוֹצָאֵי שְׁבִיעִית. נִטַּיְּיבָה אוֹ נִדַּיְּירָה – לֹא תִּזָּרַע לְמוֹצָאֵי שְׁבִיעִית.

Rabbi Asi said to him: You already learned in a mishna (Shevi’it 4:2): A field whose thorns were removed during the Sabbatical Year may be sown after the conclusion of the Sabbatical Year, since removing thorns is not full-fledged labor that renders the produce of the field prohibited. And it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Shevi’it 3:6): If it had been improved with fertilizer, or if it had been populated by the owner’s herd in order to fertilize the field with their manure, it may not be sown after the conclusion of the Sabbatical Year, for the Sages imposed a penalty to prevent one from benefiting from prohibited labor.

וְאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא, נָקְטִינַן: הֱטִיבָהּ וָמֵת – בְּנוֹ זוֹרְעָהּ. אַלְמָא לְדִידֵיהּ קְנַסוּ רַבָּנַן, לִבְרֵיהּ לָא קְנַסוּ רַבָּנַן.

And Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says: We have a tradition that if one improved his field in a forbidden manner, and then died, his son may sow it. Apparently, we should infer that the general principle with regard to penalties is that the Sages applied the penalty to the one who committed the transgression himself, but the Sages did not penalize his son.

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי, נָקְטִינַן: טִימֵּא טְהָרוֹת שֶׁל חֲבֵירוֹ, וָמֵת – לָא קְנַסוּ רַבָּנַן בְּנוֹ אַחֲרָיו. מַאי טַעְמָא? הֶיזֵּק שֶׁאֵינוֹ נִיכָּר לָא שְׁמֵיהּ הֶיזֵּק, וּקְנָסָא דְּרַבָּנַן הִיא – לְדִידֵיהּ קַנְסוּהוּ רַבָּנַן, לִבְרֵיהּ לָא קָא קְנַסוּ רַבָּנַן.

Abaye said: We have a tradition that if someone defiled his friend’s ritually pure items, thereby incurring liability to pay for the damage that he caused, and died before paying, the Sages did not penalize his son after him to pay for the damage. What is the reason for this? Damage that is not evident, i.e., that does not involve any physical change to the goods that is visible to the eye, is not considered damage by Torah law; but since the other party did suffer a loss, there is a penalty of the Sages. The Sages applied the penalty only to the one who caused the damage himself, but the Sages did not apply the penalty to his son.

אוֹ לְחוּצָה לָאָרֶץ: תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הַמּוֹכֵר עַבְדּוֹ לְחוּצָה לָאָרֶץ – יָצָא לְחֵירוּת, וְצָרִיךְ גֵּט שִׁחְרוּר מֵרַבּוֹ שֵׁנִי. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: פְּעָמִים יָצָא, וּפְעָמִים לֹא יָצָא. כֵּיצַד? אָמַר: ״פְּלוֹנִי עַבְדִּי מְכַרְתִּיהוּ לִפְלוֹנִי אַנְטוֹכִי״ – לֹא יָצָא. ״לְאַנְטוֹכִי שֶׁבְּאַנְטוֹכְיָא״ – יָצָא.

§ The mishna taught that if one sells his slave to a gentile or to a Jew outside of Eretz Yisrael then the slave is emancipated. The Sages taught (Tosefta, Avoda Zara 3:18): With regard to one who sells his slave to a Jew outside of Eretz Yisrael, the slave is emancipated, but he nevertheless requires a bill of manumission from his second master. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Sometimes he is emancipated and sometimes he is not emancipated. How so? If the master said: So-and-so my slave, I sold him to so-and-so of Antioch, then he is not emancipated, because it is possible that he describes the purchaser this way because he was born in Antioch, and now he lives in Eretz Yisrael. However, if he said: I sold him to so-and-so of Antioch who is in Antioch, then he is emancipated, as his statement clarifies that he is selling his slave to one who lives outside of Eretz Yisrael.

וְהָא תַּנְיָא: ״מְכַרְתִּיהוּ לְאַנְטוֹכִי״ – יָצָא, ״לְאַנְטוֹכִי הַשָּׁרוּי בְּלוֹד״ – לֹא יָצָא!

The Gemara challenges: But isn’t it taught in that same baraita: If he said: I sold him to so-and-so of Antioch, then the slave is emancipated, but if he said: I sold him to so-and-so of Antioch who dwells in Lod, a city in Eretz Yisrael, then the slave is not emancipated. This indicates that if he states that he sold the slave to so-and-so of Antioch, without further comment, the slave is emancipated; this is not in accordance with the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

לָא קַשְׁיָא, הָא דְּאִית לֵיהּ בֵּיתָא בְּאֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל, הָא דְּאִית לֵיהּ אוּשְׁפִּיזָא בְּאֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל.

