נזיר סב

נזיר סב

יָכוֹל לֹא יְהוּ נְזִירִין — תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״אִישׁ״! הָאִיתְּמַר אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הֲלָכָה הִיא בְּנָזִיר.

One might have thought that gentiles cannot be nazirites at all. The verse therefore states: “Man,” to teach that they can become nazirites. The Gemara answers: Wasn’t it stated that Rabbi Yoḥanan said that the halakha that a son may use his father’s nazirite offerings is a halakha transmitted to Moses at Sinai with regard to a nazirite? Since this halakha does not appear in the Torah, the verse cannot be coming to exclude it.

אִי הָכִי ״אִישׁ כִּי יַפְלִא נֶדֶר בְּעֶרְכְּךָ״, בַּעֲרָכִין, לְמָה לִי? מִכְּדֵי הָאִיתַּקַּשׁ עֲרָכִין לִנְדָרִים, דְּאָמַר קְרָא ״אִישׁ כִּי יַפְלִא נֶדֶר בְּעֶרְכְּךָ״, וְהָתַנְיָא גַּבֵּי נְדָרִים: ״אִישׁ״. מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״אִישׁ אִישׁ״ — לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַגּוֹיִם שֶׁהֵן נוֹדְרִים נְדָרִים וּנְדָבוֹת כְּיִשְׂרָאֵל.

§ The Gemara asks: If so, why do I need the verse: “When a man shall clearly utter a vow of persons to the Lord, according to your valuation” (Leviticus 27:2), stated with regard to valuations, from which it is derived that gentiles are included in the halakhot of valuations? After all, aren’t valuations juxtaposed to vows, as the verse states: “When a man shall clearly utter a vow of persons to the Lord, according to your valuation.” And isn’t it taught in a baraita with regard to a verse dealing with vows: “Any man [ish] from the house of Israel, or of the strangers in Israel, who sacrifices his offering, whether it be any of their vows, or any of their gift offerings, which are sacrificed to the Lord as a burnt-offering” (Leviticus 22:18), what is the meaning when the verse states the extra emphasis: “Any man [ish ish]”? The baraita explains: This serves to include the gentiles, that they can take a vow for vow offerings and gift offerings like a Jew. It can be derived from this juxtaposition that gentiles are included in the halakhot of valuations.

״אִישׁ כִּי יַפְלִא״ בַּעֲרָכִין לְמָה לִי? אֶלָּא הַאי ״אִישׁ״, מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְאֵיתוֹיֵי מוּפְלָא סָמוּךְ לְאִישׁ.

The Gemara now restates its question: In that case, why do I need the phrase “when a man shall clearly utter a vow” stated with regard to valuations? Rather, this term, “man,” does not include gentiles, but is necessary to include a minor one year before he or she reaches majority. If a minor takes a vow one year before coming of age, and shows a clear understanding of his statement, the vow takes effect. This individual is included in the halakhot of valuations as well.

הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר מוּפְלָא סָמוּךְ לְאִישׁ דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא. אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר דְּרַבָּנַן, ״אִישׁ כִּי יַפְלִיא״ לְמָה לִי? לְאֵיתוֹיֵי מוּפְלָא סָמוּךְ לְאִישׁ דְּגוֹי.

The Gemara comments: This works out well according to the one who says that a minor one year before he or she reaches majority must fulfill his or her vows by Torah law, because the verse serves as the source for this halakha. However, according to the one who says that this halakha applies by rabbinic law, why do I need the verse “when a man shall clearly utter a vow”? The Gemara answers: The verse serves to include a minor one year before he or she reaches majority who is a gentile, that this halakha applies to gentiles by Torah law.

הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל נֶעֱרָכִין, וְאֵין הַגּוֹיִם נֶעֱרָכִין. יָכוֹל לֹא יְהוּ מַעֲרִיכִין, תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״אִישׁ״ — שַׁפִּיר.

