כתובות מח

כתובות מח

רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב אוֹמֵר: ״שְׁאֵרָהּ כְּסוּתָהּ״ — לְפוּם שְׁאֵרָהּ תֵּן כְּסוּתָהּ, שֶׁלֹּא יִתֵּן לָהּ לֹא שֶׁל יַלְדָּה לִזְקֵינָהּ, וְלֹא שֶׁל זְקֵינָה לְיַלְדָּה. ״כְּסוּתָהּ וְעוֹנָתָהּ״ — לְפוּם עוֹנָתָהּ תֵּן כְּסוּתָהּ, שֶׁלֹּא יִתֵּן חֲדָשִׁים בִּימוֹת הַחַמָּה, וְלֹא שְׁחָקִים בִּימוֹת הַגְּשָׁמִים.

Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says that she’era and kesuta should be interpreted as follows: In accordance with her flesh [she’era], i.e., her age, give her clothing [kesuta]. This means that he should not give the garments of a young girl to an elderly woman, nor those of an elderly woman to a young girl. Similarly, kesuta and onata are linked: In accordance with the time of year [onata], give her clothing [kesuta], meaning that he should not give new, heavy clothes in the summer, nor worn-out garments in the rainy season, i.e., the winter, when she requires heavier, warmer clothes. The entire phrase, therefore, refers only to a husband’s obligation to provide clothing for his wife.

תָּנֵי רַב יוֹסֵף: ״שְׁאֵרָהּ״ — זוֹ קֵרוּב בָּשָׂר, שֶׁלֹּא יִנְהַג בָּהּ מִנְהַג פָּרְסִיִּים שֶׁמְּשַׁמְּשִׁין מִטּוֹתֵיהֶן בִּלְבוּשֵׁיהֶן. מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ לְרַב הוּנָא, דְּאָמַר רַב הוּנָא: הָאוֹמֵר ״אִי אֶפְשִׁי אֶלָּא אֲנִי בְּבִגְדִּי וְהִיא בְּבִגְדָּהּ״ — יוֹצִיא וְנוֹתֵן כְּתוּבָּה.

Rav Yosef taught the following baraita: “She’era,” this is referring to closeness of flesh during intercourse, which teaches that he should not treat her in the manner of Persians, who have conjugal relations in their clothes. The Gemara comments: This baraita supports the opinion of Rav Huna, as Rav Huna said: With regard to one who says: I do not want to have intercourse with my wife unless I am in my clothes and she is in her clothes, he must divorce his wife and give her the payment for her marriage contract. This is in keeping with the opinion of the tanna of the baraita that the Torah mandates the intimacy of flesh during sexual relations.

רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אֲפִילּוּ עָנִי שֶׁבְּיִשְׂרָאֵל וְכוּ׳. מִכְּלָל דְּתַנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר הָנֵי לָא. הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִי דְּאוֹרְחַהּ — מַאי טַעְמָא דְּתַנָּא קַמָּא דְּאָמַר לָא? וְאִי דְּלָאו אוֹרְחַהּ — מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה?

§ The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yehuda says: Even the poorest man of the Jewish people may not provide fewer than two flutes and a lamenting woman for his wife’s funeral. The Gemara infers: This proves by inference that the first, anonymous tanna cited in the mishna holds that these are not part of a husband’s obligations. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If this is the common custom in her family at funerals, what is the reason for the opinion of the first tanna who said that he does not have to do so? If he neglected to provide these items he would be treating her with disrespect. And if this is not the common custom in her family, what is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda?

לָא צְרִיכָא: כְּגוֹן דְּאוֹרְחֵיהּ דִּידֵיהּ וְלָאו אוֹרְחַהּ דִּידַהּ, תַּנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר: כִּי אָמְרִינַן עוֹלָה עִמּוֹ וְאֵינָהּ יוֹרֶדֶת עִמּוֹ — הָנֵי מִילֵּי מֵחַיִּים, אֲבָל לְאַחַר מִיתָה — לֹא.