The Gemara answers: It is not difficult. This case, when he is not emancipated, is referring to when the purchaser from Antioch has a house in Eretz Yisrael, and it may be that he purchased the slave to serve in his house in Eretz Yisrael. That case, in which the slave is emancipated, is referring to when he has only an inn [ushpiza] where he is staying in Eretz Yisrael, and the only home belonging to the purchaser is outside of Eretz Yisrael.

בָּעֵי רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה: בֶּן בָּבֶל שֶׁנָּשָׂא אִשָּׁה בְּאֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל, וְהִכְנִיסָה לוֹ עֲבָדִים וּשְׁפָחוֹת, וְדַעְתּוֹ לַחֲזוֹר, מַהוּ?

Rabbi Yirmeya raises a dilemma: If there was a resident of Babylonia who married a woman in Eretz Yisrael, and she brought in to the marriage slaves and maidservants for him, and he intends to return to Babylonia, then what is the halakha? Is marrying him akin to selling the slaves to her husband? Since he plans to take them out of Eretz Yisrael, will they be emancipated?

תִּיבְּעֵי לְמַאן דְּאָמַר הַדִּין עִמָּהּ, תִּיבְּעֵי לְמַאן דְּאָמַר הַדִּין עִמּוֹ.

Let the dilemma be raised according to the one who said: The law is with her, that in the event of a divorce the slaves remain in her possession, and her husband cannot pay her for them in order to maintain possession of them; and let the dilemma be raised according to the one who said: The law is with him, and he may pay her and retain possession of the slaves.

תִּיבְּעֵי לְמַאן דְּאָמַר הַדִּין עִמָּהּ – כֵּיוָן דְּהַדִּין עִמָּהּ, כְּדִידֵהּ דָּמוּ; אוֹ דִילְמָא, כֵּיוָן דִּמְשַׁעְבְּדִי לֵיהּ לְפֵירָא, כְּדִידֵיהּ דָּמוּ?

The Gemara explains: Let the dilemma be raised according to the one who says that the law is with her, and since the law is with her, the slaves are therefore considered as hers. It is not considered as if she sold them, and consequently they are not emancipated; or perhaps since they are liened to the husband for him to keep the profits of the slaves’ labor, as the profits from their labor belong to the husband like the revenue from other property that a woman brings into the marriage, the slaves are considered as his, and it is as though he purchased her slaves.

וְתִיבְּעֵי לְמַאן דְּאָמַר הַדִּין עִמּוֹ – כֵּיוָן דְּהַדִּין עִמּוֹ, כְּדִידֵיהּ דָּמוּ; אוֹ דִלְמָא, כֵּיוָן דְּלָא קָנֵי לֵיהּ לְגוּפֵיהּ – כְּדִידֵהּ דָּמוּ? תֵּיקוּ.

And let the dilemma be raised according to the one who says: The law is with him, and since the law is with him, the slaves are therefore considered as his, and they should be emancipated; or perhaps since the husband did not acquire the slave himself, but only the rights to his labor, the slaves are considered as hers. No answer was found, and the Gemara concludes that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.

אָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ, שָׁנָה לִי רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: עֶבֶד שֶׁיָּצָא אַחַר רַבּוֹ לְסוּרְיָא, וּמְכָרוֹ שָׁם רַבּוֹ – יָצָא לְחֵירוּת. וְהָתָנֵי רַבִּי חִיָּיא: אִיבֵּד אֶת זְכוּתוֹ!

Rabbi Abbahu says: Rabbi Yoḥanan taught me: If there was a slave who willingly followed his master to Syria, which is considered to be outside of Eretz Yisrael with regard to the sale of slaves, and his master sold him there, then the slave is emancipated. The Gemara challenges: But didn’t Rabbi Ḥiyya teach: If a slave left Eretz Yisrael willingly, he lost his right to be emancipated if he is then sold outside of Eretz Yisrael?

לָא קַשְׁיָא, כָּאן שֶׁדַּעַת רַבּוֹ לַחְזוֹר, כָּאן שֶׁאֵין דַּעַת רַבּוֹ לַחְזוֹר.

The Gemara answers: It is not difficult. Here, where he is emancipated, it is referring to a case where his master’s intention upon traveling to Syria was to return, and the slave followed him under that assumption. Therefore, when the master sold the slave in Syria, it is as though he sold him from Eretz Yisrael to outside of Eretz Yisrael. There, where he is not emancipated, is referring to a case where his master does not intend to return, and the slave followed him under that assumption. Since the slave willingly left Eretz Yisrael permanently, he lost his right to be emancipated if he is then sold outside of Eretz Yisrael.