The Gemara comments: This works out well according to the one who says that it is inferred from the phrase: “The children of Israel” (Leviticus 27:2), that Jews can be valuated but gentiles cannot be valuated; and one might have thought that gentiles cannot take a valuation vow. Therefore, the verse states: “Man.” According to this opinion it is fine, as the phrase “when a man shall clearly utter a vow” can teach that if a gentile close to adulthood grasps the meaning of vows, he can take a valuation vow.

אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר: בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל מַעֲרִיכִים, וְאֵין הַגּוֹיִם מַעֲרִיכִים. יָכוֹל לֹא יְהוּ נֶעֱרָכִין, תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״אִישׁ״ — אֲפִילּוּ תִּינוֹק בֶּן חֹדֶשׁ בַּר עָירוּכִי הוּא, ״כִּי יַפְלִיא״ לְמָה לִי?

However, according to the one who says that the children of Israel can take a valuation vow but gentiles cannot take a valuation vow, one might have thought that gentiles cannot be valuated; therefore, the verse states the additional term: “Man,” to teach that anyone, even a month-old baby, can be valuated according to the assigned value stated in the Torah. According to this opinion, it is of no importance how old the subject of the vow is, and therefore the verse clearly cannot be including a gentile on the verge of adulthood. Consequently, the question remains: Why do I need the phrase “when a man shall clearly utter a vow”?

אָמַר רַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה: לְאֵיתוֹיֵי גּוֹי גָּדוֹל, דְּאַף עַל גַּב דְּגָדוֹל הוּא — אֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ לְהַפְלוֹת.

Rav Adda bar Ahava said: The verse is referring to all vows, and serves to include, i.e., to teach, the halakha of a type of adult gentile, who although he is an adult, he does not know how to clearly utter a vow. The verse teaches that his vows are invalid, as derived from the phrase “when a man shall clearly vow.” Vows of a gentile are valid only if he can express them clearly.

אֶלָּא: ״כִּי יַפְלִיא״ דִּכְתַב רַחֲמָנָא גַּבֵּי נְזִירוּת, לְמָה לִי? מִכְּדֵי הָאִיתַּקַּשׁ נְזִירוּת לִנְדָרִים, ״כִּי יַפְלִיא״ לְמָה לִי?

Having clarified the verse concerning valuations, the Gemara asks: However, concerning the verse: “When a man or woman shall clearly utter a vow” (Numbers 6:2), which the Merciful One writes with regard to naziriteship, why do I need it? After all, isn’t the halakha of naziriteship juxtaposed to vows; why do I need the verse “when a man or woman shall clearly utter”?

לְאֵיתוֹיֵי יָדַיִם שֶׁאֵינָן מוֹכִיחוֹת. דְּאִיתְּמַר: יָדַיִם שֶׁאֵינָן מוֹכִיחוֹת, אַבָּיֵי אָמַר: הָוְיָין יָדַיִם. רָבָא אָמַר: לָא הָוְיָין יָדַיִם. לְאַבָּיֵי נִיחָא. אֶלָּא לְרָבָא, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?

The Gemara answers: This verse serves to include the case of one who vowed by means of ambiguous intimations, i.e., he expressed only part of the formula of the vow, so that his meaning is unclear. As it was stated that amora’im had a dispute with regard to this issue: With regard to ambiguous intimations, Abaye said that they are considered intimations to vows, and the vows take effect, and Rava said that they are not considered intimations to vows, and the vows do not take effect. According to the opinion of Abaye, this answer works out well, as the phrase “when a man shall clearly utter,” serves to include all pronouncements indicative of vows, even ambiguous intimations. However, according to the opinion of Rava, what is there to say?

אֶלָּא: ״כִּי יַפְלִיא״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְרַבִּי טַרְפוֹן, דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן: אֵין אֶחָד מֵהֶן נָזִיר, לְפִי שֶׁלֹּא נִיתְּנָה נְזִירוּת אֶלָּא לְהַפְלָאָה. הָנִיחָא לְרַבִּי טַרְפוֹן, אֶלָּא לְרַבָּנַן מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?