The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to state their dispute in a case where it is the common custom for his family according to its social status, but it is not common for her family according to its social status. The first tanna holds: When we say that a woman who marries a man ascends with him, i.e., she must be treated as equal in status to her husband if his social status is higher than hers, and does not descend with him if he is from a lower social status, this applies only when they are alive, but after death the Sages did not enforce this rule.

וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה סָבַר: אֲפִילּוּ לְאַחַר מִיתָה. אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא אָמַר מָר עוּקְבָא: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה.

And Rabbi Yehuda maintains: Even after death she must be treated in accordance with his status, which means that if those in his family are mourned with flutes and lamenting women, he must provide the same for her funeral. Rav Ḥisda said that Mar Ukva said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

וְאָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא אָמַר מָר עוּקְבָא: מִי שֶׁנִּשְׁתַּטָּה — בֵּית דִּין יוֹרְדִין לִנְכָסָיו וְזָנִין וּמְפַרְנְסִין אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ וּבָנָיו וּבְנוֹתָיו, וְדָבָר אַחֵר. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: מַאי שְׁנָא מֵהָא דְּתַנְיָא: מִי שֶׁהָלַךְ לִמְדִינַת הַיָּם וְאִשְׁתּוֹ תּוֹבַעַת מְזוֹנוֹת — בֵּית דִּין יוֹרְדִין לִנְכָסָיו, וְזָנִין וּמְפַרְנְסִין אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ, אֲבָל לֹא בָּנָיו וּבְנוֹתָיו, וְלֹא דָּבָר אַחֵר?

Apropos this ruling, the Gemara cites another statement that Rav Ḥisda said that Mar Ukva said: With regard to one who became insane, the court enters his property and feeds and provides a livelihood for his wife, his sons, and his daughters, and it also gives something else, as will be explained. Ravina said to Rav Ashi: In what way is this case different from that which is taught in a baraita: In the case of one who went overseas and his wife claims sustenance, the court descends to his property and feeds and provides a livelihood for his wife, but not for his sons and daughters and does not give something else. If a father is not obligated to sustain his children in his absence, what is different about a situation where he is mad?

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: וְלָא שָׁאנֵי לָךְ בֵּין יוֹצֵא לְדַעַת לַיּוֹצֵא שֶׁלֹּא לְדַעַת?

Rav Ashi said to Ravina: Is there no difference for you between a man who leaves his responsibilities knowingly and one who leaves them unknowingly? A father who lost his sanity did not do so by his own choice, and therefore it can be assumed that he would want to provide for his children from his possessions, despite the fact that he is not obligated to do so. By contrast, if he went overseas he freely decided to depart, and one would think that he would leave enough for his sons and daughters. If he failed to do so, he has demonstrated that he does not want to provide for them.

מַאי ״דָּבָר אַחֵר״? רַב חִסְדָּא אָמַר: זֶה תַּכְשִׁיט. רַב יוֹסֵף אָמַר: צְדָקָה. מַאן דְּאָמַר תַּכְשִׁיט, כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן צְדָקָה. מַאן דְּאָמַר צְדָקָה, אֲבָל תַּכְשִׁיט יָהֲבִינַן לַהּ, דְּלָא נִיחָא לֵיהּ דְּתִינַּוַּול.

The Gemara asks: What is this something else mentioned in the baraita? Rav Ḥisda said: This is a wife’s ornaments, to which she is entitled in addition to her sustenance. Rav Yosef said: It is money for charity. The Gemara comments: According to the one who says that the court does not pay for a woman’s ornaments from her husband’s property if he has gone overseas, all the more so he maintains that the husband’s property is not taken for charity. Conversely, the one who says that the court does not give money for charity holds that this applies only to charity, but it does give her ornaments, as it is assumed that it is not satisfactory for him that his wife be demeaned by a lack of jewelry.

אָמַר רַב חִיָּיא בַּר אָבִין אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: מִי שֶׁהָלַךְ לִמְדִינַת הַיָּם וּמֵתָה אִשְׁתּוֹ — בֵּית דִּין יוֹרְדִין לִנְכָסָיו, וְקוֹבְרִין אוֹתָהּ לְפִי כְבוֹדוֹ. לְפִי כְבוֹדוֹ וְלֹא לְפִי כְבוֹדָהּ?

Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin said that Rav Huna said: In the case of one who went overseas and his wife died, the court enters his property and buries her in accordance with his dignity. The Gemara asks: Does the court act in accordance with his dignity and not in accordance with her dignity? What if she came from a more dignified family than her husband?

אֵימָא: אַף לְפִי כְבוֹדוֹ. הָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן: עוֹלָה עִמּוֹ וְאֵינָהּ יוֹרֶדֶת עִמּוֹ, וַאֲפִילּוּ לְאַחַר מִיתָה.

The Gemara answers: Say that Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin meant: Even in accordance with his dignity, i.e., if his family was more distinguished than hers, he must bury her in accordance with the dignity of his family. The Gemara adds: This comes to teach us that she ascends with him to his social status and does not descend with him, and this principle applies even after her death, in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion in the mishna.

אָמַר רַב מַתְנָה, הָאוֹמֵר: ״אִם מֵתָה, לֹא תִּקְבְּרוּהָ מִנְּכָסָיו״ — שׁוֹמְעִין לוֹ. מַאי שְׁנָא כִּי אָמַר — דְּנָפְלִי נִכְסֵי קַמֵּי יַתְמֵי. כִּי לָא אָמַר נָמֵי, נִכְסֵי קַמֵּי יַתְמֵי רְמוּ?

Rav Mattana said: In the case of one who says that if his wife dies, they should not bury her using funds from his property, the court listens to him. The Gemara asks: What is different about the case when he says this command that induces the court to comply with his wishes? It is due to the fact that the property has come before the orphans as an inheritance, while the obligation to bury her is not incumbent upon them but is a duty of the inheritors of her marriage contract. However, even if he did not state the above preference, the property is cast before the orphans and it belongs to them. What does it matter whether or not the husband issued a command to this effect?

אֶלָּא: הָאוֹמֵר: ״אִם מֵת הוּא, לֹא תִּקְבְּרוּהוּ מִנְּכָסָיו״ — אֵין שׁוֹמְעִין לוֹ. לָאו כׇּל הֵימֶנּוּ שֶׁיַּעֲשִׁיר אֶת בָּנָיו וְיַפִּיל עַצְמוֹ עַל הַצִּיבּוּר.

Rather, the Gemara amends Rav Mattana’s statement: With regard to one who says that if he himself dies, they should not bury him using funds from his property, one does not listen to him, but the court spends his money without resorting to charity. The reason for this is that it is not in his power to enrich his sons by saving them this expense and to cast himself as a burden on the community.

מַתְנִי׳ לְעוֹלָם הִיא בִּרְשׁוּת הָאָב עַד שֶׁתִּכָּנֵס

MISHNA: Even after she is betrothed, a daughter is always under her father’s authority until she enters

לִרְשׁוּת הַבַּעַל לְנִשּׂוּאִין. מָסַר הָאָב לִשְׁלוּחֵי הַבַּעַל — הֲרֵי הִיא בִּרְשׁוּת הַבַּעַל. הָלַךְ הָאָב עִם שְׁלוּחֵי הַבַּעַל, אוֹ שֶׁהָלְכוּ שְׁלוּחֵי הָאָב עִם שְׁלוּחֵי הַבַּעַל — הֲרֵי הִיא בִּרְשׁוּת הָאָב. מָסְרוּ שְׁלוּחֵי הָאָב לִשְׁלוּחֵי הַבַּעַל — הֲרֵי הִיא בִּרְשׁוּת הַבַּעַל.

her husband’s authority in marriage via the wedding canopy. If the father delivered his daughter to the husband’s messengers to bring her to her husband and the wedding canopy, once she has been handed over she is under the husband’s authority. However, if the father went with the husband’s messengers, or if the father’s messengers went with the husband’s messengers, she is still under the father’s authority, as he has not fully delivered her to the husband’s messengers. If her father sent her with his own messengers and the father’s messengers delivered the woman to the husband’s messengers, from that moment onwards she is under her husband’s authority.