וְהָתַנְיָא: יוֹצֵא הָעֶבֶד אַחַר רַבּוֹ לְסוּרְיָא – ״יוֹצֵא״?! לָא סַגִּי דְּלָא נָפֵיק?! וְהָתְנַן: וְאֵין הַכֹּל מוֹצִיאִין!

And the Gemara notes that this distinction is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Avoda Zara 3:18): The slave follows his master to Syria. The Gemara asks: Must he follow him? Is it not possible for him not to follow his master? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Ketubot 110b): All may ascend to Eretz Yisrael, i.e., a woman or slave can say that he or she wishes to ascend, and they may do so against the wishes of their husbands or masters; but all may not remove, i.e., one cannot force his slave to leave Eretz Yisrael with him.

אֶלָּא יָצָא הָעֶבֶד אַחַר רַבּוֹ לְסוּרְיָא, וּמְכָרוֹ רַבּוֹ שָׁם; אִם דַּעַת רַבּוֹ לַחְזוֹר – כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ, וְאִם אֵין דַּעַת רַבּוֹ לַחְזוֹר – אֵין כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ.

Rather, the baraita should be understood as speaking after the fact: If a slave willingly followed his master to Syria, and his master sold him there, then if his master’s intention when he traveled to Syria was to return to Eretz Yisrael, then he is forced to emancipate the slave; but if his master did not intend to return to Eretz Yisrael, and the slave willingly left with him, then he is not forced to emancipate the slave, as the slave has lost his right to be emancipated if he is then sold outside of Eretz Yisrael.

אָמַר רַב עָנָן, שְׁמַעִית מִינֵּיהּ דְּמָר שְׁמוּאֵל תַּרְתֵּי: חֲדָא – הָךְ; וְאִידָּךְ – דְּאִיתְּמַר: הַמּוֹכֵר שָׂדֵהוּ בִּשְׁנַת הַיּוֹבֵל עַצְמָהּ; רַב אָמַר: מְכוּרָה, וְיוֹצְאָה. וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: אֵינָהּ מְכוּרָה כׇּל עִיקָּר.

Rav Anan said: I learned two halakhot from Mar Shmuel. One was this halakha, that a slave is emancipated after being sold to someone outside of Eretz Yisrael; and the other halakha I learned is as it was stated that there was a dispute with regard to the following issue: Certain types of fields that were sold before the Jubilee Year are returned to their original owners in the Jubilee Year. What is the halakha with regard to one who sells his field in the Jubilee Year itself? Rav says: It is sold in principle. However, it leaves the possession of the purchaser immediately, and the purchaser is not refunded his money. And Shmuel says: It is not sold at all.

בַּחֲדָא – הָדְרִי זְבִינֵי, וּבַחֲדָא – לָא הָדְרִי זְבִינֵי; וְלָא יָדַעְנָא הֵי מִינַּיְיהוּ.

Rav Anan continues his statement with regard to the two halakhot he was taught by Mar Shmuel: In one of the two sales the money received from the sale is returned, and in one of the two sales the money received from the sale is not returned, and the purchaser loses his money, but I do not know in which of the cases the money is returned and in which of the cases it is not returned.

אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: נִיחְזֵי אֲנַן, מִדְּתָנֵי בְּבָרַיְיתָא: הַמּוֹכֵר עַבְדּוֹ לְחוּצָה לָאָרֶץ – יָצָא לְחֵירוּת, וְצָרִיךְ גֵּט שִׁחְרוּר מֵרַבּוֹ שֵׁנִי. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ קַנְיֵיהּ רַבּוֹ שֵׁנִי, וְלָא הָדְרִי זְבִינֵי; וְכִי אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל הָתָם אֵינָהּ מְכוּרָה – וּמָעוֹת חוֹזְרִין.

Rav Yosef said: Let us see if it could be determined which case involves which halakha. From what is taught in the baraita: One who sells his slave to a Jew outside of Eretz Yisrael, then he is emancipated, but he nevertheless requires a bill of manumission from his second master. Learn from the baraita that his second master acquired him, and the money of the sale is not returned. In other words, from the fact that there is the need for the second master to emancipate him, it is clear that the sale took effect. Therefore, it stands to reason that the purchaser is not refunded the money of the sale. And if so, when Shmuel said there that the field is not sold, he meant that the sale does not take effect at all and the money returns to the purchaser.