Rather, the Gemara explains that the phrase “when a man or woman shall clearly utter” is necessary for that which was stated by Rabbi Tarfon, as it is taught in the Tosefta (3:19) that Rabbi Yehuda said in the name of Rabbi Tarfon: If several people took a vow of naziriteship as part of a wager with regard to an uncertain occurrence, not one of them is a nazirite, as naziriteship is imposed upon someone only if his vow is explicitly enunciated. That is, one is a nazirite only if he vows in a definitive manner, not if there was any uncertainty involved. The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon. However, according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with his ruling, what is there to say?

אֶלָּא: מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְתַנְיָא: הֶיתֵּר נְדָרִים — פּוֹרְחִין בָּאֲוִיר, וְאֵין לָהֶן עַל מַה שֶּׁיִּסְמוֹכוּ.

Rather, the phrase “when a man or woman shall clearly utter” is necessary for that which is taught in a baraita: The halakhot of dissolution of vows, namely that one may request from a halakhic authority to dissolve them, fly in the air and have nothing to lean upon, i.e., these halakhot are not mentioned explicitly in the Torah.

רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: יֵשׁ לָהֶם עַל מַה שֶּׁיִּסְמוֹכוּ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״אִישׁ כִּי יַפְלִא״, ״כִּי יַפְלִא״, שְׁתֵּי פְעָמִים. אֶחָד הַפְלָאָה לְאִיסּוּר, וְאֶחָד הַפְלָאָה לְהֶיתֵּר.

Rabbi Eliezer says: The halakhot of dissolution of vows have a basis upon which to lean, as it is stated: “When a man shall clearly utter a vow” (Leviticus 27:2) and: “When a man or woman shall clearly utter a vow” (Numbers 6:2), twice. One explicit utterance is for prohibition, i.e., when one takes a vow, he is bound to keep it, and one explicit utterance is for dissolution, i.e., in the event that he provides a halakhic authority with a reason why the vow should no longer apply, the vow can be dissolved and he will no longer be bound by it. This is an allusion in the Torah for the dissolution of vows.

מַתְנִי׳ חוֹמֶר בָּעֲבָדִים מִבַּנָּשִׁים, שֶׁהוּא מֵפֵר נִדְרֵי אִשְׁתּוֹ, וְאֵינוֹ מֵפֵר נִדְרֵי עַבְדּוֹ. הֵפֵר לְאִשְׁתּוֹ — הֵפֵר עוֹלָמִית. הֵפֵר לְעַבְדּוֹ — יָצָא לְחֵירוּת וּמַשְׁלִים נְזִירוּתוֹ.

MISHNA: The previous mishna taught that the naziriteship of women includes a stringency that does not apply to slaves. This mishna adds: There is a greater stringency in the case of slaves than in the case of women, as a man can nullify the vows of his wife but he cannot nullify the vows of his slave, despite the fact that he can prevent him from fulfilling them in practice. Similarly, if he nullified the naziriteship of his wife it is permanently nullified, and it remains nullified even if she is later divorced or widowed. Conversely, if he nullified the naziriteship of his slave by forcing him to violate the terms of his vow of naziriteship, when the slave is emancipated he completes his naziriteship.

גְּמָ׳ תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: לְמָה רַבּוֹ כּוֹפוֹ? לִנְזִירוּת, אֲבָל לֹא לִנְדָרִים וְלַעֲרָכִין.

GEMARA: The Sages taught (Tosefta 6:4): With regard to what matter can his master force a slave? With regard to naziriteship. However, he cannot force his slave in the case of other vows and valuations. This baraita is apparently saying that a master cannot prevent his slave from fulfilling the terms of a vow.

מַאי שְׁנָא גַּבֵּי נָזִיר — דְּאָמַר רַחֲמָנָא ״לֶאְסֹר אִסָּר עַל נַפְשׁוֹ״, בְּמִי שֶׁנַּפְשׁוֹ קְנוּיָה לוֹ — יָצָא עֶבֶד שֶׁאֵין נַפְשׁוֹ קְנוּיָה לוֹ. אִי הָכִי, אֲפִילּוּ גַּבֵּי נְדָרִים נָמֵי!