גְּמָ׳ מַאי לְעוֹלָם? לְאַפּוֹקֵי מִמִּשְׁנָה רִאשׁוֹנָה. דִּתְנַן: הִגִּיעַ זְמַן וְלֹא נִישְּׂאוּ — אוֹכְלוֹת מִשֶּׁלּוֹ וְאוֹכְלוֹת בִּתְרוּמָה. קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן, לְעוֹלָם.

GEMARA: The mishna taught that a daughter always remains under her father’s authority until she has fully entered her husband’s jurisdiction. The Gemara asks: What is the significance of the term: Always, in the mishna? The Gemara explains: This comes to exclude the opinion stated in the initial version of the mishna. As we learned in a mishna (57a): If the time that the groom designated for the wedding arrived, and the wedding was postponed, and they were not married, the brides are entitled to eat from his food and, if he is a priest, eat teruma, like married women. The mishna here teaches us that the halakha is not in accordance with this earlier ruling cited in that mishna. Rather, they are always under their father’s authority until they actually enter the wedding canopy.

מָסַר הָאָב לִשְׁלוּחֵי הַבַּעַל, הֲרֵי הִיא בִּרְשׁוּת הַבַּעַל וְכוּ׳. אָמַר רַב: מְסִירָתָהּ לַכֹּל, חוּץ מִתְּרוּמָה. וְרַב אַסִּי אָמַר: אַף לִתְרוּמָה.

§ The mishna taught that if the father delivered his daughter to the husband’s messengers, she is under the husband’s authority, unless the father or his messengers accompanied them. Rav said: When her father delivers her she leaves his jurisdiction in all respects, apart from the issue of partaking of teruma. Even if her husband is a priest, if she is not from a family of priests, she may not partake of teruma until she is fully married. And Rav Asi said that once she has been delivered to the husband’s messengers she is under her husband’s authority even with regard to teruma.

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רַב הוּנָא לְרַב אַסִּי, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ חִיָּיא בַּר רַב לְרַב אַסִּי: לְעוֹלָם הִיא בִּרְשׁוּת הָאָב עַד שֶׁתִּכָּנֵס לַחוּפָּה! אֲמַר לְהוּ רַב: לָאו אָמֵינָא לְכוּ לָא תֵּיזְלוּ בָּתַר אִיפְּכָא?! יָכֵול לְשַׁנּוֹיֵי לְכוּ: מְסִירָתָהּ, זוֹ הִיא כְּנִיסָתָהּ לְחוּפָּה.

Rav Huna raised an objection to the opinion of Rav Asi, and some say that it was Ḥiyya, son of Rav, who raised an objection to the opinion of Rav Asi: The mishna states that she is always under her father’s authority until she enters the wedding canopy. According to Rav Asi, however, as soon as her father delivers her to the husband’s messengers she is no longer under her father’s authority. Rav said to them: Didn’t I tell you not to follow, i.e., attempt to refute rulings, on the basis of sources that can be explained in opposing manners? Rav Asi can answer you that the mishna means that her delivery to the husband’s messengers is equivalent to her entrance to the wedding canopy, and the same halakhot apply in both cases.

וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: לִירוּשָּׁתָהּ.

And Shmuel said that once a woman’s father has delivered her to the messengers of her husband, she is under her husband’s authority only with regard to her inheritance, i.e., her husband inherits her property upon her death as though she had already entered the wedding canopy.

רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: לִכְתוּבָּתָהּ. כְּתוּבָּתָהּ מַאי הִיא? דְּאִי מֵתָה יָרֵית לַהּ, הַיְינוּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל! אָמַר רָבִינָא: לוֹמַר כְּתוּבָּתָהּ מֵאַחֵר מָנֶה.

Reish Lakish said: Her delivery is also effective with regard to her marriage contract. The Gemara asks: What is Reish Lakish referring to when he says that she is under her husband’s authority with regard to her marriage contract? If you say it means that if she dies he inherits all her property, including the dowry specified in her marriage contract, that is the same as the statement of Shmuel, and Reish Lakish has added nothing to his ruling. Ravina said: Reish Lakish is coming to say that if the man dies before marrying her, and she then marries someone else, her marriage contract from the other man is one hundred dinars, as she is considered a widow from marriage rather than a widow from betrothal.

רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן וְרַבִּי חֲנִינָא דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ: מְסִירָתָהּ לַכֹּל, אַף לִתְרוּמָה.

Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Ḥanina both say that a woman’s delivery to the messengers of her husband causes her to be under his authority for all matters, even including partaking of teruma.

מֵיתִיבִי: הָלַךְ הָאָב עִם שְׁלוּחֵי הַבַּעַל, אוֹ שֶׁהָלְכוּ שְׁלוּחֵי הָאָב עִם שְׁלוּחֵי הַבַּעַל, אוֹ שֶׁהָיְתָה לָהּ חָצֵר בַּדֶּרֶךְ וְנִכְנְסָה עִמּוֹ לָלִין, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁכְּתוּבָּתָהּ בְּבֵית בַּעְלָהּ, מֵתָה — אָבִיהָ יוֹרְשָׁהּ.

The Gemara raises an objection from the Tosefta (Ketubot 4:4): If the father went with the husband’s messengers, or if the father’s messengers went with the husband’s messengers, or if she owned a courtyard along the way and she entered with her groom to lodge, not for the purpose of marriage but merely to stay overnight until they arrive at his residence, then even if the dowry specified in her marriage contract is already in her husband’s house, if she dies, her father inherits from her, as she is not considered to have entered her husband’s domain.

מָסַר הָאָב לִשְׁלוּחֵי הַבַּעַל, אוֹ שֶׁמָּסְרוּ שְׁלוּחֵי הָאָב לִשְׁלוּחֵי הַבַּעַל, אוֹ שֶׁהָיְתָה לוֹ חָצֵר בַּדֶּרֶךְ וְנִכְנְסָה עִמּוֹ לְשׁוּם נִישּׂוּאִין, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁכְּתוּבָּתָהּ בְּבֵית אָבִיהָ, מֵתָה — בַּעְלָהּ יוֹרְשָׁהּ.

Conversely, if the father delivered her to the husband’s messengers, or if the father’s messengers delivered her to the husband’s messengers, or if the groom owned a courtyard along the way and she entered with him for the purpose of marriage, then even if the dowry specified in her marriage contract is still in her father’s house and has not yet been given to her husband, if she dies, her husband inherits from her.

בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים — לִירוּשָּׁתָהּ, אֲבָל לִתְרוּמָה, אֵין אִשָּׁה אוֹכֶלֶת בִּתְרוּמָה עַד שֶׁתִּכָּנֵס לַחוּפָּה. תְּיוּבְתָּא דְכוּלְּהוּ! תְּיוּבְתָּא.

The Tosefta concludes: In what case is this statement said? It is stated with regard to the husband’s right to inherit from her. However, with regard to teruma, the halakha is that a woman who marries a priest may not partake of teruma until she actually enters the wedding canopy. This baraita is apparently a refutation of all of them, i.e., all of the opinions cited previously that hold that once the woman is delivered to the husband’s messengers, if the husband is a priest, the woman may partake of teruma. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, this is a conclusive refutation.

הָא גוּפָא קַשְׁיָא: אָמְרַתְּ נִכְנְסָה עִמּוֹ לָלִין. טַעְמָא דְּלָלִין, הָא סְתָמָא — לְשֵׁם נִישּׂוּאִין. אֵימָא סֵיפָא: נִכְנְסָה עִמּוֹ לְשֵׁם נִישּׂוּאִין, הָא סְתָמָא, לָלִין.

The Gemara asks: This matter itself is difficult. You said in the Tosefta that if she entered with him to her courtyard to lodge for one night, and she dies, her father inherits her property. The reason is because it specified that they entered only to lodge there, from which it may be inferred that if they entered without specification it is as though she entered for the sake of marriage. Say the latter clause of the Tosefta: If she entered with him to his courtyard for the purpose of marriage, and she dies, her husband inherits her property. This indicates that if she entered without specification, i.e., without saying that they were doing so for marriage, it is considered as though they entered merely to lodge. The inferences from these two clauses of the Tosefta apparently contradict one another.

אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: סְתָמֵי סְתָמֵי קָתָנֵי. סְתַם חָצֵר דִּידַהּ — לָלִין. סְתַם חָצֵר דִּידֵיהּ — לְנִשּׂוּאִין.

Rav Ashi said: This is an incorrect interpretation, as the tanna taught the halakha of entering one type of courtyard without specification and the halakha of entering a different type of courtyard without specification, as follows: If they entered her courtyard without specification it is assumed that they entered merely to lodge, whereas if they entered his courtyard without specification, it is assumed that they did so for the sake of marriage, unless they expressly stated that they had another purpose in mind.

תַּנָּא: מָסַר הָאָב לִשְׁלוּחֵי הַבַּעַל וְזִינְּתָה — הֲרֵי זוֹ בְּחֶנֶק. מְנָא הָנֵי מִילֵּי? אָמַר רַבִּי אַמֵּי בַּר חָמָא, אָמַר קְרָא: ״לִזְנוֹת בֵּית אָבִיהָ״, פְּרָט לְשֶׁמָּסַר הָאָב לִשְׁלוּחֵי הַבַּעַל.

§ A Sage taught in a baraita: If the father delivered his daughter to the husband’s messengers and she subsequently committed adultery, she is sentenced to strangulation, in accordance with the halakha of a married woman who committed adultery, rather than stoning, which is the punishment for a betrothed woman who commits adultery. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rabbi Ami bar Ḥama said that the verse states, in the context of the command to stone a young woman who commits adultery during betrothal: “To play the whore in her father’s house” (Deuteronomy 22:21), which excludes a case when the father has delivered her to the husband’s messengers, when she is no longer in her father’s house.

וְאֵימָא: פְּרָט שֶׁנִּכְנְסָה לַחוּפָּה וְלֹא נִבְעֲלָה!

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But one can say that the verse is excluding a case where she has entered the wedding canopy but she has not yet had intercourse, whereas if her father has merely delivered her to the husband’s messengers she is still considered to have sinned in his house and is punishable by stoning like any other betrothed woman.

אָמַר רָבָא: אֲמַר לִי אַמֵּי, חוּפָּה בְּהֶדְיָא כְּתִיבָא: ״כִּי יִהְיֶה נַעֲרָה בְתוּלָה מְאוֹרָשָׂה לְאִישׁ״. ״נַעֲרָה״ — וְלֹא בּוֹגֶרֶת, ״בְּתוּלָה״ — וְלֹא בְּעוּלָה, ״מְאוֹרָשָׂה״ — וְלֹא נְשׂוּאָה.

In answer to this question, Rava said: The verse cannot be excluding that case, as Ami said to me that the case where she already entered the wedding canopy is not derived by inference from that verse; it is explicitly written in the following verse: “If there is a young woman who is a virgin betrothed to a man” (Deuteronomy 22:23). The terminology of the verse indicates that it applies to a “young woman” and not to a grown woman; to a “virgin” and not to a non-virgin; and to a “betrothed” woman and not to a married woman.

מַאי ״נְשׂוּאָה״? אִילֵימָא נְשׂוּאָה מַמָּשׁ, הַיְינוּ ״בְּתוּלָה״ וְלֹא בְּעוּלָה! אֶלָּא לָאו, שֶׁנִּכְנְסָה לְחוּפָּה וְלֹא נִבְעֲלָה.

The Gemara analyzes this statement: What is the meaning of the term: A married woman, in this context? If we say that she is actually married and has already engaged in intercourse with her husband, this ruling is the same as the previous one, that she must be a virgin and not a non-virgin. Rather, is it not the case that it is referring to a woman who has entered the wedding canopy but has not had intercourse, and yet if she committed adultery at this stage she is sentenced to strangulation, like one who had engaged in relations with her husband? Consequently, the other verse, cited by Rabbi Ami bar Ḥama, cannot be referring to this case.