The Gemara asks: What is different with regard to a nazirite that a master can force his slave to transgress his naziriteship, as the Merciful One states: “To bind his soul with a bond” (Numbers 30:3), from which it is inferred that the Torah is referring only to one whose soul is in his possession, i.e., who is not owned by another; this excludes a slave, whose soul is not in his possession because he is under his master’s control. If so, then even with regard to vows that same halakha should apply as well, as that verse is written in the context of vows in general, not specifically vows of naziriteship. Why is a master unable to compel his slave to break a vow?

אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת, הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן: כְּגוֹן שֶׁהָיָה אֶשְׁכּוֹל שֶׁל עֲנָבִים מוּנָּח לְפָנָיו. גַּבֵּי נְדָרִים, דְּכִי מִיתְּסַר בְּהַאי לָא מִיתְּסַר בְּאַחֲרִינֵי — לָא מָצֵי כָּפֵי לֵיהּ.

Rav Sheshet said: With what are we dealing here? With a case where a cluster of grapes was placed before the slave and he vowed not to derive benefit from it. With regard to vows, when he is prohibited from eating this cluster he is not rendered prohibited from eating others; therefore, the master cannot force him to eat it, as he has no reason to insist that the slave consume this particular cluster of grapes.

גַּבֵּי נְזִירוּת, דְּכִי מִיתְּסַר בְּהַאי אִיתְּסַר בְּכוּלְּהוּ — מָצֵי כָּפֵי לֵיהּ. וְגַבֵּי נְדָרִים, מִי לָא עָסְקִינַן דְּלֵיכָּא אֶלָּא הַאי אֶשְׁכּוֹל, דְּאִי לָא אָכֵיל לֵיהּ, חָלֵישׁ?

By contrast, with regard to naziriteship, when he is prohibited from eating this cluster he is rendered prohibited from consuming all others; therefore, the master can force him to eat. This is because the lack of food weakens the slave, who is the property of his master. The Gemara asks: And with regard to vows, are we not dealing even with a situation where he has only this cluster before him and he vows not to eat it, in which case if he does not eat it he is weakened? Why can’t the master compel him to eat the grapes in this case?

אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: כְּגוֹן שֶׁהָיָה חַרְצָן מוּנָּח לְפָנָיו. גַּבֵּי נְדָרִים, בְּהַאי הוּא דְּמִיתְּסַר — לָא מָצֵי כָּפֵי לֵיהּ. גַּבֵּי נָזִיר, דְּאִיתְּסַר נָמֵי בְּאַחֲרֵינִי — מָצֵי כָּפֵי לֵיהּ.

Rather, Rava said that the difference between vows of naziriteship and other vows concerns a case where there was a grape seed, which provides only negligible nourishment, that was placed before the slave, and he vowed not to eat it. With regard to vows, concerning which he is prohibited to eat only this one seed, the master cannot force him to eat it, as refraining from eating a grape seed would not weaken him. With regard to a nazirite, who is prohibited from consuming other grape products as well, the master can force him.

וְגַבֵּי נְדָרִים, מִי לָא עָסְקִינַן דְּלֵיכָּא אֶלָּא הַאי חַרְצָן, דְּאִי לָא אָכֵיל לֵיהּ, חָלֵישׁ?

The Gemara again asks: And with regard to vows, are we not dealing even with a situation where he has only this grape seed in front of him, in which case if he does not eat it he would be weakened? Why, then, can the master compel him to violate only his naziriteship vow but not a regular vow?

אֶלָּא אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: לְמָה רַבּוֹ צָרִיךְ לִכְפּוֹתוֹ — לִנְזִירוּת. וְאֵין צָרִיךְ לִכְפּוֹתוֹ לִנְדָרִים, וְאֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ לִכְפּוֹתוֹ לִשְׁבוּעָה.

Rather, Abaye said that the baraita does not in fact list cases in which a master can compel his slave to violate his vow, but rather means the following: With regard to what situation is a master who wants to negate his slave’s vow required to force his slave to violate his vow by stating explicitly that he does not want him to fulfill it? It is the case of a vow of naziriteship. But he is not required to force him in the case of other vows and he is not required to force him in the case of an oath, as these do not take effect at all.

מַאי טַעְמָא? דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״לְהָרַע אוֹ לְהֵיטִיב״, מָה הֲטָבָה רְשׁוּת — אַף הֲרָעָה רְשׁוּת. יָצָא לְהָרַע לַאֲחֵרִים — שֶׁאֵין הָרְשׁוּת בְּיָדוֹ.

What is the reason for this? It is as the verse states with regard to oaths: “Or if anyone swear clearly with his lips to do evil, or to do good” (Leviticus 5:4). Just as the “good” mentioned in this verse is referring to a voluntary action, so too the “evil” is voluntary, e.g., if he takes an oath not to derive benefit from an item. This excludes a slave, whose oath or vow would cause evil to others, as it is not in his power to affect his master adversely. Therefore, his statement is invalid. Here too, as the owner will suffer if his slave’s diet is restricted, a slave may not accept a vow or an oath upon himself.

מַתְנִי׳ עָבַר מִכְּנֶגֶד פָּנָיו, רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: לֹא יִשְׁתֶּה, וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: יִשְׁתֶּה.

MISHNA: In a case where a slave took a vow of naziriteship but was prevented by his master from fulfilling the terms of his vow, the Sages engaged in a dispute what the halakha would be if he permanently left his master’s presence, i.e., he ran away without being emancipated. Rabbi Meir says: He may not drink wine. Since the slave is free in practice, his vow goes into effect. And Rabbi Yosei says: He may drink wine, as he is not emancipated.

גְּמָ׳ לֵימָא בְּדִשְׁמוּאֵל קָמִיפַּלְגִי, דְּאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הַמַּפְקִיר עַבְדּוֹ יָצָא לְחֵירוּת, וְאֵין צָרִיךְ גֵּט שִׁיחְרוּר.

GEMARA: The Gemara suggests: Shall we say that Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei disagree with regard to the following statement of Shmuel? As Shmuel said: With regard to one who renounces ownership of his slave, the slave is emancipated, and he does not require a bill of manumission. This halakha indicates that if a slave is free in practice, he no longer requires a bill of manumission but is automatically considered a freeman.

רַבִּי מֵאִיר אִית לֵיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל. רַבִּי יוֹסֵי לֵית לֵיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל.

The Gemara asks: If so, should one say that Rabbi Meir is of the opinion that the ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, and therefore the slave is obligated in naziriteship as soon as he runs away, like any other freed slave, and Rabbi Yosei is of the opinion that the ruling is not in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel?

לָא, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא אִית לְהוּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל. אֶלָּא: מַאן דְּאָמַר יִשְׁתֶּה, סָבַר: סוֹף סוֹף מִיהְדָּר הָדַר וְאָתֵי גַּבֵּיהּ, לִישְׁתֵּי חַמְרָא כִּי הֵיכִי דְּלָא לִיכְחוֹשׁ. וּלְמַאן דְּאָמַר לֹא יִשְׁתֶּה, סָבַר: לֶיהֱוֵי לֵיהּ צַעְרָא כִּי הֵיכִי דְּלִיהְדַּר גַּבֵּיהּ.

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, it is possible that everyone is of the opinion that the ruling is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. Rather, the mishna is referring to a case where the master refused to declare the runaway ownerless, and was intent on recovering him. Consequently, the slave is not in fact a freeman at all, and the tanna’im disagree with regard to the following: Rabbi Yosei, the one who says that he may drink wine, maintains that the slave will ultimately return and come back to his master, and therefore it is preferable for him to drink wine so that he should not be weakened by the time he returns. And according to Rabbi Meir, the one who says that he may not drink wine, he maintains that it is better that the slave should suffer by being deprived of wine, so that he will return to his master, as the desire to drink wine will spur him to return.